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This thesis attempts to describe and analyse the radical
tradition embodied in religious and other movements in Northern
Nigeria from the Jihad in Hausaland to the period of party
politics around independence. Islamic ideology, it is argued
is the historical link between the various radical movements
of Northern Nigeria, In particular, I argue that Islam was
the main quarry from which were mined the ideas of the N.E.P.U.,
the last and main representative of this tradition with which
I deal.
Chapter 1 briefly describes the nature of economic and
social inequality in Hausa society, and the means whereby
social order is maintained. Such inequality, and the abuse of
both state power and of Islam itself (described in Chapters 3
and 4) have provided the target for a series of radical move¬
ments deriving their concepts and ideology from the long¬
standing radical interpretation of the Cur*an and the Hadith,
described in Chapter 2.
The main such radical movements are the Jihads of the
early nineteenth century (Chapter 2) and the Northern Element
Progressive Union, a secular nationalist party inspired by
radical Islamic thought, on the one hand and, on the other,the
extensive abuse and oppression of the Native Authority system
of colonial Northern Nigeria described in Chapter 3. N.E.P.U.
is discussed at length in Chapter 5 which attempts to analyse
its debt to Islamic ideas, its social composition and history,
and the reasons for its ultimate failure to achieve either
xiii
power or major domestic reforms. The final chapter reviews
the evidence for arguing that Northern Nigeria shares in the
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GLOSSARY OF TERMS
For the sake of simplicity I transliterate and translate
Arabic and Hausa words according to general academic or written
usage. For example, I am aware that the word ISLAM is used in
three different meanings and misunderstanding can arise from
the failure to distinguish them:
1) Islam means the religion taught by the Prophet
Muhammad and embodied in the Muslim revelation known as
the Qur'an (recitation).
2) Islam is also the subsequent development of the above
religion through tradition and through the work of the
leading Muslim jurists and theologians, This includes the
Shari'ah (Muslim Canon Law) and the corpus of Islamic
theology,
3) Furthermore, Islam is the counterpart of Christendom.
In this sense it refers to what Muslims actually did, i.e.
Islamic civilization as known in history.
In this thesis I use the word ISLAM to mean submission to the
will of ALLAH which combines all the three meanings above.
Hausa readers will notice that I accepted the literary
colonization in which Hausa words are spelt as English writers
would spell them rather than the Hausa themselves would spell
them. For instance, Zariya (a female name from which is derived
that of the city of Zaria) is spelt as Zaria. This is deliberately
done to avoid confusion and subsequent controversy which I can
ill-afford at the moment. I prefer to use MUSLIM to the equally
common MOSLEM and MUHAMMAD to MOHAMMED (or worse still, MOHAMMET)
-rwLM JL i
mainly because there is no letter ' o' in the Arabic alphabet.
I have omitted most of the diacritical marks such as accents and
apostrophes which are used in Arabic transliteration. In general,
I tried to keep very close to the method used in the Shorter
Encyclopaedia of Islam (edits.) GIBB, H.A.R., and KRAMERS, J.H.,









-(slave) from which common names like ABBULLAHI,
etc., are derived.
-(Female: HAJIYA). A title of respect for a
Muslim who has performed pilgrimage at MAKKA,
-A Muslim court judge,.
-(sing: ATTAJIRl) rich merchants.
-Beputy of the Holy Prophet Muhammad.
The title was originally reserved for the four
companions of the Prophet who also succeeded
him in leading the original Muslim community.
It was later adopted by Muslim rulers with the
implication that they have also inherited the
holiness of the four successor Caliphs.
-(BUJJAL) false prophet or, simply, anti-Christ.
-Literally, the house of war (that of struggle
for Islamization), i.e. the areas of the world
still unsubdued by Islam.
-Literally, the house of Islam, i.e. the actual
realm of the Muslim faith in which Islam is in














-A non-Muslim living under Muslim protection
governed by the mutual obligation of peaceful
coexistence.
-King: the chief of Nupeland. This is the
official title of the ruler of Bida Emirate.
-Enlightenment on religious matters.
-Pharoah
-A rupture of public peace.
-(sing: KADO) non-Pulani as distinct from the
Pulani.
-Traditions concerning Prophet Muhammad's
actions and utterances.
-(HAJ) The pilgrimage to MAKKA in the lunar
month of ZUL-HADJ. This enjoined pilgrimage
upon those who can afford it is one of the five
pillars of Islam.
—(HIDJRA; HEGIRA.) exile (the breaking of relations
by emigration). This tradition started with the
flight of Prophet Muhammad from MAKKA to KADI1TA
in A.D. 622, from which year the Muslim calendar
dates. 'The term is also used to refer to the
flight of Shehu Usman Dan Podio from Degel to
GUdu on 21/2/1804.
-Son of
—The consensus of Muslim Scholars
-The right and the responsibility of every Muslim












-(LIMA!!) a prayer leader. The temporal and
spiritual leader in an Islamic community hence
a title for the Caliph.
-Submission to the Will of Allah or, the act of
surrendering oneself to Allah. In common
everyday Arabic language ISLAM means to deliver
in sound condition.
-(Of Islam or followers of Islam). In Northern
Nigeria, the term is used to refer to a parti¬
cular type of school which combined religious
and secular teachings. The idea was hatched
by M. Sa'adu Zungur but the schools were actually
founded by Alhaji Aminu Kano.
-A group of Shi'ite Muslims who follow Isma*il Itn
Ja'afar al Sadiq, a descendant of the Holy
Prophet Muhammad.
-People: often refers to Muslim Community.
-Exertion. Any struggle against injustice;
war in self-defense; or campaigns in defence
of Islam.
—The Muslim Holy Shrine situated in the grand
mosque in MAKKA. J)^Yi-^() jWjM-
-A Muslim scot the followers of Shayk Abdul













-King; the chief among Fulani. This is the
official title of the ruler of the Adamawa
Emirate.
-The guided one (the Muslim's equivalent of
the Messiah). The name is taken by Muslim
leaders who claim divine enlightenment.
-(pi: MALAMAI; Female: MALAMA) the possess or
of knowledge. It is commonly used as a
courtesy title for Hausa Muslims.
-Shayk among the Fulani. A learned man. This
is the official title of the first Fulani
ruler of Adamawa Emirate.
-The submitter, i.e. one who submits oneself
to the WILL of God. This is manifested by
the simple declaration that, "I witness that
there is no God but Allah and Muhammad is His
Messanger".
-In Northern Nigeria this term is used to denote
followers of any religion other than Islam,
Christianity and Judaism.
-The traditional practice of confining wives to
remain in houses, most of the time, unseen by
men other than their husbands.
-The ninth lunar month in the Muslim calendar
in which the Qur'an was revealed to the Holy
Prophet Muhammad. This month is observed by














-(SALLAH) prayers. Muslim festival of either
ID AL FITR or ID AL KABIR.
-Hereditary traditional status in Hausaland,
which grants a title or office, of a king or
lesser ranko The holders of such titles or
offices are the SARAXUNA, the ruling class.
-King (or chief), as LAMIDO among Fulani; MAI
or MOI in Borno; or ETSU among Nupe.
-Commander (or leader) of the faithful. This
is the title reserved for the Sultans of Sokoto.
-Freedom. The N.E.P.U. slogan.
-(The known path) Muslim canon law
-(SHI'ITES) a partisan Muslim sect which holds
that Ali- the cousin, the son-in-law of the
Holy Prophet and the fourth of the successor
Caliphs, and his descendants are the rightful
heirs of the Prophet.
—(SHAYK) leader or teacher. When used alone
(as the Shehu.) it refers to Shehu Usman Dan Foaio.
-That part of Africa stretching from the southern
part of the Sahara desert to the rain forest belt
along the equator. It is derived from the Arabic,
term BILAD AL-SUDAN (the country of black men).
It is often called Western Sudan to differentiate
it from the Nilotic Sudan.















-(SUNNA) the orthodox code of Islamic practice
transmitted through Prophet Muhammad.
-Qur'anic exegesis. The translation, explana¬
tion and interpretation of the Qur'an.
-(sing: TALAKA) peasants; common people as
counterposed to the SARAKUNA, ruling class.
-Roughly 'dissimulation'
-Passive acceptance of authority
'
((Y Y^YC-f) -fjW- I
—A Muslim •sect of the followers of Shayk Ahmadu
Tijjani
—Living beyond one's income under Islamic Law.
—(ULEMA) Muslim theologians who rule on important
religious and political matters.
-Islamic community of believers.
-Muslim religious sermon
—(Vizier) Chief minister in Borno; Chief councillor
in the Emirates of Northern Nigeria.
-War. For example YAXIN BA3ASA (the civil war,
notably, of Kano).




The subject of this thesis is the nature ana roots of the 'radical
tradition in Northern Nigeria', the ideas, individuals and movements
which inspired "Northerners" from the early nineteenth century into
religious and political opposition, and to demands for political and
social reform. We shall show that the roots of radicalism can be
found in those teachings of Islam which emphasizes the rights of the
common people against their rulers and thus obliges the commoners to
resist the tyranny of their rulers. 'Tradition' refers to the
historical continuity which sustains/^uslim resistance against tyranny
and their insistence on maintaining the purity of their religion.
This tradition is derived from the Islamic conception of history as a
continual and continuing conflict between the rulers and the ruled (or
the oppressors and the oppressed). We hope to show that this same
radical tradition was a major influence on the Northern (later
Nigerian) Elements Progressive Union (N.E.P.U.), the main post war
opposition party in Northern Nigeria.
LITERATURE SURVEY ON N.E.P.U.
The principal literature on NEPU tends to fall into three main
categories; two of which bear on the role of Islam. The various
2
historical institutional studies^ of which Whitaker's is the fullest,
least inaccurate and most perceptive, all tend to neglect the role of
religious inspiration, seeing NEPU simply as a secular nationalist
party akin to the National Convention of Nigerian Citizens (N.C.N.C.)
of Dr. Azikwe. Indeed, some of them, notably Olusanya and Coleman,
see it as an offshoot of that party. Further discussion of these
studies is reserved for chapter 5 and will be limited, since this
thesis does not attempt to provide a detailed history of NEPU itself.
The remaining material consists of biographies of leading figures in
2
NEPU, notably Aminu Kano and M. Sa'adu Zungur, and studies of local
1. These include Coleman, J.S., Nigeria: Background to Nationalism,
Berkeley, 1963, pp.357 & 66, Olusanya, G.O., "Political Awakening
in the North; a reinterpretation", In Journal of the Historical
Society of Nigeria, vol.4, No.1, 1967, pp.125-134; Post, K.W.J.,
The Nigerian Federal Election of 1959. London, 1963; Sklar, R.L.,
Nigerian Political Parties. Princeton, 1963; Dudley, B.J.,
Parties and Politics in Northern Nigeria, London, 1968, Whitaker,
C.S. Jr., The Politics of tradition, Princeton, 1970; and "Three
Perspectives on Hierarchy - Political Thought and Leadership in
Northern Nigeria", In Journal of Commonwealth Political Studies,
Vol. 3-4, 1965, pp.1-19. There is also an article by Whitaker
and Sklar on, "Nigerian Parties and Politics", In Coleman, J.S.
and Rosberg, C.G. (eds.), Political Parties and National
Integration in Tropical Africa, Berkeley, 1964, pp.597-654.
Last, M., "Aspects of Administration and Dissent in Hausaland,
1800-1960", In Africa. Vol. 40, No.4, 1970, pp.345-354.
2. For Alhaji Aminu Kano see, Feinstein, A., African Revolutionary:
The Life and Times of Nigeria's Aminu Kano, New York, 1973;
Dambazan, L., Dan Arewa Na Ainihi: H. Aminu. Kano, Kano, 1956
and Aminu Kano, Kano 1963. In the case of M. Sa'adu Zungur see,
Abdulkadir, D., The Poetry, Life and Opinions of Sa'adu Zungur,
Zaria(Gaskiya Press), 1974; and Kano, Aminu, Rayuwar Ahmad
Mahmud Sa'adu Zungur, Zaria (Gaskiya Press) 1973.
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politics in Kano and Zaxia"' in which NEPU figured prominently. Both
of these categories are concerned with the influence of Islam on the
ideology and activity of their subjects.
Feinstein's biography of Aminu Kano, the NEPU leader, is detailed
and enthusiastic, and useful for its basis in interview material,
but it remains the work of a friend rather than' a critic; and must
be supplemented by the comments in Paden's study of Kano. By contrast,
Hiskett's discussion of Sa'adu Zungur attempts a critical assessment
of his political thought and its relationship to Islam and nationalism,
and thus touches on the main theme of this thesis. Thus, Hiskett
argues:
"European-style nationalism.... helped to stimulate
Sa'adu Zungur's intense awareness of his own
Northern identity but this express itself much
more in Islamic solidarity or pan-Islamism but not
in nationalism." 2
However, Dr. Hiskett overlooks Sa'adu Zungur's practice of Taqivya
(dissimulation) which was necessary for the survival of any sensible
anti-colonialist, /ijLslim nationalist of Sa'adu Zungur's time in Northern
Nigeria. All Sa'adu Zungur's contemporaries in Northern Nigeria
dissimulated their true beliefs to varying degrees and in different
forms. Secondly, Dr. Hiskett, does not see that attacking the
Native Authority (NA) system in Northern Nigeria (see chap.3) was the
1. Paaen, J.N., Religion and Political Culture in Kano, Berkeley,
1973; Smith, M.G., "Historical and Cultural Conditions of Political
Corruption among the Hausa", In Comparative Studies in Society
and History, Vol.6, No.2, 1964, pp.164-194; Tahir, A., Scholars,
Sufis, Saints and Capitalists in Kano, 1904-1974: Pattern of
Bourgeois Revolution in an Islamic Society, Ph.D. thesis,
Cambridge, 1975. ~ ~ " ~~~
2. This and the Quotation below are taken from Hiskett, M., "The
Development of Sa'adu Zungur's Political Thought from Karaba
Dasoja, through Areema Jumhuriyako Mulukiya, to Wakar Yanci",
In African Language Studies, Vol.16, 1975, pp.1-23.
first prerogative of a perceptive nationalist because as colonial
creation and agents, the NAs were local versions of colonialism.
Hence, challenging the NAs was a form of nationalism. Following
the above observation, Dr. Hiskett further concluded that:
"To speak of Sa'adu Zungur as a 'nationalist'
may be to confuse his essentially Islamic
philosophy with the very different ideas on
African nationhood.... of other non-Muslim
personalities of African independent movements."
Undoubtedly, Sa'adu Zungur used different methods of appeal and of
mobilizing the masses, to non-Muslim African nationalists. However,
taking different routes does not necessarily lead to different
destinations. Sa'adu Zungur's understanding of the process of
decolonization was very different to that of non-|/uslim West African
nationalists in the sense that it arose in part from Muslims' contempt
for, and thus their total rejection of, the dehumanization effects of
Western Christian material culture. Yet all nationalists, muslims and
non-Muslims alike, have in common the desire to overthrow foreign
domination of their countries and hence they all aim at the political
independence of their respective countries. In this sense Sa'adu
Zungur was a nationalist like any other nationalist in West Africa.
The accounts of Kano politics by Paden and Tahir are explicitly
concerned with the role of Islam and of Islamic scholar-priests
(Malamai) in Kano public affairs. Thus their discussions of NEFU
do not characterize it as secular in inspiration. At the same time
they are unable to comprehend NEPU institutionally, as a political
party contesting elections, mobilizing support through its use of links
with religious brotherhoods and other organizations, and through the
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exploitation of local and. national grievances. In his account,
Paden used Alhaji Aminu Kano's interpretation (Tafsir) of the Qur'an
extensively and, by so doing, he links NEPU supporters with the
reformed Ti.i.ianiyya. Nevertheless, the historical thread which ties
A1
such a radicalf muslim soot /and the progressive political party of
Northern Nigeria is clearly missing in his analysis. Perhaps he is
not aware that Alhaji Aminu Kano is the deputy Khalifa of the
Ti.i.ianiyva in Northern Nigeria. He also makes a sweeping observation
that NEPU appeared ready to support any deposed Emir without attempting
to explain the implicit electoral strategy (which was successful in
the case of Abdulmumini in Katsina Province) in the party's support
for only certain deposed chiefs. NEPU did oppose bad chiefs but, at
the same time, it was equally vocal in defence of rulers who were
victimized by the Regional Government or who themselves became victims
of the abuse of the NA system by their "powerful" Councillors!
Neither Dr. Paden nor Dr. Tahir attempts to explain why NEPU won local
elections in areas^ where Ti.i.janiyya was strong; and although Dr. Tahir
touches on the socio-economic grievances and religious roots of NEPU,
nonetheless, he sees the party as essentially a "mere" protest
movement.
1. For instance, Lamido Ahmadu of Adamawa (1946-1953) was deposed
in 1953 mainly because of the intrigues of all-powerful councillors.
See Kirk-Greene, A.H.M., Adamawa Past and Present. Oxford, 1958,
pp.145-146; Smith, Sir Bryan Sharwood, But Always As Friends.
London 1967. In the case of Muhammadu Sanusi in Kano, see, Paden,
op.cit., pp. 182-183 Sanusi was deposed mainly because of his
personal rivalry with the Premier of Northern Nigeria. My
informants also include Alhaji Ibrahim (interviewed at Maiduguri
in 1972). Alhaji Ibrahim Biu is now the Chairman, Public Service
Commission, Borno-State of Nigeria, and he resides in Maiduguri.
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All these works are useful in that they form a solid jumping-
off point for research students of the future. Through them, it is
possible to obtain from secondary sources alone an adequate outline
of NEPU's electoral history, its organization and sociology. Their
analysis of political (and in some cases ethnic) discontent which led
to the emergence of NEFU will also remain a documentary source
material for curious researchers. But, having said this, it is all
the sadder to have to record that what is conspicuously absent in all
of them is the examination of the ideological excitement which
underlined NEPU's political philosophy. None of them attempts, by
way of analysis, to link NEPU to past reform movements in Northern
Nigeria - or in West Africa. Thus, we are yet to be informed of the
roots and the nature of NEFU radicalism. These are some of the
omissions which this thesis is set to correct.
ISLAMIC POLITICAL THOUGHT
Islamic political thought begins from the belief that Islamic
government exists by virtue of a divine contract based on the
Shari'ah (^Lslim canon law). Therefore, political science is not
an independent activity of/Muslim social thinkers but a department of
theology. It follows that there is no absolute distinction between
state and society, or between mosque and state, and there is no
separate doctrine of temporal power. Religion, morals and politics
are one. and "the same thing. Similarly, what is legal is automatically
moral and vice versa. Thus political disaffection amounts to
religious dissent and, as such, the legality and illegality of a
political rebellion (or any political action) is deeply rooted in
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Shari'ah. With the expansion of Islam, there have of course developed
a body of political ideas at the base of which lie different ana
pre-Islamic traditions and conceptions of state. Nonetheless and
local variations notwithstanding, all/Muslims accept that the central
functions of State are the maintenance of Islam, the application of
Shari'ah and the defence of orthodoxy against heresy."'
There are three established sources for the raw materials upon
which Islamic political thought is built:
1) The scattered verses of the Qur'an which deals with political
thought, the tradition of the Prophet, the practice of early Islamic
Community (of the time of Muhammad and his four successor Caliphs).
And theinterpretations of these sources in the light of later political
developments, reinforced by the dogma of the divine guidance of the
community and the infallibility of IJMA (the consensus of/Muslim
scholars).
2) The formulation put forward by the administrators and writers of
manuals of conduct for rulers and governors the "mirrors of Princes".
These formulations stipulate the duties of rulers as well as the
rights and the obligations of citizens. They are concerned with the
practice rather than the theory of governments. They seek to adapt
Islamic norms to existing tradition of Kingship. The basis of these
2
formulations is justice rather than right religion.
3) The formulations of philosophers which owes much to Creek
1. For a concise and illuminating analysis of the functions of an
Islamic state, see Rosenthal, S.I.J., "Some Aspects of Islamic
Political Thought," In Islamic Culture, Vol.xxii, No.1, 1948.
2. Dr. M.T.A. Liman, a senior Lecturer, in the department of Arabic
and Islamic Studies, Bayero University, Kano, drew my attention
to various examples of these adaptations in Islamic history.
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philosophy in the sense that it identifies the "Philosopher King"
with the Imam (Caliph). Its basis is piety and knowledge rather
than religion or justice.
The basis of Islamic political structure is the UMMA - an inter¬
national/Muslim community bound together by the ties of religion.
Within the "JMMA all are equal and there is no distinction of rank but
only of function. God alone is the sovereign in the IlMMA and His rule
is both direct and immediate. Its international organization is
defined and secured by the common acceptance of, and the common
surrender to, the divine law and the vice regency of the IMAM (Caliph).
But the Caliphate is justified on utilitarian grounds, i.e. it must
exist on the maximum popular participation in the election of the
Caliph and the right of the community to depose him for his errors
especially for oppression and corruption. Among the essential
qualities of a Caliph are: knowledge, piety, austerity in personal
life and justice. Lineage is irrelevant in becoming a Caliph and
thus every faithful can be elected. Obedience to Caliphs is
conditional on the Caliphs' themselves being obedient to God and to His
Prophet, i.e. a true believer should owe no obedience to the Caliph
who disobeys God. The same obedience is due to subordinate officials
to whom the Caliph delegated his religious, legal, military and
administrative functions, as is due to the Caliph himself, but should
they act contrary to the Shari' ah the Caliph must depose them. In
this way Islam asserts the rights of/Muslims to rebel against tyrants.^
1. For a fuller exposition on this topic see, H.A.E., Gibb, "A1
Mawardi's Theory of the Caliphate," In Studies on the Civilization
of Islam, London, 1962, pp.151-165.
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A more conservative and authoritarian conception of the Islamic
State developed from the actual practice of government of/Muslim
communities, and is well presented by its earliest major formulator
Al-Ghazali. Al-Ghazali states categorically that the jurists are forced
to acknowledge any existing/Muslim power since the alternative is anarchy
and the stoppage of social life for lack of a properly constituted
authority.^ In Al-Ghazali's theory, the Caliphate stands for the whole
Islamic government and it contains two main elements, viz: the Sultan;
and the Ulema (Muslim Scholars), who by their approval of the Sultan's
choice and by their Fatwa (enlightenment on religious matters) express
the functional authority of the Shari'ah. Al-6hazali insists that the
authority of the Sultan, even if vicious, must be upheld because it is
a lesser evil than anarchy. He considers the authority of the Sultan to
supervise the performance of canonical duties indispensable and thus calls
him the shadow of God on earth. In view of this, disobedience is only
permissible in the event of the Sultan's decisions being manifestly
contrary to the Qur'an, the Sunnah (the code of Islamic practice trans¬
mitted through Prophet Muhammad) and the consensus of the Salaf (past
scholars). He maintains that no/Muslim ought to draw a sword against a
brother/Muslim because a rupture in public peace (Fitna) is one of the
least forgivable sins. He recommends justice as the most effective means
"Z
of preventing unrest, eliminating enemies and modifying existing evils.J
To Al-Ghazali, the purpose of the Sultan's government is the formal
establishment of the religion of Islam and conditions in which his
1. There is an instructive analysis on Al-Ghazali's statement in G.E.
von Grunebaum, Medieval Islam, Chicago, 1946, p.168.
2. A full discussion on Al-Ghazali's theory can be found in L. Binder,
"Al-Ghazali's theory of Islamic Government," in The Muslim Morid,
Vol.XLV, 1955, pp.229-241.
3. For a more detailed discussion of Al-Ghazali's recommendations see,
A.H. Dawood, A Comparative Stud" of Arabic and Persian Mirrors for
Princes from the Second to the Sixth century A.H.. Ph.D. Thesis,
London University, 1965.
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subjects can fulfil their destiny. The duty of the Sultan is to
preserve equipoise by keeping each in his proper place. As the
Sultan is seen to be divinely inspired, obedience to him as the choice
of God is encumbent upon the people, but only he who practices justice
is the true Sultan. For religion is made strong by Kingship, and
Kingship by the army, and the army by wealth, but wealth is assured
by making the country populous and flourishing, and this result can
only be achieved by justice. In this way Al-Ghazali put great emphasis
on the need for the Sultan to be strong. This view derived, at least
in part, from the contemporary circumstances especially the violent
nature of the/Muslim rule of that time and the disorders created by
the Isma'ilis^ and the prevailing intrigues. In an attempt to resolve
the tension between Islamic values and the threat of anarchy, Al-Ghazali
divides the duties of the Sultan into two: his duty towards God and
his duty towards the people. The former includes the performance of
religious duties, the avoidance of innovation and the suppression of
heresy. The latter includes the ruler's practice of justice which
means the inherent moral quality derived from the perfection of the
intellect and consisting in restraining dictatorial instincts, passion
and anger.
1. A group of Shi'ites muslims who follow Ismail Ibn Ja'afar al-
Sadiq, a descendant of the Holy Prophet. They are often assoc¬
iated with the Ashishin (the Assassins) mission, active in the
Fatimid) Empire especially during the reign of Caliph al-
Mun.tasir (1036-1094) See, B. Lewis, The Assassins. A radical
Sect of Islam, London 1967, especially pp.20-37.
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THE RADICAL INTERPRETATION
All conceptions of the Islamic State assume the ultimate source
of power to he divine, that is to say, God delegates power to a
temporal ruler on the condition that divine laws are rigidly adhered
to and strictly enforced. This should be done because a/Muslim is
one who surrendered himself to God and thus obedience to His
injunctions takes precedence over everything else. In the light of
this, a/^uslim society as most (if not all)/Muslims conceive it, should
be one ruled by God and not by man: the role of man is only to
implement and, if necessary, to enforce the divine law. If Islam is
not the governing principle of the state, the state is not an Islamic
one; and if the citizens are true/Muslims they must aspire to change
it. Muslims believe that servitude to divine law will ultimately
bring freedom - spiritual, material and political - to all mankind.
This is the rationale of their total submission to the will of God.
The essence of this submission to God is that a/Muslim should
obey nobody else against the creator. In this lies the Islamic
tradition which gives recognition to the principle of justifiable
revolt. Islam simultaneously teaches submission to authority and
revolt or rebellion when it lays down that the/Muslim's duty of
obedience lapses where the command is sinful. Since no procedure is
laid down for testing the righteousness of a command, or for exercising
the right to disobey one that is sinful, the only effective recourse
for the concientious/kuslim is to rebel against the ruler and then try
to overrule or depose him by force. A more expeditious procedure is
to remove him by assassination. This is the process by which Caliphs
Umar, Usman and Aliyu were physically eliminated by aggrieved citizens.
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This process was elevated to the status of a principle (it was
considered a virtue of orthodoxy by religious/political activists)
and it was very often invoked, especially by sectarian rebels to
1
justify their murderous acts. Thus, total submission to the will
of God and the justification of rebellion against sinful command by
any earthly power are some of the unique political content of Islamic
ideology.
The Islamic community of believers (Arabic: Umma: and Hausa:
Jama'a). as ideally conceived, is a religious polity, established and
maintained under divine law. For example in a country like Nigeria
(as in many parts of Africa) accepting the Muslim faith introduces a
previously animist and pre-literate person living in a tribal community
to a world religion, literacy and the rule of law. In addition, the
obligation to perform the pilgrimage at Makka, mean that the faithful
are* at least, ideologically linked to the whole/Muslim world. In
this sense Islam is truly universalis tic. In the Jama'a the distinction
between secular and religious is unknown. In the light of this, Islam
is not only the official ideology and the legal system of the Islamic
state but also the basis of popular culture: its spirit should saturate
all aspects of life. In contrast to the political tradition of the
West which separates church from State, in Islam there is no separation
1. Ibid, especially pp.9-13 and 12S, in which Lewis discusses murder
as an instrument of policy and a religious duty.
2. Even the Hausa Jama'a is derived from Arabic Jama'at (people); or
Jama'at-I Islami (a group of believers in Islam). The Hausa
concept of Jama'a can also mean a given local community whereas
Umma stands for an essentially international community of believers
to whom other units - like geographic, cultural, linguistic, etc.,
are irrelevant or even harmful. Many pious muslims are usually
unconcerned with national boundaries and ethnic differences; for
them the bond of Islam unites all believers as it distinguishes
them from non-muslims.
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of the mosque from the State but rather the two form a sort of "the-
ocracy" under the Imam. A muslim theocracy is one ruled by all
muslims including the rank and file and thus the entire muslim
population should be mobilized to participate in politics.
Thus literacy is highly valued because it is necessary to read
(or to be able to read) the Qur'an in order to interpretate its
injunctions and the Shari'ah. This necessity for literacy gives a
special position of respect to scholar-priests i.e. Kalamai (the
possessors of knowledge. Sing: Halam)♦ The Malamai are present
among all occupational groups and are necessary for a muslim community's
life rituals, i.e. births, marriages, deaths, personal counselling
and, at times, mediation between the rulers and the ruled. However,
it should be noted that Islam is not hierarchical: it lacks such
hierarchies as Pope - Bishop, Priest, and thus each Malam is economically
and socially dependent on his community rather than on a bureaucratic
organization. In a/Muslim community the Malamai have the prerogative
of critizing political authority. They form public.opinion and thus
become the leading political actors because Islamic law also regulates
economic practices, like usury, inheritance, alms giving, etc.''
When we look at the origins of Islam in Arabia we shall see that
2
the first Islamic community, under the Prophet and the early Caliphate,
made sustained efforts to create an egalitarian society by its
1. See, J.J. Spengler, "Economic Thought of Islam: Ibn Khaldun", In
Comparative Studies in Society and History, Vol.VI, No.4, 1963-
1964, pp.
2. Among others see, Watt, W.M., Muhammad: Prophet and Statesman,
Oxford, 1977; and Brockelmann, C., History of the Islamic Peonies,
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distributive principles through which spoils of conquest were shared.
In addition, every member of that community had a right to some of
the wealth of the State. The State was fully responsible for
providing support to its members irrespective of their status, ages,
tribe, sex or religion. The poor, the old and the sick had to be
tended and cared for by the State. There were a combination of
factors (social and religious) which gave rise to the "socialist"
principles of Islam which insists that there should be a reasonable
minimum standard of living for each individual as well as a maximum
level of affluence. For one thing, the faith was revealed at a time
when the mass of the people were suffering both materially and
spiritually from the incursions of the newly rich Makkan commercial
class which offended the Prophet's own sense of humanity.^ And for
another, the Qur'an enjoined wealthy/Jfuslims to give part of their
wealth to the poor:
"Who so gives and shows piety, and professes the
truth of the most excellent (reward), We shall
smooth (his way) to ultimate happiness.
Who so is mean and bumptious on account of wealth,
who denies the most excellent (reward), We shall
smooth (his way) to ultimate misery.
His fortune shall not profit him when he falls
into the abyss." (92: 5-11)
This Islamic socialism (the application of the teachings of Islam to
socio-economic justice) and the disapproval of bumptiousness (ostentation,
1. There is an insightful discussion of this in Zubaiaa,S., "Economic
and Political Activism in Islam", In Economy and Society, Vol.1,
No.3, August, 1972, pp.308-338; and Watt, W.M., Islam and the
Integration of Society, London, 1961, p.7, in which he explains how
those in a socially weak position notably, widows and orphans,
were shamelessly cheated and oppressed by the rich merchants.
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lack of compassion and selfishness) produced the principle of moral
austerity which includes the refusal to use political office for
personal gain especially on the part of the leadership.
The foregoing attempts to show that the ideal Islamic society
should consist of people who, by having put their faith in Islam,
have become liberated from all other allegiances except that which
they have undertaken towards God; that society which lives by applying
Islam would be free and democratic, and that its citizens would be, as
the Prophet of Islam put it, "as equal as the teeth of a comb."^
Subsequently,/^uslims believe that they belong to Ummatan Wasata (a
just and balanced community) and members of this community are told:
"You have a pivotal role to play in the service of
mankind - you must act as a model to others as the
Prophet was a model to you." (2: 143)
And another injunction explains:
"God changes not the condition of people who will
not change it themselves." (13:11 )
Such teachings exercise a powerful hold on/Muslim minds who use them
to justify religious and political activism. They inspired many
uslim reformers in the past as they do today.
1. Prophet Muhammad in Hadith, cited by Sa'id, A.M., Arab Socialism,
London, 1974, p.46.
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RADICAL TRADITION IN PRACTICE:1 MORAL AND POLITICAL CONCEPTS
We indicated, above that Islam is essentially a system of values,
of
a body/^imperatives, a view of how the faithful should live and order
their relations with one another as well as with society. Islam
includes a complex of beliefs about the/Muslim's relations with
nature, the cosmos, etc., and his purpose and destiny in life. These
values, imperatives and views, are expressed in rituals, behaviour,
practices, rules, institutions and scholarship, and embodied in all
aspects of Islamic civilization. The application of the Islamic value
system to non-Muslim society has been always a radical act. Indeed, at
the time of its founder (Muhammad), Islam was a revolutionary movement,
^aterly, Islamic ideas have been taken over by ruling classes and
transformed into State religions, hence it has been associated with
conservative, traditionalist, authoritarian, hierarchical ideologies
whose functions have been the justification and the maintenance of the
existing social and political order and the ascendency of the ruling
classes. Simultaneously, there have been puritan/Muslims dedicated to
maintain the purity of their religion, who thus adhered to its
revolutionary (or radical) spirit. Thus the history of Islam is a
continuing struggle between the radical - democratic and the conser¬
vative authoritarian interpretations of the Qur'an. Against the
radical interpretations some Caliphs, Sultans, Emirs and Ulama, have
constantly restated the conservative authoritarian interpretations and
2
persecuted the radicals.
1. This section relies heavily on the work of Thomas Hogkin, notably
his recent "The Revolutionary Tradition in Islam" in Race & Class,
volume XXI, No.3, 1980, pp.221-237, which is the best and most
concise account available.
2. See a more detailed discussion of this point in Hodgkin, T.L.,
"Mahdism,, Messianism and Marxism in.the African setting", In Yusuf
Padl Hassan, Sudan In Africa, Khartoun, 1972.
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The Islamic principle which says that "Judgment belongs to God
alone," manifests a tendency which is characteristic of radical move¬
ments throughout history, in their inclination to reject governments and
to move towards an anarchist standpoint. The Caliphate is seen only as
a necessary evil: if the faithful were sufficiently mature ana virtuous
to ensure the application of the Shari'ah there would be no need for a
Caliph. But if there have to be a Caliph then there must be the maximum
popular participation in his election and they should reserve the right
to depose him for his errors, more especially for his oppression and
corruption. Among the essential qualifications for a Caliph are
knowledge, moral and material austerity, adl (justice) etc. Anyone of
the faithful, if he or she is qualified, can elect and/or be elected.
Lineage is irrelevant hence succession to office based on heredity is
illegitimate. Muslim radicals insist on the attainment of high
standards of education, not only to minimise apathy in public affairs,
but also as a precondition for understanding and thus for acting in
accordance with the Shari'ah. Muslim radicals everywhere share the
ascetic and egalitarian attitudes inseparable from their distaste for
people in authority. Similarly, they share common rejection of all
forms of ethnic and social privileges as strongly as they acre attracted
to poor and oppressed people. This is because all/Muslim radicals
invariably agree on the undermentioned main points of theory which
underlined the motives and causation that inspire Islamic political
activism.
1. The principle of individual responsibility tends to detach radical
uslims from the habit of obedience and deference to established
authority (of Sultans, Emirs, Colonial governments etc.) because it is
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associated with the principle of Ijtiha.d (the idea of inquiry)
discussed below. This principle emphasizes the right and the
responsibility of every/r/uslim to interpret the Qur'an and Sunnah for
himself (or herself). This principle is always referred to in the
lim world against the principle of submission to bureaucratic
authority.
2. The idea of activism which insists that "people make their own
history". This idea runs through the radical tradition of Islam:
that believers have the responsibility to command the good and forbid
the evil; that religious beliefs must be expressed in social practice;
and that believers must struggle (and make sacrifices) to bring into being
a just society.
3. The egalitarian democracy which developed during the formative years
1
of Islam remains an essential element of the radical tradition in Islam.
Firstly, this example insists on the equality of all before the creator,
irrespective of ethnic origin, lineage, social status, or sex. Secondly,
it stresses the rights of the people against their rulers; and the right
of all/Muslims to maximum participation in decision making at all levels;
and finally, it emphasizes the special rights of the most oppressed and
the poorest people. This argues that to treat unequals equally is a
form of injustice and thus it justifies preferential treatment for the
weakest and the most deprived categories.
4. Austerity (Zuhd) is very much related to the idea of religious
puritanism which, among other things, insists on simplicity of life and
the avoidance of conspicuous consumption and ostentatious style of life.
1. See Watt, M.W. The Formative Period of Islamic Thought, Edinburgh,
1973.
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References are always made to the golden past in Islamic history and,
especially, to the exemplary leadership of/muslim reformers.
5. Islam seeks to establish a world wide (Universal) Islamic community.
Hence, in the Islamic views the world is divided between Bar al Islam
(the abode of Islam) and Par al Harb (the abode of war or the area of
struggle). The effort to create this universal Islamic community by
asserting their autonomy or their rule over non-Muslims provided the
continuing vitality of Islam. Whenever and wherever this world wide
revolutionary drive is halted a/Muslim community finds itself comfronted
with tension between the wider perspectives of world revolution and the
limited objectives to create and maintain a just society within itself.
6. It is believed by/Muslims that their conception of history as a
continuing struggle will generate a situation of profound crisis and thus
lead to the emergence of a revolutionary movement that will, in turn,
bring about the overthrow of the existing corrupt and oppressive social
order and substitute it with a just and egalitarian (classless) society.
For this historical process of the struggle between the oppressors and
the oppressed will ultimately lead to the victory of the oppressed.
The expectation of the Mahdi arises from this conception of history.
7. 'Mahdism' stems from the belief that if the present belongs to the
oppressors, the future belongs to the revolutionary community outside of
which there is no salvation and no future. There are three essentials
of Mahdism l) the conception of a period of profound crisis immediately
before the Mahdi appears, 2) that the Mahdi would exercise a special
revolutionary initiative and conduct a Jihad (holy war) against nominal
and backsliding muslims, J>) the association of the Mahdi with the
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approaching of the end of the world and the brief intervening golden
period during which he would fill the earth with justice and equity as
it was filled with tyranny and oppression.''
Among other things the above shows that in Islam divine guidance is
not only a matter of individual faith, it also provides a blueprint for
the human community on earth. Islam defines both the relationship of
the individual to God and the role of the proper, divinely guided
community on earth. This explains the much repeated generalization in
this thesis that Islam is not only a creed but a total way of life.
The attempt to create a community in accordance with the revelation of
God is a key theme in the history of Islam. Thus, it is partly the
determination to apply the Islamic principles of social and political
organization which lead to the rise of Islamic radicalism in West Africa.
RADICAL TRADITION: MOVEMENTS AND STATES IN WEST AFRICA
Islamic history abounds with accounts of social movements led by
militant preachers who spread the good tidings of escape from the pains
and evils of their times to a better future. Their tasks had been to
find out and articulate latent grievances, to challenge the authority of
the dominant class and to organize the oppressed for a contest with the
dominant forces. This "authentic, ancient, but also living revolutionary
2
tradition in Islam" can be seen as arising first in Kharijism in the
7th century, though asserting itself somewhat later on the periphery of
3
the Islamic area, as in West Africa with the Almoravids.
1. The basic text for the theory of Mahdism is in Ibn Khaldun's
Muauaddimah (Rosenthal, F. trans.), vol.11, 1958, p.156, also see
Holt, P.M., Mahdist State in the Sudan 1881-1898: A study of its
Origins, Development and overthrow, Oxford, 1977, pp.22-31.
2. Hodgkin, "Revolutionary tradition..." op.cit., p.235.
3. T.L. Hodgkin "The Revolutionary tradition in muslim West Africa",
in D.P. Little (ed.), Essays on Islamic Civilisation (London 1976/
pp.103-117.
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In West Africa the activities of such militant preachers culminated in
the late eighteenth century and nineteenth century Jihads which overran
Hausa land and Borno, Hasina and some parts of Guinea.^ The
uslim intellectuals who led the Jihads were inspired by the teachings
of Islam which discourage Tag lid (passive acceptance of authority in
matters of faith) and encourage I.itihad (personal interpretations).
The reforming Jihadists were determined to replace the old regimes by
new administrations to be based on classical Islamic models described by
uslim theorists such as al Mawardi - discussed above. Thus, Islam
provided the Jihad movements with ideology as well as an attractive
alternative social system which appealed to the masses battered by the
existing institutions. All through the Jihads the crucial factors
which united the peasants with their intellectual leaders was the ideology
of Islam. This is not to play down economic and social causes of the
revolt or to under-estimate the feeling of patriotism (or nationalism)
but rather to explain that the problem of organizing resistance was
2
resolved in Islamic terms.
1. Efforts to bring about Islamic reforms in West Africa are well
documented. Among many others, see, Last, M., "Reform in West
Africa: the Jihad movements of the nineteenth century" In Ajayi,
J.F.A., and Crowder, M. (edits) History of West Africa, London, 1974,
Vol.11, pp.1-29, and Hiskett, M., "The nineteenth Century Jihads in
West Africa" In Flint, J.E. (edit.) The Cambridge History of Africa,
Cambridge, 1976, Vol.5, from C.1790 to C.1870, pp.125-169.
2. On the socio-economic causes of the Jihads see, Smith, H.F.C., "A
neglected theme of West African History: The Islamic Revolutions
of the nineteenth century" In Journal of the Historical Society of
Nigeria. Vol.11, No.2, 1961, PP.277-285. But on how the feelings
of patriotism (or nationalism) were induced in mobilizing the
peasants see, Abdullahi Ibn Muhammad Tazyin al Waraqat (Hiskett, M.,
trans.) Ibadan, 1963.
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Some of the consequences of the Jihads include the emergence of new
ruling classes (e.g. in Hausa land and Borno). But in Senegal where
the Tarioa (Muslim brotherhoods) leaders acquired power in the nineteenth
century in the face of the disintegration of Wolof society. The muslim
Marabus (religious but not formal political leaders) succeeded the
Wolof chiefs and aristocracy in authority, forming cohesive and powerful
orders in which they enjoyed enormous religious - political and economic
authority over their followers and Ta'alibe (disciples). There are now
three large and important Tarioas in Senegal - The Ti.i.janiyya, of which
there are several groups, the Muridiyya. second in number of adherents
but the most influential, are the ILadirivya.^ The Jihads led to a
wider dissemination of Arabic literacy which created a mood of Islamic
perfectionism and thus to increased criticism and revolts within the
/j/iuslim communities. Furthermore, the Jihads strengthened Islamic
culture and hence put the whole sub-Saharan Africa culturally within the
C
Si
orbit of the/Muslim world.^ Consequently, Islamic education and literacy
are partly responsible to the/muslim's resistance to secular Western
3
education until recently. However, even in Hausaland where the greatest
policy impact of Islam is manifested in the conservative and hierarchical
1. The Impact of Islam in the Senegalese Society is discussed in detail
by Lucy Behrman, Muslim Brotherhoods and Politics in Senegal,
Cambridge, Mass. 1970, chapters 4-6.
2. For a brief but useful discussion on this see, Kraus, J,, "Islamic
Affinities and International Politics in sub-Saharan Africa", In
Current History. Vol.73, No.456, April 1980, pp.154-158 and 182.
3. After the creation of twelve new States out of the former three
regions of Nigeria in 1967, the six States in the North embarked on
rapid educational development to bridge the gap between the North and
the South. Prior to that children of the common people were actively
discouraged from attending Western Schools and those who attended
were laughed at as: Ya:n Makar&ntaua Bokoko
Babu Karatu Sai Sata
which means:
"The pupils of Book Schools
_£_They7 learn nothing but thievery."
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emirate system of governments (discussed in chapter II), compromises
were made by the successors to the Jihadists in which the old Habe
social and political institutions were adapted to the need of the new
rulers.
From the earliest days of Islam, some/muslims insisted on a rigorous
adherence to the rules of the faith. These /Muslim fundamentalists
opposed the compromises made by reformist leaders and conservative
ulama. They actively condemned fellowMuslims who did not adhere
strictly to the Qur'an and Sunnah. The careful study of the life of the
Holy Prophet provided a focus for those who insisted that life in the
Islamic community should be based strictly on the teachings of the Qur'an
and Sunnah. A key figure in this development was Ahmad Ibn Hanbal (780-
. 1
855), whose vigorous opposition to political compromise and philosophical
innovation set the tone for the later fundamentalist spirit in Islam.
Thus the fundamentalists were the strongest leaders who maintained the
vision of the early ideal community of/Muslims and they frequently
advocated programs of Islamic purification and revival. This spirit
has inspired militant Islamic movement from the early days down to the
present. In West Africa, as in the rest of the/Muslim world, this
militancy developed into the popular belief in the future coming of a
luslim Messiah figure, the Mahdi, whose divinely guided rule would
supplant existing institutions. Expectations of the Mahdi resulted in
2
revolts against colonial authorities in West Africa.
1. For his birth, early life and subsequent activities see Gibb, H.H.R.
and Kramers, J.H. (edits) Shorter Encyclopaedia of Islam, Leiden &
London, 1961, pp.20-21.
2. Mahdism in Northern Nigeria is discussed in chapter III,
and for the rest of West Africa see the references therein.
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Muslim fundamentalists have not changed their position till today.
Whenever and wherever compromises by/Muslims appear to threaten the basic
Islamic identity of society, they call for a reaffirmation of the
unchanging truth of Islam. This has taken many forms. In relative
isolated areas fundamentalist movements have existed in different forms.
But nowhere have they been as successful as in the Arabian Peninsula,
•j
where under the leadership of Muhammad Ibn Adb al-Wahhab (an Islamic
scholar in the tradition of Hanbal above) they established and still
control the modern Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Elsewhere in the Islamic
2
world Wahhabism remains active only in using the Qur'an and Sun-.ah to
condemn current practices of rulers and the general population.
3 .
But in West Africa, Wahhabisfri (or Subbanu al Musilmin: as they are
locally known) is a radical and largely urban Islamic movement most
4
active, like the earlier Hamaliyya, in Mali and Guinea, and arising
towards the end of 1944 at a time of general radicalization of West
African politics. Their main religious aims were to establish schools,
or entire mosques, independent of the control of the existing Imams whom
they saw both as disseminating a false version of Islam, and as
1. For the origins and the doctrine of Wahhabism as well as a short
biography of its founder Adb - al - Wahhab see, Gibb, H.A.R., and
Kramers, J.H. (edits) op.cit., pp.618-621.
2. On how Wahhabism spread to other parts of the world, see, Voll, J.O.,
"The Islamic Past and the Present Resurgence", In Current History,
Vol.78, No.456, April 1980, pp.145-148 and 180-181; and on the
reaction of Western Europe to the movement see, Daniel, M., Islam
Europe and Empire. Edinburgh, 1966, pp.113-116.
3. See Kaba, L., "The Wahhabi movement and its contribution to political
development in West Africa, 1945-1958", Ph.D. Thesis, North Western
University, 1972.
4. See Alexandre, P., "A West African Islamic Movement: Hamallism in
French West Africa", In Rotberg R.I. and Mazrui, A.A. (edits)
Protest and Power in Black Africa, New York, 1970, pp.497-512.
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compromised by the mutual support existing between them and the French
administration."' Since they attributed the corruption of Islam to the
combination of French colonial interference and the venality and
incompetence of the Imams, they "thought that political independence
2
and national unity were indispensable to the triumph of a 'clean Islam'".
From this, and from their interpretations of Islamic injunctions against
injustice and exploitation, the Nahhabi movement became clearly involved
with the radical local sections of the Rassemblement Democratique Africaine
(R.D.A.). in Mali and Guinea. Traders and Transporters disseminated
both Wahhabist ideas and the RDA message, and the urban social base of
both organizations were similar in the 1954-1957 period when Wahhabism
was most influential: traders, drivers, transporters, clerks (but not
graduates) and younger members of leading families. The parties
themselves drew heavily on Islamic or Wahhabi symbols and concepts;
4
though not to the extent of ceasing to be secular organizations.
1. Kaba, L., op.cit., p.246. A more extreme version of this mutual
support was found in Senegal [_ See, O'Brien, D.C., The Mourides of
Senegal, Oxford, 19YJ_7" and, of course, in Northern Nigeria.
2. Kaba, L., op.cit., p.525.
5. Ibid., pp.258-259, 522-557.
4. Ibid., pp.286-289, 529-555.
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ISLAMIC RADICAL MOVEMENTS: SOME COMMON CHARACTERISTICS1
1. Although Islamic radicalism takes different forms in different
locations (because they often emerge from different historical and
cultural context) and can best be understood by studying them from the
circumstances in which they arose, it seems generally recognized that
they have certain common characteristics. For instance, they all aim
at "perfection" in the sense that they strive to establish a "just and
egalitarian" society in which all citizens would be able to participate
fully in the political process. Their concept of justice entails
equality before the law and life more abundant for all. Their
egalitarian ideas stem from their rejection of all forms of ethnic and
social privilege which attempt to legitimise the relative deprivation
of the masses.
2. Either because of their critical understanding of the existing
system or because of their puritanical adherence to the orthodox teachings
of the Qur'an (or both) they reject established authorities, both
secular and religious, as corrupt, oppressive and illegitimate. Hence
they seek to establish an alternative system, which is an advance on the
existing one. Whether or not their envisioned new order is based on
the ideal of the Shari'ah they tend to use the teachings of the Qur'an
and Sunnah to justify their refusal to submit themselves to established
bureaucracies.
1. These are only a few of the common characteristics of Islamic
radical movements. This list is compared with Thomas Hodgkin's
common characteristics of Mahdist and Messianic movements in his
"Mahdism, Messianism and Marxism", op.cit., as well as his
definition of "Radical Tradition" in his "The Radical Tradition in
Muslim West Africa", In D.P. Little (edit) Essays on Islamic
Civilization, Leiden, 1976, pp.103-117.
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3. As a result they are forward looking and thus progressive movements.
Their strict adherence to the unchanging teachings of the Qur'an and
Suhnah as well as their references to the golden past of Islam are by
no means simply backward looking and conservative. On the contrary,
they manifest their determination to return to the ideal and on that basis
establish a perfect society.
4. They are universalis tic in the sense that the new societies they want
to create would accommodate and provide for non-Muslims and/Muslims alike,
of course, with the hope that non-Muslims would see the justice of the
Shari'ah and thus be converted to Islam.
3. They all challenge the social functions and hence the social basis of
established authorities. Thus, the authorities regard them as subversive
and often they are treated accordingly.
6. In most cases they are led by militant preachers and teachers who
spread among the masses, the good tidings of how to escape from the
corruption, oppression and tyranny of the existing order.
7. They all become involved in attempts to create movements and states
based on their conception of Islam, either directly or with the major
Mahdistmovements and the Jihads . or through their close integration
with more secular political parties, with the Hamalliya and Wahhabis in
past war ..francophone Africa, or as with Ti j jandyya in Northern Nigeria,
which Ijad close ties with NEHJ. Both NEPU and the RDA capitilised on
the puritan Islamic ideas ana stances of the movements though at the same
time maintaining their secular position as modern nationalist parties
which appealed for the support ofj^uslims and non slim alike.
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The desire to apply the radical principles of Islam enumerated
above, in current terms, partly manifested itself in the struggle of the
radical nationalist parties to liberate their respective communities
from Western Imperial domination. Hence their alliance with the
radical religious movements. But in the case of NEPU in Northern
Nigeria, two major factors led to a relative subordinate role for Islam
in the party's national and to a lesser degree regional politics.
Firstly, it was necessary to be (or to appear to be secular) in order to
win the support of Christian and animist electorates, as it was
obvious that no one sectarian party would win enough votes (or seats in
the legislature) to form a government. Secondly, not only national
stability but also national unity would have been greatly endangered if
sectarian parties were to exist. Thirdly, Northern solidarity would not
be maintained against the South, as non-Muslims in the North would reject
any party with/Muslim connotations as they had always rejected Islam.
As is now well known, these religions and cultural factors are some of
the reasons which led to the adoption and retention of a federal system
for Nigeria. However, secular politics not withstanding, NEPU shares
the forgoing characteristics of Islamic radical movements as the
examination of the party's ideas and method of appeal shows in Chapter V.
STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS
The first three chapters attempt to serve two purposes: on the one
hand to explain the social context within which modern radicalism sprang
up in Northern Nigeria and, on the other hand, to describe sources of
dissent in Northern Nigeria, namely social inequality, religious belief
and the colonial local government system. Chapter one concentrates on
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economic and social inequality (which tend to threaten order), and on
the maintenance of that order through religion, patronage and coercion.
Since NEPU was itself seen as threatening the social order, these
resources were used to contain or undermine■its activities, as described
in Chapter five. Chapter two discusses Islam as a quarry from which
uslims mine their radical political ideas mainly by their arguments
and disputes (or disagreements) over the interpretations of the Qur'an
and the Hadith. This tradition of dialogue (and often conflict) between
uslim intellectuals centers on the desire to maintain the integrity
of a particular/gkislim State at one level and, the purity of religious
faith on another level. In the case of Northern Nigeria, this conflict
is illustrated by reference to the nineteenth century Jihad and the
subsequent establishment of/Muslim governments. I argue that the piety
and the principles of austerity of the early .jihadists were abandoned by
their successors and hence paved the way for the emergence of an
oppressive political system and a conservative interpretation of Islam
in support of that system.
Chapter III is concerned with how the nineteenth century Emirate
governments became the local version of colonialism officially
christened "Native Authorities," and the way in which the British policy
of Indirect Rule actively supported that formal structure. Consequently,
the British support for the Emirs in particular and the Sarakuna (the
ruling nobles) as a whole, led to widespread abuse of power by all N.A.
officials. This abuse, like the earlier and similar abuses of Habe
rule in the eighteenth century, was the main (but not the only) source
of opposition which started moderately but later became more articulate
as the role of the N.As became all pervasive. The A.A. system fostered
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an atmosphere which poisoned the region's society from the top to the
bottom. After Nigerian independence (in 1960) no one dared speak
openly in the rural areas. Prom 1961 - 1965» there was an outcry
against mass imprisonment of the opponents of the ui.A. system in the
urban centres, but lost in their own dreams neither the Emirs nor the
Northern Regional Government seemed to have heard any protest.
Chapter IV examines the origins of modern radicalism which challenged
the N.As and, by so doing, the whole colonial apparatus. It concen¬
trates on radical activities from the 1930s to the formation of NEPU
in 1950.
The history and sociology of NEPU, the first organized radical
opposition party in Northern Nigeria is the subject of chapter five,
which also examines NEPU policies, political strategies and radical
ideas, linking these with earlier expressions of modern radicalism and
more especially with Islamic radical ideas. This theme is carried
over to the final chapter. In chapter six we attempt to trace and
draw together the threads of both motive and causation which spur
uslims to religious and political activism. This concluding chapter
summarises some of the political teachings of Islam and thus shows
the raw materials from which the political ideals of the Jihadists
were drawn and developed; and by identifying this same source as the
mainspring of modern and organized radicalism in Northern Nigeria, we
assert a continuing radical Islamic tradition in Northern Nigeria,
at least up to 1966.
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CHAPTER I
INEQUALITY AND SOCIAL ORDER
Bamu Yarda Ba Tanderu Na Ingila Kullu Na Nigeria
"We do not accept that the bakery should be in England when
the dough is in Nigeria." NEPU
INTRODUCTION
At the time the British assumed responsibility for Northern
Nigeria, the society was roughly divided into three strata: free
uslims, their slaves, and 'pagans' (or animists) who were potential
slaves.'' These social divisions remained important up to the 1940s
and 1950s. However, social differentiation in Northern Nigeria
(especially in Hausaland) is by no means as simple as this. The
society is still both horizontally and vertically differentiated
because social distinctions are still deeply cut by ethnic cleavages
and religious beliefs. To some extent, historical circumstance has
also elevated some groups over others as we show below. In addition,
the colonially inherited federal structure of Nigeria reinforced social
inequalities and economic imbalances. These imbalances sharpened
perceptions of unequal relations as well as of political domination.
1. My own observation is also confirmed by Lugard, P.D., "Northern
Nigeria", In The Geographical Journal, Vol.XXIII, No.1, 1904,
pp. 1-29; and Perham, M., Native Administration in Nigeria, Oxford,
1962, p.49. In the Northern Nigerian context, a 'pagan' is one
who is neither /$[us lim nor Christian or Jewish, i.e. it denotes
one who practices indigenous religion.
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In contemporary jargon, Northern Nigerian society can be
classified, and described as "pre-industrial." The largest
proportion of its people are engaged in agriculture, and the number
occupied in handicrafts and trade, or modern industry, form a
relatively small proportion of the total; and even those occupied in
other trades often combined their commercial or industrial occupations
with agricultural pursuits. This does not mean that commercial and
industrial activities are insignificant or that they play little part in
shaping the economy of the region or in directing the course of its
economic development. On the contrary, cottage industries and trade
are important and integral to the economic life of the society.
Similarly, those engaged in trade and industry have increasing
influence on the politics of the region.
This chapter aims to provide background information on the social
context within which NEFU sprang up and operated as well as to outline
the sources of dissent in Northern Nigeria. Hence it focusses on social
relations through which people both produce and exchange the material
conditions of their existence. The chapter is divided into two parts.
Part one attempts to identify poverty and the elements of poverty, in
order to show how the ruling class keep the common men in their places.
It starts with an account of the pattern of settlement so as to bring
to light the rural - urban dichotomy. The second part of this chapter
discusses social inequality and political order by attempting to
analyse social division in Hausa society in historical, religious and
ethnic terms. I shall trjr to explain forms of economic and social
differences in order to show how social order is maintained by means of
patronage and coercion: both methods are underlined and supported by
the system of education and religious belief.
33
PATTERNS OF SETTLEMENT
The pattern of settlement in Northern Nigeria centres around.
Sirane (cities) and Garuruwa (towns). But the largest proportion of
the population live in Kauyuka (villages) and Unguwowi (hamlets).''
Some of the typical features of these villages and hamlets are inherent
in the essential needs of agriculture and social life. Thus, the
most obvious characteristic of the hamlet or the village is its
topography. It is collective i.e. a grouped settlement and, the form
of grouping most characteristic of the countryside, is that of a "nuclear"
village (or hamlet) consisting of a cluster of households around a centre,
topographical or economic - a well, a lake, a pond, a stream, a river,
or a hill. Most of the hamlets (and to some extent villages as well)
are not permanent settlements; their inhabitants are liable to migrate
to new settlements whenever circumstances warrant it. But the cities
and the towns are more permanent settlements. Some of the cities, like
Kano, Katsina and Zaria, are very old, being first settled hundreds of
years ago. Some of the towns were first settled in the nineteenth
century, having sprung up during or after the/^uslim uprisings (jihad).
Both the cities and the towns were originally chosen for settlement
because of economic ana military reasons but today they are essentially
metropolitan areas (Kano) or urban centres (Jos).
At the turn of the century, most hamlets and some villages were
inhabited by slaves (on Gandu farms), nomads (mostly Fulani or Tuareg)
1. In her description of Kano and its environs (especially Dorayi
village), Polly Hill contrasted the differences between the city
and its surrounding villages. See Hill, P., Population, Prosperity
and Poverty: Rural Kano. 1900-1970, Cambridge, 1977, pp.1-20.
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or animist tribes, who lived very near or on the top of hills, to
escape from slave raiders. Towns and cities were inhabited by free
uslims, their house slaves and trading strangers (or visiting traders).^
But today, most villages and hamlets are inhabited by Talakawa (indepen-
dent commoners) of different religious beliefs scattered over their
respective farmlands, hunting grounds or fishing lakes and rivers.
The cities and the towns are characterised not only by their demographic
densities but also in terms of the heterogeneity of the population in
their division of labour and differentiation of functions. Nevertheless,
Northern Nigerian society still remains a collection of tribal units
ruled by native chiefs and aristocrats and continuing in the main to
conform to their pre-colonial customs in all matters legal, social and
agrarian.
RURAL POVERTY
As an overwhelming majority of the population live in the rural
areas at subsistence level, by peasant farming land tenure is most
1. There are various accounts of village setting in Northern Nigeria
and the Western Sudan. Among others see, Barth, H., Travels and
Discoveries in North and central Africa, 1849-1855, London, 1890;
Shaw, Flora, L. (Lady Lugard) A Tropical dependency - An outline
of the Western Sudan with an account of the modern Settlement of
Northern Nigeria. London, 1905, Smith, P.M., Baba of Karo, A
Woman of the Muslim Hausa. London, 1954.
Talakawa (sing. Talaka) is loaned and naturalized into Hausa from
the Arabic word Talaq which means an independent (or free) person.
In the pidgin Arabic of the Southern Sudan, the word stands for an
independent person as opposed to a slave. In Hausa language Talaka
is often synonymous with a 'poor person'. It also denotes one who
does not hold an official title. Perhaps it is equivalent to a
yeoman as opposed to a serf in medieval England. But in political
terminology, Talakawa stands for commoners (the 'have nots') as
opposed to the aristocrats, the rich or the privileged (the
'haves').
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important to them. In Northern Nigeria, the land tenure sj/stem has
a double ancestry: the traditional African concepts of communal
ownership of land; and the Islamic law which recognizes individual
tenure.' But the basis of the present system of land tenure is communal
in that it is generally recognized by all communities that members
resident within a village area have the right to use as much of the
2
land around their area as they require. Although little is known of
the land tenure system in the pre-Jihad period, in the post-Jihad era
the ijuslim rulers arrogated to themselves ownership of all lands in
their respective areas of jurisdiction. This derived from the/nluslim
'Z
belief that Ardhul Anwati (the conquered land) belongs to the ruler.
However, the customary rights of the individual farmer to occupy and use
a patch of the land of his community survived. Although the farmers'
legal right to the land is usufructual, according to custom the farmers
have .effective security of tenure both for themselves and for their heirs.
The vast majority of rural dwellers are engaged in farming during
A
the rainy seasons. But in the dry seasons some of them engage in
trades other than farming in order to supplement the little incomes they
1. P. Hill's, Studies in Rural Capitalism in West Africa. Cambridge,
1970, is rather general but the system of land tenure she discusses
applies to many parts of Northern Nigeria.
2. There is an insightful analysis of this in Hill, P., Rural Hausa:
a Village and a setting, Cambridge, 1972. Although this is a
particular study of Batagarawa village in Kaduna state, the same
principles are generally recognized by most communities in Hausa
land.
3. Interview with Alhaji I.K. Alkali, Edinburgh, 4/2/76. However,
according to Alhaji Aminu Xano, Shehu Usman Dan Podio ruled that
land, like sunshine and air, belongs to God and that it was wrong
(in Islamic law) for any one to claim its ownership.
4. The rainy season is from May to October whereas the dry season is
from Nov. to April.
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make in farming. The types of trades which the farmers undertake
are determined by their respective wealth and, to some extent, by
social consideration (for example Fulani dislike such jobs as
butchering). The relatively well-to-do villagers tend to be long
distance traders, Qur'anic teachers etc. The middle income farmers
are generally craftsmen: dyers, weavers, blacksmiths etc. and local
traders. Poor farmers are usually non-landowning, e.g. servants,
labourers etc. (who do not own even the patches of land on which they
farm).'' Villagers produce not only food crops but also cash crops
to provide money for their household expenditure. In fact, the
average middle income farmer has to supplement his income with hand
craft productions, such as leather crafts, woodwork, etc. Almost
every sizeable village has its own hucksters, fullers, spinners, etc.
In addition to farming, poor farmers can find employment as communal
employees i.e. herdsmen, or labourers, just to eke out additional
2
income by other non-agricultural pursuits.
1. Hill, P., Rural Hausa, op.cit., pp.105-106 discusses this and the
wage rates of farm labouring.
2. Smith, M.G., The Economy of Hausa Communities of Zaria, A report,
to the colonial social science research Council, Colonial
Research Studies, No.16 (HMSO) London, 1955, p7l38, contains
data on production for subsistence and exchange.
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TABLE11:1 ANNUAL BUDGET OF A FARMING HOUSEHOLD, MISAU, BAUCHI
PROVINCE, 19391
Production Consumption Sales
Farm Produce: £ s. d. £ s. d. £ s. d.
Grain 3 17 9 3 15 9 2 0
2
Other food crops 2 11 9 10 7 2 1 2
Corn stalks 8 8 1 4 7 4
Cotton 1 0 0 — 1 0 0
Total £7 18 2 £4 7 8 £3 10 6
3
Other Production:
Donkey transport 15 0 — 15 0
Spun cotton 5 0 — 5 0
Mats 5 8 — 5 8
(Collected foods 5 0 5 o) —
(Homestead maintenance 5 0 5 o) —
(Firewood 5 0 5 0) —
Total £9 18 10 £5 2 8 £4 16 2
Recorded Purchases for
consumption:
Meat & milk at 4d per week








TOTALS £9 18 10 £8 1 6 £4 16 2
TAX 7s. 3d.
1 From data reportedby the agricultural officer, Bauchi province, Feb.1940
2 Including a small crop of ground-nuts.
3 There are no data for the value of household maintenance and collected
produce, a probable value has been assumed for some of these and
placed in square brackets.
4 These are certainly incomplete but the minor items need not have
amounted to more than two or three shillings.
1 . This table along with the explanatory notes are taken from Perham, M.
(ed.) Native Economies of Nigeria, London, 1946, p.130. It is based on
a study at Misau in Bauchi emirate. It should be noted that Misau has
more fertile land and thus its people are much richer than those in
some emirates e.g. some parts of Adamawa and Sokoto.
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NATURE OP MATERIAL POVERTY
The whole of Nigeria is a poor country by the standards of the
Western Industrial countries. But the levels of living for the masses
in Northern Nigeria towards the end of the colonial period was the
lowest in the country as table 1:2 below indicates."'
TABLE 1:22 REGIONAL DIVISION OP NATIONAL INCOME (1952)
West North East
Total N.I. £200m. £246m. £150m.
Population 7m. 15ai. 8m.
N.I. per head £29 £16 £19
However, the cost of basic foodstuffs, etc., differs from Region
to Region, and when 'adjusted' for such price levels the figures
become:
West - £26 North - £16 East - £23
Most people then and still live, very simply and their needs are basic.
They still own very little property and, even their household goods, are
3
most inadequate and dilapidated. In the rural areas, incomes are not only
4
very low by Nigerian national standard, but are also irregular. There, the
1. For example Perham, M. (edit) Native Economies of Nigeria, op.cit.,
contain a comparison on levels of consumption and money incomes between
the North and the Southern Regions in- pp.58-64 and 155-179. Also as a
trade unionist I know that when labourers wages were 5/- in the West
and Lagos; about 4/- in the East; it wa3 about 3/- on the North Region.
Wages in the Northern Region remained lower than in the rest of the
country up to 1969.
2. This regional division of national income is from Stapleton, G.B., The
Wealth of Nigeria, London,1958, p.95. A further discussion on the
relative poverty of Northern Region can be found in Nigeria, the polit¬
ical and economic background(prepared by the Royal Institute of Inter¬
national Affairs), Oxford, 1964.
3. I first came face to face with stark poverty in rural houses in Fika
emirate of Borno province (now Borno state) and I observed similar
situations during my visit to Sokoto in 1976.
4. A few villagers drift into the townships to take to all sorts of labour¬
ing jobs in the dry season but the overwhelming majority remain in the
villages unemployed until the return of the rainy season. There are also
natural causes of irregular income. For example, drought or quila birds
or locusts can often damage crops and thus bring great hardship on
farmers.
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people live from hand to mouth and they have scant security for the
future. In the Sahel areas of the far North, food is, at times, a
great problem because of shortage of rainfall and the spreading of the
Sahara desert. Although the food intake is above starvation level in
the Savannah zone, it is generally inadequate in nutritional content to
provide minimum safeguards to health.
Large numbers of Northerners have only one set of clothing which
is seldom washed. Typically, the same clothes are worn day and night
, Coarse
since pyjamas are unheard of and, even Gwado (a blanket of •oouroo cotton
cloth) is beyond the means of those who are very poor. I trust that
even without medical evidence, it is easy to imagine the hygenic
conseuqences of this poor clothing. Few people in the rural areas have
shoes on. Children up the age of seven roam about practically naked
and beyond that age, some boys wear Bante (a piece of cloth tied around
the waist which covers only the private parts). Women generally have
more and better clothes than men except for the poorest of women who
often have to be content with one Zani (a cloth wrapper measuring about
two square yards covering the body from the waist to the knees).''
Poor housing is another obvious evidence of poverty in Northern
Nigeria. The majority of the people live in poorly built, overcrowded,
insanitary and very scantily furnished homes (if at all they are
furnished) which lack nearly all basic amenities. The houses are often
1. Households survey data are hard to come by but those who are
familiar with Northern Nigeria do not need it anyway. However,
NEPU political songs are full eloquent exposition of the poverty
of the Northern masses and M. Gambo Hawaja's "A Yau Ba Maki NEPU
Sai Wawa," is the .most elegant versification of this.
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no more than shacks or hovels, round huts with thatched roofs dotted
in the savannah grasslands under the intense heat of the tropical
sunshine."' Nevertheless, housing is one of the aspects of which one can
say that rural inhabitants are in some cases better off than the poorest
in the urban areas who do not have even the miserable shelters of the
rural people. It is common to see beggars and truck pushers sleeping
day and night in front of public buildings (if they are allowed) and
2
under bridges or on the open fields and streets. In the rainy season
such poor fellows suffer from the heavy downpour of the tropical rains
and, in the dry season, strong, dusty winds (harmattan) fill the air
hence eyes are constantly sore and smarting throats irritated and lungs
afflicted. Potters, soap-makers, smiths, bakers and farmers carry out
their menial trades in and about their houses. Although these appalling
conditions constitute health hazards to the communities concerned, the
risks seem to be the greatest for infants who innocently play in the
rubbish while their parents looked rather unconcerned as they feel
relieved by anything that attracts the children away from their shoulders
and laps. The effects of all this on the health of the people and
subsequently on productivity are too obvious to be argued here.
1. The problem of housing and lack of even a decent shelter seem to me
to be more acute in Borno and Sokoto provinces where a good many
of the houses are made of corn stalks and there are few trees to
give comfortable shelter.
2. It seems to me that the worst areas are Gangaren Jos; Maciyan Dan
Auta, Zaria; and Bompai, Kano. Up to 1970s successive Nigerian
governments made unsuccessful efforts to return beggar and destitutes
back to their respective villages. Blind centres were built in
Kaduna, Yola and other provincial capitals but not enough to make
any impact.
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THE INSANITARY CONDITIONS' 0? THE POOR1
It seems the greatest of all the sanitary problems is the disposal
of human waste and this affects the urban slums as much as the rural
districts. In the rural districts, throughout Northern Nigeria, it is
the common practice to defecate in the fields, bushes or jungle areas
very near human habitation, consequently, villagers who normally walk
bare-footed are exposed to hook worms and all sorts of foot diseases;
the wind-blown fecal dust makes the eyes very sore, and when it rains
the parasites which thrives in human waste are washed into the rivers,
streams, lakes, ponds and wells from which water is obtained for
drinking and cooking purposes. Where latrine pits exist, they are
usually poorly constructed, shallow and surrounded by cesspools in which
the cockroaches that roam the houses at night reside in day-time; water
from them may also drain into wells, increasing the risk of cholera and
other diseases. In the urban slums the sanitary provisions are hardly
better than in the rural areas and may be worse. Some latrines are dry
and as such scavenging has to be done manually. The scavengers, who
are usually the poorest, tend to perform their jobs indifferently and
their carelessness accentuates health hazards. Most urban areas have
open drainage which both spreads germs and gives off obnoxious odours.
Little effort is made to improve sanitation as constructed latrines are
rarely used or, at best, misused and,due to public indifference, the
authorities are unconcerned about sanitary conditions. Consequently,
insanitary conditions result in the spread of many diseases which lead
to ill-health and physical weakness and this, in turn, minimises
economic productivity. If one agrees that poverty created the above
1. This account is based on my personal experience all over the North
but I first noticed it at Fika in Borno State. Manual night-soil-
men operate in all the urban centres. The writer attempted to
organize them into trade unions in Kaduna in 1965 but some of them
were so ashamed of their work that they did not want to expose
themselves by joining a Union.
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condition in the first place then the obvious conclusion is that the
poor are caught in a vicious circle which perpetuates their poverty.
SOME CHARACTERISTICS OF THE RULING CLASS
The underlying causes of the foregoing appalling conditions of
the poor people are partly economic, as social inequality and cultural
poverty are reflections of material poverty; and partly political,
because the administrations are not designed to benefit the people but
to subdue them and thereby facilitate their easy exploitation by the
ruling classes (see Chapter III). For the attitude of the ruling
classes in North towards the Talakawa is more like that of a hyena
towards a goat than that of a shepherd towards his flock, and has been
so since at least the mid-nineteenth century. For instance, Henry
Earth (who accompanied a Borno Commander on an expedition in 1850)
observed the senseless destruction of human life, prosperous villages,
which followed the capture of few thousand slaves, asked the Commander:
"Why not let these people cultivate in tranquility
and levy tribute on them?"
The Commander replied:
"That only by most violent means were they able to
crush these pagans, who cherished their indepen¬
dence and liberty above everything and that, that
was the reason why he had to burn all their granaries,
in order to subdue them with famine; and that even with
famine they were less sensible than he could wish, as
the water of the area provided them with unlimited
supply of fish." 1
1. H. Barth, op.cit., p.594, cited in Perham M., Native Administration
in Nigeria, Oxford 1962, p.45.
^3
Similarly, in 1904, F.D. Lugard observed that:
"Inherent in the system j_of administration/
was the ceaseless raiding for slaves, both
for use by the rulers and for payment of
the Sokoto caliphate. The country was thus
rapidly depopulated, since the numbers
captured, vast as they were, were but a
small proportion to those killed or left to
die of starvation. These raids were made
against independent pagan tribes... Raids
were also made upon the subject peoples
/muslims/ on the excuse of rebellion, or no
excuse at all. Where a Fulani army passed
it left a depopulated desert." 1
Destruction of life and property by the ruling class continued well into
2
the 1960s especially in Mumuye and Wurkun Districts of Gongola State.
However it must be admitted that their prevalence and intensity was
minimised under the moderating influence of British colonial
administrators. The rationale for those atrocities was the ruling class
belief that the more prosperous their subjects became the less coercible
they would be. So, the strategy was to make the Talakawa economically
dependent so as to make their political control effective. This shows
how the emirate system of government rested, in part, on the poverty
of the subjects.
1. Lugard, F.D., op.cit., p.7.
2. Unquotable sources informed the writer that two District Heads were
deposed in Muri, on the insistence of British District officers,
for ordering their servants to destroy pagan villages. Many
villagers were killed in Wurkun in similar circumstances. In
1943, Abubakar Imam complained to Lord Lugard on the atrocities
of District rulers in the North: See Hew Nigerian (Special
Supplement) Wednesday, 17 January 9779, p.11. After independence,
N.P.C. government kept a blind eye on what happened to villagers
in the rural districts (see chapter III).
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TAXATION AS A MEANS OP POLITICAL CONTROL
In pre-Jlhad Hausaiand (as in the post-Jihad administration)
slave-raids were meant to supplement the income of the rulers, which
mainly derived from levies, which tended to impoverish their subjects.
The(Muslim rulers inherited from their Habe predecessors an onerous
system of taxation. In addition to Kudin-Kasa or Kndir.-Gona (land tax)
every handicraft (weavers, dyers, blacksmiths, etc.) was taxed. Also
caravans, canoe-owners, sellers in the market, all alike paid tax, while
a sort of death duty was enforced."' When the British colonial super¬
structure was imposed upon Northern Nigeria in 1902, the aim of the
British administration was to regulate this incidence of taxation by, on
the one hand, freeing the peasantry from oppressive impacts and, on the
other hand, enforcing uniform payment of "a fair and just" tribute of
2
which the new colonial government claimed a share. This assured a fair
revenue to the Emirs, in lieu of their former sources of wealth which
consisted in slaves, booty from raids and in taxes. In this way taxes
paid by peasants continued to support large numbers of idle Princes, office¬
holders and armed retainers. Thus in Northern Nigeria, as in most
developing countries, peasant farmers generate most of the economic surplus
that support the ruling strata while the methods of extracting this
surplus remains the core of their social and political problems.^
1. Fika, A.M., "The political and Economic Reorientation of Kano
Emirate, Northern Nigeria 1882-1940", Ph.D. thesis, London University,
1973, pp.74-75.
2. Lugard, F.D., The Political Memoranda, London, 1919, pp.165-215.
3. There is a general but insightful discussion by Williams, G. and
Turner, T., "Nigeria: politics and political economy", in Dunn,
J., (ed.) West African States: Failure and Promise, Cambridge, 1978,
pp.132-172; Also see Williams, G., (ed.) Nigeria: Economy and
Society, London, 1976. The parasitic nature of the ruling class is
better exposed in Williams, G., "Inequalities and class in Rural
Nigeria", unpublished paper 1979, p.11.
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Although the British tried hard to rationalize the system of tax
collection in order to minimise appropriations by intermediaries and
to increase the State's share of revenue, taxation remained at a high
level in Northern Nigeria throughout the colonial period. 'Taxes were
not reduced to match any fall in agricultural prices; and often they
amounted to half or even most of a farmer's cash income. One of the
effects of this has been the continued destitution of the Talakawa
which results in the poor nutrition and the material poverty enumerated
above as most of their cash incomes (at times most of their belongings)
2
went to pay taxes. For example Naael attributed the poverty of the
NUPE Talakawa in part to the appropriation of a substantial share of
farm output in the form of tithes, rents, official salaries, etc., and
the share of taxes which accrued to the privy purse of the royal house.
In the Bida emirate, as in the emirates of Hausaland, the ruling classes
had a great capacity to exact rents from the fiefs to which they lay
claim. On the Banchi Plateau, Gwoza and Adamawa Hills areas which are
lacking in export crop and thus in lucrative markets for food crops,
the Talakawa suffered particularly from lack of money necessary to pay
1. See Perham, M., Native Administration in Nigeria, op.cit., pp.51-54.
There is a more detailed discussion on the relation of taxation to
income including income data in Forde, D. and Scott, R. in Perham
(edit) The Native Economies of Nigeria, op.cit., pp.164-187.
2. This account is drawn from Nadel, S.F'., A Black Byzantium, The
Kingdom of Nune in Nigeria, Oxford, 1942, pp.162-165 in which he
discusses taxation.
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even for taxes, clothing and supplementary food. Thus, Forae
perceptively observed that in general Northern Nigerian farming
households in the early 1940s were unable to obtain an adequate
supply of items necessary to their diet, ana were usually unable to find
the £3 or so they needed to meet the "customary standards of
consumption in supplementary foodstuffs, clothing... and personal
services", because the annual tax-payment constituted a very heavy
reduction in the real cash income available for such expenditure.
From the foregoing we can see that neither production for the
market nor the subordination of peasant farmers to political
authorities outside their respective communities were colonial
innovations in the emirates of Northern Nigeria. Although the British
administrative reorganization (1910-1925) made the emirates' control
over outlying districts more effective, the ruling class have always
maintained a patrimonial form of administration over the rural
populations. They also provided for their own consumption through
1. Having come from Ja£ingo town in Muri Division, Adamawa province, I
am familiar with some of the causes of poverty in Adamawa and Gwoza
area and having worked for the U.A.C. in Jos (1961-1964) I know
Bauchi and Jos Flateau fairly well. The problem of tax collection
and poverty is also documented. See, among others Kirk-Greene,
A.H.M., "Tax and travel among the hill tribes of Northern Adamawa",
in Africa, Vol.XXVI, No.1, 1956, PP.369-378; Koko, A., "Northern
Nigerian District Officer, past, present and future," In The
Nigerian Journal of Public Affairs, Vol.11, No.1, 1971, pp.29-38;
Smith, M.G., "Kagoro Political Development", In Human Organization.
Vol.19, No.3, 1950, pp.137-149.
2. Forde, D., in Perham, M. (edit), op.cit., pp.163-164. The quotation
below is taken from p.164 thereof.
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taxing their subjects, appropriating slaves and tributes from
conquered tribes; exactions on trade and commerce; and by maintaining
estates worked by a form of slave labour. Hence in contrast to the
poverty of the peasant producers, the ruling class, rich merchants and
members of the State bureaucracy (most of whom resided in the cities,
urban centres and district headquarters) were comparatively better off.
The British organization of the Native Administrations (N.A.;
discussed in Chapter III) reduced the incidence of abuses but it also
stabilized the sources of income of the ruling classes and thus provided
them with the regular income necessary to maintain the pattern of
expenditure needed to preserve their privileges and statuses. In
addition to what Fulani call Barka Lamu (the fruits of office), the
ruling class, their attendants and N.A. functionaries received regular
salaries and had gratuity and pension entitlements on their retirements.
This clearly differentiated the Masu-Sarauta (the office holding
aristocracy) from the rural populations by their wealth, landholdings
and political power.
SOCIAL INEQUALITY
A comprehensive analysis of the class relations of Northern
Nigerian society and its political implications is not only beyond the
scope of this chapter, but would present grave difficulties at present.
Apart from the familiar problems of applying class concepts and class
analysis to largely 'peasant societies',^ in the Northern Nigerian case
1. See the introductory chapter in Shanin, T., The Awkward class,
Oxford, 1972 also see his peasant & peasant society, Penguin 1971;
and Berger, J., Pig Earth. Writers & Readers Cooperative, 1979.
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the data for such analysis are scarce and hard to cone by.^ Further
the attempt would raise numerous problems. For example, Northern
Nigerian producers derive their incomes from various productive,
distributive and other activities. Farmers are also commonly traders
or labourers or tailors and, in some respects their farm incomes may
depend on their non-farming earnings. In a life time people can shift
from, say, wage labour to fanning, to trading; or combine all and
retain farming as their main source of income. This is why we do not
intent to classify people into classes in the aggregate. Instead, our
focus is on the simple divisions of Kausa society arising from
historical religious and ethnic factors as well as gender, status and
wealth.
The concept of social inequality is very much associated with two
interlocking but conceptually different, social processes. One is the
"appropriate" allocation of material rewards attached to different
positions in the social hierarchy and, the other, is the process of
2
recruitment to these positions. Modern Nigeria exhibits forms of
inequality arising from both economic and political power. For example
the new "breed of intermediaries", who act as middlemen between foreign
firms and government departments, have acquired great political
influence because of their wealth. They are also buying titles from
the traditional elites and thus achieving for themselves high social
status.
1. G. Williams, unpublished paper, op.cit.
2. This concept is ably analysed by Westergaard, J., "Class, Inequality
and Corporation", In Hunt, A. (edit) Class ana Class structure,
London, 1978, pp.165-185.
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DIVISIONS IN HAUSA SOCIETY: ETHNICITY AND RELIGION
Northern Nigerian Society is divided on ethnic and historical
lines as, for instance the distinction between Pulani and Habe (non-
Fulani). The word Habe denotes fijuslims of non-Pulani origin, both of
1
slave and of free descent, so Hausa are Habe. Among the Northern
Nigerian ethnic groups an individual derives his ethnic status from his
father. Thus a child of a Pulani father by a Munmye slave woman is
Pulani. Following their conquest of the Hausa States during the
Jihad period, the new Fulani rulers established harems of non-Pulani
women, in part symbolising their dominant position. This extensive
opportunity for recruiting concubines from their own slaves and other
non-Pulani tribes helped to create social stability in the sense that
it served as a form of political alliance between powerful clients,
non-fiuslim chiefs and the Emirs.
2
In this way the children of Habe mothers were assimilated into
the Pulani ruling aristocracy. However, Kabe may also be assimilated
to Pulani affiliation through their Pulani mothers. This does not
mean that all Pulani have high status, on the contrary, most of them
are among the ruled, thereby giving the word Pulani, a differing
political and ethnic reference. In Northern Nigeria, the rule of
1. The Hausa themselves refer to the animists as Arna (a derogatory
Hausa word for pagans (sing: Arne) while the Kanuri of Borno
call them Kirdi (equally derogatory as Arna). But in the Fulfulde
speaking areas of Adamawa, Gombe, Muri, the word Habe refers to
animists or any native of non-Pulani descent. See P. Salamone,
"Becoming Hausa: Ethnic identity, change and its implications for
the study of ethnic Pluralism and Stratification" In Africa 45? 4
(1975) 410-24. "The Serkawa of Yauri: Class, Status or Party?"
In African Studies Res. 18, 1 (1975) 88-101.
2. Under Irjuslim law the child of a slave concubine by her master is a
free member of the master's family having equal rights of inherit¬
ance with other issues on its father's death. In this way, most,
if not all Emirs, in Northern Nigeria had (or still have pagan
cousins).
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succession is observed, by both Fulani and Habe alike. With few
exceptions only the sons of the past rulers are eligible to succeed
to the throne. This principle applies to the lesser offices of the
State with hereditary nature.
Compared to the Hausa and the Pulani of the far Worth, the animist
tribes of the/Middle Belt, had inferior technology; lived in smaller
settlements; and had their own peculiar mode of social organization.
All these combined to leave them relatively defenceless against slave
raiders to whom they formed the legitimate target of slave raids and
tribute exactions. Traditionally, the nearest they came to independence
was by recognizing the suzerainty of the Pulani rulers and by payments
of tribute. This is why they are generally regarded by all muslims,
and especially by the Pulani, as the lowest social group. In the
Emirates, the animists are looked upon with extreme contempt. In the
eyes of the Pulani ruling aristocracy all pagans are uncouth and
unreliable. That these animists groups put together form about 30c/o ^
of the population of Northern Nigeria is not of great significance to
the Pulani aristocracy.
The religious division of Northern Nigerian sociaty is due to the
fact that the far North (Emirates) is predominantly muslim and, as such,
it received its culture over 500 years ago across the Sahara from
Middle Eastern sources. Thus in addition to an obscure myth of
common origin'in the East', and a common religion, there are certain
common social and political ideas and purposes which link the muslim
2
parts of Northern Nigeria with North Africa. The Middle Belt remains
1. This oercentage {30fo) is quoted from the Nigerian Year Book, Lagos,
1970. .
2. There^many literature which analysed the factors linking Nigeria and
North Africa. For example see Hodgkins, T.L. educative analysis in
"The Battle for the Maghred", In Political Quarterly, Vol.29, No.4,
1958, pp.348-355.
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largely animist and therefore indigenous in religion and culture,
though during this century, both Christian and latterly muslim
proselytization has occurred, without apparently creating marked
religious tension. These contrasting influences have led to two
distinct patterns of social political settings. Although the peoples
of Northern Nigerian origin are commonly referred to as "Northerners"
(indicating Northern solidarity), especially in Southern Nigeria, and
despite the fact that the North is apparently more homogenous than the
South, these internal distinctions within the Northern communities are
there for all to see.
WEALTH AND STATUS
Because "classes" in the sense of distinct and selfconscious socio¬
economic groups having autogenistic economic and political relations
with other socio-economic groups are not the predominant social
categories in Northern Nigeria, we focus this section on the notion of
2
status based on birth and social placement. What militates against
the 'contradictions of the capitalist mode of production becoming
3
increasingly social in nature is the family bond linking the rich and
1. The recent controversy in the Constituent Assembly (1978) and the
tension it generated, over the Shari'ah issue, did not go beyond the
debating chamber.
2. According to Smith, M.G., "The Hausa system of social status", In
Africa. Vol.29, No.3, 1959, pp.239-251, 'Social placement' refers to
a position an individual occupies.and belongs to in the society;
whereas 'social status' implies that such placements have a common
basis and hierarchical form (p.239).
3. On the 'capitalist mode of production', See Marx, K. Capital, A
Critique of political economy, Vol.1, (S. Moore and S. Aveling, trans,
and edited by P. Engels), London 1977, pp.173-180. Also see Marx's
Pre-capitalist Economic Formations (edited and with introduction by
Hobsbawm,E.) London, 1978, especially pp.1-65.
VV 'b
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the poor, literate and the illiterate, the influential and the
insignificant. The Emir, the chief, the title-holder, or the rich,
may have a brother, a sister, a relation or a friend who might be
very poor - labourer, peasant farmer, destitute etc. - but to their
credit it would never occur to them to hide their lowly relatives as
might be the case in Britain or in all Western Europe and North America.
The extended family system, good neighbourliness and Amana (a
combination of trust and loyalty) bridge the divisions between the
strata. As family boundaries overlap those of strata, perception of
elite status does not necessarily imply hostility or class antagonism.
The poor look up to the rich with admiration rather than with
envy or jealousy. Wealth is seen as something bestowed upon the rich
by God:'' it is rarely perceived as having been amassed by Zam'ba
2
(cheating or exploitation) or Riba(profiteering). The Hausa saying
Arziki Kvautan Allah (wealth is the gift of God) supports this.
Enterprising young men aspiring for success in business normally
identify themselves with the already established businessmen hence the
adoption of such names " Tjbale Na Alhaji Abdulnadir" or "Alhaji Abdul-
Kadir Na Alhaji Mafl/sur". Ubale identifies himself with Alhaji Abdul
Kadir (as Alhaji Abdul Kadir did to Alhaji Mafcjfsur before he became well
1. This attitude towards the rich is not peculiar to Hausa; Lloyd, P.O.,
Power and Independence: Urban Africans' Perception of Social
Inequality, London, 1974, pp.174-178, observed a similar attitude
among the Yo3fuba.
2. The Hausa word Zamba also means fraud and swindling; Riba which
ordinarily means profit also means profiteering which makes it
immoral in Islam and thus illegal in Islamic law. Again the
Yoruba also have similar words Kalabule (commercial cheating) and
Gvinabu (adroit trade malpractice;, according to A. Omotosho.
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established) in anticipation of patronage and help from his 'Master'
to enable him establish his own independent business later in life.
Thus instead of class hostility we find in Northern Nigerian society
relations of Biyayya (deference) and Para,la (prestige). Dara.ia. does
not necessarily carry with it the assumption of wealth and political or
economic power but it is simply of high social status based on birth,
education and the holding of an official title. Some people are also
evaluated on the age they have reached. For instance, depending on
individual merit and moral qualities, distinction is made between Tsoho
(old man) and Dattiio (a respectable gentleman or a mature man). In
this way social superiority can be achieved without acquiring wealth or
power or both. Since this status system is all embracing class
antagonism is not yet manifest. However, this does not mean that no
lines of distinction are to be drawn in the social structure.^
GENDER
Generally speaking, the female is socially inferior to the male in
2
all parts of Nigeria. Within the various social categories, women
are lower in status than men. In the Middle Belt, women do take part
in many economic and social activities. Among the Jukuns and the
Igbirra women even hold high political offices,J but that does not
1. For more details on the various social gradations see Smith, M.G.,
"The Hausa system of Social Status", op.cit. and Greenberg, J.H.,
"Islam and Clan Organization Among the Hausa", In South Western
Journal of Anthropology, Vol.3, 1947, pp.193—211.
2. It seems that this is not peculiar to Nigeria or to African countries.
See Mitchell, J., Woman's Estate, Penguin, 1971, pp.41-54.
3. This point was discussed in greater detail elsewhere. See my
"Nigerian Politics: The causes and the effects of the Civil War,"
unpublished seminar paper, Dept. of Sociology, Leeds University,
1976, pp.4-8.
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enhance their social status to equal that of men. But among some
tribes, as with the Munmye, married women are regarded as the property
of their husbands and are often inherited by sons (except for their
own mothers). This does not, of course, include the new Christian
converts who as Christians have accepted Western European culture to
varying degrees. Among the /muslim community women are legal minors and
2
both legally and economically are the wards of men. In Islam women
have a religious duty to marry, and so, in most parts of the far North,
some unmarried women are considered prostitutes. But the general
Hausa word for prostitutes Karuwai (sing: Karuwa). applies to women who
live independently and who are known to serve male clients for financial
reward. Unmarried women who live with their parents or relations are
called Bazawarai (sing: Bazawara).
Marriages may be polygamous because the Qur'an says:
"If you are afraid that you will treat the orphans
unjustly, then marry what women seem good to you,
twos, threes and fours; if you are afraid you
will not deal equitably, then one; or what your
right hands possess (i.e. slave concubines); then
you are more likely not to be unfair"
1. For a detailed discussion on the political status of women, see
Sanday, P.R., "Female Status on the Public Domain", in Rosaldo,
M.Z. and Lamphere, L., (edits) Woman, Culture and Society, Standford,
1974, pp.189-206. ""
2. The legal obligation of the male/Muslim towards his family and,
especially, therights and obligation of women is ably discussed by
Hinchcliffe, D., "The Status of Women in Islamic Law", in Brown,
G.N. and Hiskett, M., Conflict and Harmony in Education in
Tropica! Africa, London, 1974, pp.455-466.
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(The Qur'art verse 4:3). Thus Islam permits maleMuslims to marry up
to four wives at the same time, on the condition that all the wives
will be treated EQUALLY. Within the polygamous households, in'Muslim
areas, co-wives are ranked in seniority by reference to marriage order
to the common husband.'' Divorce is allowed under Maliki law (i&islim
law) by the simple repudiation of the wife by the husband or by the
wife's desertion and refusal to return to the husband's house. Common
law wives (concubines) are also allowed as some schools of thought hold
that a male muslim is permitted to take as many concubines as he can
2
afford to maintain. All common law wives share the same status,
below that of married women.
Wives, as well as concubines, can be kept in purdah. While purdah
is still the ideal and is widely practised, poverty or education (among
other factors) may lead to its abandonment by individual husbands.
Prestige is in relation to the degree of purdah imposed and it is more
1. Baba of Karo's personal experience is an educative inside story
of this. See Smith, M.F., Baba of Karo. London, 1954.
2. Nevertheless, polygamy is a very controversial topic among the
Ulema. Some 'muslims hold that it is allowed only on the condition
that all the wives are treated equally (the key word and, hence the
emphasis, is Equality) and, since this condition is impossible to
meet in practice, they maintain that it amounts to prohibition.
On the problems of reform of marriage and inheritance in Islam,
see Watt, W.M., Muhammad: Prophet and Statesman, Oxford, 1977,
pp.151 -166. For a scathing attack on the practice of polygamy in
Northern Nigeria, see Isa Wali,"The True position of 'Women in Islam,"
In Nigerian Citizen, 18 July, 1956. p.6. Although the Jones'
account is a manual with special reference to conditions of women
in India, it is a remarkable elaboration of Isa Walib views. See
Bevan-Jones, V.L. and L., Woman in Islam, Lucknow, 1941, especially
pp.177-193. There is a study of the status of women in the muslim
world in general, with particular stress on legal and socioeconomic
fields in Beck, L., and Keddie, M. (edits) Women in the Muslim
World, Cambridge, Mass. 1978.
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significant to the prestige of the husband than for that of the wives.
So, full purdah is practiced by the aristocratic families of the far
North whose wives and concubines work within the confine of their
respective compounds, whereas their servants and maids do what has to
be done outside the compounds. Commoners, especially in the rural
areas, practice partial purdah as their wives ana children often help
imposed no such restrictions on their wives. Thus, in this traditional
setting the male takes priority over the female. This ascribed
superiority of the male over the female partly derived from the men's
ability to excludethe women from socially productive work and thus
restrict them to private housework; and partly it stems from women's
economic dependence on men which leads to their being physically
determined as inferior to men. Ethnic and religious differences
notwithstanding the overall inferioriaation of women is total in the
whole of Nigeria.
ELITE STATUS AND OFFICE-HOLDING
Another general differentiation in Hausa society is the
2
distinction between the rulers and the ruled. In this rough division
there is, on the die hand, the Sarakuna (rulers) and Masu Sarauta
(political office holders) and, on the other hand, the Talakawa
1. For the account of the economic activities of' Hausa women in purdah,
see Hill, P., "Hidden Trade in Hausalana", In Man, Vol.4, No.5,
1969, pp.392-409.
2. Among some of the non-muslim communities being a chief does not
entail exemption from work and thus the degree of the exploitation
of the common people is very much lesser than what is obtained in
the Muslim areas.
them with farm work and draw water for domestic use
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(Commoners). In Hausaland, the rulers exercise considerable authority
over the ruled and, therefore, have high status. Their authority is
partly derived from the misinterpretations of the Qur'an by venal
Malams (See Chapter II) who claim that Islam invested the rulers with
the religious sanctions of Allah's will and thus provides religious and
moral support for their rule; and partly by their domination of all
the institutions of command and control. Following this their status
comes from their effective control of all administrative appointments and
through the enormous wealth"' they accumulated from the
exploitation of the peasantry. Thus, the complete monopoly of power
and patronage by the rulers marks the greatest social distinction in
Hausaland. The distinction between the rulers and the ruled accordingly
divides the society into two clearly defined strata: the one
subordinate to the other. As we have seen above the same basic idea
is expressed in ethnic terms, because the official systems are co¬
extensive with the society. Office holders include persons drawn from
all significant status levels and in so far as the society is highly
differentiated, offices and their holders are also status differentiated.
Hence only Princes can seek the throne and only 'slaves' (see below)
2
are eligiole for slave offices. But, on the whole, the status of the
Pulani ruling lineage, in particular and the entire aristocracy in general,
1. Russell has compared and contrasted the enormous wealth of Fulani
Emirs as opposed to the abject poverty of their subjects, based on
her observations at Jalingo, Yola, Kafanchan and Katsina. See
Russell, E., Bush life in Nigeria (Privately published) by Sir
Kenneth Maddocks, Abbey House, Sutton Moutis, Yeovil, Somerset, 1978.
2. The distinction between slave offices and royal offices are discussed
below. Smith's didactive analysis on the statuses of slaves is
based on his observation in Zaria but the same principle applies in
varying degree to all Hausaland. See Smith, M.G., op.cit.
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is higher than that of other Fulani. Their male members are each
Yerima or Jauro (a Prince); and their females are each a Gimbiva or
Mairam (a Princess). According to convention, their privileges
included their exemption from the payment of taxes.^
2
The Fadawa (sing: Bafade 'courtiers and royal attendants') occupy
a high status in Hausa society because of their proximity to the
Sarakuna. The majority of Fadawa are commoners but their status varies
with the rank of the official they serve. In this way it sometimes
happens that the client of a man who has never held office may outrank
the agents of some officials. The official system reflects the status
differentiation current in the Emirates but it can neither relate one
status to another consistently nor supply an invariable principle of
social classification. Indeed, the official system is quite marginal
to status placement and it is neither as uniform nor as consistent as
it may seem. In this case, it seems the only consistent principle which
holds is the convention that only the aristocracy are eligible to
compete for those offices which come to be theirs, as only members of the
learned families, Malamai (clerics) are eligible for legal and religious
positions, to which individuals are appointed on the basis of their
Islamic learning and particularly their knowledge of jurisprudence
(FIQH) and the Maliki law.
The Malamai (sing: Malam) form a group which is so heterogeneous as
1. This confirmed that taxation (or the payment of taxes) was an
admission of subjection and thus taxes were seen by both the rulers
and the ruled as a substitute to the payment of tributes.
2. This group include a large number of spies, intriguers and wire¬
pullers. In some respects the3/ resemble the large number of "retainers"
around Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia as described by Markakis,
J., Ethiopia, Anatomy of traditional Polity, Adis Ababa, 1974,
pp.229-259. " ~~ ' "
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to defy any general ranking status. Although senior judicial offices,
like Alkalai (sing: Alkali) and religious offices like Imams. etc.
are held by this group, the group itself has no definite general status.
However, they may be considered part of the establishment not only
because they dominate the judicial and religious institutions but also
because of their manifold relationship with the aristocracy. Each
Ma lam has definite religious duties alotted to him for which he is
appropriately remunerated. These duties include naming babies,
marriages, burial of different classes, etc. Furthermore, the Malamai
as a whole, are the principal recipients of public alms and Zakkat (the
equivalent of tithes). To the extent that they enjoy these benefits,
some Malamai holding office as Imam etc. are partially independent of
official support. Despite the religious nature of their social
functions, some official Malamai often act very much like the Sarakuna.
This is because their official recognition and hence their access to the
(political) court inject a political ingredient in their activities.
On the whole, the Malamai are highly respected because as religious
leaders they are seen as the moral guardians of their communities.
Hence the Hausa epithet: Malamai Magada Annabawa (the Malamai are the
successors of Prophets). As pious men and diviners, they pray for the
safety and success of the rulers and of the commoners. In this way
they are taken into confidence by both the rulers and the ruled alike.
Through the process of private consultations with their clients, they
get to know the commoners' views on public issues: what the commoners
want and expect of their rulers. Since the same Malamai are also
advisers to the rulers on Islamic affairs they tend to suggest popular
public policies while justifying their opinions by using Islamic religious
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tenets. In this intermediary role between the rulers and their
subjects, the Malamai directly and indirectly participate in the attempt
to solve public issues and conflicts. They participate in the
deliberations, in the decision-making and in the coordination of action
in matters of policy.^
The aforementioned social and political order in the Emirates
seems to have a high absorptive capacity, but in reality those absorbed
are not treated exactly as the members of the ruling classes, or even
as those who might have inherited their offices. Hence the difference
between Karda and Shigegge and other official title-holders comes to
2
light. Karda refers to ascribed status which to Hausa is very
important and, as such, is held in very high regard. It is applied
even to occupational groups. The son of a hunter is socially expected
to become a hunter when he grows up but if, for instance, he chooses to
become a fisherman, he will be looked upon as a Nouveaux Riche and
treated as a Shigegge (see below) in the trade. The usual Hausa
blessings for children which reflect the depth of this belief is:
Allah Yasa Kagaji Baba or Yaro Magajin Baba (may you inherit your father's
occupation). Hausa sayings like: Dan Ha Gada Yafi Dan Na Kova
(ascribed familiarity is better than acquired skill; or such songs as:
Yaro Nemi Magani Ga Ubanka, (Boy, learn a skill from your father)
1. Mr. A. Cohen's work is a study of Hausa Malamai among the Hausa
settlers in Ibadan, Western Nigeria but it is indicative of the
general practice in Hausaland itself. See Cohen, A., Custom and
Politics in Urban Africa, London, 1969, pp.205-207. For a detailed
analysis -of the social functions of muslim scholars in Hausaland,
see Last, M.D., The Sokoto Caliphate, London, 1967, pp.lxxvi-lxxx;
and his "Aspects of Administration and Dissent in Hausaland, 1800-
1968", In Africa, Vol.XL, No.4, 1970, pp.545-354.
2. A very useful analysis of the distinction between Karda and
Shigegge is made by Kirk-Greene, A.H.M., in his "The merit principle
in an African Bureaucracy: Northern Nigeria", in Rivkin, A., (ed.)
Nations by Design. 1968, pp.205-258.
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Uban Wani Bayi Baka Saidai Naka. (somebody else's father won't teach
you, only yours will); all confirm the Hausa's deep belief in
inheritance and admiration for ascribed status. The Shigegge are those
who are freely appointed or recruited and thus have achieved status.
While the Karda can go wrong and thio excused as Kuskure (a mistake)
the Shigegge's mistake is regarded as a reflection of the lack of the
Karda's ascribed familiarity (Ba Saban Ba). The existence of this type
of attitude towards those who achieved status suggests that there might
be some dormant resentment by the new recruits against the system but
since the expression of dissent is not accepted and can be ruthlessly
treated when it occurs, such frictions do not come to light. Nevertheless,
the possibility of its existence cannot be completely ruled out.''
The Emirates traditional system of taxation subjected traders,
craftsmen, farmers and other producers to special taxes which were
collected by officials separately for each category. Thus, there were
chiefs of blacksmiths (Sarkin-Makera), of weavers (Sarkin-Masaka) etc.
In Pulani ruled Emirates, these occupational offices were mainly filled
by Habe and, in all the Emirates, they were clearly subordinate to
those filled by Pulani, being charged only with tax collection and the
organization of supplies required by the Emir. When taxation was
reorganized (after the British conquest) and the special rates abolished,
the formal hierarchies of occupational offices simply lapsed, but the
1. There are interesting accounts of how verbal and active dissent
are dealt with within Northern Nigerian palace politics in Whitaker,
Jr. C.S., The Politics of Tradition: Continuity and Change in
Northern Nigeria, 1946-1966, Princeton, 1970; Smith, M.G. Government
in Zazzau, London, 1960: Smith, Sir Bryan Sharwood, But Always as
-■"hi end s . London, 1970; Paden, J.N., Religion ana Political Culture in
Kano, California, 1973.
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occupational groups upon which they were based remained unaffected
and thus the titles still exist. This shows the error of defining
social units in purely political terms.
STATUS IN NON-MUSLIM SOCIETIES
Amongst the less complex animist communities of the Middle Belt,
the pattern of social status is very different, except among the Jukuns
and the Igbirras where the system is, to some extent, similar to that
of the Emirates. For example, among the egalitarian TIV and Munmye,
social status is attributed to two things: age (the principle of
gerontocracy) or the acquisition of high spiritual powers. The eldest
man in the village is often the most respected but the man with high
Akombo (spiritual powers among the TIV)^ or the Pantigiriri (the rain¬
maker among the Munmye tribe) is both respected and feared because of
his magical powers (Tsafi). The holders of these offices of power which
are achieved and not ascribed, enjoy high status socially but have no
political power. Similarly, heads of large extended families, who
usually live together in compounds, are also very much respected. In
tribes who have no centralized political organization, old men who
happen to be the keepers (or the caretakers) of the shrines, arbitrate
in disputes and as such enjoy high social status. In many areas of the
Middle Belt, chieftaincy institutions are of recent creation and so
they do not carry the same influence as is the case in the Emirates.
1. This information on the TIV is drawn from Mead, M., Cultural Pattern
and Technical Change. Paris, 1965* p.96. Also see Bohannan, L.,
"Political Aspects of TP/ social organization", In Middleton, J.,
and Tait, D., (eds.) Tribes Without Rulers, London, 1958, pp.33-56.
My information on the Munmye is the result of my interview with
M. Muhammadu Bello Kassa, M.H.A., Vakilin Kassa, at Kano, 1978.
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However, many are adopting the political organization of the Emirate
although their chiefs donot enjoy the same social status or exercise
the same political power as their counterparts in the Emirates. The
animist tribes, more especially their youth, who are educated and thus
are Christians, are as aware as they are equally resentful of the
contempt with which they are held in the Emirates. This in part led
to what came to be known as "The Middle Belt Controversy", and became
(in 1963) an explosive political issue in Nigeria.^
SOCIAL MOBILITY OP SLAVES
The appointment of slaves or persons of slave origin to high
offices of the state shows one of the patterns of upwards social mobility
in the Hausa system of social status (discussed above). That they
were the law enforcing agents in the pre-colonial period shows that
they were a factor in the maintenance of social order (discussed below).
The legacy of slavery and the slave mentality of uncritical obedience
to the State exist in Northern Nigeria today, in that slaves were the
precursors of the Fadawa group discussed above as well as in the sense
that the Native Authority Police (see Chapter III) took over the
functions previously performed by janissaries (slaves). On the other
side of the same coin, the 'modernised' Native Authority staff also
performed the functions discharged by slaves in the pre-colonial
1. For an official view on the origin of the Middle Belt disturbances
of 1960-66, read the memoirs of a former colonial governor of
Northern Nigeria during whose tenure of office the crisis began to
surface, see Smith, Sir Bryan Sharwood, op.cit. Martin Dent whose
account differs from the official view and, for which he left the
Northern Nigerian Civil Service, was a District Officer in TIV
Division. See Dent, M., "A minority party - The United Middle
Belt Congress", In Mackintosh, J.P., Nigerian Government and
Politics. London, 1966, pp.461-507.
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bureaucracy. This explains in part the deferential attitudes and
self-effacing behaviour of N.A. workers. In addition the power of
the Emirs to promote without creating envy or to destroy without
creating danger any employee of the N.A. was reminiscent of the way
slaves were treated before the advent of the British.
That slavery existed in Nigeria from time immemorial up to the
early twentieth century needs no emphasis here.^ Although one of the
noble objectives of British colonialism was to stop the slave trade,
they did not find it desirable to eradicate domestic slavery in Northern
Nigeria. However, the British stopped slave raids and made slavery
illegal. In practice, this meant that slaves were given 'permissive
freedom', i.e. they could run away from their masters and the courts
would not support the masters in getting back the slaves. This gradual
policy of abolishing slavery over a long period of time is, partly
responsible for the existence of voluntary 'slaves' in some parts of
2
Northern Nigeria today. When "the legal status" of slaves was abolished
(on 31st March 1901) many slaves remained with their masters and the
British subtly supported this by not taking steps to make the law
3
effective or even to indicate its purpose.
1. Literature on Slavery in Nigeria abounds. To mention only a few,
see Lugard, F.D., Political Memoranda: Revision of Instructions to
Political Officers on Subjects Chiefly Political and Administrative,
1913-1918, London, 1919, pp.217-248. Miers, S. and Kopytoff, I.
(eds.) "slavery in Africa, Madison, Wis., 1977, especially, pp.85-
102, 121-154; Mason, M., "Captive and Client Labour, the Economy of
the Bida Emirate, 1857-1901," in Journal of African History, Vol.14,
No.3, 1973, pp.453-471. For a useful discussion in Islam and
Slavery in Senegal which bears a remarkable resemblance with Northern
Nigeria, see Kleitf, M.A., Islam and Imperialism in Senegal, 1847-
194, Edinburgh, 1968. A general discussion on Slavery in West
Africa can befound in Grace, J., Domestic Slavery in West Africa,
London, 1975.
2. In traditional Northern Nigerian Society the distinction between a
'slave' and a 'servant' is a highly academic one. For one thing
voluntary slaves exist and, for another, most of the servants in
Emirs' palaces insist on being slaves for reasons discussed below.
3. See Lugard, F.D. Political Memoranda, op.cit., and Perham, M.
Native Administration in Nigeria, op.cit., pp.49-50.
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In societies based on slave labour, slavery is "justified" by
legal sanctions hence slaves form the social stratum which suffered
great economic exploitation and the worst form of dehumanization,
because most slaves were prisoners of war and/or they were of foreign
origin /I.e. of different tribes/ in the enslaving communityJ
Although the house slaves lived with the family group of their masters
and were better treated than the field slaves, nevertheless, all slaves
were socially defined as objects or things of property. Those slaves
who were regarded as a purely economic commodity were clearly marked
for sale or for export. During the Jahiliyya (the period of ignorance
which simply means pre-Jihad era) period slaves who were marked for
sale (and export) were totally dehumanized that they were no more part
2
of the social system than any item of trade.
After the Jihad, the position of slaves in the Emirates became
legally ambiguous because it defied the main purpose of enslavement in
Islam which is to convert the captives to the religion of Islam.
Under no circumstances can a Muslim be enslaved by another/raLslim.
Islam makes it clear that enslavement must follow a 'True Jihad, meaning
one captured in a strictly muslims' reaction to defend themselves in
war. In this sense the victim is seen to be a threat to the Islamic
community. Even at that, further conditions were set: one must
either convert the victim to Islam; ask him to pay a ransom for himself;
1. A very general but radical analysis of the dehumanizing effects
of slavery is made by Patterson, 0., "Slavery in Human History",
In New Left Review. No.117, 1979, pp.31-67. Patterson's discussion
of general theory of slavery and his example of plantation slavery
is distinguished from African domestic slavery inGrace, J.,
Domestic Slavery in West Africa, London, 1975.
2. For a comparative study of slavery and emancipation in Nigeria
(Zaria) and West Indies (Jamaica), see Smith, M.G., "Slavery and
emancipation in two cities", In Social and Economic Studies, Vol.3,
No.A, 1954, pp.239-290. ~ ""
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or free but bind him over to be of good behaviour and make peace
with/Muslims. Otherwise he is essentially a prisoner of war and
ought to be treated accordingly.''
But, as is well known, not allMuslims follow the teachings of
their religion or the examples set by their religious leaders, and
Northern Nigeria was no exception. Perham tells us how, after Jihad,
slavery had received "the most respectable" confirmation in that after
Muhammadu Bello (the Sultan of Sokoto) had laid down three categories
of people: pure Muslims, nominal/Muslims and heathens; he then
asserted that on consensus of the Malamai the third category should be
enslaved and their property divided among/iuslims In the Emirates
three categories of slaves existed: 1) the field slaves who lived and
work on Ganau (farm settlements) 2) house slaves who did all the
domestic work and attended to the general needs of the nobility 3) slave
titled office holders (and other courtiers). The general problem of
slavery itself is beyond the scope of this thesis because, with the
legal abolishing of slavery, it ceased to be of central importance. In
addition, we are only interested'in how slaves were recruited into the
Sarakuna class. Hence the third category is the focal point of our
discussion.
1. Commentaries in the Hadith support this because when Prophet
Muhammed conquered Makka, after a period of Hi.iira at Madina, he
set all the city dwellers free. Shehu Usman Dan Foaio was also
opposed to illegal 'enslavement'. In his book, Masa'il Muhimma,
e complained of illegal sale of Fulani as slaves because they were
uslims. Also in a poem, "Tabbata Hakika"(Be sure of that) he
explained that whoever enslaved a free man shall suffer torment:
"The Hell-fire shall enslave him." Shehu Abdullahi Ibn Podio
rebuked some of his kinsmen for consorting with the Gobir enemy and
he contemptously referred to them as "the sellers of freemen in the
market." For a useful account on the Hadith and slavery see Liman,
M.T.A., "The Influence of the Poetry of Al-Kumait Ibn Zayd Ai-
Asadi on the downfall of the Umayyad Dynasty," Ph.D. thesis, London
University, 1974, p.50; and for the detailed account of both Usman
Dan Fodio and his brother Abdullahi see Hiskett, M., The Sword of
Truth, The Life and theTimes of Shehu Usman Dan Fcaio, New York,
1973, pp.77-78.
2. Perham, M., op.cit., pp.49-50.
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In many Emirates, if not in all Emirates, slaves had considerable
economic freedom. They often emerged as major political figures
and in some States (e.g. in Gongola, Bauchi and Borno, to mention only
a few) certain slave statuses are far more materially rewarding and
thus more powerful than those of free men."' In most cases slaves were
drawn into the network of political offices and, as such, the social
distinctions between slaves and free men were so blurred that one could
hardly speak of a well-defined slave stratum. Nevertheless, it is
imperative to identify the faint line of distinction between slave
officials and other nobles because in their case the word 'slave' was
an exclusion mechanism which debarred them from aspiring to the throne.
Among the Sarakuna. the cultural distinctions between slaves and
free men were minimal, if any. All title-holders, slaves and free men
alike share, on the one hand, bland self-assertion in dealing with their
inferiors and, on the other hand, courteous behaviour towards their
equal. They also have (as they always had) a particular characteristic
in which even when angered and intriguing against each other, they did
so in restrained fashion, contained by invisible rules of "tolerance",
"good sense" and "fair play." The habit of compromise was (is) part
of their culture. They all taught their sons to be self-confident,
courageous and to develop initiative. Conversely they discouraged, or
even ruthlessly suppressed, the same qualities in the Talakawa. In
1. For example, there is a detailed account of influential slave
officials in Borno in Brenner, L., The Shehus of Kukawa, Oxford,
1973, especially pp.89-103. There is also a well researched account
by Cohen, R., "The Dynamics of Feudalism in Borno", In Butler, J.
(ed.) Boston University Facers on Africa, Vol.11, Boston, Mass.,
1966, pp.85-105.
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fact slave title-holders, like their free counterparts, owned their
own slaves as well as employing free servants. Smith tells us that
Turaki Ba'idu, a slave official of Halam Musa (the first Eulani Emir
of Zaria) had over 1,200 slaves and that he was one of the wealthiest
men in Zaria at that time.'' This shows that the relationship between
slave and master was of utmost significance, because in its most
effective form it was considered to be the ideal relationship between
any two individuals of superior and subordinate rank, be they free or
slave. In that case to be a slave was like being a client, it did not
in itself entail dishonour. On the contrary, it provided, an oppor¬
tunity to demonstrate mutual trust, inner courage and integrity, not
to mention the promotion of mutual interests.
Apparently, the word 'slave' was not humiliating to slave officials
because it was used metaphorically as in the Islamic belief that all
men are the "slaves of God", which emphasized the extent of their
submission to Almighty Allah. Thus a God-fearing man is admirably
called Abdullahi (in Arabic) or Bawan Allah (in Hausa). Hence, being
called 'slaves' denoted the loyalty of the slave officials to the
Emirates' political system. This is why in Hausaland, holders of
slave offices were called Bayin Sarki (the Emir's slaves). Slaves
could (and did) rise to high offices of the State as District Heads or
2
even become members of the category of the "Traditional King Makers",
i.e., Kachalla (Commander), Kaigrama (War Lord or leader), A.jiva (the
caretaker of captives), etc. Slaves of such status were so influential
1. Malam Musa ruled Zazzau in 1804-1821. See Smith, M.G., Government
in Zazzau 1800-1951, Oxford, 1960, p.82.
2. The council of electors who selected and appointed a new Emir.
They also advised the Emir on the recruitment and the appointment
of all title-holders.
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that their importance, in seme cases, was second, only to the Emir
himself. Their own 'slavery' was a verbal idiophone which marked
their loyalty and obedience to the Emir at whose pleasure they held
office. In addition, it forbade them, socially from usurping offices
reserved for royal nobles and, more especially, the Emir's throne.
This shows clearly that no matter how powerful a slave official became,
his office and thus his social status was lower than that of the royal
noble. They were part of the Sarakuna but they remained in status
ranking, the sub structure of the Masu Sarauta.
PRESERVATION OP SOCIAL ORDER
A society so divided by both status and wealth requires means for
ensuring the reproduction of social order, regulating the relations
between different strata, whatever their basis. A common culture alone
is insufficient, not least because the non-Muslim areas of Northern
Nigeria share a common culture with the muslim areas only to a limited
degree (see Chapter II). Apart from its monopoly of wealth and force,
the ruling stratum in Northern Nigeria is able to rely on a variety of
interpersonal relationships (deference, joking relationships), religion,
and patronage as a means of social control.
The ethnic divisions of Northern Nigerian society have led to
"joking relationships" which, politically, serve as a social basis of
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peaceful coexistence. Joking relationships are widely practised
in Northern Nigeria between both blood relations and ethnic groups.
For instance, cross cousins joke with and tease each other. Similarly,
NUPE people joke with Katsina people (Nupawa Da Katsinawa). Kano
people with Zaria people (Kanawa Da Zazzagawa), TIV with Fulani (Munci
Da Fulani), Bolewa with Bura (Bolawa Da Burawa), to mention only a
few. These joking relationships are certainly one of the factors in
the social s^^stem which holds Northern Nigeria together and, thereby
gives it its sense of"Northernness."^ More formal institutions may be
created for the same end. After lengthy warfare in the sixteenth
century between Borno and Kwararrafa (Jukun^the two Kingdoms made peace,
exchanged Ambassadors and gifts between them. The gift exchange
between the two tribes continues till today. The holder of the title
'Ajifinge' represented the Jukuns in Borno whereas the 'Zanuwa'
represented Borno at Wukari (the capital of Jukun Kingdom) when the
sovereignty of the two Kingdoms was ended by the British conquest of
Nigeria, the Zanuwa was appointed the District Head of Katsina Ala in
2
1912. Such demonstration of solidarity and unity of the North also
featured in the First Republic of Nigeria (1960-1966) when a Kanuri
school teacher represented one of Bauchi constituencies in the Northern
House of Assembler at Kaduna whereas a man from Kazaune and a man from
Daura were among the Kano members of the same Assembly. Joking relations
which are one of the bases of tribal understanding and tolerance in
1. There is an insightful analysis of inter ethnic relations among
the Hausa by Salamone, F.A., "Becoming Hausa: Ethnic identity,
change and its implications for the study of ethnic pluralism and
stratification", In Africa, Vol.45, No.2, 1975. pp.410-425.
2. Interview with Mr. Abama and Alhaji Maina Waziri at Kano in 1978.
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Northern Nigeria exist even among (and between) the animist communities.''
This partly explains why the ethnic hierarchy is tolerated.
RELIGION AND ELITE STATUS
But the elite status of the Fulani as with such status in all
I
uslim societies, is derived also from Islamic scholarships. The
pursuance of knowledge is obligatory on every muslim; the Hadith
enjoined all Muslims to "search for knowledge even in China"This
injunction reflects the importance of learning in the minds of the
earlyfmuslims and the Prophet himself. In pre-Jihad Hausaland, Fulani
had the virtual monopoly of literacy and as such they were the sole
religious leaders injmuslim communities. In the post-Jihad period,
political leadership was added to Fulani religious leadership and thus
combined in them spiritual and temporal leadership in the Emirates.
The habit of behaving in the way people praise was also attributed to
the Fulani aristocracy. This attribute might have originated from
the modest and the austere way of life of some of the leaders of the
Jihad. Their exemplary life styles came to earn for the Fulani the
epithet: Fulani Yayan Kunya (Fulani the modest ones). The piety of
the Fulani leaders of Sokoto, in particular, gave them the name:
Torobe. popularly known as the'Toronkawa (the God-fearing ones).
Similarly, their warm and generous characteristics endeared them to all
1. Among the Hausa, the joking relationship is known as Abokan-Wasa
(play-mates); and the traditional exchange of gifts or presents is
called Biyan-Shara (the traditional payments to play-mates). See
Smith, M.F., Baba of Kano, op.cit., p.45.
2. Cited in Liman, M.T.A., op.cit., p.96.
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who came in contact with them. In the aristocratic families,
efforts designed to uphold the qualities of the Fulani elders, as well
as to develop initiative, are continuously inculcated in their progeny;
whereas the society as a whole systematically disciplined and repressed
other children. Thus, tradition, Islamic learning, apparent devotion
to God and the simplicity of their style of life combine to make the
Fulani Ardo'en (clan leaders) the accepted leaders of the/muslim
communities of the early nineteenth century Hausaland. Since Islam
emphasizes that one of the constitutional principles of the State is the
unity of the political and the religious community, the leadership in
the Emirates have adopted Islamic teachings to support the political
order. Thus, as religious leaders, Fulani are automatically seen as
the defenders of the Islamic faith. In fact, to some orthodox'muslims,
the concept of an individual leader is implicit in the religion.
The combination of spiritual and temporal power in a ruler is not
peculiar to the irfuslims of the far North. In the case of some tribes
of the Middle Belt (e.g. Jukun, Bachama, Igala. etc.) it is part of
their political culture that there should be one person who is the
living symbol of their corporate existence, who will be their leader
in battle, their law-giver, and the trusted intermediary between them
and the Supreme: in times of peril and who protects them from
pestilence or famine. Thus, like the Emir in a muslim Emirate, that
person is their chief executive. In addition, both the animist and
muslim communities share common high respect for elders. In this way
Islam and custom between them imposed on the rulers of Northern
1. For differing habits between the Fulani and the Hausa see,
Hiskett, M., The Sword of Truth, op.cit., pp.25-26.
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Nigeria certain obligations, i.e. the maintenance of the apparatus of
authority, the protection of the poor against the devices of evil
doers, etc. In return, the rank and file of the society are expected
to demonstrate their allegiance to their superiors by periodical
offerings in cash and in kind.''
PRESERVATION OF ORDER WITHIN THE RULING GROUP
As discussed above, while the characteristics of the ruling group
include kindness, generosity, sympathy, restraint and tolerance towards
each other, they do not extend the same towards their inferiors. The
whole group can be pictured as members of a large extended family who
prefer to intermarry among themselves and thus strengthen political
ties and economic interdependence.
Competition for succession to the throne (of Emirship) is limited
to the male members of the ruling dynasties who are in most cases
brothers, cousins or other very close blood relations. In this
competition, a loser is "down" but not "out", because it is not a
game of 'winner takes all.' The successful candidate for Emirship
redistributes posts and titled offices among his family and hence keeps
2
them reasonably contented. Even those who hold no offices at all are
1 . Literature abounds on the social and political organizations in
Northern Nigeria. To mention only a very few see, Kirk-Greene, A.H.
"Bureaucratic Cadres in a Traditional Milieu", In Coleman, J. (edit)
Education and Political Development, Princeton, 1968,pp. 372-406;
"The Muslim Areas of Northern Nigeria under British Rule", In
Nigeria, a quarterly magazine of general interest, No. 22, 1944, pp.
30-41; Bohannan, L., "Political Aspects of Tiv Social Organization"
In Middleton, J., and David, T., (edits) Tribes 'Without Rulers,
London, 1958, pp. 33-36..
2. On how this system worked in Zaria Emirate see Smith, M.G.,
Government in Zazzau, op. cit., p. 84.
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well supported by their more fortunate relatives. Group cohesion
is tightly maintained and underlined by their relative self-
consciousness as a group, and their desire not to rock the boat by
criticism, exposure of abuses, etc. In this way they maintain their
superiority and hence a corresponding measure ofinfluence over the
fate of the community.
In addition, most senior titled officials are of slave origin and
thus not entitled to compete for the Emirship. This group are
however equally interested in preserving the goose which lays the
golden egg and so are ready, at all times, to deal ruthlessly with any
more action which threatens the social order. For this reason, the
discontented are well aware that the Emir has the monopoly of the
means and, indeed, the use of violence which will not be spared on any¬
one who threatens the social order. Their coercive means also
regulate the relations between Emirs and the merchants (i.e. the wealthy).
In most cases the Emirs are the richest persons around but where there
is an exception the Emirs have a range of means from social and religious
preserves through manipulation of the courts, to crude force, in order
to ensure that no one else acquires or uses an economic base to
challenge their powers. Thus, the merchants tend to secure the Emirs
protection through gifts and by defraying their expenditures on
important occasions. Where the merchants are dominant (as in
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Kano)^ some of them do tend to support opposition elements, if not
themselves active in opposition to the Emiracy; yet even this is
tempered by gifts to the Emir and his family, or to important Imams.
RELATIONS BETWEEN STRATA: POVERTY AND PATRONAGE
In part one of this chapter I tried to show how the Talakawa were
kept down by the tyranny of poverty and hunger. Poverty and its
attendant hardships are related to a very strong Kingship system which
gives the head of the family an authoritative hold on all members of the
extended family. The economic interdependency of small scale peasant
production, which is wholly by human labour with the aid of primitive
tools, is such that defiance of the authority of Maigida (Head of the
family) is seen as economic suicide, and risking being made a social
outcast. As is the case in most peasant societies where the majority
of the people have been accustomed to the caprices of seasonal cycles
2
and habituated to the hazards of subsistence farming, the Talakawa
attach considerable importance to the trait of generosity and, to its
opposite, the social sin of miserliness. A Hausa proverb elegantly
1. The opposition tendency of Kano merchants is discussed in detail
by Tahir, I., "Scholars, Saints and Capitalists in Kano 1904-1974:
The Pattern of bourgeois revolution in an Islamic Society", Ph.D.
Thesis, Cambridge University, 1975. But what should be noted is
that the Habe versus Fulani conflict is more pronounced in Kano
than anywhere else in the Emirates. This makes Kano the exception
rather than the rule. Being an ancient trading city, Kano has
the largest indigenous merchant class most of whom are Habe of
Hausa origin whereas the ruling class are almost exclusively
Fulani. But even in Kano, the merchant class were incorporated
into the ruling group through marriage at the local level and by
virtue of the NPCs control of patronage at the regional and central
levels. However, some of them continued to support NEPU secretly,
as I explain in Chapter V.
2. For a comparative study of the predicaments of peasant life see,
Shanin, T., (ed.) Peasant and Peasant Societies, Penguin, 1971.
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expresses this belief when it says: Da Hannu Akan San Girma (true
greatness is identified by generosity); whereas the miserly are
anathemised in the somewhat more eliptical maxim: Lafin Babba Rowa
(the sin of an important person is stinginess). This partial
redistribution of wealth extracted through taxation or other means from
the peasantry forms the basis of patron-client relationships in peasant
societies'' and can regulate both relationships within a ruling
hierarchy, and between that hierarchy and subordinate strata, though
the nature of the 'client' status differs in the two cases. Whitaker
has described the significance of patronage in Northern Nigerian
politics with admirable brevity:
"Clientage is a key traditional political
institution, indeed, a major social adhesive
of the emirate system The crux of the
clientage relationship in all the emirates is
that patronage, economic security and protect¬
ion can be exchanged for personal loyalty and
obedience. For the Habe Talakawa, clientage
represented the principal channel of upward
mobility, toward and within the ruling circle.
For those outside that sphere, lesser forms
of clientage relationships provided virtually
the only defense against such eventualities
as arbitrary tax levies, injurious treatment
in judicial proceedings, discrimination in
allocation of farming land or in administration
of public services, to mention the most common
perils.
The efficacy of traditional clientage
within an emirate lies in the ability to exercise
influence in proportion to the rank and position
in the socio-political hierarchy. Typically an
influential official enjoys the allegiance to a
more influential person above. 2
f. For a general but instructive study of patron and client relations
See, Schmidt, S.W. et al.: (eds.) Friends, Followers and Factions,
California, 1977.
2. This and the quotation below are taken from Whitaker, C.S. Jr.,
op.cit., pp.373-375.
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The NPC by virtue of its close relationship with the ruling hierarchy
and its control of public spending, was able to turn patronage to its
advantage. Whitaker again explains:
".... the party was the principal agency of
patronage offices, loans, scholarships, contracts
and other opportunities sought by the upwardly
mobile. This could be accomplished either
directly and formally or indirectly and informally
through the medium of the party or ex-party men
who dominated the public boards, corporations and
commissions. Second (and of the greater consequence
in terms of winning mass support), the interlocking
directorate of local administrative and party
personnel inescapably bound humble persons to
traditionally august figures in their capacity as
party men. The dependency that derived from the
vast network of clientage relationships inherent
in traditional society were transferred to the
party. Loyalty to the NPC became a way of
defraying traditional political obligations."
Among other factors, it was this traditional institution of clientage
which effectively competed with the functions (or the potential
functions) of NEPU as a radical opposition. Along with coercion,
patronage snatched from NEPUs grasp the opportunities for exercise of
power and thus for implementing its programmes which it claimed would
have freed the Talakawa from the grip of socio-economic and political
traditional hold.
DEFERENCE AND OBEDIENCE
It was previously stated that life was terrible for the "little
people" and that the Talakawa were conscious of that. They were fully
aware that their only general protection against overzealous tax
collectors, judicial bias and administrative arbitrariness was deference
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ana obedience to the ruling group and their clients.
The subservient habits of the Hausa society stemmed from the
heritage of slavery. In the precolonial period, slaves had to obey
their masters and if any of them rebelled (or defied their master) all
the free men would combine to crush such a rebellion. Other subject
people showed their obedience and apparent loyalty by the payment of
tribute and by accepting a client status to a local noble . Those
were the only means of protection and security open to the Talakawa,
and through those means the slave mentality of fear, dependence and
servitude was inculcated in the rank and file of the society.
The socialization processes through which children, youths and
women passed emphasized over and over again the importance of obedience,
dependence and servitude to one's superior in exchange for protection,
status security and, in some respects, upward social mobility. Beneath
the deference and obedience of the subordinate classes to their social
superiors, lies the fear of the coercive instruments controlled by the
ruling group, who do not hesitate to use them to enforce obedience as
and when the occasion arises.
The entire socialization processes reinforce the subordination
o fj#omen and children to men and elders as well as that of the Talakawa
towards the Sarakuna. Long before children begin to perceive this
social differentiation (or understand it) they begin to react to it as
they are controlled by it. The society has innumerable ways of
making social categories known, felt and feared. Initiative is
discouraged among the children of the Talakawa as much as severe
discipline is enforced against "disobedience"; and loyalty is often
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rewarded. Muslim Hausa take Islam to be synonymous with loyalty and
obedience to the extent that a loyal or an obedient person is not
expected to "cry when he is hurt." It is metaphorically explained
that the more quiet, loyal and obedient a sheep the more benefits she
gets from the shepherd. Thus it is considered meritorious not to
press to the limit one's claim for compensation when one has been
injured, which again tends to undermine the potential for opposition
movements.
RADICAL THOUGHT AND SOCIAL ORDER
The foregoing situation produced in the Talakawa a people who by
sheer force of circumstances have learned to survive amidst severe
psychological and physical onslaughts, acquiring in the process the
toughness such experience entails. Radical ideas are slow to grow or
spread in such a milieu, but certain categories have tended to adopt
them: the western educated elite (Ma'aikata); artisans , traders and
others whose incomes and occupations freed them from dependence on
patrons; and a few enlightened and more independent peasant producers
(especially those influenced by the more radical Islamic brotherhoods
or movement). This pull of radicalism which brought together the
enlightened poor and the radical Ma'aikata culminated in the emergence
of the Northern Elements Progressive Union (NEPU) discussed in
Chapter V.
But this unity of "radicals" did not bring electoral success to
NEPU because the majority of the peasants remained conservative; and
as is well known the conservatism of the peasants centre on the defense
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of what is known against what is not known. This makes the Talakawa
stratum a granary of meanings preserved from lines and generations
threatened by continual and relentless external change. Whereas the
Ma'aikata wanted changes which would transform oppressive institutions
and ascribed statuses, the peasants refused to accept that
proposition because they envisaged in it the disappearance of their
culture. Their conditions of living, their exploitation and suffering
were bad, but the prevailing social hierarchy did provide them some
protection, as clients to their social superiors, and thus meaning for
their survival. Consequently, they could not contemplate the
abolishing of what was known in the mere hope of replacing it with what
was claimed to be ideally a better one. Moreover, many older peasants
were already adult when the British conquered Hausaland and thus they
could compare and contrast the situation in the pre-colonial period
and what obtained during colonial rule. Hence, some of them knew that
it was one thing to overthrow an oppressor and quite another thing to
establish a just rule.
In a nutshell, the main reason for the failure of modern radicals
and, indeed, of radical reforms in twentieth century Northern Nigeria
lies,in the nature of the alliance between the Talakawa and the
Ma'aikata. This was based and maintained on the specific issue of
ridding Nigeria of colonial domination and of minimizing the abuses of
the native rulers, to which both of them agreed. Apart from that, the
other ideals of the Ma'aikata were far beyond the comprehension or
desires of the Talakawa. Thus no total alliance was possible between
the two components of the NEPU and hence NEPU was unable to sustain




ISLAMIC INJUNCTIONS AND MUSLIM GOVERNMENTS1
BABU WANDA YAFI WAIII SAI WANDA YAPI WANITSORON ALLAH
"No one is superior to the other except he who is most God-fearing"
N.E.P.Uo
This chapter is a brief outline on how the Qur'an and Hadith
authorize the process by which Muslim affairs and activities should
be organised and conducted. Thus, it shows the Qur'anic basis of the
character of Muslim government and the specific versions of these
concepts derived by the Jihad leadership. The erosion of the original
ideals in the actual practice of post-Jihadic government led to a
series of crises and chaos until the advent of the British.
Prologue
Islam is an Arabic word which denotes submission: a complete
surrender and obedience to Allah. As a religion, Islam similarly
stands for complete submission and obedience to God. Literally, the
word means "peace" and this signifies that one can achieve real peace
2
of body and mind through submission and obedience to Allah. Such a
life of obedience brings peace of the heart and it establishes real
1. The following account on Muslim Governments is partly drawn from:
Rosenthal, E.I.J., Political Thought in Medieval Islam (Cambridge,
1958); Watt, W.M., Islamic Surveys 6: Islamic Political Thought:
The Basic Concents (Edinburgh, 1968).
2. See Abdul, M.O.A., Islam as a Religion: Faith and Duties (Lagos,
1976), pp. 15-18.
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peace in society at large® The religion of Islam teaches mankind to
be in peace with the Creator as well as with one another® Whereas to
be in peace with God one has to give absolute submission to His will,
recognize His oneness, obey His commands and worship Him as the only
one who deserves to be worshipped, to make peace with man, one has to
do good and behave well always and to do unto others as one would want
them to do unto one. Whoever believes in Islam and practices its
teachings is a Muslim® The Qur'an confirms this when it says:
Whoever submits himself entirely to God and he is
the doer of Good to others is a Muslim® (2:112)
This verse shows that faith alone is not enough to make a good Muslim;
it has to be accompanied by good deeds. What makes a good Muslim.
includes, among other things, the way one behaves towards others, what
one worships, what one says and what one does to others®^"
Islam is not a religion which confines its scope to the private
life of man® It is a complete way of life which caters for all the
fields of human existence® It provides guidance for all walks of
life, individual and social, moral and material, economic and political,
legal and cultural, national and international® The Qur'an enjoins man
to enter the fold of Islam without any reservation and follows God's
2
guidance in all fields of life. Islam clearly states that its
objectives are: the purification of the soul and the reformation and
the reconstruction of society® The Qur'an says:
We sent our messengers and revealed to them the
Scriptures and the authority to establish justice
amongst mankind ... (57:25)
1. See Abdul, A'la, Maududi, Towards Understanding Islam (Gary,
Indiana, 1970), pp. 2-10.
2® For an instructive discussion on this see: Ahmad, Khurshid,
Islam: Its Meaning and Message (London, 1975), p® 28®
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The Holy Prophet explained to his followers that,
Every one of you is a shepherd and will be questioned
about the well-being of his flock® So the Head of the
State will be questioned about the well-being of the
people of the state® Every man is a shepherd to his
family and will be answerable about every member of
it® Every woman is a shepherd to the family of her
husband and will be accountable for every member of
it® And every servant is a shepherd to his master
and will be questionable about the property of his
master. 1
This shows that the teachings of Islam are so all-embracing that it does
not leave out any field of human existence to become a playground of
worldly forces alone.
Another feature of Islam is that it establishes a balance between
the individual and society® It believes in the individual personality
of man and holds that everyone is personally accountable to God® It
guarantees the fundamental rights of the individual and does not permit
anyone to tamper with them. It makes the proper development of the
personality of man one of the prime objectives of its educational
policy® Hence it holds that a man should not lose his individuality
2
in society or in the state®
According to the Qur'an:
Man shall have nothing but what he strives for® (53:29)
And whatever hardship you suffer, it is what your hands
have wrought® (42:30)
God does not change the condition of people unless they
first change that which is in their hearts. (l3:ll)
1. Cited in Ahmad, K®, on. cit. , p. 38® For a more thorough study
of Prophet Muhammad as a statesman, see Watt, W.M., Muhammad;
Pronhet and Statesman (Oxford, 1977)® Also see Rodinson, M®,
Muhammad (Penguin. 1977): and Rodinson, C®H., Muhammedanism; Has
It Any Future? (London, 1897).
2® Sayyid, Qutb, The Religion of Islam (Gary, Indiana, 1970), pp® 1-13,
contains a more detailed discussion on Islamic education, policy
and society (or state)®
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For each is that which he has earned, and against
each is only that which he has earned and against
each is only that which he has deserved. (2:286)
For us are our deeds and for you are yours. (28:55)
Similarly, Islam awakens the sense of social responsibility in
man, in that it enjoins Muslims to organize themselves in societies
and states and it commands the individual to subscribe to the common
good. For example, prayer is offered in congregation to inculcate
social discipline and social cohesion among the Muslims. Everyone
who has the means is enjoined to pay Zakka (the equivalent of tithes)'"
and the Qur'an says:
The alms-seeker and the destitute have their due
rights in their wealth. (51:19)
Furthermore, Jihad (the duty to defend oneself and the Muslim community
2
against aggression) is made obligatory, which means that the individual
1. Zakka is usually translated as the "poor tax", in order to distinguish
it from Sadaaa which is "properly voluntary alms-giving." One
wonders whether the distinction really holds in practice because
the two overlap.
2. Jihad is translated as the "Holy War" in everyday language but,
strictly, it means "Exertion". It is the obligation laid on
Muslims to struggle (or to strive) against any form of socio¬
economic and political injustice. It also means the purification
of the faith because Muslims believe that faith will inevitably
deteriorate if it is not regularly purified. There are numerous
works on the Jihad. In the case of Northern Nigeria, these include
the following: Bivar, A.D.H., "A Manifesto of the Fulani Jihad",
Journal of African History, XI (No. 2, 1961), pp. 235-243; Last,
M., "A Note on the Attitudes to the Supernatural in the Sokoto
Jihad", Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria IV (No. 1,
1967), pp. 3-15, The Sokoto Caliphate (London. 1967). and "The
Jihad Movements of the Nineteenth Century", in Ajayi and Crowder
(eds.), History of Vest Africa, vol. II (London, 1974), pp. 1-29);
Smith, H.F.C., "The Islamic Revolutions of the Nineteenth Century",
Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria. II (No. 2, 196l),
pp. 169-185; Smith, M.G., "The Jihad of Shehu Usman Dan Fodio", in
Lewis, I.M. (ed.), Islam in Tropical Africa (Oxford, 1966),
pp. 408-419; and Willis, J.R., "Jihad fi Sabil Allah", Journal of
African History, VIII (No. 3, 1967), pp. 395-415. Also see Hiskett,
M., "The Nineteenth Century Jihads in West Africa", in Flint,
J.E. (ed0), Cambridge History of Africa, vol. V, From c. 1790 to
c. 1870 (Cambridge, I976J, pp. 125-169.
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will, when the occasion arises, offer his life for the defence and
the protection of the true Islamic state. To this end the Holy Prophet
said:
All mankind is a fold every member of which shall be a
keeper or shepherd unto every other and be accountable
for the entire foldc
Live together do not turn against each other, make
things easy for others and do not put obstacles in
each other's way.
The believer in God is he who is not a danger to the
life and property of any other. 1
In this way Islam establishes harmony between the individual and the
2
society and assigns to each its proper due. This shows that Islam
is not altogether satisfied with the mere performance of worship,
hence, it does not distinguish the sacred from the secular. For
instance, in the management of public affairs, both the temporal and
spiritual authority is vested in the Umma (community of Muslims) to
be exercised by their elected leader and there are enormous scriptural
literature which provide the basic background to the Islamic political
3
thought and processes.
1. Cited in Ahmad, K., on. cit. . p. 39o For a more thorough study of
the Islamic way of life see: Mawdudi, Abul Ala, Islamic Law and
Constitution (Lahore, I960), and Islamic V.7ay of Life (Lahore. 1967):
also Ahmad, K. (ed.), Studies in the Family Law of Islam (Karachi,
I960) and Family Life in Islam (Leicester, 1974).
2. For the appreciation of this unique feature of Islam by a Western
scholar, see Gibb, H.A.R., Whither Islam (London, 1932), p. 379°
3. To mention just a few, see: Gibb, H.A.R., Studies on the Civili¬
zation of Islam (London, 1962); Rosenthal, E.I.J., Islam in the
Modern National State (Cambridge, 1965); Schacht, J. and Bosworth,
C.S. (eds.). The Legacy of Islam (Oxford, 1979), especially pp.
392-424; and Watt, W.M., Islam and the Integration of Society
(London, 1961), especially pp. 143-180.
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Islamic Theory of Government
One of the basic principles of Islam is that human beings must,
individually and collectively, surrender all rights of overlordship,
legislation and exercising of authority over others,, Ho one should
be allowed to pass orders or make commands in his own right and no one
ought to accept the obligations to carry out such commands and obey
such orders. Hone is entitled to make laws on his own authority and
none is obliged to obey them. This right is vested in Allah alone0
The Qur'an enjoins:
... The authority rests with none but Allah. He
commands you not to surrender to anyone save Him.
This is the right way (of life). (12:40)
(if) They asked, "Have we also got some authority"
say: All authority belongs to God alone. (3:154)
Do not say wrongly with your tongues that this is
lawful and that is unlawful. (16:116)
Who so does not establish and decide by that which
Allah has revealed, such are disbelievers. (5:44)
Following these injunctions sovereignty belongs to Allah. He alone
is the Law-giver. No man, not even the Holy Prophet, has the right
to order others in his own right to do, or not to do, certain things,
because even the Holy Prophet is subject to God's Commands. The
Qur'an said,
We sent no messenger save that he should obey
Allah's Command. (4:64)
And the Holy Prophet explained,
I do not follow anything except what is revealed
to me. 1
1. Cited in Ahmad, K., on, cit. , p. 158.
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Muslims are obliged to obey the Prophet and to imitate his ways because
he enunciated not his own commands but God's commands. This is clearly
explained in the Our'an:
They are the people to whom We gave the Scripture and
Command and Prophethood. (o:90)
It is not (possible) for any human being to whom Allah
has given the Scripture and the Wisdom and the Prophet-
hood that he should say to people: "Obey me instead of
Allah"o Such one (could only say): "Be solely devoted
to the Lord." (3:79)
Thus, the fundamental character of an Islamic state can be summarised
as follows:
1) Neither a person, group of persons nor the populace of a given
state can claim sovereignty. God alone is sovereign; the people are
His subjects.
2) Following l) above, absolute authority is vested in God. The
believers can neither legislate nor modify God-given Laws — the
Shari'ah.
3) The Islamic state must be founded on the Shari'ah and the Hadith
(Prophetic Traditions). The government of an Islamic state will be
entitled to obedience in its capacity as a political agent (of God)
and only in so far as it acts in that capacity. If a Muslim government
disregards the Laws of God, it automatically forfeits the obligation
of the believers to obey it. In this lies the implied injunction upon
the faithful to rebel against unlawful and oppressive regimes.^"
1. For the classical foundations of an Islamic state, see: Rosenthal,
E.I.J., Islam in the Modern National State (Cambridge, 1965),
pp. 12-27® Rabi, Muhammad Mahmoud, The Political Theory of Ibn
Khaldun (Leiden, 1967), shows the distinction between Khilafa
(the state based on the Shari'ah of Islam) and the Mulk (the state
with a mixed constitution, based on the Shari'ah and the political
laws of the ruler). Also see Ibn Khaldun, The Muoaddimah, An
Introduction to History (Rosenthal translation)(London, 1967),
Chapter III, pp. 311-472.
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Islam bases its ideal polity on the sovereignty of God and
Viceregeney of man. Hence, it is a "theocracy". But an Islamic
theocracy^is ruled by the whole of the Muslims, including the rank
and file. The entire Muslim population should be mobilized to partici¬
pate fully in politics. In this "divine democracy", the Executive arm
of the Government is supposed to reflect the general will of all
Muslims who also have the right to depose their rulers. But the
Our'an should remain their Constitution and the Shari'ah their Law,
Similarly, Islamic process of Government should be based on the Hadith
(i.e. on how Prophet Muhammad administered the first Muslim community),"*"
All administrative matters and all questions about which no explicit
injunction is found in the Qur'an or the Hadith, are settled by I.ima
(the concensus of the Islamic community); and, in the final analysis,
only the sacred texts remain as the proper legitimising basis of the
2
I jma. On the other hand, Islamic democracy is a limited popular
sovereignty under the suzerainty of God: as no Muslim leader or
Legislature, no religious scholar, or even the entire Muslim world
put together, can either form an independent judgement, or have any
right to make the least alteration on explicit command of God, or where
the known Hadith of His Prophet already exist. Although the Qur*an
and Sunnah (customs and practices, i.e. the exemplary life of Prophet
1. Among others, see Watt, W.M,, Islamic Political Thought: The Basic
Concents (Edinburgh, 1968), especially pn, 3-30; Gibb, H.A.R,,
Islam, a Historical Survey (Oxford, 1975), especially pp. 16-23;
and Rodinson, M., Muhammad (Carter, A., translator) (Penguin, 1977),
pp„ 215-292; and Guillaume, A., Islam (Penguin, 1978), pp. 20-54.
2, For a didactive analysis of Ijma, see Weiss, Bernard, "Al Amidi
on the Basis of Authority of Consensus", in Little, Donald (ed,),
Essavs on Islamic Civilization (Leiden, 1976), pp. 342-356,
^ /ugv/-fx/C^Yt-C, /u X&L /C.
upY>o-
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Muhammad.) form the basis of an Islamic Government, the propagation of
the Islamic religious faith is not the "be-all" and the "end-all" of
the Islamic state.
One of the many purposes of the state is to create conditions in
which the mass of the people will be assured of social justice in
accordance with the standards laid down in the Qur'an which gave
explicit instructions for a disciplined mode of life.
(Muslims are) those who, if we give them power in the
land, establish a system of Salah (worship) and Zakka
and enjoin virtue and forbid evil and iniquity <, (22:41)
You are the best community sent forth to mankind; you
enjoin the Right conduct and forbid the Wrong; and you
believe in Allaho (3:110)
Thus the Islamic state aims to establish a system of social justice
in accordance with the teachings of the Qur'an0 It is meant to prevent
exploitation, to safeguard liberty, and to protect its citizens from
foreign invasion,, The objectives of an Islamic state are to eradicate
all forms of evils and to encourage all types of virtues and excellence,
especially those expressedly mentioned in the Qur'an. Political power
should be used for these purposes as and when the occasion demands.
The state should employ all means of propaganda and peaceful persuasion,
as well as undertake both moral and physical education of all the
peoples so as to harness social influence and public opinion, in order
to achieve the set objectives. The Islamic state is supposed to be
1. The idea of Sunnah is derived from pre-Islamic Arabia and, literally,
it means "the beaten track". In the desert of Arabia, it is an
act of common sense to follow "the beaten track", otherwise one
may lose one's way and die in the desert* For a more detailed
explanation of Sunnah, see Watt, W.M., "Islamic Political Concepts",
in Political Theory and Ideology in African Society (Centre of
African Studies, University of Edinburgh, 1970), pp. 1-6,
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universal and all-embracing in the sense that its sphere of activity
should be co-extensive with all aspects of human life. It should
seek to mould every aspect of life and activity in consonance with its
moral norms and its ideals of social justice; simultaneously individual
liberty should be upheld and all traces of oppression eliminated. As
in most known states, this is an attempt to take a middle course
between the two extremes of anarchy (chaos) and dictatorship (totalitarian).
The Islamic state is an ideological state in which theology, not
politics, provides the basis of argument and the form of expression^";
and only those who are knowledgeable in Islam are permitted to be
members of the state's Executive Council. Conversely, non-Muslims are
not entitled to have a say in the shaping of the state's fundamental
policies. This is because they lack knowledge in Islamic theology and
2
philosophy which are also the ideological basis of the state. But
they are free to live within the Islamic state as Dhimmis (non-Muslim
rz
citizens) and enjoy specific rights and privileges in accordance with
the Shari'ah; the state protects them as any Muslim; their persons are
honoured; their lives and properties are protected; and if they are
capable of service, their services will be used. In this way the rights
1. See Lewis, B., "The Study of Islam", in Encounter. XXXVIII (No. 1,
1972), pp. 31-41.
2. For a brief but useful study in the historical development of
philosophical and religious thought in the Muslim world, see
Watt, W.M., Islamic Survey I. Islamic Philosophy and Theology
(Edinburgh, 1979).
3. For an illuminating analysis of Christianity in the Middle East
and then the relation between Islam and Christianity, see Browne,
Laurence E., The Eclipse of Christianity in Asia (Cambridge, 1931);
Watt, W.M., Islamic Revelation in the Modern World (Edinburgh,
1969), especially pp. 94-98 and 114-117; and Franck, Dorothea S.
(ed.), Islam in the Modern World (Washington, 1950). Aslo see
W.B.C. Frend, "Christian Period in Mediterranean Africa, c. AD
200 to 700", in J.D. Fage (ed.), The Cambridge History of Africa,
vol. II, From c. 500 BC to AD 1050 (London, 1978), pp. 410-489.
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of minorities are protected; their freedom guaranteed and they are
given the right to live according to their own culture. This is the
rationale of the Islamic policy of peaceful coexistence, expressed
in the Muslim axiom: Lakum ma lana wa alaikum ma alaina (You have what
we have and you share in our responsibilities).^"
Islam has also defined means of selecting those who are to act
in the vicariate of God on earth. The Qur'an says:
Allah has promised those among you who believe and
do righteous deeds that He will assuredly make them
to succeed (the present rulers) and grant them
viceregency in the land just as He made those before
them to succeed (others). (24:55)
The use of the word "vicegerency" (Caliph) means that the Caliph is
bound by the concept of delegation and, therefore, his authority is
not sovereign, in that the power to rule has been delegated to the
whole community of believers and not to the Caliph alone; nor to any
particular group of persons within the community. Thus, the delegated
authority is a popular one, not a limited one, hence the Caliph, is,
in fact, a primus inter -pares in the Muslim community. According to
the Islamic political theory, every Muslim is a Caliph of God, in his
own individual capacity and, by virtue of this position, he is
2
individually responsible to God. This theme led to the development
of an Islamic version of Protestantism (see Ti.i.ianiyya in Chapter Vl).
1. I owe this explanation to Alhaji Aminu Kano, interviewed in London
on 12 May 1974. He also suggested further readings on the topic
for me. For a more detailed exposition on the relations between
Muslim rulers and their non-Muslim subjects, see Tritton, A.S.,
The Caliphs and their Non-Muslim Subjects (Oxford, 1950).
2. For a detailed discourse on this proposition, see Lambton, A.K.S.,
"Islamic Political Thought" in Schacht, J., and Bosworth, C.E„,(eds.),
The Legacy of Islam (Oxford, 1979), pp. 404-423o
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The concept of popular vicegerency is the real foundation of
democracy in Islam because it made every Muslim a Caliph of God and
thus an equal participant in the CaliphateD Furthermore, Islam enjoined
its believers not to tolerate any class divisions based on distinctions
of birth and social position. Islam teaches the equality of man as
well as his nothingness before God. This means that, in theory, all
men enjoy equal status and position. The only criterion for superiority,
in an Islamic social order, is personal ability and character. The
point which was repeatedly taught and explicitly asserted by the Holy
Prophet and leading Muslims is that:
No one is superior to another except in point of faith
and piety. All men are descended from Adam and Adam
was made of clay. An Arab has no superiority over a
non-Arab nor non-Arab over Arab; neither does a White
man possess any superiority over a Black man nor a Black
man over a White one, except in point of piety. 1
This shows that Islamic religious tradition is overwhelmingly hostile
to social as well as racial discrimination. For example, after the
conquest of Makkah when the whole of Arabia came under the domination
of the Islamic state, the Holy Prophet, in an address to his tribesmen,
who were regarded as superior to other Arabs, said:
0 people of QuraishJ Allah has rooted out your
haughtiness of the days of ignorance and the pride of
ancestry ... You are descended from Adam and Adam
was (born) of earth. The noblest of you all in the
sight of Allah is the most devout. An Arab is superior
to a non-Arab in nothing but devotion. 2
1. Nasr, Seyyed Hossein, "Ideals and Realities of Islam", cited by
Ahmad, K„, ot). cit.. p. 169. This point was also dealt with, at
length, by Lewis, Bernard, "The African Diaspora and the Civiliza¬
tion of Islam", in Kilson, Martin and Rotberg, R. (eds.), The
African Diaspora: Interpretive Essays (Cambridge, Mass., 1976).
2. Jahiz, "Kitab al-Bayan wa-t-Tabyin", cited in Rodinson, Maxine,
Mohammed (Anne Carter trans.) (Penguin, Harmondsworth, Middlesex,
1977), p. 286; also see Ahmad, K., on. cit. , p. 169.
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This insistence on the equality of all men and of all races before God
is meant to ensure that no individual or group of individuals will
suffer any disability on account of birth, social position or profession
that may in any way impede the growth of his faculties or hamper the
development of his personality. In an Islamic society everyone is
supposed to enjoy equal opportunities for progress. The door will be
left open to all to make as much progress as possible according to
their inborn capacities and personal merits without prejudice to
similar rights of other people. In this way even slaves and persons
of slave descent can move up the social ladder to the highest positions,
yet other citizens can never feel ashamed to serve under them. This
argument was forcibly made by Ibn Hazm (994-1064), when he said:
God has decreed that the most devout is the noblest,
even if he be a negress's bastard, and that sinner and
unbeliever is at the lowest level, even if he be the
son of the Prophet. 1
This type of unrestricted scope for personal achievement has always
been a hallmark of the ideal Islamic society.
Islam seeks, on the one hand, to set up democracy and, on the
other hand, to put an end to that individualism which militates against
the health of its body politic. The relations between the individual
and society have been regulated in such manner that the personality of
the individual does not suffer any dimunition0 Islam makes the purpose
of an individual's life the same as that of the community, namely the
acquisition of the good things in life through the enforcement of
1. Ibn Hazm, "Jamharat Ansab al-'Arab" (ed. Levi, Cairo, 1948), cited
by Lewis, Bernard, in Kilson, M. and Rotberg, R., op„ cit.. p. 47.
Also see Lewis, B., Race and Color in Islam (New York, 197l), which
is a useful reading on this topic; an abridged version of this
book under the same title can be found in Encounter.XXXV (No. 2,
August, 1970), pp. 18-34.
Divine Laws (Shari'ah). This is why after safeguarding the rights
of the individual, it imposed upon him certain duties towards the
community. In this way the requirements of both the individual and
the society have been so well harmonized that the individual is
afforded the fullest opportunities to develop his own potentials and
is also enabled to employ his developed facilities in the service of
the community,,
In the Islamic society, every sane, adult Muslim is entitled to
express his opinion because every Muslim is a repository of the
Caliphate. God made the Caliphate conditional not upon birth or
wealth but upon faith, good conduct and competence. Therefore, all
Muslims have equal freedom to express their opinions. Consequently,
there is no room for dictatorship in the Islamic society. No person
(or group of persons) is entitled to become an absolute ruler by
depriving the rank and file of their inherent right to the Caliphate.
The position of men who are elected to conduct public affairs is
simply this: all Muslims (or, as it is technically stated, all Caliphs
of God) delegate their Caliphate to them for administrative purposes.
Thus, the Caliph is in a position of dual responsibility: on the one
hand, he is answerable to God, and on the other hand, he is answerable
to his fellow Muslims (Calinhs) who have delegated their authority to
him. If he raises himself to the position of an absolute ruler, i.e.
a dictator, he assumes the character of a usurper rather than a
legitimate caliph because dictatorship is a negation of popular
viceregency and, therefore, un-Islamic. These safeguards against
dictatorship are meant to give the individual the full liberty to choose
whichever path he likes to take to develop his faculties in any
direction which suits his natural gifts. If the Caliph obstructs
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anyone by physical means, or if he obstructs the growth of anyone's
personality by institutional means, he will be punished by God for
his tyranny.
Political tyranny, economic exploitation, social repression, and
any form of injustice, are vices which Muslims are enjoined to fight
against. Any Muslim ruler who practices such vices is deviating from
the teachings of the Qur'an and thus has forfeited the right to demand
obedience and support from his fellow Muslims. This message is clearly
stated in the Qur'an, which says:
No obedience is due to any creature against the Creator. 1
This injunction also instructs Muslims to obey only what is lawful
and to disassociate themselves from, indeed to disobey and even correct,
if they can, what is unlawful. In fact, according to Caliph Umar
(the second of the "Rightly Guided Caliphs"), Muslims are commanded to
rebel in the sense of "struggling" or "striving" against any form of
2
social, economic and political injustice. It is regarded as Fardh ain
(compulsory) upon Muslims to resist injustice. Any positive action
directed against injustice and against any object of disapprobation
by "exertion", is regarded as Jihad. Muslims believe that faith will
inevitably deteriorate if it is not regularly purified, hence, the
obligation of the Jihad which is taken to mean the purification of the
1. The Qur'an, chapter 66, verse 9, cited in Liman, M.T.A., The
Influence of the Poetry of Al'Kumait Ibn Zayd Al'Asadi on the
Downfall of the Ummawad Dynasty (unpublished PhD thesis. School
of Oriental and African Studies, London, 1974), p. 55o
2. Islamic political literature abounds with stories of Caliph Umar
(634-644). Among many others see Arnold, Thomas, The Caliphate
(Oxford, 1924); Hitti, Philip K., The Arabs: A Short History
(Chicago, 1956); Lewis, Bernard (ed.), The Arabs in History
(London, 1956); and Watt, W.M., Islam and the Integration of
Society (London, 1961), especially pp. 163-180. But for a specific
discussion on Umar's Caliphate, see Brockelmann, Carl, History of
the Islamic Peonies (London, 1952), pp. 45-70.
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faith. This instills in the minds of Muslims, the puritanical and the
activist conception of Islam. Similarly, it serves both as the point
of reference and the justification of positive actions for the purposes
of reforms in the Islamic society and the extension of the frontiers
of Bar al-Islam.
Islamic Reforms in Northern Nigeria
The idea of the Jihad and the expansion of Bar al-Islam at the
expense of Bar al-Kufr. through the establishment of empires, trans¬
cending ethnic loyalty and geographical area, and held together by the
common belief in Islam and under the jurisdiction of a Muslim Caliph,
existed in Africa south of the Sahara centuries before the Muslim
uprising in Northern Nigeria in the early nineteenth century. For
instance, although the ascendancy of the Almoravids in the Western
Sudan in the eleventh century was short-lived, it affected subsequent
reform movements in the area in many ways. For example, it transmitted
its "radical" interpretations of the Qur'an to the Muslims in the
Western Sudan; it established a channel of communication between Western
Sudan and North Africa; and it created a precedent for later reform
movements which sought to transform their respective societies in
accordance with the prescriptions of the Shari'ah.^
1. There are many accounts of the impact of the Almoravids in North
Africa and the Western Sudan0 Among many others, see Le Tourneau,
Roger, The Almohad Movement in North Africa in the Twelfth and
Thirteenth Centuries (Princeton. New Jersey. 1969): Brelvi. Mahmoud,
Islam in Africa (Lahore. 1964) especially pp. 344-564; Lewis, I.M.
(ed.). Islam in Trooical Africa (Oxford, 1966); Levtzion, N., "The
Sahara and the Sudan from the Arab Conquest of the Maghrib to the
Rise of the Almoravids", in J.D. Fage (ed.), The Cambridge History
of Africa, vol. II (London, 1978), pp. 637-718. Also see Mohammedan
HistoryTpubIdshed by HMSO, London, 1920), and Little, Bonald P.
(ed.), Bssavs on Islamic Civilizations (Leiden, 1976). Among many
articles/
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The usurpation of power by Askia Al Hajj Muhamed Ture1, in the
fifteenth century Songhay Empire (1464-1591), was not unconnected with
the desire to purify the Muslim faith and to modify indigenous,
pre-Islamic, political institutions. During the one century rule of
the Askia3 over the Songhay Empire certain developments in favour of
Islam took place: (i) the creation of a centralized government and
complex bureaucracy very much like those of the Islamic states in the
Maghrib and the Middle East; (ii) the establishment of centres of
higher learning and research in Islamic sciences (e.g. in Timbuktu);
(iii) the growth of the number and the political influence of the
Muslim clerics; (iv) the application of a more positive policy of
2
Islamization in the whole Empire, The evidence of Askia Muhammad's
concern with the purification of Islam, partly lies in his question to
Shayk Al-Maghili (to whom Western Sudan owes several aspects of its
reform traditions) , on the status of Muslims who combined Islam with
pagan practices, Al-Maghili replied:
articles there are Hunwick, J.O., "Ahmad Baba and the Moroccan
Invasion of the Sudan (l59l)", in Journal of the Historical Society
of Nigeria, II (No, 3, 1962), pp, 311-326; Sanneh, Lamin, "The
Origins of Clericalism in West African Islam", Journal of African
History. XVII (No. 1, 1976), pp. 49-72,
1, For a detailed account of how Askia Muhammad took over power in the
fifteenth century Songhay Empire, see Lewis, I,M,, op, cit.,
pp0 296-315, A comparative study of the rule of Askia Muhammad and
Sonni Ali before him, is made by Pardo, A,, "The Songhay Empire
under Sonni Ali and Askia Muhammad: A study in comparisons and
contrasts", in Daniel F, McCall and N,R, Bennett (eds,), Boston
University Papers on Africa. V (l97l)» pp, 41-58,
2, Lewis, IoM., op, cit.. contains various aspects of reforms under¬
taken by the Askia administration in the Songhay Empire,
3, For an assessment of Shayk Al-Maghili's activities in West Africa,
see Bedri, Kamal and Starratt, Priscilla E., "The Crown of Religion
concerning the Obligation of Princes", Kano Studies, New Series,
I (No, 2, 1974-1977), pp. 15-27; Gwarzo, Hassan Ibrahim, The Life
and Teachings of Al-Maghili with Particular Reference to the Saharan
Jewish Community (unpublished PhD thesis. School of Oriental and
African Studies, London, 1972); and Baldwin, T.H., The Obligation
Princes (Beirut, 1932),
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As for those people whose characteristic you described.,
they are polytheists without doubt, because anathematizing,
according to manifest Law, is for less than that, and
there is no doubt that Holy war against them is better
and more meritorious than Holy war against unbelievers
who do not say, "There is no God but God, Muhammad is
His Apostle" ... 1
Obviously, the Askias in their century long reign did not cure
the socio-economic problems of the society and the political oppression
of the rulers; nor did they end the syncretism of Islam and paganism
in their area of jurisdiction; because three hundred years after
both Al-Maghili and Askia Muhammad, the protest against illegality,
tyranny and mixing of Islam with paganism was re-echoed by Shehu Usman
Dan Podio, his brother Abdullahi b. Fodio and his son and successor
Muhammadu Bello.
The interpretations of the above Sokoto triumvirate comprise the
main primary sources on the state of affairs in Hausalana before the
2 3
nineteenth century Jihad0 In his book Kitabul Para , Shehu Usman Dan
Fodio made sharp and destructive criticisms of the Habe rulers of
Hausa states,, Having condemned their excesses and corruption he quoted
the Holy Prophet as having said:
1„ Quoted in Hiskett, Mc, "An Islamic Tradition of Reform in the
Western Sudan from the Sixteenth to the Eighteenth Century",
Bulletin of S.O.A.S.. XXV (Ho. 3, 1962), pp. 577-596.
2. Their main texts which focus on the society, political and religious
situation are: Shehu Usman Dan Podio, Bayan Wu.iubul Hi.iira (l807),
Kitabul Para (1810-1811); Abdullahi b. Podio, Diyal Hukkum (l807-
1908). Diva'ul Wilayat (1815); Muhammadu Bello, Usulus Siya'asat
(1806;, Infakul Haisuri. Other sources include T. Hodgkin's
comprehensive historical anthology, Nigerian Perspectives (Oxford,
1975), especially section seven, 1800-1850, pp. 244-292, and
Smith, M., Baba of Karo (London, 1954), especially pp. 66-82.
3. This information is drawn from Hiskett, M., "Kitab Al-Parq: a
Work on the Habe Kingdoms attributed to Usman Dan Fodio", Bulletin
of S.O.A.So. XXIII (No. 3, I960), pp. 558-579*
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If we appoint an Emir or assign to him a certain stipend,
then anything which he receives other than that is fraud. 1
Shehu Usman Dan Fodio went on to say that for the unbelievers, the
purpose of government was only the fulfilment of their lusts, because
they were like beasts. He described the ways of their (Habe) govern¬
ments as follows:
1) Succession to the throne was by hereditary right or by force to
the exclusion of consultation.
2) Their sovereignty rested upon three things: the people's persons,
their honour and their possessions. Whoever they wish to kill, violate
his honour, exile, confiscate his wealth, they do so without any regard
to Shari<ah.
3) They imposed uncanonical taxes on all subjects (Muslims and
non-Muslims alike). They also imposed fiscal exactions on merchants
and travellers.
4) Without any religious observance, they ate and drank what they
wanted; wore what clothes they wished; took any woman they wanted into
their houses (many times numbering thousands) as concubines, without
marriage; and they lived in grandeur in their decorated palaces.
5) Their rulers practiced Kamuwa (confiscation of property) in market
places, etc. Also, when their prosperous subjects died, their properties
were forcibly taken without consultation or the consent of the dependents
of the deceased.
6) They compelled people to serve in their armieso
?) All subject peoples gave presents called Gaisuwa (bribes) to their
superiors and those bribes (money) determined truth and falsehood in
1. Cited in Ibid., p. 567.
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legal disputes,, People had to pay money (bribes)"*" to be conducted
before the rulers. Thus, the rulers shut their door in the face of
the needy (poor).
8) They delayed in the payments of debts and that was considered as
injustice by the Muslim reformers.
9) Freedom of worship was denied to Muslims by beating those who were
seen praying to God in the open.
10) The subject peoples practiced the long standing Hausa tradition
of greeting their rulers by throwing dust over their heads, which was
evidence of the excess of the rulers, and thus an evilo They also did
different kinds of vainglorious things, such as beating drums and
blowing flutes, etc., for their rulers,,
11) Habe rulers were said to be liars, treacherous and proud; that one
could not see any of them who did not give airs; and whoever was
disrespectful to them was severely punished. The reforming Ulema held
that whoever practiced any (and worst still all) of the points enumerated
2
above was on the way to hell-fire. The Shehu then instructed his
Muslim followers not to imitate the unbelievers' way of government and
3
not to use the titles of their officials such as Galadima . Uban Dawaki
(Master of horses), etc.
1. The Kanuri equivalent of this type of bribery, which is still being
practiced in Borno, is known as Kufelo. For an analysis of insti¬
tutionalized corruption in Borno, see Cohen, Ronald, "Some Aspects
of Institutionalized Exchange: A Kanuri Example", in Cahiers
d'etudes africaines. V (Nos. 17-20, 1975), pp. 353-369.
2. Points 1-11 are the paraphrased summary of the criticisms levelled
against the Habe kingdoms by Usman Dan Fodio, "Kitab Al-Farq", in
Hiskett, M., op. cit.. pp. 556-569.
3. Among the Kanuri of Borno, the title of Galadima is known as Galtima,
meaning the Governor of the tfest. This suggests that it is originally
a Borno title which is adopted by Hausa and then by their Fulani
successors. It is one of the senior hereditary titles conferred
on clients (Barori) as well as on Princes under Fulani. See Aliyu,
Abubakar Yaya, "Report on the Sokoto Sub-Project", in Nigerian
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In his book, Infakul Maisuri^. Huhammadu Bello, elucidated the
contempt which the reforming Ulema felt towards both Hausa rulers and
the venal Muslim clerics who supported them. He cited the tradition
2
in which Sahabi Aliyu classified people into three categories:
(i) scholars of high standing; (ii) those who seek knowledge and the
way of salvation; (iii) the untutored rank and file who would follow
3
anyone who called them. Subsequently, Muhammadu Bello drew a line
between those who deserved to be honoured by virtue of their merit
and those who are to be the followers by gradation. He said:
Any man whose exact knowledge is proved and whose conduct
is good and follows not worldliness, it is right to
follow him. He who displays good deeds, it is right to
honour him according to his worth. (But) He who casts
aside the veil of shame from his face, it is right to
revile him. If evil is made plain and the Malam (cleric)
keeps silent and does not prevent it, God will punish
him and drive him away, without doubt, from those who
keep His word. 4
In a way, the above quotation reveals the Platonic legacy in the Islamic
political thought, in the sense that the highest honour should be
Administration Research Project. First Interim Report (institute
of Administration, A.B.U., Zaria, 1972), pp. 4-10, and Alkali,
Muhammad Nur, "The Concept of Islamic Government in Borno under
the Saifawa Dynasty", in Kano Studies. Hew Series, I (No. 2,
1974-1977), PP. 29-36.
1. This information is drawn from Arnett, E.J., The Rise of the
Sokoto Fulani (Kano, 1922), being a paraphrase and in some parts
a translation of the Infakul Haisuri by Muhainmadu Bello. Also see
Hodgkin, T.L., on. cit.. pp. 256-258, 264-267, 283-285, 287-290.
2. The Arabic word Sahabi means a friend or a companion of the Holy
Prophet. In addition to being friend and companion of the Holy
Prophet Muhammad, Aliyu was the fourth of the Rightly Guided
Caliphs (656-66l), the cousin, and the son-in-law of the Holy
Prophet. On how and why Aliyu was assassinated, see Brockelmann,
Carl, on. cit.. p. 70. Also see Watt, W.M., Islamic Philosophy and
Theology (Edinburgh. 1979), especially pp. l-5o
3. Paraphrased from Arnett, E.J., on. cit.. p. 27.
4o Quoted from Ibid.
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accorded to the learned on the basis of their knowledge as similar
honour was reserved for the "guardians" in Plato's Republic on the
1
basis of their intellectual capacities. But more than in Greek philo¬
sophy, Islamic philosophy makes it obligatory on the "philosophers" to
do good and forbid evil. It appears from Muhammadu Bello's assertion
above that the Muslim Ulema is ordained to be the shepherd of his people;
and his failure to carry out this command amounts to a dereliction of
his religious duty, This act, we are made to understand, would be
appropriately punished by God,
According to Muhammadu Bello, the Muslim crusade was a reaction
to acts of provocation against the Muslims by Habe chiefs0 For example,
they blockaded roads to stop Muslims from paying courtesy calls on the
Shehu, and they confiscated Muslim properties. Thus, the Jihad was
declared firstly for the purpose of self-defence, i.e, to repel attacks
on the Muslims; and secondly, in order to reform Islam, i,e. to extirpate
heathenism, destroy its thicket, to convert more people to the Muslim
faith and thereby to replace nominal Islam with the true Islam,
On his own part, Abdullahi b. Fodio was said to be more worried
with the mercenary tendencies of some undisciplined Muslims and venal
Malams who shifted their allegiance to suit their material interests.
At first, they cooperated with Habe chiefs against the Muslims but
later, when the Muslims gained the upper hand in the wars, they joined
the ranks of the Jihadists in order to share in the booty of the wars.
The fact is that, in pre-Jihad Northern Nigeria, religious syncretism
1. Rosenthal, E.I.J., in Political Thought in Medieval Islam
(Cambridge, 1958), pp. 115-114, suggests that it was the study of
Platonic political philosophy which gave Islamic political
philosophy its character and its form.
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was so common that even Shayk Muhammad Al-Amin El-Kanemi^, the famous
Borno scholar, who questioned the legitimacy of the Jihad, admitted
that Islam in the country (Hausaland and Borno) was tinged with
heathen practices: that women went without the veil and that the
administrations were corrupt. In keeping with Al-Maghili's dictum,
the prevailing un-Islamic practices justified the Jihad in the whole
area. Above all, a good number of the Habe chiefs were outright
animists, whereas Islamic traditions hold that:
It is well known that the prevailing belief in the
country is the belief of the chief. If the chief
becomes heathen, the country becomes heathen too. 2
This shows that of all the factors which led to the Jihad, Islam, as
the ideology of the movement, was predominant. Through the teachings
of Islam, Hausa subjects became aware of the injusticies of their
rulers. Islamic awareness, political and social discontent created
a crisis of confidence: one in which the Muslims felt so frightened
3
and insecure under Habe rule, that the Shehu had to make a Hi.iira.
1. Among the Kanuris of Borno, he is simply referred to as Shehu Laminu.
He emerged as the leader of Muslims in Borno in 1800-1814. For
a brief, but useful, analysis of his leadership, see Brenner,
Louis, The Shehus of Kukawa (Oxford, 1973), pp. 26-47. And, for
his case against the Jihad, see Hodgkin, T.L., Nigerian Perspectives
(Oxford, 1975), pp. 261-264; and Lavers, John E., "Islam in the
Borno Caliphate: A Survey", in ODU. New Series, No. 5 (l97l),
pp. 27-48, which contains a detailed analysis of the state of
Islam in Borno from 1500-1800. Also see Cohen, R., "The Bornu
King Lists", in Boston University Papers on Africa, vol. II (1966),
pp. 39-83.
2. Muhammadu Bello, "Infakul Maisuri", cited in Arnett, E.J., on. cit..
Literature abounds on the background of the Jihad. To mention a
few, see Hodgkin, T.L., on. cit., especially pp. 244-267, and
Hiskett, M., The Sword of Truth (Oxford, 1973), and the list in
footnote no. 2, p. 84.
3. The act of fleeing from the land of unbelievers by Muslims, first
started by the Holy Prophet Muhammad when, in A.D. 622, he migrated
from Mecca to Medina. Shehu Usman Dan Folio's migration from Degel
to Gudu took place on 21 February 1804. Among many works on this
topic, see Boyd, Jean, The Flame of Islam (NNPC, Zaria, 1972),
pp. 27-28.
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As the Muslim community travelled to Gudu to join their leaders, the
authorities in Gobir became desperate and moved swiftly to stop that
mass exodus of people from their area of jurisdiction. This brought
the two sides face to face for the final show-down.
Although the Hijira appears to be the last straw which broke the
camel's back, the nineteenth century Muslim uprising in Northern Nigeria
jointly derived from many, and far more deep-rooted factors, which
include the following: the desire to return to the Our'an and the Sunnah,
the determination to establish an Islamic state in its pure form, the
struggle against the payment of uncanonical taxes, frustrations due to
the decadence of Habe regimes. the emphasis on moral and material
austerity, the campaign against paganism and the striving against the
excesses, the abuses and the worldliness of the Habe ruling dynasty.
Indeed, it was a protest against the arbitrariness, the political
oppression and the social injustice of the Habe rulers. Further causes
of the tension which led to the uprisings included the contempt with
which Muslim scholars held their non-Muslim overlords, the Muslims'
consciousness of their cultural superiority over pagans, their virtual
monopoly of literacy and their awareness that they knew much more about
the wider world than their pagan neighbours and rulers. All these
combined, made the Muslims "mighty subjects",^"
In addition to their literary skills, and their knowledge of the
Muslim world, the scholars were also diviners and physicians and so
the Habe rulers needed their superior magic (Ronga) as much as they
needed their services as scribes and teachers. Hence many Muslim
1, This phrase was first used by Smith, H.F.C., in "The Islamic
Revolution of the Nineteenth Century", in Journal of the Historical
Society of Nigeria. II (No. 2, 1961), p. 172,
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scholars were employed as functionaries in the Habe courts*. Being
employees in the Habe courts gave the Muslims an inside view of the
extent of the deterioration of the Hausa system of government. The
knowledge and the experience acquired by the Muslims in the Habe courts
made the scholars even more determined in their efforts to replace the
Hausa states by an Islamic state, based on the Shari'ah and to establish
a bureaucracy manned by God-fearing Muslim leaders. Since all subject
peoples suffered from an extreme sense of frustration and helplessness
under Habe rule, the Muslim rebellion provided the much needed rallying
point for the Talakawa to turn against their rulers. On the one hand,
the rebellion offered a genuine popular basis for resistance and, on
the other hand, the Muslim leaders skillfully exploited the grievances
of all subject peoples (Muslims and non-Muslims alike) to their
advantage and for their final victory.^
That victoiy was also due to increased conversion to 131am. As an
alternative value system to the animist beliefs, Islam articulated
latent grievances to challenge the dominant pagan mythology and thus
organize the people for a contest with the dominant forces around them.
Whereas the teachings of Islam produced a critical mass of potentially
discontented people in Hausaland, the working out of the large-scale
institutional forces of the same society set the stage for the appearance
of militant Muslims preachers who spread the good tidings of escape
from the evils and the pains of the Habe rule. Most of those militant
teachers belonged to the Fulani ethnic group. This is one of the reasons
1. For detailed accounts of the various causes of the Jihad see the
following: Smith, H.F.C., ibid.: Hodgkin, T.L., Nigerian Perspec¬
tives (Oxford, 1975); Bivar, A.D.E., "A Manifesto of the Fulani
Jihad", in Journal of African History, XI (ho. 2, 196l), pp. 235-
243; Al-Hajj, M., "The Fulani Concept of Jihad — Shehu Usman Dan
Fodio", in ODU, I (No. 1, 1964), pp. 45-58.
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why the nineteenth century Muslin Revolution which ended. Sabe rule in
most of Hausaland is commonly called the "Fulani Jihad"» Even though
the Fulani Ulema were small in number, they constituted an influential
cultural group in a society which was overwhelmingly pre-literate and
where the standard of learning was very low indeed,, For several years
before the Jihad, the Fulani were religious teachers and, by virtue of
their religious knowledge, they were also the leaders of Muslim
communities and hence, they commanded considerable authority. This
point is important in the study of the Jihad as a political force because
it underlines both the causes and the motives of the movement. Although
the Fulani were numerically in the minority, they were able to lead and
to carry out the Jihad to a successful end because of their sense of
cohesion and their intellectual superiority over the rest of the
population. Their knowledge of the Muslim world and, especially, that
of the rise and fall of the Muslim Empires in the Middle East gave them
some degree of organizing ability and political acumen over and above
that of the Habe aristocracy,, This also explains why the "Fulani Jihad"
was only checked, in the northeastern part of Nigeria, by Borno Muslims,
whose cultural development and social organization equalled that of
the Fulani. Even the scholar leaders of the Jihad themselves had
acknowledged the equality, if not the superiority, of the then Borno
society.''"
I. According to Hiskett, M., "Materials Relating to the State of
Learning Among the Fulani Before their Jihad", Bulletin of S.O.A.St.
XIX (No. 3, 1957), pp. 550-578, Muhammadmu Bello said, "Before Jihad
no country surpassed Borno in prosperity and there are not found
in our towns students and writers of the Koran equal to theirs"
(ibid., p. 572). This remark also proves that Islam had been
prevalent in Northern Nigeria centuries before the Jihad. Similarly,
there were many devout and learned Muslim clerics amongst both the
peoples of Borno and Hausa as among the Fulani. Because Borno,
like Hausaland, was inhabited by mary and different ethnic groups.
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It should he noted that, although the Jihad was Fulani led, the
the actual war attracted the interests of all the underlying population
of the Hausa society: good Muslims and nominal Muslims, non-Muslims
and Muslims, Fulani and Habe, alike, all participated in the crusade
for the emancipation of their society. In fact, for many participants,
the main, if not the sole incentive, for fighting in the Jihad was to
share in the booty of the wars. It provided opportunities for people
to distinguish themselves in the wars and, subsequently, to acquire for
themselves wealth, political office and prestige. Nevertheless, there
were other people who fought in the Jihad in the expectations of their
reward from God thereafter. Thus, the appeal of the Jihad was neither
limited to the Fulani scholars, nor even to the wider body of nomads
belonging to the Fulani tribe.
In view of the fact that Fulani have always been, and are still,
in the minority, and in view of the fact that they were then, and are
still, thinly scattered all over Northern Nigeria: firstly as nomads,
secondly as peasant farmers, and thirdly as the settled aristocracy"*",
there is no reason to believe that all Fulani had (or have) common
interests and thus had unanimously supported the Jihad.
For the spread of Islam in the south-eastern part of the then
Sokoto Empire, see Sa'ad, A., "Islam in Fombina Before c. 1847",
in Northern History Research Scheme. Third Interim Report (1967-
1971, Zaria, 1975), pp. 45-54, and "The Foundation of an Islamic
Scholastic Community in Yola", in Kano Studies. New Series, I (No. 3,
1978), pp. 27-38. But for a general discussion on the spread of
Islam in Vest Africa see, McCall, T.F., "Islamization of the
Western Sudan in the Eleventh Century", and Levtzion, M., "Patterns
of Islamization in Vest Africa", in 3oston University Papers on
Africa, V (l97l), pp. 1-30 and 31-39, respectively.
1. This occupational classification is in numerical order. Only a
small minority of Fulani are settled in towns and even a smaller
minority of the settled Fulani form part of the ruling elites.
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Conversely, all available evidence suggests that many persons of
Fulani origin refused to lend their support to the cause of the Jihad.
For example, Abdullahi b0 Fodio complained that his own tribesmen were
slow in coming forward to assist the Shehu,^" This shows that a very
large number of the Shehu's supporters were Hausa or from other tribes,,
Muhammadu Bello confirmed Abaullahi's complaint when he explained in
his own account of the Jihad:
As for us who had helped each other for the Muhammadan
faith, we take no glory in anything except in our faith
,.. Now the different races among us Muhammadans were
first the Toronkawa: they are our kindred; then our
Fulani and our Hausas. There were also some of other
races who assembled and aided us in the service of
Godo 2
The fact that in all of his accounts of the various wars fought during
the Jihad period, Bello always emphasized the collective actions of
Muslims rather than of Fulani shows that the other ethnic groups were
as crucial to the successful prosecution of the "Holy War" as they were
of significant importance to the whole of the Reform Movement.
The above shows that the nineteenth century Jihad was partly a
Muslim affair and partly a protest of the Talakawa against the oppression
3
of the Habe ruling dynasties. While the objectives of the Jihad were
always presented in Islamic terms, in practice, the actions of the
1. Arnett, E.J., od, cito . p. 47. Almost all the known literature on
the Jihad agrees that the movement reflected a religious rather
than a tribal unitya This is because Islam was the ideology of
the movement and Muslim leaders commanded the campaigns. Similarly,
all available evidence indicates that all agrieved parties joined
in the struggle to overthrow the existing rulers.
2. Quoted from ibid,, p, 58,
3. This point comes even more clearly in Hodgkin, T.L., Nigerian
Perspectives, especially in pp. 50-71. A similar conclusion was
made by Last, M., "The Jihad Movements of the Nineteenth Century",
in Ajayi, J.F.A. and Crowder, M. (eds„), History of V;est Africa,
vol. II (London, 1974), pp. 1-29.
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Jihadists were due to a combination of various interests,, What was
common to both the ideology and the practice was the aim of overthrowing
the common tyranny (Habe rule) and the subsequent expectations of the
realization of individual liberty, freedom of worship and social justice,,
The Jihad was officially declared at Gobir in 1804 and a few years
later (1810) it had overrun most of Hausaland,"^ Outside the Hausa
States, especially in the riverine and the plateau areas, the military
campaign continued until the advent of the British in 1903, Whether
or not all the civil wars which took place in the nineteenth century
Northern Nigeria were Jihad, is debatable and the debate is beyond the
2
scope of this study,,
The Calinhate in Northern Nigeria
Soon after the defeat of the Hausa rulers on the battle-fields,
the warrior-scholars who led the Jihad, learned the sad lesson that
the great communalist ideals prescribed by Islam do not yield easily
3
to practical implementation. Thus, like their predecessors in the
1. See Sa*ad, Abubakar, "The Establishment of Fulbe Administration
in Adamawa", a seminar paper, Dept. of History, A.B.U., Zaria, 1971.
2. Islam teaches that "True Jihad" is essentially in self-defence.
The Our'an says: "Propagate the faith of your creator with diplomacy
and good counsel" because, "No force in religion light can be
distinguished from darkness." In this verse, "diplomacy" means
the application of tact and intelligence, I am grateful to M,T.A,
Liman to whom I owe the above quote and the explanation of the
true meaning of Jihad,
3. On the process of government, scholars like Al-Mawardi, Al-Ghazali,
Ibn Jama'a and Ibn Taymiya, hold utilitarian moral views which,
each in its own way, expresses the "greatest good of the greatest
number". Their principles of public administration are so flexible
that they advocate what is possible rather than what is ordained.
See Al-Mawardi, Al-Ahkam As-Sultanivya (also in French translation),
'Whereas Gibb, H.A,R., Studies on the Civilization of Islam, on, cit,,
pp. 151-165, carries a brief, but very useful summary of Al-Mawardi's
Theory of the Caliphate. Rosenthal, E,I.J,, Political Thought in
Medieval Islam, on, cit.. pp. 21-83, contains an instructive analysis
of the Muslim version of government as the "art of the possible".
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history of Muslim Empires, they formulated, and put forward manuals
of conduct for rulers, governors ana bureaucrats. These formulations
were to serve as the mirrors for Princes, They were more concerned
with the practice rather than the theory of government as enjoined
by the Qur'an. On the whole, the manuals emphasized justice rather
than religion, spelling out the responsibilities of rulers, as well
as the rights and duties of subjects, and to some extent, seeking to
assimilate the Islamic norms of traditional kingship. Again, like
2 3
Muslim constitutionalists before them, they upheld the Islamic elitism
which identifies the Philosopher King with the Imam: on the basis of
righteousness and knowledge. Therefore they specified the qualities
for leadership and laid down the principles of and the institutions
for public administration.
Regarding leadership qualities the Shehu held that these should
include being just, knowledgeable and courageous. The leader should
be elected:
1, The list in footnote 2, p.98 , are the standard texts on admini¬
stration by the Sokoto Triumvirate commonly referred: to by
researchers. But, for a full list of Usman Dan Fodio's works, see
Balogun, Isma'il, A.B,, The Life and Works of Usman Dan Fodio
(Lagos, 1975), especially pp. 40-48; Al-Hajj, M.A,, "The Writings
of Shehu Usman Dan Fodio: A Plea for Dating and Chronology", in
Kano Studies, New Series, I (No, 2, 1974-1977), pp. 5-13.
2, Al-Ghazali towers above them all. See his book Kitab Al-Iatisad
Cairo, A.H. 1320), Also see Arnold, Thomas and Guillaume, Alfred
eds.), The Legacy of Islam (Oxford, 1934), and 'Watt, W.M», Islamic
Philosouhy and Theology, on. cit., pp. 114-123 and Muslim Intellectual:
the Struggle and Achievement of Al-Ghazali (Edinburgh, 1963). This
list is by no means exhaustive,
3, The teachings of Islam hold that an elite, based on knowledge and
skills, useful to the society, is perfectly justified up to the
point where the accrued distinctions serve as spurs on others to
strive to acquire the same.
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By the best Muslims from among their scholars and
their virtuous men. A man they are pleased to have
as the Commander of the Faithful by virtue of his
being the best of them and the most suitable for
the office. 1
Perhaps the Shehu's most prized quality is Adl. "Justice", in his
2
Bayan vJu.yab al-Hi.iira , he emphasized that a leader should be a man
of sound judgement and diplomacy in handling public affairs, capable
of being strict when necessary and lenient when leniency is required.
It is the duty of the leader to order people to uphold justice and
goodness. According to the Shehu:
The essence of it (justice) is that the Sultan
should draw the scholars near to him since they are the
custodians of religious knowledge. They are its
guardians, propagators, who know it thoroughly and show
the way to God. He (the Sultan) whould do nothing without
their order. The other aspect of justice is conventional.
It is the practices the Kings followed before Islam came,
by which they managed their worldly affairs. The King
who ignored them was unsuccessful. 3
The Shehu further insists that leadership should go to those who least
4
want it: "The Emirate is not given to one who aspires to it." The
ideal Emir is constantly reminded that his leadership is meant to be
used to secure benefits and well-being for the community and not for
his personal advantage or pleasure. For the Shehu, the proper thing
for the Commander of the Faithful to do is to fear God and follow the
1. Shehu Usman Dan Fodio, in Bavan Ju.iub al-Hi.iira, cited by Tukur,
M., "The Philosophy, Goals and Institutions of the Sokoto Caliphal
Administration", in Nigerian Administration Research Project. First
Interim Report (Zaria, 1972), p. 22.
2. Shehu Usman Dan Fodio, Bavan V/u.iub al-Hi.iira Ala Al-Ibad, 1807.
El-Masri's translation for his PhD thesis (ibadan, 1967). My
subsequent account on Bayan V/u.jub al-Hi.iira is heavily drawn from
his translation.
3. Quoted from ibid., p. 44. In the conclusion of this quote the
Shehu warned with the maxim that "A Kingdom can endure with
unbelief but it cannot endure with injustice."
4o Cited in Tukur, M., on. cit. , p. 24o
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habits of Muslims in their system of government: these habits have
their foundation in piety and righteousness. Integrity and incorruptibility
are the twin ideals which go hand in hand with piety. No Emir of high
standing can accept gifts from officials before appointing them to
public office. To do so is to weaken religion, open the door to
bribery and oppress the people. The legality of a gift, Gaisuwa, not.
withstanding, the Shehu holds that no governor is justified in
accepting it. Obviously he suspects that the person giving the present
will expect some kind of favour at a future date.
In enumerating what is incumbent upon the Emir, Abdullahi b. Fodio
said that he should realize that he is no better than any of the
creatures of God. He has to love goodness for his people. He must not
embezzle wealth from the public treasury. He should ensure that orders
are obeyed; and that he should utter no word without following it by
action. On the criteria and the qualifications for appointment to
the offices of the state, Abdullahi advised that appointment to any
office through mutual love is unlawful. He asserted that the appointees
should be men of religion, virtue, piety and knowledge. Abdullahi b.
Fodio believed that the Emir must make himself available to his subjects
at all times and that only by so doing would he protect them from the
injustices of his deputies. His position is that:
It is necessary for the grand Amir to sit everyday
for the people where women and children can reach
him. It is not enough that he has appointed judges
and other helpers. Complaints of the subjects could
be against them. 1
In fact, this position is supported by Al-Maghili's advice to Muslims
in the Western Sudan when he said:
1. Abdullahi b. Fodio, cited by Tukur, M., on, cit.. p. 25o
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The veiling of the King from his subjects is the
source of all mischief. 1
The idea of the accessibility of Muslim leaders is buttressed by the
life story of the "Rightly Guided Caliphs" who succeeded the Holy
Prophet. It is said that they lived simply and made themselves
2
available to their people,, This is why Muslims regard the ideal
Caliph as Rudd al-Hazalim, "Reliever of the Oppressed".
3
In his Usui al-Siyasat , 1807, Muhammadu Bello was emphatic on
the subject of justice:
The justice of a Sultan for one single day is better
than the devotion of an ordinary man for seventy days.
On the day of Judgement, when no shade exists but the
shadow of God and there is no refuge but His shadow,
seven men will be granted shelter: the Sultan who is
just towards his subjects. The just Sultan will be
raised to Heaven. If you govern do it with justice.
All administrators will be in Hell-fire except those
who have followed the path of piety ana discharge their
duties honestly. The oppresive ruler will not obtain
any intercession. The Amir who draws his sustenance
from the people but does not bother to treat them justly
or relieve their oppression, the chief who fails to
strike a balance between the strong and the weak and
judges vengefully or by caprice have incurred the wrath
of God. 4
Apparently, paraphrasing his father, the Shehu, Bello shunned those who
struggle for power:
1. Al-Maghili, Obligation of Princes (Baldwin translation), on. cit..
p. 8.
2. Muslim tradition holds that rulers are leaders who are also
expected to be with their people; and it holds that criticism of
rulers by subjects, within the conventionally accepted terms are
tolerated. This is the precedent set by the Khulafa'u Al-Rashidun.
who were available to their subjects at all times. For example,
see the story of Caliph Al-Mansur in Hiskett, M., A History of
Hausa Islamic Verse (London, 1975), pp. 92-93„
3. Prof. Abdullahi Smith has an unpublished translation which is
slightly different from Shehu Yamusa's text,in his M.A. thesis,
The Political Ideas of the Jihad Leaders.(Ahmadu Bello University,
Zaria, 1975).I relied more on B.G. Martin's translation in Boston
University Papers on Africa, V (l97l), pp. 63-86.
4. Muhammadu Bello, Usui Al-Siyasat, B.G. Martin's translation, on.
cit., pp. 79-80.
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The person who we see striving hard for leadership
causes us to think that he does not deserve to have
it. 1
Thus, for the Sokoto leaders of the Jihad, the foundations of government
are: that it should not be given to those who seek it; it must be by
consultation; it should ensure justice, enjoin good works and forbid
harshness. The Shehu, in particular, sees the crown of a king in his
integrity; his stronghold in his impartiality and his capital in his
subjects. He observes that there can be no triumph with transgression,
no rule without learning, and no chieftancy with vengeance. He
instructs that a ruler has to accustom himself to patience and to swallow
2
the bitterness of his subjects' aversion.
They conceive administration as an organ for the implementation
of decisions arrived at by consultation. In keeping with Islamic
political theory, they see the primary purpose of their governments to
"enjoin what is right and forbid what is wrong and to render worship
possible." This particularly means being just, avoiding oppression
and corruption. Muslim governments should strip evils from religious
and temporal affairs and introduce reforms in both. The objectives
of the post-Jihad governments include: to protect the Faithful against
unbelievers and to wage war against oppressors and exploiters; to
combat every cause of corruption in the country; to reform the markets
and set to right the affairs of the poor and the needy; to teach
3
knowledge, Ilm, and to encourage people to study. These objectives
show very clearly that the new government intended to renovate and to
1. Ibid., p. 81.
2. See Bayan Ju.jub, op. cit. , p. 210.
5. Shehu Usman Dan Fodio, Kitab Al-Farq. M. Hiskett's translation,
op. cit.. pp. 569-570.
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improve all aspects of the pre-Jihad society. The social/economic
policies of the new government include the provision of social
services and the expansion of trade and commerce. These objectives
are so comprehensive that they would not have been undertaken by a
minimal government which was to concern itself with the maintenance
of law and order only. Muhammadu Bello even went further to say that
the function of the administration is to guarantee the interests of
the religion and the entire harmony of the world:
The Imam or the Amir or the V/ali is the one who lays
down for the people of his state their worldly and
religious duties. And he is the one who fosters the
artisans and is concerned that people have a trade which
is dispensable to the population, such as cultivators
and smiths, dyers and physicians, grocers and butchers
and carpenters and all the trades which contribute to
the harmony of this world. He must allocate them to
every village and every town according to the needs of
the people, likewise foodstuffs and supplies as they
are needed, and as the towns and country places become
filled with population. He must see to the construction
of walls around the towns and bridges and the maintenance
of markets and roads and the realization of the general
public welfare, so that the harmony of this world may
be maintained. 1
In fact, Bello's exposition is supported by a familiar tradition of
Umar ibn al-Khattab, who said:
A lamb might go to the bank of the Euphrates and fall
in, and 'Umar would be asked about it on the day of
Judgement, for there is no mercy for the Wali who
lets the rights of Muslims perish. 2
Similarly, the idea of a welfare system and that of the equitable
distribution of wealth and amenities are also rooted in the origins of
1. Usui Al-Siyasat, on. cit., p. 81.
2. Umar Ibn al-Khattab is the well known Caliph Umar. This quote is
related by Ali Ibn Abi Talib. Also to be found in Jawhara and
quoted by Bello himself in ibid., p. 84. Islamic history presents
Caliph Umar as a legendary figure not only because he was the
second Caliph (AD 634-644) but because as one of the earliest
converts to Islam he was a close companion ana the father-in-law
of the Holy Prophet: he was the father of one of the Prophet's
wives, Hafsat.
16
Islam in Arabia, especially under the early Caliphate* In the
formative years of Islam, all the Khulafa'u Al-Rashidun. more especially
Umar Ibn Khattab, were rigorously distributive in their attitudes
towards the resources of the state* For example, tradition has it
that Caliph Umar walked about the streets in his simple clothes,
wearing sandals and refusing to ride, because he saw himself as the
embodiment of the state and thus he wanted to see that little was
spent on the state* During his reign (AD 634-644) there developed a
sort of "socialism" based on the principle of social equality and
the equal sharing of war booty. For instance, it was related that
Caliph Umar was accused, by one of his own subjects, of having taken
more than his share of blankets, distributed as the spoils of conquest.
He considered it a matter of fundamental importance to prove the man
wrong. Indeed, he proved there aixL then, that the extra blanket he
had on was lent to him by his son.^" This distributive aspect of Islam
is closely related to the egalitarian concept in the sense that the
Islamic ideal of a "classless" society is genuinely fraternal one in
which every man should see every other man as a brother so that there
2
would be no conceit or constraint of "class" to limit fraternity*
The institution of the new Caliphate is to be headed by the
Commander of the Faithful, Sarkin Musulmi. at the centre (Sokoto) while
1. Although this is a well known story among the students of Islamic
history, I was actually tutored on its political implication by
M.T.A. Liman. A* Mazrui's Political Values and the Educated Class
in Africa (London, 1978), pp. 141-142, contains an extended version
of the same story.
2. See Muhammad Umar Chapra, "Objectives of the Islamic Economic
Order", in Khurshid, A., op. cit., pp. 173-195; M.M. Sherif (ed.),
A History of Muslim Philosophy. Vol. I (Wiesbaden, 1963). pp. 178-
190; and Mirza Muhammed Hussain, Islam Versus Socialism (Lahore,
1970).
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administrative authority in the provinces lies with the Emirs,
Amirul Jaish. Since the Emir who is the shepherd of his people cannot
conduct all the affairs of the community personally, it is inevitable
that he should delegate certain powers to his deputies., These deputies
should include the vizier, Waziri"*", who should take charge of the central
administration,, Abdullahi b. Fodio advised that the Waziri should fear
no one but God and that:
He should be truthful and just in his religion;
trustworthy in his character; perspicacious in the
affairs of the subjects; able to have mercy on them
and console those wounded by the Sultan. He should
not withhold good advice even when it is unpalatable. 2
Other senior ministers of the state should include: the Chief of
Police, the tax collector and the Cadi-Alkali (Muslim judge). Regarding
the qualities and the qualifications of the Alkali. Abdullahi b. Fodio
sees no judicial role for a corrupt or ignorant person. He also
recommended that the state bureaucracy should be manned by impartial
civil servants: revenue collectors, clerks and accountants, market
supervisors, health inspectors, etc. There should also be neutral law
enforcing agents. But the Waziri should remain the over-all deputy
of the grand Amir.
1. According to Ibn Khaldun, Waziri means "help". He explains:
The Wazirate is the mother of governmental functions
and royal ranks. The name itself means "help". Wazirah
(Wazirate) is derived either from Mu'azarah "Help" or
from Wizr "load" as if the Wazir were helping the
person whom he supports to carry his burden and charges.
Thus, the meaning comes down to no more than "help".
See The Muaaddimah (London, 1967), vol. II, p. 6 (translated from
Arabic to English by Franz Rosenthal).
2. Quoted from Diyaul Hukkam (Yamusa's translation) cited by Tukur,
M., on. cit.. p. 36. It should be remembered that Abdullahi b.
Fodio was the Waziri of his brother Shehu Usman Dan Fodio. See




It is evident that the justification of the Caliphate administration
is essentially religious (not secular) but its implementation is such
that even other-worldly objectives have temporal underpinnings. Their
aim was to establish essentially Islamic Governments. The Jihad was a
revolutionary movement and its leaders intended to keep that revolutionary
V
spirit permanent by establishing governments which catered for the
interests of all citizens. Were the ideals of the Jihadists carried
on by their successors?
In the late 1840's, most of the "First Eleven" of the team which
led the Jihad had passed away and thereby gave way to their "Second
Eleven", Those successor Emirs were preoccupied with issues and
problems different from those of their predecessors. Whereas the first
category of leaders were essentially Muslim scholars concerned mainly
with the propagation of the faith, their successors were essentially
military administrators concerned with the consolidation of their
respective positions of authority and with the expansion of their
respective empires. They assumed such secular titles as Etsu. Lamido.
Sarki. etc.\ whereas their predecessors were modestly called by their
2
achieved religious titles, such as Shehu. Modibbo, Malam. In view of
their militaristic policies, they relied heavily on the warrior class,
1. Btsu is the traditonal title for the ruler (Emir) of Nupeland; and
Lamido is the Fulfude word for the Fulbe rulers (Emirs) of Adamawa;
whereas Sarki is the Hausa word for King (or chief),
2, Shehu is derived from the Arabic word Shaykl a title implying both
religious and tribal leadership. The title was adopted by the
rulers of Borno in the nineteenth century. When used alone (The
Shehu) it refers to Usman Dan Fodio, Modibbo is a Fulfulde word
meaning the learned; its shortened version, Modi means a graduate.
Mallam (Mallama, female) is a title of respect for a Muslim
religious, or secular, teacher or scholar.
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Bayin-Sarki. for advice and support. The leading and, indeed, most
powerful war chiefs, such as ¥amhai, Haga.lin-Gari. Ubandoma, etc."'",
replaced the scholars as the Emirs' friends and confidants and, indeed,
as their power base. Thus, the scholars were out of power though they
remained associated with the palaces as religious advisers: Imams and
Al-kalai. Some of the scholars were horrified by their change of
fortune. But, more important, this change in the power structure brought
a deep division among the scholars; between the puritan scholars who
adhered rigidly to Islamic orthodoxy and the less puritan who accepted
their new role as "official" interpreters of the ^ur'an and the Hadith,
in order to support the new political set-up0 The former came to be
known as Bawan-Allah (the God-fearing) and the latter were contemptuously
referred to as Malum-Fada (the Venal Malam). Their statuses and public
standing differed greatly in the eyes of the public. The one was
admired and respected, the other was inwardly resented and merely
tolerated.
A good number of the scholars depended on the Emirs for gifts
3
of food, slaves and land to farm. Such scholars composed poems and
songs in praise of the Emirs and in commemoration of their successful
campaigns. But the relations between the Emirs and the puritan scholars
became frosty. Since Islamic traditions enjoin Muslims to vote with
their feet when they found themselves in a situation beyond their
1. These are hereditary, senior cbieftancy titles usually conferred
on clients, Barori. See Abubakar, Y. Aliyu, on. cit., p. 6.
2. Literally, this means the palace Malam, i.e. the greedy one.
3. For the case of what happened to the Malams at Yola in Gongola
State, see Sa'ad, A., "The Foundation of an Islamic Scholastic
Community in Yola", in Kano Studies, New Series, I (No. 3, 1978),
pp. 27-38.
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control, many puritan scholars began to migrate from the Emirates,,
But some went from the frying-pan into the fire, as Modibbo Raji and
Modibbo Hassan discovered to their dismay. They migrated from Gwandu
and Malle respectively, to Yola, where they found in existence the
evils of deviation from Sunnah and a return to Habe customs, from which
they were trying to escape.Many puritan scholars led independent
lives either by withdrawing from their communities and living as
hermits in isolated areas or by remaining in their respective communities
2
but refusing to accompany the Emirs on their "unreligious" wars. This
type of opposition to authority continues till today in Northern Nigeria
and such puritan opponents of authority are highly respected, in Muslim
areas, as much as they are feared by the erring members of the establish-
mento When in opposition the Malams work on their farms by themselves
assisted by their relatives and by their students. They also receive
Sadaqa (alms) and Zakka from their former students, parents of their
pupils and from many Muslims who appreciate their predicament. As a
rule , most puritan scholars did not then (and do not now) accept
public offices, such as the Alkalai nor do they agree to identify
themselves, in any way, with Emirs or any member of the establishment.
1. Sa'ad, ibid.. p. 6, gave a detailed account of their predicament.
2. Last, M., made a useful study of the traditional method of
opposition in Hausaland, in his "Aspects of Administration and
Dissent in Hausaland, 1800-1868", Africa. XL (No. 4, 1970),
pp. 345-354.
3. Sadaqa and Zakka form the basis of the Islamic system of social
security, i.e. the means by which the poor and the destitute are
taken care of in Muslim communities. It is believed that God will
reward such charitable persons thereafter, hence it is not demeaning
for Muslims, of any standing, to receive either Sadaoa or Zakka
or both. But, in most cases, it is preferably given to the poor,
the destitute or scholars engaged in fulltime teaching and writing
and thus they have no alternative trade or occupation.
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But (very rarely) some of them agree to serve as Imams (prayer leaders)
or to undertake Tafsir (Q.ur'anic exegesis) during the lunar month of
Ramadan, when all Muslims fast from sunrise to sunset*,
One of the immediate effects of the Emirs' apparent deviation from
the path of the Shari*ah and the Sunnah after the Jihad, was that the
states lost the services of the most religiously respected and there¬
fore the most authoritative scholars. Thus, the venal Malams became
the companions of rulers. This in turn led to a general decline in
standards of conduct and, more especially, to moral weakness: open
corruption brought about by worldly success and the loss of the early
ideals.^"
Consequently, some influential groups, more especially those who
were rivals to the thrones, began to question the authority of the
leaderships by refusing to recognize thema This necessitated more
militaristic policies by the Emirs, in order to maintain their
positions, to crush any act of rebellion, and to extend the boundaries
of their areas of jurisdictions. Hence, the rise and the increased
influence of the Bayin-Sarki as the most important sub-structure of the
Emirates' governments. In addition to their being the law enforcing
agents in the Emirates, they became the effective "King-makers" until
the British conquest. It was unthinkable to ignore their candidate
or their choice for Emirship; and even very difficult, if not impossible,
for the candidate of their choice not to succeed to the throne. Thus,
princes aspiring to an Emirship, or for any titled office, rivaled
1. A. Sa'ad, on, cit, , suggests that this led to greater use of force
in Yola, whereas Johnston, H.A.S., The Fulani Empire of Sokoto
(Oxford, 1967), pp. 177-187, described it as "cracks in the
edifice" of the entire Fulbe Administration.
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each other in trying to buy their support and their loyalty0 The
Bayin-Sarki were influenced by gifts of clothes, horses, slaves, live¬
stock, as well as by marrying their daughters or their female relations.
As "generosity" became one of the accepted qualities for leadership,
bribery and corruption also became institutionalised in the political
system of the Emirates. Competition among the Princes to outbid each
other in trying to win the support of the Bayin-Sarki, led to increased
warfare, so as to capture more slaves for such distribution; to
increased exploitation and extortion of all subject peoples (Muslim
and non-Muslims, Fulani and non-Pulani alike), and to increased
political oppression.
The combination of the foregoing factors changed the climate of
public affairs throughout the Emirates. Various un-Islaaac institutions,
ceremonies and precedents developed to enhance the status of the Sarakuna.
Subsequently, there emerged courtiers, palace drummers and praise singers,
ceremonial horses, larger harems, and all sorts of hangers-on. All the
pomp and pageant of the condemned Habe system was readopted by the Muslim
rulers. In this way, ostentation and public display of wealth and power
replaced the moral and the material austerity for which the Jihadists
were renowned. The rulers also adopted, applied and obviously enjoyed
all the privileges, the rights and the abuses of the Habe rulers,
against which the Muslims had fought but a few years before. To the
consternation of the puritan Malams, in particular, and the Muslim
community as a whole, they also adopted and indeed upheld inheritance
as a legitimate way of succession to leadership. Members of the
Sarakuna class enjoyed high social staus, endless privileges and
rights over and above the Talakawa,
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All these were obviously un-Islamic. Islam always emphasized
achieved over ascribed leadership as it condemned social differentiation
based on birth or on wealth. Between man and man Islam recognizes
only one criteria for superiority, and that is due to more righteous
conduct. Qur'anic injunctions are explicit on this subject:
The most honourable among you in the sight of Allah
is the most righteous among you ... (49:13)
And thus, "The noblest among you ... is the most
pious." 1
By the same token, Islam stresses individual merit as the main, if not
the only, criterion for leadership in public affairs. All distinctions
based on parentage and tribal relations are irrelevant. Hence, the
Arabic saying: Inna akramakum indallahi ataakum. "The best among you
is your leader." The teachings of the Qur'an and the Hadith on equality
and leadership are also supplemented by the practices of some early
Muslim leaders. Neither the Holy Prophet, nor any of the four "Rightly
Guided Caliphs", was succeeded by his son or relative. Islamic
tradition is overwhelmingly hostile to leadership by ascription, as it
is to social discrimination. Islam teaches that individual merit is
determined by piety and good works only, thus discounting both pedigree
and race. Some of the Jihadists tried to uphold the Islamic tradition
of learning, especially among their offspring. Muhammadu Bello said:
The people of Hausaland corrupt our children when they
tell them that their family is a family of saints and
turn them from the path of learning. That is but a lie,
an illusion, an error and a fallacy; for science can
only be preserved by learning and the Malams are
nearer to science than anyone else. 2
1. The Qur'an (3:102) cited in Lewis, B., on. cit. , pp. 41-42.
2. Quoted from Arnett, S.J., on. cit., p. 31.
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During his (Bello's) last illness and. on his deathbed, Bello was said
to have called in his eldest son Aliyu and warned him against attempting
to succeed Bello as the Commander of the Faithful,, When urged by his
Waziri (Gidado) to name his successor, Bello refused to do so and said
that he left the succession in the hands of God and advised the Waziri
to be the first to swear allegiance to whomever the Provinical Governors^
2
elected to succeed him as the Sarkin Musulmi,
Thus, it is a well established Islamic tradition that succession
to leadership is not by ascription. Emirs are to be elected either by
the whole community of Muslims or by a council of learned scholars.
But the fact of conquest created new relationships; and the range of
conquest evoked new attitudes which flouted the teaching of the Qur'an
and shelved the ideals of the founding fathers of the Jihad, No sooner
than the Jihad ended, than the struggle for leadership ensued, between
the descendants of the leading Jihadists, Emirs came to be selected by
Sarakunan-Karaga (the council of traditional king-makers), a body
dominated by the Bayin-Sarki, usually with two representatives of the
learned scholars: the Imam and the chief alkali. Similarly, the
relationship between Muslim rulers and their non-Muslim neighbours
also changed. During and immediately after the Jihad, that relation
was based on the policy of peaceful co-existence by which Muslims and
non-Muslims shared the benefits as well as the responsibilities of
3
being members of the same communits',, But these noble teachings were
1, The Provincial-Governors were the Amirul Jaish, also known as the
flag-bearers because their insignia of office included flags given
to them by Shehu Usman Dan Fodio. After the British occupation of
the Muslim North, their descendants were restyled: Emirs.
2, Arnett, E.J., on. cit., pp. 31-32, contains a full account of
Muhammadu Bello's admonition to his son Aliyu.
3, For the origin of the Islamic policy of peaceful co-existence,
see Wolf, E. R., "The Social Organization of Mecca and the Origins
of Islam", in South Western Journal of Anthropology, VII (No, 4,
1951), p. 15.
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indefinitely deferred, the ideals of the Reformists were betrayed and
the expectations and the hopes of the Talakawa, who supported the
Jihad, were shattered. What also disappeared were the self-restraint
and the simple style of life which the led admired in their leaders.
At this juncture, it is important to remember that the experience
in Northern Nigeria was not the only instance when a Muslim community
found itself in a crisis of confidence resulting from deviation from
the set Islamic tenets. This seems to be a permanent feature in the
political history of Islamic Empires. For example, during the reign
of the Ummayyad Caliphs (41 A.H. to 126 A.H.), the entire Muslim
world was bedevilled by a crisis of confidence in the Caliphate, which
led to civil wars and to the subsequent fall of that Islamic empire."'"
Wherever and whenever autocratic rulership became firmly established
in the Muslim dominion, the situation arose when Muslims had to choose
either to follow the orthodox teachings of their religion or to devise
their own secular arrangements for the management of public affairs.
Naturally, as the size and administrative complexity of the state
expanded, a number of questions which had not been originally anticipated,
but which had to be answered within the broad principles of Islam, also
arose. Islamic constitutionalists, who were usually connected with
the ruling establishments, were called upon to provide answers to the
issues of statecraft, such as the question of political legitimacy,
the nature of law and rulership, the nature of the organization of
1. The thesis of M.T.A. Liman, on. cit., examines some of the factors
which led to the downfall of the Ummayyad Dynasty. Brett, M.,
"The Arab conquest and the rise of Islam in North Africa," in J.D.
Page, on. cit., pp. 490-555, discusses the general problems of
state expansion in North Africa under the Ummayyads; pp. 513-522,
examines the factors which led to "the fall of the Ummayyads".
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the state, the extent and the limit of governmental powers, the nature
of rights and obligation of citizenship. The traditional theories and
concepts which had been of great help in ruling a small state (a Muslim
community) were no longer of much help in consolidating and ruling
empires (Emirates) composed of heterogeneous peoples and of different
elites."^"
What was required was the development of rational concepts to
meet the requirements of the new situations. Rational principles
(within the broad principles of Islam) had to be developed, enlarged
and, at times, bent to satisfy the desires of authority. Since chaos
and disorder were a reality, legal doctrines current in Muslim states
insisted on practically unquestioning obedience even to autocratic
rulers. Those aspects of Islamic traditions which called upon Muslims
to resist actively and to rebel against tyrannical rulers were either
suppressed or manipulated to provide support for the ruling elites.
Religious rationalization was also brought forth to warn against anarchy
and called for obedience to the powers that be. In order to achieve
cohesion within the Empire, religion was manipulated as the ideology
of the state. Thus, the religious quest for perfection and universality
was made the handmaid of the politically ambitious rulers. Al-Ghazali
(1064-1111), a leading Muslim Jurist of his time, explained:
The concessions made by us are not spontaneous, but
necessity makes lawful what is forbidden. We know
it is not allowed to feed on a dead animal: still
it would be worse to die of hunger. Of those that
content that the Caliphate is dead forever and
irreplaceable, we should like to ask: what is to be
preferred, anarchy and stoppage of social life for
1. These problems have been variously analysed in Arnold, Sir T.W.,
The Caliphate (London, 1965); Asad, M., The Principles of State
and Government in Islam (Los Angeles, 1961); and Muir, Sir William,
The Caliphate, Its Rise, Decline and Fall (London, 1924).
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lack of properly constituted authority, or acknowledgement
of the existing order, whatever it be? Of these two
alternatives, the Jurists cannot but choose the latter, 1
Let us remember that the Muslim Jurists of Al-Ghazali's time were
part of the Ulema which, as a group, had neither an institutional basis
of power nor independent means of decent living other than that secured
for them by state patronage and by state power. In order to keep
themselves in business, they maintained close association with govern¬
ment officials, merchants and craftsmen. Thus, like the Malamai group
in Northern Nigeria, they acted as the community leaders of the rank
and file and as the intermediaries between the subjects and the rulers.
As one would expect of those in dependent positions, the Ulema were
essentially a conservative force, acquiescent in the power of the state.
So, they continued to give tacit support to a constituted authority
"whatever it be", provided the rulers were Muslims. Apparently, the
theological justification for their continued support of the authority
rested on the principle that any government was better than one headed
by a non-Muslim ruler, or worse still, than a state of anarchy. After
all, a Muslim government would provide the conditions under which
Muslims could lead a religious life and fulfill their ritual obligations.
In view of that, the only alternative to a Muslim-led government was
seen by them as either anarchy or irreligion. This doctrine was
affirmed by Al-Ghazali when he urged Muslims to support any Caliph who
was in command of the armed forces.
Government in these days is a consequence solely of
military power, and whosoever he may be to whom the
holder of military power gives his allegiance, that
person is the Caliph. And whoever exercises independent
1, Quoted from Arnold, T. and Guillaume, A. (eds,), The Legacy of
Islam (Oxford, 1934), p, 302,
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authority, so long as he shows allegiance to the Caliph
in the matter of his perogatives of the prayers and the
coinage, the same is Sultan, whose commands and judgements
are valid in the several parts of the eartho 1
This passage attempts to rationalize the capitulation of those Ulema
who acquiesced in the power of the state. In so doing they ignored
the Qur'an; they filing aside the Hadith; and they flouted the Shari'ahn
The Islamic history of that period abounds in the examples of political
and military upheavals of all kinds: religious wars, dynastic conflicts,
tribal battles, revolts and rebellions. Most of those tribulations
were between the various sections of the ruling military classes, and
the ruling elites and the intransigent groups or tribes*
The Emirates of Northern Nigeria experienced similar predicaments
but in different circumstances. The problems which confronted Muslim
communities in nineteenth century Northern Nigeria were neither the
clear choice between anarchy or the acceptance of the existing order,
nor the overwhelming military power of any single Emir. The real
problems were, on the one hand, the change in the political structure:
the dependence of the Emirate governments on the military powers of the
Bayin-Sarki and, on the other hand, the consequent deviation by the
ruling elites from the path of the Shari'ah and the abandonment of the
exclusively religious duties (e.g. the conversion of pagans to Islam,
etc.) by the states. There was neither visible threat to the Muslim
communities nor strong internal dissension likely to undermine peace
and tranquillity. Obviously, the rulers flouted the ideals of the
Jihadists because of avarice. For instance, they stopped conversions
to Islam because the inhabitants of the pagan enclaves, near the Muslim
settlements, were regarded as their reserves of wealth to be captured
1. Quoted from ibid., p. 329*
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and enslaved for domestic purposes or exported to external slavery in
exchange for foreign goods, as and when the need arose. And in the
capital cities (the seats of the Emirs), religious teaching was
neglected, hence many people lived in ignorance and sin. In fact,
the religion of the masses became not Islam, but a combination of
idolatry and magic, more suited to their own superstitious needs.
That deliberate neglect of religious teaching to the masses by the
Muslim authorities provided an excuse for the rulers to enslave nominal
and poor Muslims at will, on the grounds that they were Habe and there¬
fore were liable to be enslaved. That practice was so widespread in
the cities of the far North that it came to be known in Hausa as Hurugu.
The fear and insecurity was such that when Hausa people heard of the
anti-slavery activities of some white Christians along the sea-coast
(the South), they composed songs to welcome the Christians to Hausaland.
Part of the song runs as follows: "Christians, you are taking long
to arrive, Are your horses chameleons?"^
Those unhappy situations dwindled away the confidence of the
Muslims in their rulers. Having lost all credibility, the governments
also lost the support of the governed. Thus, the Jihad which started
1. "Chameleon" here refers to the slowness of the animal and not its
adaptability to the environment. Also see Alhaji Umaru, "The
Arrival of the Christians: A Hausa poem on the Colonial Conquest
of West Africa", in Africana Bulletin, No. 22 (1975), pp. 55-129.
I am grateful to Alhaji Aminu Kano for drawing my attention to this
song. The Hausa translation runs as follows:
Nasara Kun Dade Baku Zo Ba,
Ko Dokin Hawainiya Kuka Hau Ne?
I am also indebted to my student, Aliyu Abdullahi Jibia, at Bayero
University, Kano (1978) who presented me with a copy of Gandoki.
in which the full text of this song is reproduced. See Alhaji
Muhammadu Bello, Gandoki (Zaria, 1977), p. 4. In Skinner, N. (ed.
and trans.), Alhaji Mahmudu Koki, Kano Malam (A.B.U., Zaria, 1977),
pp. 17-20, gave his childhood recollections on how slaves were
captured, sold and treated in Kano.
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as a popular revolutionary movement deteriorated into inefficient
tyrannies of ruling elites supported, mainly, if not only, by force
of arms, the military power of the Bayin-Sarkio^
In spite of its deviation from the defined tenets of Islam and
despite all its abuses the "Emirates' system of Governments" was an
advance on the Habe system which was overthrown by Muslims about a
century previously. Whatever backsliding there had been on the part of
the Muslim rulers, the Emirate governments had some advantages over
their predecessor Habe governments which can be summarized as follows:
(l) at least, for about two decades after the Jihad, the new governments
reduced the worrying inter-tribal strife and warfare which prevailed
during the Habe rule. (2) They provided a central government with
authority over most of the Worth where independent Habe kingdoms existed
before. The mark of Sokoto authority over its vassals was the fact
that it had to approve all apointments of new Emirs by sending the
2
Waziri of Sokoto to present letters of appointments, from the Sultan
of Sokoto, to the new Emirs. In return, the Emirs paid allegiance to
the Sultan of Sokoto either by annual visits or/and annual dispatch of
tribute (slaves, etc.). There were numerous other ways by which the
1. These trends were already clear to the earlier Jihadists, notably
Shehu Usman Dan Fodio and his brother Abdullahi b. Fodio (who was
one of those Malams who migrated from his community in disgust at
the undermining of Islam). For the Shehu's criticisms, see his
poem, Wallahi Wallahi. cited in Hisket, M., The Sword of Truth
(London, 1961), p. 107, and for Abdullahi b. Fodio, see his
Risalat Al-Hulk. Diva*al-Hukkum, Diva'al-Siyasat and Sabil Al-5alama.
summarised in ibid.. pp. 97-98 and p. 105, and Paden, J.N.,
Religion and Political Culture in Kano (Berkeley, 1973), pp. 214-219.
2. The Waziri of Sokoto is equal in his status to a first class Emir.
Sending him to deliver a letter of appointment to a new Emir
denotes the Sultan's approval of the appointment of the new ruler,
and, conversely, the new ruler's subordination to the Sultan of
Sokoto.
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Emirs manifested their loyalty to Sokoto but it is unnecessary to
enumerate them here0 (3) The Emirates' government attempted to create
(or created, in comparison to what existed in the Habe system which
was overthrown), an independent judiciary in a bid to ensure impartiality
of the law and to avoid molestations."1 This list is by no means
exhaustive.
Conclusion
Prom the foregoing we can conclude that the Jihad was a revivalist
lA
movement employed by Muslims to establish an Island/State (or states)
and these states were ideally to be based on the unalterable Law of
Allah and the unchanging Sunnah of the Holy Prophet Muhammad. Its
ideology was Islamic: derived from the teachings of the Qur'an and
the Hadith. Thus, the new governments, established after the Jihad,
were held together because of the understanding that all the Emirs
were merely to enforce the Islamic policy. In spite of their deviation
from the teaching of the Qur'an and their misinterpretation of the
Hadith. a fragile unity was maintained among the Ulema for fear
of the consequences of an alternative system which migat be a return
to Habe rule and hence, the subjugation of the Ulema by non-Muslims and
a possible annihilation of the Faithful Muslims. That apparent unity
enabled the ruling elites to continue to claim that the legitimacy of
their regimes was derived from Islam. Another factor which maintained
1. I am indebted to Alhaji Aminu Kano who drew my attention to some
cf the advantages of the Emirate system of government, interview
in London, 12 May 1974. A very able analysis of the impact of the
Jihad is made by Hull, R., "Impact of the Fulani Jihad on Interstate
Relations in the Central Sudan Katsina Emirate: A Case Study", in
Boston University Papers on Africa, V (l97l), pp. 87-136°
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the Emirate governments until the advent of the British was the great
absorbtive capacity of the system. For instance, the re-emergence of
the Habe warriors in Muslim courts gave them (Habe) both power and
privilege within the very system which had defeated them, on the
battlefields, a few decades previously. Having their stake in the
system and thus their interests to protect, the Bayin-Sarki defended
it with intense loyalty. In that way the coercive power of the
warriors became a great supporting pillar of the expressed religious
(Muslim) brotherhood which cemented the system together. Finally, as
the system had been in existence for about a century (1804-1903)
before the British came, most, if not all, people knew no other system.
They accepted what they knew as natural: meaning they knew nothing
else and would not conceive an alternative political system.
On the other hand, to the extent that the Emirate system was, or
claimed to be, rooted in Islamic orthodoxy, prompted not merely
criticism from the less "venal" Madams, but more active opposition
stemming from this criticism. The radical opponents of the system
discussed in later chapters can be seen (in part) as the modern




GIRMAN UBANGIJI GAMA KAI DA TAIMAKON JTJNA
"To the Glory of God and People's Soldarity"
N.E.P.Uo
Introduction
The previous chapter attempts to show that the successor Emirs
to the Jihadists established over much of Northern Nigeria a system
similar to that of Oriental despotism,,^" The Shari'ah was imperfectly
applied and its adoption was merely a cover beneath which the ruling
class pursued their selfish interests0 In doing so, the Sarakuma paid
lip-service to Islam when it suited them to do so, and each Emir was
surrounded by a group of Muslim literati whose function was to give
the administration some elements of legitimacy by attempting to create
the impression that rules, orders and actions of the governments were
in keeping with the Shari'ah and therefore proper,, The populace were
urged to recognize the rights of the governments to be obeyed and
conversely the governments were encouraged to make their will effective
against those who defied them0 Thus, both constitutionally and in
terms of religious observance, Islam became drawn into the accommodation
of un-Islamic practices in support of the selfish interests of the Emirs
and the entire traditional bureaucracy,, The established bureaucracy
1. For a brief but useful analysis of Oriental despotism, see
Harrington Moore Jr„, Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy
(Penguin, 1966), pp. 314-315o
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in the upper North had many of the characteristics of medieval "feudalism"
where clients owed nearly total obedience and allegiance to patrons who
were members of a hierarchical, deeply entrenched ruling class. With
effective institutions of command and control to preserve their interests,
the ruling class also enjoyed unlimited privileges in that they had
rights to which no corresponding duty was attached.
This chapter attempts to show that administrative institutions
were instruments for extracting surplus from the masses, and that the
local government bureaucracy was entirely a self-serving, not a public
serving instrument, which saw the country and its populations largely
as a ripe farm to be eaten and exploitedo For example, the imposition
of community tax (Haraii) and cattle tax (Jangali) were, more than
anything else, means by which the traditional authorities kept their
hold on their subjects. We also aim to show that as the local govern¬
ments became synonymous with colonial rule, the privileges of the
ruling class were maintained and increased under British colonial
administration. In fact indirect rule did not change fundamentally
in Northern Nigeria until the end of 1976.
The traditional political system obliged the Emir to delegate
power to certain deputies with defined responsibilities including the
Waziri. Alkalai and Hakimai (District Heads)} This formed the basis
1. Tukur, M., makes a brief analysis of the traditional political
institutions in Sokoto Emirate in "The Philosophy, Goals and
Institutions of the Sokoto Caliphal Administration", Nigerian
Administration Research Project Interim Report (Zaria, 1972),
pp. 15-42. Paden, J.N., Religion and Political Culture in Kano
(Berkeley, 1973), p. 216, discusses the role of the District
Heads in Kano Emirate.
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of the structure of the "Native Administrations"" in Northern Nigeria
because it was the Muslim system of government which was preserved
under Lord Lugard's policy of "Indirect Rule". The central concept
of Indirect Rule was that all communities possessed indigenous leaders
who commanded respect and obedience and, therefore, wielded authority.
Thus, such leaders could be co-opted into the Native Authority system.
The main tenet of Indirect Rule was that traditional authorities in
the colonies should be recognized whenever possible and the colonial
power should coopt them as the sub-structure of colonial administration
and rule through them. That framework survived all through the colonial
period to provide the administrative infra-structure of the post-colonial
governments in the former Northern Region of Nigeria. Local government
reforms made by the military administration in 1967 modified the
structure but did not transform it. The recent local government reforms
(which came into effect on 1st January 1977) decentralized the former
N.A. areas of jurisdictions. It also attempts to democratize local
government in Nigeria. But in the North, the Emirs still remain as
1. Also called Native Authority as interchangeable with Native
Administration (N.A.). See Perham, M., Lugard: The years of
Authority 1898-1945 (London, 1961), especially pp. 138-173.
There is a critical analysis of Indirect Rule by Nicolson, I.P.,
The Administration of Nigeria. 1900-1960 (Oxford, 1969), pp. 124-
179 and 216-250. Whitaker, C.S., Jr., The Politics of Tradition.
Continuity and Change in Northern Nigeria, 1946-1966 (Princeton,
1970), pp. 259-309, discusses the enhanced position of the Emirs
under British colonial rule and the problems which arose thereon
for the post-colonial N.P.C. government.
2. See Federal Republic of Nigeria (F.R.N.), Suggested Framework for
a National System of Local Government (Federal Ministry of
Information, Printing Division, Lagos, 1976); Guidelines for
Local Government Reform (Government Printer, Kaduma, 1976).
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the chairmen of their respective Emirate Councils^ (the unelective
2
traditional councils) and their influence remains great.
Indirect Rule was developed in response to the particular
circumstances found in Northern Nigeria. That being the case, let us
digress into history in order to trace some of the reasons which made
Northern Nigeria the classic example of the British policy of Indirect
Rule and how, in turn, that policy gave the Emirs more power than they
enjoyed even under the late nineteenth century Caliphate system and
thereby produced and maintained a political system unfavourable for
democracy and for rapid economic development.
Historical Background
Towards the end of the nineteenth century the Emirate Governments
3
in Northern Nigeria were on the verge of collapse,. That shaky
situation was the result of a combination of factors which included
the following:
(l) Many people abhorred and condemned the enslavement of Muslims and
the existence of markets in which such slaves were sold in all the
capital cities.
1. Except in Kano and Kaduma States, where the state governments
abolished the Emirate Councils in October 1979. See People's
Redemption Party (PRP of Nigeria) Manifesto for the July/August
1979 Election (Government Printer, Kano. 1979)» P. 22; and speech
by Kaduma State Governor on Tuesday, 2nd October 1979; and a note
from an observer: "The New Order in Kano and Kaduma. States", in
New Nigerian, Tuesday, 9 October 1979, pp. 7 and 9„
2„ The local government reform in 1976 was discussed by three
Nigerian scholars: Gboyega, A.E. and Oyediram, 0„, "A view from
Ibadan"; and Aliyu, A.T., "As seen in Kaduma", in Panter-Brick,
K„ (ed„), Soldiers and Oil, the Political Transformation of
Nigeria (London, 1978), pp. 253-287.
3. There are several accounts of the crises in the various Emirates,
but Murray Last's analysis stands out above them all. In his
concluding remarks, Last, M., The Sokoto Caliphate (London, 1967),
pp. 227-235, analyses the problems in Sokoto and its neighbouring
provinces.
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(2) Indiscriminate slave raids and official gangsterism (the use of
violence by palace officials to prey on rural populations)" which
made life very insecure in the countryside and left the inhabitants
easy victims of slave raiders and bandits. The Emirate system of
government became so inadequate for maintaining peace and security of
the rural dwellers that villagers had to bargain with bandits in order
to be left in peace. Professional and hereditary bandits existed and,
in some cases, they lived in cordial relations with the Emirs. In
that way gangsterism became part of the society and it acquired
2
respectability through the notion of "chivalry". All these show that
the governments and the ruling classes performed no function that was
useful to the life of the Talakawa. On the contrary, they lived on
the commoners like ticks on cattle. As the relation between the rulers
and the ruled became increasingly that of extortion, it was obvious
that the link between them was liable to snap under any severe strain.
It did when the British struck.
•T
(3) Internal conflicts, such as the civil war in Kano (1893-1895)
4
and dynastic conflict in Zazzau. The Muslim hold in Adamawa had always
1. The case for Zaria Province was discussed in detail by Smith, K.G.,
Government in Zazzan (Oxford, I960), p. 190.
2. Interview with Bobbo Sarki at Jalingo in 1976; see Smith, M.,
3aba of Karo (London, 1954), especially part one, pp. 38-73 and
107; Hodgkin, T.L., Nigerian Perspectives (Oxford, 1975), pp. 384-
286.
3. There are accounts of the Kano civil war (Yakin-Basasa) in Hogben,
S.J. and Kirk-Greene, A.H.M., The Emirates of Northern Nigeria
(London, 1966), pp. 202-204; Paden, J.N., on, cit., pp. 251-254;
but Fika's, A.M., The Kano Civil War and British Over-Rule
1882-19J0 (ibadan, 1978), especially parts II and III, pp. 29-83,
contains much more detail and it is up to date.
4. See Smith, M.G., op. cit.. pp. 178-188; Hogben, S.J. and Kirk-Greene,
A.H.M., on. cit., pp. 227-230.
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been nominal"'', while in the Middle Belt and the Banchi Plateau, pagans
2
continued to resist slave raiders and to counterattack,, At about the
same time Rabeh raided Borno and, indeed, shattered the Al-Kanemi ruling
dynasty, until his death in action on the battlefield of Kusseri against
"5
the French on 22 April 1900o
The result of that unrest was the influx of run-away slaves and
other aggrieved commoners into Lokoja where the Niger Company (a
British company) had a trading post under Sir George Goldie.^ Those
aggrieved natives were first recruited into the company's Royal Niger
5
Constabulary Force and later joined the British army and thus comprised
1. Kirk-Greene, A.H.M., Adamawa Past and Present (London, 1958), pp.
125-151 and 152-165, contains an illuminating analysis of the
relation between the Fulani and their pagan neighbours in Muri
and Adamawa Divisions. Also see Hogben, S.J. and Kirk-Greene,
A.H.M., op. cit.. pp. 428-453; Sa'ad, A., "The Establishment of
Fulbe Administration in Adamawa", seminar paper (a copy in the
possession of the writer), (A.B.U., Zaria, 197l).
2„ See Hogben and Kirk-Greene, op. cit. , pp. 454-471; Aliyu, A.Y.,
"The Foundation of Banchi Emirate", Nigerian Administration Research
Project, First Interim Report (A.B.U., Zaria), pp. 44-61;Gonyok,
C.K., "Colonial Administration in Ngas", seminar paper (a copy in
the possession of the writer) (A.B.U., Zaria).
3. Hogben and Kirk-Greene, op, cit.. pp. 333-337; Adeleye, R.A., Power
and Diplomacy in Northern Nigeria, 1804-1906 (London, 197L ), PP<>
110-111; and "Rabih Fadlallah 1879-1893: Exploits and Impact on
Political Relations in Central Sudan", Journal of the Historical
Society of Nigeria. V (No. 2, June 1970), pp. 223-241; "Rabih b.
Fadlallah and the Diplomacy of European Imperial Invasion in the
Central Sudan, 1893-1902", in ibid.. V (No. 3, December 1970),
pp. 399-418; Horowitz, M.M., "Ba Karim: An Account of Rabih's Wars",
African Historical Studies. Ill (No. 2, 1970), pp. 391-402.
4. See, among others, Flint, J.E., Sir George Goldie and the Making of
Nigeria (London, I960); Muffett, J.D.M., Concerning Brave Captains
(,London, 1964); Burns, Sir Alan, The History of Nigeria (London, 1972).
5. According to Kirk-Greene, A.H.M., "A Preliminary Note on New Sources
for Nigerian Military History", Journal of the Historical Society
of Nigeria. Ill (No, 1, March 1965), pp. 129-147, the pedigree of
the Royal Niger Constabulary (1893) is traced from the Hausa Militia
(I864) and develops to the West African Frontier Force (1897), the
Northern and Southern Nigeria Regiments (1900), the Nigerian Regiment
(1914), the Royal West African Frontier Force (1928), the Queen's
Own Nigeria Regiment and the Nigerian Military Forces (1956), the
Royal Nigerian Military Forces (1959) and Army (i960). After
Nigerian independence it became the Nigerian Army (1963). Also see
Ukpabi, S.C. , "The origins of West African Frontier Force", Journal
of the Historical Society of Nigeria, III (No. 3, 1966), pp. 485-501.
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the bulk of the troops which under Lord Lugard conquered Northern
Nigeria,,
Between 1897 and 1903 British troops overran the whole of Northern
Nigeria. It then effectively became "the protectorate of Northern
Nigeria". But the British discovered that it was one thing to conquer
a country and another thing to administer that country efficiently.
The Talakawa welcomed the British conquest of the Emirates because they
mistakenly thought that under British rule they would not pay taxes
and tributes to the Emirs. To the pagans, British rule meant an end
to slave raids by the Emirs and their agents. Indeed, the British
tried to reduce some of the abuses of the Muslim governments. But one
of the major problems which confronted the British, as Christians ruling
over predominantly Muslim populations, was general popular hostility
2
and suspicion. They also lacked the men and the materials with which
3
to govern the vast territory. All they had were the small officer
corps of the invading army and the skeleton of the civilian staff which
they inherited from the Royal Niger Company. In view of that dearth
1. Lord Lugard's own account of the conquest of Kano and Sokoto can
be seen in his "Northern Nigeria", The Geographical Journal. XXIII
(No. 1, January 1904), pp. 1-29.
2. Ibrahim Tahir made a detailed analysis of anti-Nasara (Christian)
feelings among the merchant classes in Kano. Unfortunately, Dr.
Tahir limited his observations to the commercial rather than to
the general economic resentment and, far more importantly, he said
little, if anything, on the extent to which that feeling against
Nasara affected the relations between the Fulani ruling class and
their Christian overlords. See Tahir, I., Scholars, Sufis. Saints
and Capitalists in Kano 19QR-1974 (PhD thesis, Cambridge, 1975),
pp. 360-361.
3. Michael Crowder observed that of all colonial administrations,
"The British in Nigeria were the most thinly spread", as by com¬
parison "The Portuguese employed a relatively much larger number
of civil servants." See Crowder, M., "The White Chiefs of Tropical
Africa", in Gann, L.H. and Uuigman, P. (eds»), Colonialism in
Africa 1570-1960 (Cambridge, 1970), po. 320-350, especially
p. 329.
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of manpower, the complete lack of a communication system and the poor
transport system, it was impossible for the British to establish an
effective direct government,
These problems reinforced the British view that direct rule was
not possible in a region as vast as the Emirates of Northern Nigeria,
In 1899, Sir George Taubman Goldie had observed that:
[Direct Rule] is quite inapplicable to densely populated
regions where the whiteman must always be in absolute
considerable minority, where he can never hope to rule
by force alone, and where his ideas, if they could be
enforced upon native population, would create endless
discomfort and misery. In such regions the only true
policy of government is to adopt the local native
Governments already existing and to be content with
controlling their excesses and with maintaining peace
among themselves ... (for) it is certain that the
population of Nigeria ... would rather be misgoverned
by their own people than be governed by the very best of
our officials. 1
The administrative problems found in the Northern Emirates, after
their conqeust, confirmed the preconceived ideas of the leading British
personality in the region. Indeed, those problems (along with many
others) became the rational justification for the British reliance on
the traditional rulers: Emirs, chiefs and elders of communities. Hence,
the British declared that their aim was not to disrupt the pre-existing
government but to modify it and to bring to it the British idea of
justice. Thus, they made it clear that their policy was to support the
Emirs and chiefs and all the traditional hierarchies. With that policy
a system of colonial government through native chiefs and their
institutions was established. To the dismay of the Talakawa, the
British colonialists, like their Muslim predecessors who absorbed the
Habe warriors into their governments, turned around to support the very
1, Quoted from Muffett, J,D,M., "Sir George Goldie", West Africa.
No, 9034, 18 August 1975, p. 961,
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Emirs who they defeated on the battlefield. The despotic rule by the
Emirs was hailed as the bastion of stability"*" and their institutions
of government as the cherished heritage of Northern Nigeria. Indeed,
the British defended the Emirate system of government with all their
might. Thereby it became for the British a good model of local govern¬
ment best suited for "the less educated and the less well advanced
2
communities." Consequently, the system was adopted and unsuccessful
attempts were made to extend it to other parts of Nigeria. For example,
Tiv people in the former Benue Province (now Benue State) resisted the
Emirate type of government with vigour. The unsuccessful attempt to
impose this pattern of native rule in the former Eastern Region of
Nigeria (now Eastern States) produced the "Aba Riots". And above all,
the Nigerian press of that time were most vocal in their opposition to
3
Indirect Rule.
1. See Russell, E., Bush Life in Nigeria (privately published by Sir
Kenneth Haddocks, Abbey House, Sutton Montis Yeovil, Somerset,
1978), p. 45.
2. See Ballard, J.A., "Administrative Origins of Nigerian Federalism",
African Affairs. LXX (No. 281, October 197l), pp. 333-348, quotation
from p. 342 thereof.
3. There is an enormous literature on the opposition to indirect rule
in Nigeria. They include: Ballard, J.A., "Pagan Administration
and Political Development in Northern Nigeria", Savannah. I (No. 1,
1972), pp. 1-14; Doward, D.C., "The Development of British Colonial
Administration Among the Tiv, 1900-1949", African Affairs. LXVIII
(No. 273, 1969), pp. 316-333, and "Ethnography and Administration:
A Study of Anglo-Tiv 'Working Misunderstanding"', Journal of African
History, X1/ (No. 3, 1974), pp. 457-477. On the press opposition
see Duffield, I., "John Eldred Taylor and West African Opposition
to Indirect Rule in Nigeria", African Affairs, LXX (No. 28l), pp.
252-268. But Isichei, E., A History of the Iybo People (London,
1976), pp. 119-139, contains an instructive analysis of the Igbo
resistance to colonial domination. Also see Ikime, 0., "The
British Pacification of the Tiv, 1900-1908", Research Note, Journal
of the Historical Society of Nigeria, VII (No. 1, 1973), pp. 103-
109; "Reconsidering Indirect Rule: The Nigerian Example", Journal
of the Historical Society of Nigeria. IV (No. 3, 1968), pp. 421-
438; "Colonial Conquest and resistance in Southern Nigeria",
Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria, VI (No. 3, 1972),
pp. 251-270; "Chief Dogho: The Lugardian system in Warri 1917-1932",
Journal/
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The military defeat of the Emirates also brought disrepute to all
the chieftaincy institutions in the region0 It seriously affected the
powers of the Emirs and thereby weakened the forces of law and order,
especially during the First World War, which was the period of general
weakening in the whole country.^" Many Emirs, who resisted the British
occupation of Northern Nigeria, were deposed and replaced by those who
were more "loyal" to the colonizers. After all, the British had won
by the right of conquest what the Muslim rulers had enjoyed previously
by the same right. Similarly, they had inherited the right to rule,
o
Henceforth, the former " semi-aut-nomous" Emirs under the Sultan of
Sokoto, became the vassals of the victorious colonial power.
As the spell of their powers were broken the Emirs became
2
increasingly dependent on their new colonial master. All the new
Emirs installed by the British had to swear the oath of allegiance to
Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria, III (No, 2, 1965),
pp. 513-335; "The anti-tax riots in Warri Province 1927-1928",
Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria, III (No. 3, 1966),
pp„ 559-573; and "Native Administration in Kwale-Aboh, 1928-1950:
A Case Study", Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria, III
(No. 4, 1967), pp. 663-682, Others are: Afigbo, A.E., "Revolution
and Reaction in Eastern Nigeria 1900-1929 — Background to Women
Riot of 1929", Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria. Ill
(No. 3, 1966), pp. 539-557; "The Warrant chief system in Eastern
Nigeria: Direct or Indirect Rule?", Journal of the Historical
Society of Nigeria. Ill (No. 4, 1967), pp. 683-700; Igbafe, P.,
"British Rule in Benin 1897-1920: Direct or Indirect Rule?",
Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria. Ill (No. 4, 1967),
pp. 701-717; Tamuno, T.N., "Some Aspects of Nigerian reaction to
the imposition of British rule", Journal of the Historical Society
of Nigeria. Ill (No. 2, 1965), pp. 271-294; Afigbo, A.E., "Herbert
Richmond Palmer and Indirect rule in Eastern Nigeria 1915-1928",
Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria, III (No. 2, 1965),
pp. 295-312; Akpala, A., "The Background of the Colliery Shooting
Incident in 1949", Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria.
Ill (No. 2, 1965), pp. 335-363.
1. See Crowder, M., Revolt in Bussa (London, 1973); Osuntokun, A.,
"The Response of the British Colonial Government in Nigeria to the
Islamic Insurgency in the French Sudan and the Sahara during the
First World War", Bulletin of Ifan, XXXVI (No. 1, 1974), pp. 14-24,
and "Disaffection and Revolts in Nigeria during the First World
War, 1914-1918", Canadian Journal of African Studies. V (No. 2,
197l), pp. 171-192. Both these articles are now elaborated upon in
Dr. Osuntokun's new book: Nigeria in the First "World War (London, 1979/'.
2. Crowder, M. and Ikime, 0., West African Chiefs (Ife, 1970),
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the British Crown through the High Commissioner of the Northern Provinces.
The Protectorate was divided into twelve provinces with a British
Resident as the head of each province. Each province had police and
array detachments at its provincial headquarters to give teeth to the
Provincial Administration. Each Province was divided into administrative
divisions and each division was headed by a British District Officer
(D.O.) responsible to the Resident, responsible in turn to the High
Commissioner at the regional headquarters. Most of the former Emirates
became divisions. For example, Kano Local Authority Area (formerly
Kano Emirate) had become Kano Division whereas Kano Province included
other Divisions (also former Emirates), i.e. Gumel, Kazaure, Hadejia.^"
2
Emirs were ranked into "first class" and "second class" categoriesa
3
There were also "third class" chiefs. Some District Officers ran their
4
divisions like private estates and bullied everybody from the Emir down.
Neither the Emir nor any official had any right to his position unless
he rendered "proper" services to the Colonial Administration0
1. Local governments in the North were organized into two: the former
Muslim controlled emirates and the independent pagan areas.
2. The most powerful Muslim rulers became first class Emirs and were
given a staff of office (with a silver top) by the British. The
less powerful Emirs became second class and they were given a staff
of office with a brass top. Similarly, rituals of appointing Emirs
(and chiefs) to office varied from one local tradition to another.
But for the installation of the Lamido of Adamawa (At Yola) see
"Over the Hill to Yola", in Duckworth, E.H. (ed.), Nigeria (No. 29,
1948), pp. 189-193.
3. There were some pagans, who though might had been harried, were not
actually defeated in war by Muslims. Such independent pagan areas
were organized under their respective chiefs who became third class
chiefs and were given a short staff of office with silver top. For
the general organization of the Native Administration in the Northern
Provinces, see Perham, M., Native Administration in Nigeria (Oxford,
1962), especially pp. 81-159; also see Russell, E., on. cit. But
the administrative peculiarity of the Muslim North was clearly spelt
out in "The Muslim Areas of Northern Nigeria under British Rule",
in Duckworth, E.H. (ed.), Nigeria (No. 22, 1944), pp. 30-41.
4. They were so powerful that some of them were nicknamed Zaki (lion),
Giwa (elephant) and Babbandodo (the big monster). See Russell, E.,
on. cit.
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Factors Strengthening Native Authority Rule
The newly established colonial government faced a series of
crises in Northern Nigeria,, Some of the reasons for those troubles
stemmed from the long internal civil wars which preceded British conquest
and were, of course, followed by the British campaign itself. Others
came from the apparent weakness of the administrations (both colonial
and native), and still others from the perception of colonial rule as
a threat to Muslim hegemony. Many pagans also believed that the British
were helping the Emirs to bring them into subjection. Thus, the reasons
for the troubles were different but their effects were the same: they
tended to undermine the established authorities, they threatened the
administrations and, consequently, they led to a closer and stronger
alliance between the British and the native rulers. In turn, that new
relationship reinforced the Emirs by giving them more power and,
thereby, it created the Nigerian version of "royal absolutism"
There were also problems specific to particular parts of the region.
The Gwari and the Dakarkari peoples had always resisted Muslim domination,
so that their rebellion in 1903 can be seen, at least in part, as a
continuation of that resistance. In that resistance, they attacked
and killed a British political officer. They repeated their resistance
in 1908 when they attacked a joint military and police patrol, killing
Captain Briggs, the officer in charge. Continuing with his people's
resistance to Muslim rule from Zaria, the Yerima of Kuta seized power
in 1905 and declared his independence not only of Zaria but also of
the British. Consequently, the town of Kuta was attacked by the British
and the Yerima was arrested and imprisoned.
1. For a general discussion on Royal Absolutism, see Barrinton Moore,
Jr., or. cit., pp. 230-242 and 415-417.
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There were also protests and riots in Borgu (1915) and at Hontol
(l9l6)o In Borgu the British decided to depose the Emir, Kitaro Gani,
in favour of a "loyal" agent, who was sufficiently subdued in his
attitude towards the British and, therefore, more amenable to the
British than Emir Kitaro Ganio Wideranging administrative reforms were
also proposed which meant the disappearance of Borgu as a province and
as such a reduction in the status of the Emir. The people of Borgu
resented these measures and they refused to pay taxes. Following that,
a military patrol was moved into Borgu at the request of the District
Officer. A group of armed men attacked Borgu town, killing several
members of the newly imposed local administration. Rebellion, characterised
by the refusal to pay taxes, highway robbery and various threats against
N.A. officials, continued until 1924, when a member of Kitaro Gani's
family was restored to the Borgu throne.^" Following the administrative
reforms of 1906, the Montol people of central plateau, were subordinated
to the Ankwe chief0 The people rebelled killing the chief of Ankwe and
the Do0o, Mr. F. E0 Maltby. That incident was followed by a devestating
2
punitive expedition against the Montols by the British,, Such rebellions
occurred all over the Northern Provinces. Most of the unrest occurred
during the tours for the assessment and/or collection of taxes when
in most cases British officials were accompanied by Yaran-Sarki (Emirs'
representatives), the native officials connected with the collection of
tribute before the advent of the British. The presence of Yaran-Sarki
was seen as indicative of the white man's support of tribute collection
1. See Crowder, M., Revolt in Bussa (London, 1573), p. 13.
2. This rebellion is variously analysed in Gonyok, C.K., op. cit.;
Hobgen, S.J. and Kirk-Greene, A.H.M., op. cit.: Burns, Sir Alan,
op. cit. Also see Sa'ad, A., "The Northern Provinces under Colonial
Rule", unpublished seminar paper (a copy in possession of the
writer) (A.B.U., Zaria).
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for the Emirs hence the extension of the Emirs' control over often
previously unconquered pagans,, Thus, some of those pagans resented
the British as much as they resented the Emirs as there seemed to he
no difference between the two. In Muslim areas the Emirs were seen to
be cooperating with infidels (British) to bring about the subjugation
of Muslims by Nasara (Christians)
Another reason for the -unrest in Gwari areas was the recruitment
2
of labour for the construction of the railway. During that period,
lands were acquired in most cases without compensation and, worse still,
the people whose lands were confiscated were also required as navvies
for the construction of the rail-lines. The Emirs, through whose areas
of jurisdiction the railway lines passed, we re required to organize
the supply of labour for the construction work, and food for the workers.
Thus, some subjects were compelled to participate in the building of
the railway lines whereas others were forced to contribute food for
the upkeep of the labourers. Such demands by the colonial administration
led to the increased extortions of the subjects by the Emirs. Conse¬
quently, both the British and the Emirs became the targets of attack.
One of the effects of that was the stoppage of the construction of the
3
railway line in Gwariland for some time.
1. Both Tahir, I., 00. cit.. and Paden, J.N., op. cit., observe that
the anti-Nasara feelings were strongest among Muslim scholars in
Xano.
2. For a general study of the colonial governments' attitude towards
labour, see Mason, M., "Working on the Railway: Forced labour in
Northern Nigeria, 1907-1912", in Gutkind, P.C.W., Cohen, R., and
Copans, J. (eds.), African Labour History (California, 1978), pp.
56-79. Also see Oyemakinde, "Railway Construction and operation
in Nigeria 1895-1911: Labour Problems and Socio-economic Impact",
in Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria, VII (No. 2, 1974),
pp. 503-323.
3. See Sa'ad, A., op. cit.
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Mahdism
In the upper North, resistance to British rule often took the
form of Mahdism. In the minds of the ordinary people, the idea of the
imminence of the Mahdi is equated with the time of trougle: trouble
caused by the presence of Nasara or by the generality of infidels.
According to popular beliefs, the Mahdi will appear to end the troubles
confronting Muslims. He will cleanse the society and then make
arrangements for the second advent of the Messiah."'' Even among the
Ulema there is no unanimity on the idea of the Mahdi: whereas for some
the idea of the Mahdi is an article of faith, for others it is a
popular notion. To some schools of thought, the Mahdi is equated with
2
the "Hidden Imam" who is absolute and infallible and whose return
(raj*a) is awaited to restore the leadership of the Muslim community
to the Ahl al-Bayt (the Prophet's house). To the other school of
thought, the Mahdi is simply a reformer 'who will restore the Faith to
its original purity of the early days as it had been during the times
of Al-Khulafa'ul Rashidun (the Four Rightly Guided Caliphs).^ But in
Northern Nigeria the Mahdist uprising was clearly also a protest against
accumulated grievances: hardship and insecurity which had been
accumulating long before the British occupation of the region. Firstly,
the predicament of the masses derived from internal civil wars and slave
1. For an illuminating analysis of Mahdism, see Hodgkin, T.L., "Mahdism,
Messianism and Marxism in the African Setting", in Gutkind, P.C.N.,
and Waterman, P., African Social Studies, A Radical Reader (London,
1977), pp. 306-323, original source: Sudan in Africa, ed. Y.F.
Hasan (Khartoum, 197l). Wilson, E.T., Russia and Black Africa
before World Mar II (New York, 1974), pp. 222-223, illustrates the
hysterical response to 1920's Mahdism by the British.
2. For instance, see Lewis, B«, The Assassins, A Radical Sect in Islam
(London, 1967), p. 30.
3. See Biobaku, S„, and Al-Hajj, M., "The Sudanese Mahdiyya and the
Niger-Chad Region", in Lewis, I.M. (ed.), Islam in Tropical Africa
(Oxford, 1966), pp. 425-437.
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raids which disrupted economic activity and normal life. Secondly,
there was the British invasion of the region which lasted for about
ten years. Thirdly, the economic recession resulting from the impact
of the First World "War (1914-1918) further disrupted Northern Nigeria's
traditional trade routes,especially with Ghana and generally, across
the Sahara, with North Africa and the Mediterranean .1orld»^ Furthermore,
it was a protest against what was seen to be the undermining of Muslim
hegemony in the region. So, in the Emirates of Northern Nigeria Mahdist
revolts were the result of accumulated grievances and the British
2
occupation of the region was the last straw.
The earliest recorded instances in which the British came into
r
major conflict with Kahdism were at Bu^mi in 1909 when Sultan Attahiru
3
and his supporters were killed, and then at Satiru in 1906. The latter
is the most documented of the British experience of the Mahdist rebellion
4
in the Northern Emirates. Some Emirs who were sympathetic with these
rebellions were accordingly punished by the British: at Katsina Emir
1. See Johnson, M., "Calico caravans: The Tripoli-Kano Trade after
1880", in Journal of African History. XVII (No. 1, 1976), pp. 95-117,
2. The seriousness of the "Mahdist threat" to the British rule and the
very drastic action taken by the British against the Mahdists and
the subsequent measures against the Mahdist sympathisers can best
be understood in terms of the vast area it might have enveloped if
left unchecked. There were about fifteen Muslim Emirates controlling
a total area of some 18,000 square miles and all owing allegiance
to the Amir al-Muminin (the leader of the faithful), the Sultan of
Sokoto. However, there is some doubt about the nature of the
"Mahdist threat", as some have argued that the British exaggerated
it as a means of disciplining certain Emirs. It was also linked
with British fear of "Bolshevism" and Arab nationalism. See Wilson,
E., q-q. cit. : Holt, P.M., The Mahdist State in the Sudan. 1881-1893,
A Study of its Origins, Development and Overthrow (Oxford, 1977)
is a useful background to the study of Mahdism in Africa south of
the Sahara.
3. See Adeleye, R.A., "Mahdist Triumph and British Revenge in Northern
Nigeria: Satiru 1906", Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria.
VI (No. 2, 1972), pp. 193-214; Njeuma, M.Z., "Adamawa and Mahdism:
The Career of Hayatu Ibn Sa'id in Adamawa, 1878-1898", Journal of
African His10ry, XII (No. 2, 1971), pp. 61-77.
4. In addition to footnote 3 on the previous page, and footnote 3 above,
see Perham, M., on. cit., pp. 46-7.
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Yero~ supported the Mahdist uprising openly and was deposed for that
in 1906, thus bringing to an end the Dallazawa dynasty in Katsina
2
Emirate. In Gwandu, Emir Muhammadu was deposed in 1906 for his
3
complicity with the Satiru rebellions At Hadejia, the Emir Kuhammadu
was so delighted with the outbreak of the rebellion and so optimistic
for its success that he defied British authority. Consequently, a
British military expedition was sent against Hadejia and the Emir was
killed in action. In 1907, three Ilorin officials (Balogun Ajikobi,
Magajin Gari and Ajaji Ogidiolu) supported the Mahdist rebellion. They
defied their Emir, who was on the side of the British, led their men
in the attack on the Residency. But they were later crushed by a
4
British military expedition,, During the course of the First World
War there were further upsurges of Kahdism in Northern Nigeria,, But
with the support of the Sultan of Sokoto and many other Emirs, the
situation did not get out of hand0
It should be noted that at that time most Emirs (if not all of
them) had acceded to office as the nominees and the proteges of the
British conquerors. In this way the fortunes of the Emirs were
directly bound up with the advent of the British. Similarly, the minor
officials and the title holders, some of whom were royal princes and
warriors, owed their loyalty to the new Emirs (the British appointees)
to whom they owed their appointments and/or continuance in office (or
both). As a result of the changes in Emirship, the political relations
in the Emirates also changed, because the stability of the position of
1. Muhammadu Yero, the eighth Fulani Emir of Katsina, 1904-1906.
2. Muhammadu Bashar was the thirteenth Fulani Emir of Gwandu, 1903-1906.
3o Muhammadu the tenth Fulani Emir of Hadejia, 1885-1906.
4. Sa'ad, A., on. cit., p. 16.
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of the British-made Emirs could not he separated from the stability
and the survival of their colonial master,, Through the policy of
punishing "enemies" and rewarding "loyalists" the British made sure
that most of the ruling elites in Northern Nigeria had vested interests
both in the stability and the continuity of the colonial rule.
Again in the 1920's the Mahdist movement created panic as it
appeared to threaten the whole Imperial structure0 For instance. Sir
Bryan Sham-rood Smith said that in Sokoto there had been something
approaching a breakdown of authority.^" Although in the 1930's the
political climate was relatively calm, some Mahdist groups continued
with passive resistance of the British up to the 1940's. Thus, for
the first three decades of their rule in Northern Nigeria, the British
faced one crisis after another. The net result of those crises was a
more stringent colonial control by the effective application of the
policy of Indirect Rule. From what followed it seemed the British
appreciated the Hausa adage, Sai Da Dangari Akan Ci Gari (a town is
never subjugated except with the aid of some of its children). For
the British introduced the "Sole Native Authority" system, among other
reasons in order to give the Emirs the full powers to deal with
recalcitrant elements.
2
The Structure of Native Administration
In 1925, H.R. Palmer was appointed the Lieutenant Governor of
Northern Provinces. Being most concerned with the maintenance of law
1. See Smith, Sir Bryan Sharwood, But Always as Friends (London, 1968),
~ a
p# 00,
2. This account of the N.A. structure was as it stood up to 1976.
The current system of local government came into existence from
1st January 1977. For simplicity, the present tense is nonetheless
used to describe the N.A. system.
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and. order necessary for smooth operation of government, the colonial
system of the "Sole Native Authority" was introduced. Among other
things, it was designed to eliminate all traces of Kahdism by giving
the Emirs effective executive powers to deal with it whenever and
wherever it arose in the Emirates, Having that much power delegated
to them, the Emirs became very powerful. From 1925 to 1966, the policy
of Indirect Rule became inviolate,"'" Henceforth, the British became
content with directing the Emirs and chiefs from the background; in
turn, the Emirs and chiefs x^ere expected to rule their subjects in a
2
manner acceptable to the British. Sir Bryan Sharwood Smith told us
that the official instructions to all District Officers was that they
should at all times uphold the prestige and the authority of the chiefs
and their administration and that should the need arise to lodge a
protest or to administer reproof, care must be taken that neither the
ruler nor any of his officials should be humiliated in the presence
of subordinates or of the public. All the British Political Officers
(The Administrative Staff: Residents, D.O.s, etc.) were instructed that
on no account they were to issue direct orders. That all orders must
3
always come from the chief or his representatives. With that unwilling¬
ness to interfere too much in local government matters, the British
A
surrendered to the ancien-regime all powers at the local level,'
Consequently, the Emirs came to exercise more power than they had
before the British conquest, In the traditional milieu, the Emir was
1. See Temple, C,L., Native Races and their Rulers (London, 1968), p. 30,
2. See Perham, K„, on. cit., pp. 47-8, and Russell, E., on. cit., p. 43.
3. Smith, Sir Bryan Sharwood, op. cit. , who, as a former governor of
Northern Nigeria, was reflecting on his personal experiences.
4. In analysing the power base of the N.P.C. in 1957, Whitaker, C.S.,
Jr., op. cit, p. 365, affirms this power of the local administra¬
tions.
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surrounded by other chief's without whom he could not exercise his
supreme perogatives. That ruling group constituted the Sarakuna who
possessed, among others, two characteristics defining their political
superiority: the exclusive control of physical force and the disposal
of wealth produced by others. In that perspective the Emir was no
longer a unique ruler. He was one among many, even if he was the first
in importance and the symbol of their collective power. But the intro¬
duction of the Sole N.A. system shattered that interdependence of the
Saralcuna class. The Emir no longer derived his authority to rule from
the support of the Sarakuna and the will of his people but from the
support which he obtained from the governor. He nominated and appointed
all his councillors, other title holders and all his District Heads'*'
and they all held their offices at his pleasure. Furthermore, Indirect
Rule restructured district administrations by obliging each D.H. to
live in the capital town of his district; thereby, each household,
every hamlet and every village was brought into the proper grip of the
Emir through the D.H., by holding someone reponsible for each unit.
The household is and was traditionally the basic political unit
in Northern Nigeria. The household is comprised of a family (a spouse
and their children) or it can be an extended family (spouses, their
children and an army of relatives living together in a compound). The
compound head (Maigida) is the authoritative leader of the compound
and relates the individuals in the household to higher echelons in the
political hierarchy. These households or compounds link together to
form hamlets, villages, wards, towns and cities. Traditionally, a
1. The lineage of some of the minor nobilities which fell out of
favour were replaced by Emirs' favourites. Similarly, members of
the reigning Emir's dynasty were placed as the District Heads over
previously independent pagan districts.
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village head is appointed by the Emir, whereas a hamlet head or ward
head (a much smaller unit than a village) is appointed by the D.K.;
but this procedure is neither common nor universal. Some times a
traditional title peculiar to the area concerned is conferred upon the
new village head at the time of his appointment. Politically, the
village head is the leading person in his area, directly responsible
to the D.H. and, through him, to the higher authorities in the capital
city where the Emir lives.
The first loyalty of the Talakawa is directed towards the local
leadership of their village or town. Occasionally, there were rebellions
in an attempt to improve the local situation, more often there was
grudging acceptance of an unchangeable situation. Many village heads
do not handle their affairs in a responsible manner. They lo ok upon
the commoners as subjects and, as such, legitimate targets for
appropriate,ve demands .Many British Touring Officers have attested to
the numerous ways villages were drained of their economic surplus bj/
village heads anxious to increase their income. All occupational groups
in a village have their respective heads, subordinate to the village
head. Hence, they all give deference, support and tribute to the
village head. About one-third of all the tribute paid to the village
head is kept by him and the remaining two-thirds are passed on to the
D.H. The authority of the village head over his community is legitimized
by his recognition and the support he enjoyed from the higher
authorities from the capital city. This recognition and support was
channelled through the D.H.
A group of villages, the number and the population of which vary
greatly, make up a district. In each district there is an administra¬
tive centre known as the district capital in which the D.E. resides.
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The D.H. is an employee of the ST.A. and, like most leading officials
of the N.A., he is directly nominated and appointed by the Emir. In
most cases he is a member of a branch of the royal family and, as such,
a potential Emir. His administrative functions include tax collection,
school inspection, supervision and repairs of roads, etc. He also
settles disputes among his people. He and the male members of his
family make up the group of local administrators who run the affairs
of the district. In each district capital, the D.H. heads a number of
N.A. departments: elementary school teachers and the staff of education
department; a number of village and district scribes; an agricultural
assistant; a dispensary attendant; a forest clerk; an Alkali and his
court scribes, etc. In Muslim areas, each district capital has a
Friday mosque with the Imam.
Every district has a number of policemen (say, 2-10, depending
on the size and the population of the district) as its official law
enforcing agents. In the Emirates, most, if not all, members of the
defunct N.A. police were former janissary (Dogarin-Sarki : the personal
bodyguards of the Emirs) who were converted into the police force after
the British conquest. Since all the janissary were slaves, most of the
N.A. policemen were either of slave origin or were known to be loyal
to the Emir. Hence, besides the police "discipline" inculcated in them
and the regular income they were provided by the N.A., they had a
traditional loyalty to the entire system and to the chieftaincy
institution in particular.
The D.H. is the eyes and the ears of the Emir in his district.
He is charged with carrying out the directives of the Emir to whom he
is expected to be very loyal. The fact is that the Emirs are so power¬
ful that any D.H. with an eye to his career followed the wishes of the
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Emir. He should see to it that the H.A. is not troubled in any way.
So, in the absence of adequate policemen he maintains law and order
by means of autocratic relationship with his subjects. He keeps a
large harem, a battalion of attendants and all sorts of retainers and
clients — many of whom can only be seen as "enforcers" and "hit men":
all this supposedly from his meagre salary of something ranging between
about £7 - £20 a month.^
The salary of a District Head is based mainly on the amount of
taxes collected in his district. As the sizes of district areas,
their population and the prosperity of the people therein differ, so
do the salaries and the wages of the district officials. Therefore,
being in a bigger and possibly more prosperous district carries along
with it a higher salary as well as a higher less visible material
reward. Hence, all district officials compete to be sent to or to be
transferred to bigger and more prosperous districts. As the nominations
and the appointments of the D.H.s were made by the Emir, their promo¬
tions and transfers were also made by him. The criterion for their
promotion was apparently based on their respective administrative
abilities, but in reality, the amount of Gaisuwa they gave to the Emir
influenced the Emir's assessment of their individual abilities.
Furthermore, the District Head, like his village heads, kept only
one-third of all the tribute paid to him, the remaining two-thirds were
passed to the Emir.
1. This very rough estimate is based on the writer's information of
an approximate salary of the D.H.s in the 1950's, in Muri Division
of the former Adamawa province (now Gongola State). It is certainly
many times more then that in Kano Emirate where according to
Perham, M., on. cit., p. 118, the Emir drew an annual salary of
£6,00G with an allowance called an "Establishment charge" of
£2,500 p.a. The rulers of Sokoto and Horno drew a little less,
whereas the Emirs of Ilorin, Zaria and Yola earned between £2,000
and £2,500 each. The lowest paid was the Emir of Jama'are with a
salary of £400 p.a. whitaker , C.S., Jr., on. cit., pp. 215-216,
explains the poor salary of the D.H. was partly responsible to
incidence of corruption; and on p. 219 he enumerated the factors
which led to extortion by the D.H.s.
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To the critic of the IT.A. system, that continual exchange of gifts
appeared as a widespread pattern of graft and led many to conclude
that the term of office of a District Head was usually only as long
as his purse. But to many IT.A. officials, gift exchange was not
bribery as it is understood in the Western context: it was not an
extra-legal or extra-official transaction.^ Rather, it was an integral
part of the system and was considered not only proper but mandatory
for all. For example, no one in the Emirates would visit, much less
make a request of his superior, without offering a gift. Conversely,
no man of status would remain respected for a long time if he did not
constantly reward his subordinates for their loyalty and services.
In this respect the D.H. must be cunning in the exploitation of his
subjects. When he succeeded in the extortion of the peasants without
causing public outcry or protests and, thereby undermining the authority
of the N«A., then he was a "good" administrator. On the other hand,
if he fell foul of his subjects, then he alone would suffer the con¬
sequences of his misdeeds. Legally, he was supposed to maintain his
large family and to meet all his social commitments and obligations
out of his own salary.
The legitimacy of the authority of the D.H. derived from the fact
that he was appointed by the Emir and that he was supported by the
power of the IT.A. So, at the lower level of the N.A. organization,
effective political power lay with the D.H. Thus, all the occupational
chiefs, all the ward, hamlet and village heads and, indeed all the
peoples of the district greet the D.H, with exaggerated reverence: more
often out of fear than love or respect. So also do people of an Emirate
(or Division) greet their Emir.
1. For a contrary view, see Whitaker, C.S., Jr., or, cit., pp. 215-216.
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The Smir was the chief executive of the IT.A. and in him lay the
authority and the power of the N.A., both of which were backed by the
coercive power of the colonial government. Among other things, the
political power of the Smir rested on the following:
(1) His office was as much a life appointement as it was hereditary.
Provided he remained loyal to the government and, on the condition that
he bled his subjects judiciously, so that his extortions did not under¬
mine his own authority and thus that of the colonial power, he remained
on the throne till death.
(2) Following the official support of the colonial government, of
which he had become a servitor, the Emir had all the law enforcing
agents and all the institutions of command and control at his disposal.
(3) His dominance over the H.A. bureaucracy gave him complete monopoly
of patronage.
(4) The "Sole N.A." system gave him the ri^it to veto all the decisions
of his council and, even more autocratic, the Emir-in-council could
enact any law for the purpose of maintaining "law and order" in his
area of jurisdiction.
(5) All Emirs and chiefs adjudicated legal cases (without any legal
training) and some of them (first class Emirs) presided over "Grade A
Courts", which were the equivalent of High Courts of Justice. That
meant that they could also try cases of murder and treason. Hence,
some Emirs were Sarakunan Yanka (singular, Sarkin Yanka) meaning those
who could inflict capital punishment. Indeed, they did before the advent
1. There were many depositions and resignations between 1953-1963,
see "The Position of Emirs" , in V/hitaker, 00. cit., pp. 272-309.
But, apparently, the rare cases of depositions were meant to sort
out the sheep from the goats and thus enhance the native
chieftaincy institution. See Perham, on. cit.. pp. 116-119.
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of the British and in the first few years of British rule. After more
than fifty years of colonial rule, at least one Emir still vetoed with
imp-unity the verdict of the Nigerian Supreme Court (see below).
In order to understand the real grip which the Emir had on the
N.A. bureaucracy it is important to know the colonial policy on
education and to see how that policy favoured the Sarakuna. Sir Donald
Cameron explained the policy as follows:
If Indirect Rule is to be truly tribal (in Northern
Nigeria) we must educate from the top down and, not
as in Southern Nigeria, from the bottom upwards, 1
This policy governed the selection of pupils to Western schools from
1903 till about 1956. Mr. Hans Vischer (still remembered as Dan Hausa
2
in Northern Nigeria) , a famous colonial educator in the Northern Region,
explained the aims of his school in these words:
The object of this school is to train sons of chiefs
with a view to making them physically and mentally
fitted to assist the government in the administration
of the country, to bring them into closer contact with
the government, to acquire for them a better under¬
standing of the policy pursued by the government, to
acquire for them elementary knowledge of sanitation
and hygiene and above all to open their eyes to the
commercial possibilities of the country. 3
Clearly, the intention was to produce a literate ruling class so that
the new administration with its rules, regulations and associated routine
1. Quoted in Whitaker, on. cit. , p. 341; but there is more information
on colonial policy of education in "Northern Nigeria Reports 1900-
1911 and 1935-1956", in IKK, Kadma. Also see Gbadamosi, G.O.,
"The establishment of Western education among Muslims in Nigeria",
Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria, IV (No. 1, 1967),
pp. 89-115.
2. See Imam, Dr. Alhaji Abubakar, "Dr. East is dead: a tribute", in
New Nigerian,aMonday. 30 June 1975. There is more account of Mr.
Hans V^scher in^Sonia, P.®., Government and Mission Education in
Northern Nigeria, 19C0-1919 (ibadan, 1966).
3. Quoted in V/hitaker, op. cit. , pp. 341-342. But for an official
view on these objectives see Williams, D.H., Short Survey of Educa¬
tion in Northern Nigeria (Government Printer, Kaduma, 1959); for




could be carried out. Many years later the Sultan of Sckoto confirmed
that, by attributing the educational backwardness of his Emirate mainly
to colonialism,, He said that the British were more interested in
training youth to collect taxes to maintain the system of Indirect Rule."'"
Following that policy, the early generations of northerners to
receive Western education were sons of Emirs, chiefs, D.H.s and other
title holders. They were either members of the aristocracy or their
clients (Yayan Sarakuna Ko Bayinsu). Later on many educated Northerners
came from the families of high ranking N.A. officials. That was parti¬
cularly true at the Middle Schools and all the post-primary levels.
The future careers and, indeed, the social statuses of those Western
educated young men were assured whatever their individual status at
birth had been. Since the traditional political system provided for a
measure of upward social mobility, even for commoners, that strengthened
the spirit of accommodation and drive for integration. The Kaaikata
2
class were on the whole easily absorbed in the N.A.s0
Most Maaikata were members of the aristocracy (in the upper North)
and many, of them were N.A. employees. Since their economic security
1. See West Africa (No. 2977), 8 July 1974, p. 842.
2. In Northern Nigeria, all the Western schools combined produced very
few graduates as compared to Southern Nigeria. Actual figures for
graduates are hard to come by but it suffices to say that up to
1950 Northern Nigeria had only two approved secondary schools for
boys whereas at the same time there were twenty in the West and
eleven in the East, i.e. the total of 31 approved secondary schools
in the South as compared to only 2 in the North. See Nduka, 0.,
Western Education and the Nigerian Cultural Background (ibadan,
1975), pp. 72.But according to Dudley, B.J.. Parties and Politics
in Northern Nigeria (London, 1968), p. 73, table 2, there were 222
boys in secondary schools in the North as compared to 9,307 in the
South. In fact that Northern figure includes those in middle
schools (effective primary schools). The few Northerners who went
to school but who preferred to join the government service or the
commercial firms (e.g., U.A.C. of John Holts) instead of joining
the N.A. services received accelerated promotions.
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and social status were assured by the N.A. system, their loyalty to
it became unquestioning,, In any case their education was designed to
train them for leadership at the local level® So, all they needed to
do was to wait for their turn (i.e. when their elders passed away) and,
in that period of waiting, prove their loyalty to the British and
their obedience to their elders in the N.A. In that way the Emir was
always surrounded by Haaikata who were loyal to the system and obedient
to him in person. In that strong position the Emir used his power
against anyone who threatened his interest or tried to undermine the
N.A.
The Emirs' Control over Native Courts"*"
The Emirs' grip on the N.A. judiciary was as firm as it was
doubly effective against any opposition. The description below of an
instance in Kano was very common in the Muslim North. In 1953 a group
of NEPIJ supporters were imprisoned for some political offences by the
Emir's Court in Kano. A NEPU lawyer, Mr. Amanke Okofor, appealed to
the Federal Supreme Court on behalf of the accused. Their appeal was
heard by his Lordship, Justice P.C. Hubbard, who in his judgement
quashed the sentence by the Emir's Court and thus set the accused
persons free. The following day, a batch of N.A. policemen in two
lorries re-arrested all the accused one by one in their respective
houses and places of work, on the alleged order of the Emir of Kano.
They were sent back to N.A. prison at Kano where they completed the
2
sentences given to them by the Emir's Court.
1. All local judges (alkalai) were employees of the N.A.s and, there¬
fore, they were appointed by the Emirs. In addition to that most of
them were related to the Emirs by marriage or belonged to the same
family. In almost all cases they belonged to the same ethnic group
and thus had very strong kinship ties.
2. This story was reported in detail in the Nest African Pilot. Friday,
9 October 1953.
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What the Emir of Kano did amounted to saying that he would never
let those rebellious peasants out of prison because courts did not
figure in his bookj And that reflected the dilemma of the colonial
government in its support for the Emirs,, The government was aware
that the ordinary people wanted justice, and to see justice done. Some
colonial administrators attempted to identify themselves with the
people they were serving by making it possible to redress their
grievances through the law courts and to a lesser extent by administra¬
tive means. Nonetheless, the ability of the Emirs to defy even the
central authority and get away with it was derived from the British
policy of defending and protecting the chiefs publicly (with occasional
private criticism when really necessary) unless their actions posed a
serious threat to British interests.^" That policy continued right into
the early years of Nigeria's political independence. Up to the early
1960s the Emirs still had the right to deport Nigerian citizens from
their respective areas of jurisdiction. Some of them did use that
power to banish members of the opposition parties (NEFU and AG known
to me) and such was the fate of many NEPU members in Borno Province
and of Njidda Kofa at Yola.
The opposition parties were so helpless in the face of such
deliberate acts of victimization of their members that Alhaji Aminu Kano
(the NEPU leader) moved a motion in the Federal House of Representatives,
Lagos, in which he said:
I rise to move a motion standing in ny name which states
that no Nigerian should be banished from his home or
place of residence until he has been given full opportunity
to defend himself in a court of law, and that persons who
are so banished at present should be freed on the 1st
October I960 ... In this motion my intention is not to
1. See Perham, on. cit.. pp. 43-60.
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bring to this house specific instances of banishments,
because it is not my intention to embarrass any
institution or any Regional Government or any local
authority. But I would like this house to accept the
principle that it is absolutely unjust, it is absolutely
wrong and morally wrong in Nigeria which is achieving
independence this year to have people who are banished
from their own homes without a chance of defending
themselves in a court of law. 1
In fact, Alhaji Aminu Kano was protesting against the autocratic
powers of the Emirs and, especially, against their interference in the
judicial process of the Emirates. Until early 1967, the Emirs hand-
2
picked and appointed all Alkalai in their respective domains. Many
Alkalai were related to the Emirs by marriage or by blood and, as N.A.
employees they were also answerable to the Emirs. Thus, with the
native courts in their complete control the Emirs had combined in
themselves judicial, executive and legislative powers, all of which
3
were arbitrarily and ruthlessly used in defence of their interests.
N.A.s and Politics
The sections above attempt to explain why the illiterate peasant
had nowhere to go to seek redress of his grievances and how bribery
and corruption became part of the mores of the N.A. service. The views
of the Talakawa were never sought on any issue, their welfare was always
disregarded and their helplessness shockingly abused. All N.A. employees
had monetary obligations to their immediate superiors and through them
to the Emir and, in return, subordinates were protected by their seniors.
1. Kano, Alhaji Aminu, Parliamentary Speeches (Kano. 1964), pp. 75-77.
2. In 1967, all Native courts were taken over from the N.A.s by the
Northern Regional Government. For full details and the reasons for
the takeover see NAK/File No. HSNC 53/s.l. Circular: LK 1033/t of
13/2/67.
3. Both 'Jhitaker, op. cit. . pp. 219-230, and Sklar, R.L., Nigerian
Political Parties (Princeton, 1963), pp. 355-365, contain useful
accounts of the Alkali courts and their openness to abuse by the
N.A.
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Thusj much of the attraction of the IT.A. service lay in the opportunities
it offered for extortion in one form or another. Impersonal and
disinterested service on the part of IT.A. employees was unthinkable.
Any service rendered by them had to be paid for accordingly by the
recipient. Those abuses notwithstanding, successive Nigerian Govern¬
ments depended on and, therefore, defended the N.A.s, To the colonial
rulers, the IT.A.s were not only necessary adjuncts to the central
administration but also de facto, if not de .jure, local versions of
colonialism and as such their authority had to be upheld. To the
NoPoCo governments (1954-1966) perhaps there was no alternative to the
IT0Ao machinery in the sense that the N.P.C, leaders belonged to the
traditional elite and that most IT.P.C. members were IT,A. employees.
As a political party the IT,P.C, was entirely dependent on the N.A,s
for its organisation and its electoral success at the polls (see below).
Thus, the defence of the IT.A. system became an accepted doctrine of
conservative politics in Northern Nigeria.
The colonial administration allowed the N.A. staff to take part
in active politics long before modern political parties were formed.
Obviously that was due to the dearth of politically skilled manpower
in Northern Nigeria at that time. But N.A. staff were allowed to
partake in political controversy only on the condition that:
An employee shall not, without permission from the
Native Authority, take any active part in local
political controversy, and the public expression of
opinions contrary to the policy of the Native Authority
may be regarded as an offence against discipline, 1
1. Quoted in Government Circular No. KLG, 412/9 of 7 June 1955 in
NAK/Pile, Min, for Local Govt: MLG/Con/29, p, 9» In fact, this was
an elderly rule which was updated until 1956, See Native Authority
Staff Regulation (Government Printer, Kaduna, 1953)»
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The fact was that the crucial political issue at the local level
was the N.A. itself. So to outlaw public expression of opinions on
IT.A. policies was to restrict N.A. staff from debating their real
problems. With the establishment of political parties in the 1950s
and the gradual evolution of elected national and regional Assemblies
as well as local councils, the government found it imperative that all
councils should contain a sufficient body of educated opinion in their
membership. Since most educated Northern Nigerians worked in the local
governments, it was felt that a total ban on the election of N.A. staff
to such councils might leave them with a membership which was not
sufficiently enlightened to understand what was required of them.^" In
the light of this the Executive Council made the following recommendation
to the N.A.s in the Northern Region:
(1) That N.A. Staff should ... be permitted to take
part in local government activities, with the exception
of official members of the N.A. councils and heads of
N.A. departments.
(2) That this permission should include standing for
election to N.A. subordinate councils.
(3) That this permission should be subject to the
proviso that N.A. employees so elected would not be
free thereby to act or speak in a manner designed to
undermine the policy or status of the N.A.
(4) That is the recommendations here made prove impractical
in the case of any individual N.A., the relevant rules in
the N.A. Electoral Rules might be amended. 2
On recommendation (3) above it was suggested that:
1. Even in 1977, Mariga and Shashanga local governments in Niger State
could not boast of a single Western educated person among its
membership who would be appointed a chairman or a portfolio
councillor. Thus, nominated members were appointed to the council
to make policy for the local government.
2. This and the quote below are from Government Circular No. MLG.
412/9 of 7 June 1955, in NAK/Pile MLG/CON/29, pp. 10-11.
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the tactful expression of views contrary to those of the
N.A., or abstention from voting, in meetings of subordinate
councils might be tolerated in order not to lose the
assistance of experienced men; but active disloyalty
against the N.A. cannot be permitted ...
What constituted "active disloyalty" was not defined, so it remained
an open ended question left to the discretion of each individual N.A.
In 1964 a further amendment to N.A. Staff Regulations Nos. 59 and
60, allowed N.A. employees to partake fully in national and local
politics on the condition that they obtained the written permission
of the N.A.^ Those regulations gave the Emirs the constitutional right
to manipulate political activities at all levels by determining who
achieved elected office. Indeed, the regulations were used, as we
show below, to ensure that holders of political offices were certified
defenders of the N.A. system.
Under the 1946 Richards Constitution, the Northern Regional House
of Chiefs (an unelected upper House) had legislative powers, whereas
the Northern Regional House of Assembly (an elective lower House) had
advisory powers only, unlike other Regions of Nigeria (East and West),
where the reverse was the case. Moreover, most, if not all, the
members of the Northern House of Assembly were sons, grandsons, relatives
or clients of the Emirs; or they were N.A. employees and thus the
2
personal nominees of their respective Emirs. When the Jam*i;wan
Mutanen Arewa — the Northern Peoples Congress (N.P.C.) — formerly a
cultural organization, was declared a political party in October 1951,
all the elected members of the Northern House of Assembly declared their
1. See Government Circular No. 38/1964, Ref. No. MLG/L/C0N/29/l72 of
27 August 1964 in NAE/File Min for Local Govt./MLG/C0N/29, pp.
172-173.
2. See"The Anatomy of Northern Nigerian Parliamentarians",in Whitaker,
op. cit., pp. 317-327.
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support for the party and thus became the members of the N.P.C.
parliamentary party."'" The N.P.C. became the ruling party in Northern
Nigeria, the dominant party in the Federal House of Representatives,
and the senior partner in the Federal Coalition Government (1957-1966).
The relationship between the N.P.C. and the traditional institutions
was such that the party became the de facto political expression of
the Northern chieftaincy institution. Since the N.P.C. was heavily
dependent on the N.A.s for its organization, each N.A. area of
2
jurisdiction was coterminous with the N.P.C. organization area. N.A.
employees were the party's local organizers and agents. In each
electoral constituency, the Emir nominated the N.P.C. election candi¬
dates. It was simply unthinkable for the party to adopt an election
3
candidate who was not also the Emir's choice.
In that way, the N.P.C. control of the Northern Regional Govern¬
ment (1954-1966) and its dominance over the Federal Government of
Nigeria, further consolidated the position of the Emirs at the local
level. The N.P.C, Government maintained the sanctity of the entire
N.A. structure and it held that Emirs and chiefs were the "fathers of
their peoples". That implied that, like the European monarchs, they
were neutral in politics. The fact was that the idea of a constituional
monarch was wholly foreign in Northern Nigeria, because the Emirs had
always been at the centre of politics. They were never above or below
politics. The N.P.C. Government also wrongly assumed that all title
holders would uphold the dignity of their offices by remaining impartial
1. Interview with Maitama Sulei, Kano, 1973. Also see Dudley, B.J.,
op. cit.. p. 83.
2. See Whitaker, op. cit., p. 365.
3. Also see Sklar, R.L., op, cit., p. 388.
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in settling disputes by being as fair as they could be to all parties,,
Any criticism of the local governments was seen by the N.P.Co
government, as a sacrilege and as an affront to the "natural rulers".
Critics of the N.A. system were therefore ruthlessly suppressed by the
N.P.C. with all the governmental machinery at their disposal. Again
the II.A. set up was referred to as "our traditional heritage", which
must be defended by all "true Northerners", from disrupters and
vagabonds. The fact that the N.A.s were the Northern Nigerian equi¬
valent of the local government and, as such, they were the arms of
the government nearest to the people, was simply ignored. The central
belief of conservative politics in Northern Nigeria was that the Emirs
had the "Divine Right" to rule, whereas their subjects, if they had
any right at all, it was the right to suffer their bondage in silence.
Northern Nigerian Emirs had always resisted being reduced to a
ceremonial or symbolic role, accordingly, they had always allied them¬
selves with whoever recognized and helped them maintain their powers
and privileges and opposed those who did not, with all the means at
their command. For example, their fierce resistance against the
British occupation of Nigeria notwithstanding, they agreed to become
the servitors of British colonialism. Indeed, many of them became "the
reliable pillars of the British Empire" x with various decorations and
honors to their names. Again despite their opposition to the introduction
of a parliamentary system of government in the late 1940s and their
open hostility to the formation of political parties in the early 1950s,
they became ardent supporters of the N.P.C. and some of them accepted
cabinet posts and thus were members of the post-colonial government.
1. Cited in Russell, E., op. cit. , p. 45.
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The Emirs, always an opportunist group, continued as political trimmers
right into the military era. To suppose that such rulers would be
neutral in politics was merely wishful thinking.
Conclusion
Prom the foregoing analysis it is reasonable to conclude that to
defeat the N.P.C. at elections would amount to the overthrow of the
entire chieftaincy (and the N.A.) institutions. Conversely, it could
have been very difficult for the N.P.C. to survive as a political party
without the support of the chiefs and the traditional instituions.
N.P.C. success at the polls was thus, to the party, as to the chiefs
and the N.A. system, a matter of life and death. As it were, N.P.C.
defeat would have amounted to a revolution in Northern Nigeria.
The reasons for the survival of the N.A. system until the recent
local government reforms (1977) was not only because it was supported
by successive Nigerian governments but also because certain circum¬
stances compelled the Talakawa to suffer their misfortune largely in
silence. Those circumstances included the Talakawa's own depth of
ignorance which was so extraordinary that they had a distorted perception
of the 'world around them. The Talakawa were so used to vicissitudes
and a hard life that they became accustomed to extreme poverty and
habituated to political servitude. Norse still, even if they were
enlightened, the constitutional arrangement in Hausaland was such that
there was no legal recourse for them. In fact there were many and
varied reasons why a revolution was not seriously contemplated (although
there were many instances of rebellions). It is beyond the scope of
this thesis to enumerate and analyse all those reasons here. It suffices
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to mention very briefly some of the reasons especially those whose
backgrounds have been treated in Chapter I.
Following the illiteracy and the ignorance of the overwhelming
majority of the population there was the lack of political education
and thus very low political consciousness, The patron-client system
in Northern Nigeria tied the rural elite to the nobility by providing
an opportunity to demonstrate mutual trust and reciprocal confidence
(Amana) not to mention the promotion of mutual interests. The strong
kinship system entrusted economic and political responsibilities of
all young persons to their elders, who as clients of the political
authorities did not lend their support to any behaviour or action
likely to disrupt the existing social order and, conversely, the young
men subordinated themselves to the authority of their elders. Political
coercion and administrative extortion were, in most cases, systematically
directed at minority ethnic groups who were regarded, by the dominant
tribal group, as bigots for whom there was no justice. Although the
Talakawa lived simply and badly too, they were not in any way desperate.
Furthermore, in the pre-NEPU period, the sole perception of an alternative
political system which would alleviate their predicament was that
provided intermittently and ineffectively by Mahdist movements. Even
this was countered by the strong Muslim religious hold imposed upon
them. Religion was used by the privileged classes as a diversionary
tactic that distracted the attention of the Talakawa away from the
injustices of this world and made them concentrate instead on the
blissful state of the hereafter. God, at least, was just, even if the
social system and its operators 'were not. In the face of that conser¬
vative interpretation of Islam, the Talakawa were inveigled to come to
terms with their lot because of the religious promise of better things
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to come. Therefore, they became more religious than their rulers as
a consolation for their worldly sufferings0 In that way the religion
of Islam was deliberately misinterpreted to give the Sarakuna greater
security and the same religious misinterpretations promoted social
cohesion,,
Thus what radical politicians faced in northern Nigeria was a
gigantic and complex bureaucratic structure, drawing its legitimacy
from both political and religious sources and relying for its stability
on a combination of mass ignorance, religious sanction and force. The
radicals wanted primarily to democratize local governments (N8A„s) and
secondarily to free Nigeria from colonial rule. As is now well known
the radicals failed to kill the twin evils of colonialism and native
tyranny with one stone. More than anything else, the N0A. institutions
were the main factors which prevented the radicals from capturing
political power in Northern Nigeria,,
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CHAPTER IT
THE ORIGINS OP MODERN RADICALISM
GARI TA WAYE TSORO YA YAYE
"New day breaks and banishes fear." N.E.P.Uo
Preamble
Both the colonial and the post-colonial governments protected
the N.A.s from any form of progressive influence and, thereby, maintained
a closed and tyrannical bureaucracy run by an aristocracy as insolent
as it was unfeeling, Consequently, the culture of unaccountability
was so firmly established that the Sarakuna acted as though they were
the special appointees from heaven invested with power0 Thus, their
minds became bloated with self-importance and encumbered with anachronistic
concepts of authority. On the other hand, the Talakawa were treated
with arrogance and extreme contempt by their rulers. The combination
of ignorance, poverty, disease and political oppression deprived the
Talakawa of organizational initiative, hence, they were effectively
excluded from institutional activity. Furthermore, due to a long
history of dependency and deference, they lacked enough courage to
articulate their grievances and demands, and thus never appeared to
the Sarakuna to be likely to challenge their rule.
It was the desire to change the above situation for the better
which came to be known as "Modern Radicalism" in Northern Nigeria.
The Radicals were those who sought to rescue the Talakawa from the
hammer of Native Administration, They aimed to cure the abuses of
the N.A. system, which was part of colonialism. Hence, Northern
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Nigerian Radicalism was also linked to the struggle against colonial
domination. In this sense the Radicals were also nationalists whose
brand of nationalism was not content with the mere transfer of political
power from the British to Nigerians. They wanted to reform and to
rebuild a modern state on the basis of pre-existing cultural ties
(of religious solidarity and inter-ethnic harmony) by fostering an
enhanced conciousness of these ties. They were in favour of economic
and social development but their method was the use of the whole ethos
of Islamic political thought ingrained in the minds of Muslims in
Hausaland from many centuries ago0 In that way the Qur'an and the
Hadith were their acclaimed and, indeed, accepted reference points.
This type of criticism of rulers is traditionally tolerated in Muslim
communities in which the Qur'an is supposed to be the constitution
and the law book. By using thi3 method, the Radicals attempted to
appear to be recalling the masses to the Revealed Truth (Qur'an) and
to past values of the society: the "Truth" cannot change but those
who forget the truth can be recalled to it. In addition, when
appealing to more educated or urbanized groups they attempted to
present the whole ruling elite as effete aristocrats and the Radicals
as the laboratory of technicians who best understood the general
problems of development and the predicament of the Talakawa in particular.
The history of Northern Nigerian radicalism is not easy to trace,
particularly in the period before Zamanin Siyasa, the period of politics
(i.e. 1946-1966). Not until the 1930's did the Ulama begin to accept
the permanence and legitimacy of colonial rule in the North. The bulk
were prepared, like their Emirs, to cooperate with the colonial admini¬
stration, while a minority who adhered to the principles of the Jihad
became increasingly critical of the nature and consequence of indirect
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rule. At the same period, the number of Western educated people was
too negligible to make any impact on the society as a whole„ So, even
if there were radicals then, they were relatively few and scattered
across the Northern Region and their activities and the organizations
they might have formed were shortlived, due to administrative hostility
and harrassmento Furthermore, not only was Northern Nigerian radicalism
presented in religious and historical terms, with particular reference
to the nineteenth century Jihad and its leaders, but the individual
radical sometimes practiced Taqiyya, the "precautionary dissimulation
of his true beliefs".^" Thus one has to be familiar with the cultural
contest in which the presentation was made to understand their
arguments. Notable among such radicals was Malam Ahmad Mahmud Sa'adu
Zungur (discussed below) but almost all the pioneer radicals were
(are) skilled in making their presentation with a deliberate cryptic
style (for allusion) and innuendo typical of both Habaici and Zambo,
the two categories of Hausa satire. Nonetheless, there was at least
one outspoken pre-war radical malam: Alhaji Sani Dingyadi„
Alha.ii Sani Dingyadi. Makaman Sokoto
Alhaji Sani Dingyadi belonged to the Habe ethnic group and he was
of Talaka parentage. His father was known as Sarkin Hakera. chief of
blacksmiths, a low status occupation in Hausa society. He was born
in 1907 and was educated at the famous Katsina College where he later
1. Referring to Sayyid Jamal Al-din Al-Afghani (1838/9-1897), Thomas
Hodgkin defined his practice of Taqiyya as "precautionary dissimu¬
lation of his true beliefs see Political Theory and Ideology
in African Society (C.A.S., Edinburgh, 1970), p. 124.
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became a master,, He was the Headmaster of Sokoto Middle and then
became Sokoto N.A. Councillor with the title of Hakama.~ He was a
member of the legislative council in the late 1940's, an N.P.C. member
of the Northern House of Assembly in 1956-1961, and a member of the
Nigerian Senate when that House was created in 19620
Alhaji Sani was the pioneer radical in colonial Northern Nigeria,,
In 1933 he addressed pupils in the Middle Schools at Sokoto, Kano,
Katsina and Zaria0 His message was simply this: Mulki Nan Gaba Sai
Da Jamiyya (future government must be by organization of a political
parly). He made it clear that he was thinking of organizing a Saniyya
movement(a party called after his name). He called for a critical
examination of Northern Nigerian society and he advised his audience
not to be afraid either to advocate or to support reforms. He reminded
them that Shehu Usman Dan Fodio did not inherit leadership; he achieved
it; he had an autonomous identity as a learned man and a great reformer.
Implicit in that statement was his resentment of the injustice of the
existing hereditary leadership in the Emirates. As J.S. Mill points
out, the Qur'an asserts that "A ruler who appoints any man to an
office, when there is in his dominion another man better qualified for
2
it, sins against God and against the state." Contrary to this maxim,
the principle of hereditary rule in the Emirates enabled even the stupid
and the incompetent to lead and to rule over Muslim communities. It
is, therefore, not surprising that such principles become the target of
1. One of the junior titles confirmed on both slaves and free-men
alike. The origin of this traditional title is still uncertain.
See Nigerian Administration Research Project, First Interim Report
(institute of Administration, A.B.U., Zaria, 1972), pp. 6-7.
2. Quoted in John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism (ea. by Mary Warnock),
pp. 177-8.
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attack by radicals. Hence, in a typical Hausa allusive innuendo that
was clearly understood by his audience, Alhaji Sani encouraged them
not to be afraid to question the basic assumptions of the Hausa society.
On colonialism he said: Lalatr.cciyar Kasa Itace Kasar Musulmi Wanda He
Karkacin Mulkin liasara (a hopeless country is one which is predominantly
Muslim but which is under the suzerainty of Christians). In the 1940*s
he formed the "Sokoto Youth Council" and the "Sokoto Debating Society".
He remained active in politics until his death in 1969.
His "Sokoto Youth Council" and "Sokoto Debating Society" merged
into the Jamiyya (discussed below) and thus formed the nucleus of the
Northern Peoples Congress (N.P.C.) Sokoto Branch. Aminu Kano was one
of the pupils who listened to him at the Kano Middle School in 1953.
Malam Sa'adu Zungur
The most controversial and the most difficult to understand among
2
the radicals was M. Sa'adu Zungur (1915-1958). He was controversial
because his committment to Islam appeared to be tempered with
scepticism. In Northern Nigeria that was something close to Kafirci
(apostasy); yet he was a practicing Muslim and a learned Malam. He
1. I interviewed Alhaji Sani Dingyadi at Kaduna in 1967. But I owe
much of this information to Alhaji Aminu Kano when I interviewed
him in London in 1974. Alhaji Aminu Kano was a pupil at the Kano
Middle School when Alhaji Sani Dingyadi visited the School and
addressed the pupils in 1933. Also see Abdulkadir, Dandatti,
The Poetry, Life and Opinions of Sa'adu Zungur (NNPC, Zaria, 1974)>
p. 11. Whitaker, C0S., Jr., The Politics of Tradition. Continuity
and Change in Northern Nigeria. 1946-1966 (Princeton. 1970).
contains a short biography of the Makama 0
2. For the biography of M. Sa'adu Zungur, see Kano, Alhaji Aminu,
Rayuwar Ahmad Mahmud Sa'adu Zungur (NNPC, Zaria, 1973). Most of
my information on M. Sa'adu Zungur was obtained from this book.
Also see Abdulkadir, D., The Poetry. Life and Opinions of Sa'adu
Zungur (Zaria, 1974).
A r-j r~1 to
was difficult to understand because of his ability in and skill at
presenting different views and arguments, on the same issue, to the
elites and the masses.^" He was born in a scholarly family in 1915o
He had an Islamic education and acquired competence in the Islamic
Sciences (theology, the law and Qur'anic studies). He had a strong
sense of history and a clear perception of the beliefs and values of
the Muslim culture prevalent in Hausalando He also received Western
education at the famous Katsina College (the Eton College of Northern
Nigeria), and he was the first Northern Nigerian to study at Yaba
College, Lagos. So he was as fluent in the English language as he
was proficient in Arabic. Having studied at Lagos must have brought
M. Sa'adu Zungur into contact with the progressive ideas of many of
the Southern Nigerian intelligentsia of the time; and he also became
aware of the relative backwardness of the North in terms of Western
education and technology. On his return to Northern Nigeria, he took
up employment at the Zaria School of Hygiene before he returned to
his home town;and soon turned Bauchi into the political boiling pot
of Nigeria.
M. Sa'adu Zungur's real attempt in political organization started
in 1959 when he formed the Zaria "Literary Society, which attracted
many educated young men, including Aminu Kano. But it was disbanded
in 1940 due to the sensitivity to criticism of, and subsequent harrass-
ment by, the administration. During the war this was the usual fate
of debating societies; after 1945 the administration made some attempts
2
both to sponsor and control their formation and proceedings. In 1941,
1. Hodgkin, on. cit., attributed this to Sayyid Afghani.
2. Interview with Alhaji Waziri Ibrahim, London, 1973o
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he founded the "Northern General Improvement Union" but it was very-
shortlived as all the committee members of the Union were transferred
from Zaria to rural stations. Sa'adu himself was sent to Anchau where
he became very ill and resigned from the government service. That
mass transfer was the sequel to Sa'adu's inauguration address in which
he said that the functions performed by the administrations were not
really essential to the way of life of the peasantry. He called upon
the authorities to justify their existence on either a religious or
a functional basis. At every stage of the speech he cited relevant
verses from the Qur'an to support his case0^ As J.S. Mill recognized
(in On Liberty) that Islam is primarily a political and social religion,
x
so did Sa'adu and he went further to hold that the fundaments of Islam
A
2
should serve as the basis of public administration. The result of
that transfer of its leadership from Zaria was the natural death of
the Union.
Having resigned from the government service in 1942, Sa'adu
returned to his home town, Bauchi. Although he had not quite recovered
from his illness at Anchau, Sa'adu was still too politically committed
to remain quiet. He believed that stability might breed stagnation and
3
so he favoured a controlled instability for the purpose of progress.
This is to say that rebellion is admissible depending on whether it is
for purely personal reasons or it is inspired by the desire for a
1. Kano, op, cit., p. 2.
2. This assertion is very much in line with Islamic traditional
political thought. For example, it follows the value system of
the founders of the Sokoto Caliphate, especially on the basic
functions of their administration. See Mahmud Tukur, "Philosophy,
Goals and Institutions of the Sokoto Caliphal Administration: A
preliminary view", in Nigerian Administration Research Project.
First Interim Report (Zaria, 1972), pp0 15-43o
3o Kano, on. cit.. p0 4.
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different kind of coirarunity from that in which the rebel finds himself.
In the latter case, the desire can be shared by all except a small
minority who profit by the existing system. This type of rebellion
is constructive and therefore legitimate. Without this kind of
rebellion mankind would stagnate and injustice would be irremediable.
The man who refuses to obey authority has, therefore, in certain
circumstances, a legitimate function, provided his disobedience has
motives which are social rather than personal. But this matter is one
which is impossible to lay down rules. In 1943, he formed Taron
Tattauna Al'amuran Bauchi (the Bauchi Discussion Circle).^" At first,
the circle was supported by colonial officials and it represented all
2
shades of opinion in Bauchi. But it was banned after one year,
following a debate on "Indirect Rule"0 That fateful debate was chaired
by the Emir of Bauchi, with the Resident of Bauchi Province in
attendance. The debate was followed by a discussion during which
Sa'adu asked for the criteria which determine the salaries of Emirs.
It fell upon the Resident to answer the question and he, at first,
gave two reasons: (l) the amount of taxes collected within the Emirate;
(2) the duties involved in administering the Emirate, i.e. the grade
of the Emir's court and the number of cases tried by the court, etc.
As for the first point, Sa'adu reminded the meeting that Bauchi Division
3
was in fact bigger than Adamawa Division ; and as for the second point
he cited the Provincial Reports, to prove that the Emir of Bauchi's
1. Ibid.
2. Ibid.
3. Without Sardauna Province, which was then a mandated territory of
the United Nations in the British Trust and administered locally
by the Adamawa N.A., Bauchi Division was, indeed, much bigger
than Adamawa Division.
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court dealt with more of such cases than the Lamido of Adamawa's
courto But the Resident explained that the colonial government also
took into consideration the order of seniority of the Emirs as
established by Shehu Usman Dan Fodio from the time of the Jihad. To
this Sa'adu pointed out that the Shehu made Bauchi senior to Adamawa.
Thus, in the presence of the Emir of Bauchi and his councillors,
Sa'adu implied that the colonial administration both slighted and
cheated the Emirs of Bauchi. The Resident understood the implications
of both Sa'adu's questions and his subsequent inferences; and, in high
temper, the meeting was closedo Consequently, the Bauchi Discussion
Circle was officially proscribed from that date.^"
M. Sa'adu Zungur then tried to establish the "Bauchi General
Improvement Union" and the "Youth Association", and he also attempted
to open an "Islamiyya School"0 All failed because of the opposition
of the authorities,. In view of that he devised other means of keeping
in touch with the educated people of Bauchi town, one of which included
visits to the N.A0 and the government's departments where he would
meet and talk to the staffo Through these discussions he would explain
his ideas and views on current affairs and, of course, he would also
2
get some information from them. This was to lead, a little indirectly,
to a marked change in Sa'adu's views and subsequent struggles.
One day he visited the Public Works Department (P.W.D.) which stood
next to the house in which Sa'adu lived. There, some of the staff
complained to him about one Mr. Orgle, the officer in charge of the
department. Mr. Orgle was notorious for his arrogance and for
1. Kano, op. cit.. p. 6.
2. Ibid.
180
humiliating his subordinates and all black people generally,, As a
result of those complaints, Sa'adu wrote an article on Mr<> Orgle for
the West African Pilot, a Lagos-based newspaper. In it he called
for the removal of Mr. Orgle from Bauchi.
About one week later this article was published and Mr, Orgle
read it. The following morning he went into the P.W,D, yard, where
by standing on an empty drum, he could see over the wall, right into
the house in which Sa'adu lived, and waited for Sa'adu to emerge so
that he could shoot him. However, Sa'adu notice^Mr. Orgle standing
against the wall of his house and before leaving the Zaure (a thatched
round-hut used as a resting or entrance hall of a house) of his
compound he asked his servant, as a precautionary measure, to find out
who was the person standing against the wall. V/hen his servant confirmed
to him that it was Mr. Orgle and he (Mr, Orgle) was armed, Sa'adu
became suspicious and sent for Aminu Kano immediately, Sa'adu and
Aminu had first met in 1935 when Sa'adu visited Kano Middle School
where Aminu was a pupil. They met again at Zaria in 1939 when Aminu
was on a teaching practice at Zaria Middle Schoolo Apparently, Sa'adu's
return to Bauchi was partly responsible for Aminu's decision to go and
teach at Bauchi in 1942. At Bauchi their friendship warmed-up and
the two became very close indeed.
On seeing Mr. Orgle, Aminu Kano informed the police and he and
Sa'adu wrote to the press about it; they also sent an urgent telegram
to the Governor at Kaduna. Mr. Orgle was charged with attempted
murder, but was only found guilty of possessing a firearm without a
licence and was fined £5. The case endeared Sa'adu greatly to the
1. Ibid.
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people of Bauchi and it made them realize how discriminating colonial
justice was„ But more important, it changed the direction of Sa'adu's
protestSo From then on his attacks were centred on the evils of
colonialism.^
The above incident occurred after World War II when Nigerian
soldiers were returning from the war fronts. So, either by coincidence
or by design, Sa'adu composed a poem Maraba Da So.ia (MS), "Welcome to
Soldiers". This poem is very much in the traditional style of Hausa
praise-songs, which intended to celebrate the triumphant return of the
soldiers, but in the end it turned out to be a succinct warning to the
administration on the impending crisis. Sa'adu was quick to see that
the return of the soldiers, who fought in various parts of the world
in order to defend the Empire would have momentous social and political
consequences. Thus, he went on to say,
Freedom is of no value,
Where there is poverty,
Mutual trust stands no chance,
If some are self-seeking at heart,
There is no good leadership,
Save where there is justice.
There is no value in kinship,
Save where there is generosity,
And when there is no gross ingratitude,
No malice, no indifference,
No inhumanity,
None is starved for food
Then only is freedom assured. 2
lo Ibid.. p. 10.
2. The full Hausa text of this song will be found in Wakokin M. Sa'adu
Zungur (NNPC, Zaria, 197l), pp. 6-10. And Abdulkadir, on. cit..
pp. 36-47, contains both the full Hausa text and an English trans¬
lation. Also see Hiskett, Mervyn, "The Development of Sa'adu
Zungur's Political Thought from Maraba Da So.la. through Arewa
Jumhuriva Ko Mulukiva to Wakar Yanci", in African Language Studies.
XVI (1975), pp. 1-23. The Hausa version runs as follows:
Babu amfani ga'yanci In akwaihalin talauci,
Babu yin zarafin aminci In da masu kwafa a zuci,
Babu kyawun shugabanci Sai idan da akwai adalci,
Babu amfanin zumunci Sai fa in da akwai karimci,
Kuma babu yawan butulci Babu keta, basakarci,
Babu ketawar mutunci Babu mai yunwar abinci,
San nan yanci yake tsayawa.
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In what looked like a reminiscence of Lloyd George's slogan that after
World War I British soldiers would return to "A land fit for heroes to
live in", Sa'adu warned the authorities that unless a programme of
rapid social change was undertaken, the return of the soldiers would
bring in its trail a crisis which had every promise of turning into a
disaster. This poem (MS) is a protest against the prevailing conditions
of the masses as well as a clairvoyant expression of the trend of future
political development. It was not long after he composed the above
poem (MS) that Sa'adu had the opportunity to address a larger audience
through an organized political party.
In 1947, M. Sa'adu Zungur met Dr. Nnamdi Azikwe, the then leader
of the "National Council of Nigerian Citizens" (N.C.N.C.)1 in Bauchi.
At that meeting Zik (as he is popularly called) invited Sa'adu to
Lagos, but before he left Bauchi to Lagos, an incident occurred in
2
Bauchi which is relevant and therefore worth mentioning,,
In 1948, Sir John Macpherson, the new Governor of Nigeria, planned
to tour the whole country, but curiously, Bauchi town was left out of
his itinerary. So, Sa'adu and his clique decided to hold a demonstration
in order to show that Bauchi people wanted to see the Governor. But
Bauchi N.A. intervened, warning that no meeting should be held in the
Division without the permission of the police. The obvious reason for
the omission of Bauchi town in the Governor's itinerary was the political
activity of Sa'adu, Aminu and their group. Perhaps the authorities
did not want the Governor to meet the agitators at Bauchi. But whatever
the real reason might be, the demonstration was held with the permission
of the Emir of Bauchi.
1. It was then called the "National Council of Nigeria and Cameroons".
2. This incident is fully described in Kano, on. cit., pp. 11-12.
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The demonstration started from the house of one Ho Waziri to
the Bauchi Market,, Probably due to the Emir's permission, the turn¬
out was far beyond the expectation of the organizers. At the market,
Sa'adu read out his political speech in which he condemned colonialism
and called upon all patriots to come forward without fear and make
sacrifices in order to free Nigeria from colonial domination. That
speech was the text of the letters which Sa'adu sent to the Governor,
to the Lieutenant Governor and to the Press, This is one of the first
organized anti-colonial political demonstrations in Northern Nigeria,
Sa'adu Zungur was appointed the Federal Secretary of the N.C.N.C.
in 1948 and he left Bauchi to resume office in Lagos. In accepting
his new appointment in Lagos, he also made his own calculations, for
having studied at Yaba College, Lagos, he was aware of the relative
backwardness of the North in terms of Western education and technical
skills and hoped that the support of a Southern Nigerian political
party might help the north to make up the leeway before independence
overtook it. But, as we show below, flirtation with Southern
Nigerians proved disappointing as Sa'adu became convinced that
Southern politicians wished to use the North to advance their own
sectional ambitions and that they were indifferent to the real needs
of Northern Nigeria. Soon after his arrival at Lagos and before he
assumed his duties in the N.C.NoC. Secretariat, he formed a "Northern
Peoples Party" , Jamiyyan Al'amuran Ni.ieriva ta Arewa, to organize
Northern Nigerian immigrants in the Lagos area and tap their resources"*":
its ideas were later to influence the formation of similar organizations
1. Ibid.. p. 14,
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in the North, through the influence of Sa'adu Zungur or Aminu Kano and
the advice which he gave him.
One of the very first things Sa'adu did in the N.C.NoC. was to
change the title of his office from the Federal Secretary to the National
Secretary of the Party0 This shows his commitment to the idea of
Nigerian unity,, But it did not take him long to become disenchanted
with the N.C.N.Co leadership whom he called "foster nationalists" —
those who are brought up in the colonial values and therefore look up
to the colonialists for inspiration as well as for aspiration. He
constantly accused his Southern colleagues of being cowards and
unimaginativeo According to Sa'adu their sole motive was to inherit
the colonial structures with all its drawbacks and abuses. Thus, even
after independence, the central government would remain an oppressive
"quasi-colonial" government, divorced from the people. His disillusion¬
ment with his colleagues led him to form a youth wing of the party,
the famous "Zikist National Vanguard".^" During his tours to various
parts of Nigeria, he recruited young men who he reckoned were courageous
and talented. His new recruits included: Alhaji Habid Raji Abdallah,
Chief Anthony Enahoro, Asita Agwuna, Mokogwu Okoye and Kebby Oged
Macauley. He surrounded himself with the above young men in Lagos
and with that group behind him he led a fierce opposition against
colonialism in 1948/49.
The reason given for Sa'adu's departure from Lagos was due to
"ill-health", but surely he could have received better treatment there
than at Kaduna. It must be due to his resentment of the "foster
1. For a brief discussion of the early activities of the Zikist National
Vanguard, see ibid. For a more detailed account of the Zikist
movement, see Coleman, J.S., Nigeria: Background to Nationalism.
(Berkeley, I960), especially pp. 288, 296-297; also see Sklar,
Nigerian Political Parties (Frinceton, 1963), especially pp. 195,
201-21, 403-406, 73-80; and Olusanya, G.O., The Second Worid War
and Politics in Nigeria 1939-1953 (Lagos, 1973), especially pp.
112-17 and 120-3.
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nationalists" who were full of words but no action and whose broken
promises he could no longer stand. He therefore broke his connection
with the N.C.N.C. and returned to the North in the firm belief that the
salvation of Northern Nigeria and, indeed, the freedom of the whole
of Nigeria, was to be fought in the North,, In his poem, Arewa Jumhuriya
Ko Mulukiva (AJM), "North Republic or Constitutional Monarchy""*", he
not only accused Southern Nigerian politicians of being insensitive
to the problems of reforms in Northern Nigeria, but he also partly
pleaded with and partly challenged the Muslim North to make rapid social
and political changes or face the inevitable consequences of Southern
(Christian) domination of the whole country. He appealed to the common
history, common religion and common culture of the Muslim North; he
also appealed to the concept of "peaceful co-existence" between Muslims
and non-Muslims which had existed in Northern Nigeria since the Jihad.
Sa'adu's main aim was to mobilize the whole North, not so much against
the South, as to bring about rapid development to the whole region.
He said:
Our prayers are to God, the Merciful
That He may protect the North as a whole
Muslims and Christians, altogether,
And also Pagans, the beer goblins, 2
The general tone of the whole poem (AJM) is in the pious Islamic
literary convention but Sa'adu's appeal to the Emirs, in particular,
lo The full Hausa text of this poem is found in Zungur, Sa'adu, op, cit,,
pp. 15-22; Abdulkadir, D,, op, cit.. pp0 72-99, contains both the
full Hausa text and its English translation; also see Paden, J.N,,
op. cito. pp, 283-284; and Hiskett, M., op. cit. This poem is not
dated by its author but it might have been composed in 1950, i.e.
after Sa'adu had left the N.C.N.C.
2. The Hausa version runs as follows:
Addu'armu ga Allah Rahimi,
Ya kiyayi Arewa gabadaya
Muminai da Masihai jumlatan,
Kumada Arna dodan nin giya.
186
is in the traditional concept of authority through a favoured line of
descent which, in Northern Nigeria, serves to establish the basic
principle of legitimacy. He then enumerated the genealogical concatena¬
tion which links the Emirs of the Muslim North to Shehu Usman Dan
Podio, the founder of the Sokoto Caliphate. This style appeals
strongly to the Muslim's sense of solidarity,, But Sa'adu did not
limit his appeal to the Northern glorious past, he also warned the
Emirs "to sprinkle water on their beards as those of their contemporaries
in India were already on fire" (a Hausa proverb which says Idan Kaga
Genron Dan-Uwanka Ya Kama Nuta Shafawa Nakaruwa)0 This is to warn the
Emirs that they must move with the times or be blown by the "wind of
change". He said to them:
The lesson is the government of India,
When it became a republic.
Today where are the great chiefs,
of Pakistan or India?
The Nizam, the Maharaja, the Rajah, all,
(They are) only weeping, none laughs.
Formerly the chiefs were more than five hundred,
All are scattered, not one remains,
It is as if they had never existed
You see the evils of a republic. 1
In the first decade of Zamanin Siyasa (1946-1956) the real political
forces in Northern Nigeria were mainly the Emirs and chiefs supported
by the British, on the one hand, and the Western educated elite on
1. The Hausa version runs as follows:
Wa'azine mulkin Indiya
Data zam daular jumhuriya
Yau ina manya na Sarakunan,
Pakistan ko kuma Indiya?
Da Nizam, Maharaja d3 Raja duk,
Sai Kuka, ba mai dariya.
Da Sarakai sun fi dari biyar,
Duka sun watse bako daya.
Saika ce fa da dai ba'a yi suba,
Kun ji sharrorin jumhuriya.
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the other. Sa'adu wanted, to unify the two groups by highlighting
what they have in common, i.e. common culture and to some extent common
ancestry. Also, in view of the educational backwardness of Northern
Nigeria as compared to Southern Nigeria, most educated Northerners
were aware of the vulnerability of the Northern Region, to becoming
the back-yard of a future independent Nigeria. Thus, what was then
contemptuously referred to a3 the "jungle republicanism" of the
Southerners (especially of the Ibos) was pointed out as the main threat
to Northern hegemony. He went on:
(You) understand the nature of a constitutional monarchy
And the dangers of a republic.
King and Houses of Representatives
And Shari* ah. that is constitutional monarchy
Government by representatives only,
No King, No Queen,
Save Police, save soldiers
Issuing orders, that is a republic.
We hope that the North should be alerted
To the inclinations of the world.
All of the false propaganda
Leave it, seek the truth. 1
Some verses of this poem appear to correspond broadly with Islamic
constitutional theory as practiced in Northern Nigeria and thus lead
to misinterpreting Sa*adu as one who is advocating for Muslim exclusive-
ness against non-Muslims or Northern identity against Nigerian unity.
But salient features of the poem represent Sa'adu's Taqiyya. in
1. The Hausa version runs as follows:
Ku fahinci shiri na Mulukiya
Da yawan hadarin jumhuriya.
Sarki da gidajen shawara,
Da shari'a, kunji Mulukiyao
Mulki na Wakilai gurguzu,
Ba sarki babu sarauniya.
Sai yan sanda, sai soja sai,
Oda, itace jumhuriyao
Fatarmu Arewa ta farga duk
Don ta game lamarin duniya.
Farfagandar makirci duka,
Sai a bar ta a bincika gaskiya.
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dissimulating his real beliefs in order to win the support of the
whole North. For the poem at once suggests to the Sarakuna how to
preserve the status-quo; exploits the fears of the Ma Aikata; and
appeals to the religious and cultural sentiments of the Talakawa.
The last verses of the poem contain Sa'adu's indictment of Northern
Nigerian society as unorganized, conservative and undisciplined. He
also criticized Northerners for being ignorant, indolent and uncompetitive.
Indeed, Sa'adu was a keen observer and his poetry remains a social
commentary, endorsed by all educated opinions. This poem, in particular,
created as much stir as it provoked criticism due to misinterpretation
and misrepresentation. For instance, his flattery of the Emirs was
misunderstood as a capitulation by him on previous opposition to the
N,A. system. Hence, M, Mudi Spikin, a Kano poet, reacted by composing
a piece entitled Arewa Jumhuriya Kawai (AJX), "North Republic, Pure
and Simple"Mudi does not refute the Islamic notion of legitimacy
implied in Sa'adu's poem (AJM) but he argues that descendants of the
Jihadists are less distinguished than their ancestors because they
have flouted the ideals of the Jihad. As a result of their deviation
from the path of Truth, "a Governor was imposed upon them from England:
he is a certain man with a horrible moustache, his name was Lugard".
The implication here is that the Emirs in the North are unjust and,
since according to Shehu Usman Dan Fodio's maxim that "a Kingdom can
endure with unbelief but it cannot endure with injustice", God trans¬
ferred the trust of his creatures in the North, from those who are
1, Quoted in Hiskett, M., on. cit». p. 10, There are two verses of
the Hausa text in Hassan, Usman, The Sources and Development of
Northern Nigerian Politics from 1804-1960 with Special Reference
to Political Verse (essay presented in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the award of M,A, degree of London University,
May 1974), ppo 11 and 13, Mudi's reply to Sa'adu was dated 1951.
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■unjust to those who are just, even though they are unbelievers,, Thus
Mudi refutes the inviolability of traditional legitimate authority of
the Muslim rule implied in Sa'adu's argument. He goes on to say:
My brothers, I have come to tell you,
My opinion, in order that you may understand the truth
About the song that Sa'adu Zungur composed
In verse about a republic,
Namely (the song about) the North, what he said about
A republic and a constitutional Oligarchy
And in the song he even said,
That it is not possible to overthrow a constitutional oligarchy;
He said much,
That was good to hear and true,
He took a firm stand, he laid emphasis on
Government by constitutional oligarchy
According to the way upon which he relies,
The flags of the Shehu, worthy to be followed.
Then M. Mudi Spikin concluded his piece with these scathing remarks^":
If NoAo Government as a whole
Were good, without any oppression,
Then what would have led to the sudden
Abolition of the princes in India?
Their rule had reached the point of complete collapse,
So that the country became a republic.
So it will happen in this country
In a very similar way, there is no doubt about it
In ny opinion it will be the day after tomorrow,
Or even tomorrow, first thing in the morning. 2
M. Mudi Spikin makes two points here. Firstly, he asserts that every
political institution (or system) is established to serve certain
socio-economic purposes. So whenever a socio-economic system changes,
so does the political set-up that serves it. Since Northern Nigeria of
today is different from Northern Nigeria of yesterday and, better
still, of tomorrow, the N.A. system has out-lived its usefulness.
Thus, the administrative structure that makes the scaffold N.A.s should
1. Quoted in Hiskett, op. cit.. p. 10.
2. Ibid.
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be dismantled,, Secondly, Mudi rejects the doctrine that Emirs are
answerable to God only0 He demands that they should also be answerable
to the electorate. Thus he is emphasizing the actual practicing of
the Qur'anic concept of dual accountability of Caliphs, Obviously, he
means that when N.E.P.U., the party to which both Mudi and Sa'adu
belonged, was voted into power by the electorate, the N.E.P.U. govern¬
ment would abolish the edifice of constitutional monarchy in Northern
Nigeria,
The disputation between M. Mudi Spikin (AUK) and M, Sa'adu Zungur
(AJM) is useful academically but, as I explained above, it derives
from the misinterpretation of Sa'adu's real beliefs: for one thing
the concluding verses of Zungur's poem reveals his displeasure or
disillusion (or both) with Northern Nigerian society as a whole; for
another his apparent (but not real) commendations of Northern political
culture did not prevent him from attacking the Sarakuna for their
autocracy. For example, at the time when his poem (AJM) was being
chanted and, indeed, acclaimed by all sections of public opinion in
Northern Nigeria, Sa'adu was also writing a series of articles in
Gaskiya Tafi Kwabo ["Truth is worth more than a penny"a government
owned Hausa language newspaper, published at Zaria, attacking the
un-Islaraic practices in the region. In one article on prostration and
genuflection (a traditional way of greeting elders and especially those
in authority in Nigeria), Sa'adu called on Muslim scholars to identify
and separate pre-Islamic practices from Islam. He argued that it was
1, The first issue was published in 1939, edited by Abubakar Imam (see below)
with the assistance of L.C, Giles of the Literature Bureau also
based at Zaria.
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not tenable to accept old methods used by leaders either for
correcting wrongs or for committing same. He asked:
Why should we pray to God by bowing five times a
day and at the same time bow thirty times to other
big fools in the same number of hours? 1
M. Sa'adu Zungur concluded his article by citing the Hadith in which
it was said the Holy Prophet Muhammad indicated his displeasure when
a follower prostrated to greet him. The Holy Prophet told that
person that bowing down and prostrating should be performed to God
alone. Then Sa'adu asked for the source of the Hausa greetings —
"Is it Islamic or pre-Islamic?"
Sa'adu's crusade gained its first success few months later when
the Emir of Abuja, Alhaji Suleimanu Barau, the first Katsina College
graduate to become an Emir, told his people that he would no longer
allow people to prostrate before him in salutation as if he were God;
they should instead greet him standing when they met him in that
posture, or sitting when he was sitting down. However that action had
2
no bandwagon effect as no other Emir emulated it.
Between 1949/50, Sa'adu worked in the N0PoC0 (see below)
office at Kaduna, but failing to convert the N.P0C0 from a cultural
organization to a political party, he left them. He then joined forces
with other radicals in the N.E.P.U. (see next chapter). M. Sa'adu
Zungur was the Legal Advisor, the Bauchi Provincial leader and a
member of the National Executive Committee (N.E.C.) of the N.E.P.U.
3
from 1951 until his death in 1958. It is now more than twenty years
1. Quoted in Adamu, Haroun, in New Nigerian Supplementary on GTK
40th Anniversary, Tuesday, 16 January 1979, p. 1. A copy of this
paper is in the possession of the writer,,
2. Ibid.
3. See Abdulkadir, D., on. cit.. pp. 9-15.
192
since he died but he is still admirably remembered as a pioneer
radical, a "Forgotten Nationalist"^ and a literary genius. As a
controversial figure of many sides, Sa'adu Zungur and his works still
remain subjects of academic interpretations and evaluations,, The way
he is interpreted depends on from which perspective one examines him.
The evaluations of his works are as varied as the academic disciplines
of the students working on him.
Alha.ii Dr. Abubakar Imam
Another figure who came into prominence from the 1940's was
Alhaji Abubakar Imam whose influence on the thinking of the young
generation of the North in the years that followed is yet to be
2
adequately acknowledged. This is because he wrote almost entirely in
Hausa for which reason his writings attracted little interest in Lagos
and the U.K. This was probably a deliberate action in his part because
he was addressing himself to the Northern audience. He is also the
3
author of the first novels in Hausa and many Hausa text books. He
became the editor of the Hausa newspaper, Gaskiva Tafi Kwabo. As the
editor, he gave some space in his paper to controversial articles
dealing with sensitive issues of religion and politics. One of the
1. This means that his nationalist activities are yet to be fully
documented. But this is not a deliberate neglect on the part of
the students of the Nigerian political scene as Sa'adu's senior
brother, the late Chief Imam of Bauchi, burnt most of his papers
because he found out that Sa'adu was working on the translation of
the Qur'an from Arabic to Hausa language. Evidently his brother
disapproved of his efforts. That happened a few months before he
died in 1958.
2. See Coleman, J.S., Nigeria (Berkeley and Los Angeles, I960),
pp. 560-2.
3. One of his most influential books is Tafiya Mabudin Ilmi (Travel
the key to education).
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most important articles, that analysed Northern Nigerian problems and
had a tremendous influence on the Western educated elements, was
written by the editor himself. The series of articles were entitled:
Ci Uku Wadanda Sukaci Ni.ieriya-Jahilci. Zalunci Da Lalaci. "Three evils
that plagued Nigeria-Ignorance, 'Graft' and laziness".^"
He regretted that due to ignorance there was a dearth of manpower
in the Northern Region and explained that laziness was the foundation
of the two other evils. It bred clumsiness, dirt and disease. On
corruption he pointed out that,
The worst of all types of corrupt practices is the
payment of something of value in order to be
appointed to an office or to obtain a job.
He quoted a District Head, who said: "I am here on contract; I bought
2
my post, I have to break even, or make profit." Those series of
articles had tremendous impact on "educated Northern" Nigerians because
when they formed a Pan-Northern cultural organisation, the Jam'iwa
Mutanen Arewa. its main objectives were to fight the three evils:
ignorance, laziness and corruption. Furthermore, it was on its
insistence that the government appointed a committee to investigate
the traditional forms of corruption (Gaisuwa) in the Northern Region.
Consequently, the Northern Region Customary Exchange Law of 1955
which regulated the offering and the receiving of traditional gifts to
Emir and chiefs was promulgated. The attacks on the N.A. were
persistent as they were vehement, urging that:
If the N.A. are to play their full part in the consti¬
tutional framework, they must be prepared continually
to adapt themselves to modern conditions ... 3
1. Adamu, Haroun , on. cit.. p. 2.
2. Quoted in Ibid.
3. Alhaji Abubakar Imam, cited by Adamu, Haroun, ibid.. p. 2.
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Again, in a series of editorials, in the Gaskiya. Alhaji (Dr.) Abubakar
Imam sounded warnings, sometimes even threats on the educational
backwardness of the North and therefore, employment opportunities for
"Northerners". He gradually made the administrations realize that
"Northernization" was the only answer and when that was adopted as
a government policy (in 1956-1966) he was one of those to implement
the policy: first as a permenent member of the Norther^Regional Public
Service Commission and later as its chairman.
In 1943, Abubakar Imam visited the U.K. as a member of West African
Press delegation and while in England he met Lord Lugardo Their
meeting started a correspondence between them. These letters, more
than anything else, reveal Imam's discontent and opposition to the
N.A. system. So incisive was his criticism against Indirect Rule (and
addressed to the very architect of the policy — Lord Lugard), that
it could not be published then because even the British administrators
were afraid as to what would happen to Imam in those days if the
contents of the letters was known. In those letters he analysed the
political problems of Northern Nigeria and explained the extent to
which Indirect Rule influenced the situation for worse, and then he
concluded:
But there is one thing which people, especially the
educated elements trouble me about and that is the
way the system is being carried out. They say that
the world is changing but Indirect Rule in Northern
Nigeria is not changing. 2
1 • f P • ^ •
2. Quoted in New Nigerian, special supplement, Wednesday, 17 January,
1979, p« 1. The original copies of this correspondence were read
by the writer in the National Archives, Kaduna, where they were
being kept under restriction up to September 1978. All the
subsequent quotes are from the same paper, pp. 3-4. A copy of the
New Nigerian under reference is in the possession of the writer.
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He argued that the so-called N.A. council was a mere facade and that
the Emir was the effective autocratic ruler. That was because:
... members of the council are chosen, as far as the
public knows, by the Emir himself. They represent
nobody but the Emir himself. When the council is
sitting the Emir is always there. It is no wonder
that if a councillor wants to escape with his bread
he believes that he must shut his eyes and his ears
and open his mouth only to say, "that is so", to whatever
the Emir says is righto
In view of that the N.A. Council was really a confidence tricko On
the face of it, it gave the impression of being comprised of independent
councillors, bound by the concept of collective responsibility, running
the affairs of the N.A. but, in reality, it was a congregation of loyal
and faithful courtiers who were privileged to be the first to hear what
his Highness, the Emir, wanted to do in his domain. In that way, the
councillors were doing more harm than good, both to the system they
represented and, to the country as a whole. The N.A. Council was a
council of yes-men, pure and simple. Imam attributed that unhappy
situation to the religious adherence of the British officials to their
official policy. They were so protective of the chiefs that the most
constructive comment on the N.A. was seen as subversive. He said of
the colonial officers:
If you talk this over to the average administrative
officer in Northern Nigeria they may think of you as
another Ghandi, a trouble-maker. Many of them say
the only thing we want is education. Education is not
the only thing we want. The first thing we want is
justice, next freedom, and number three, education which
will help us to enjoy our freedom. The people are now
dividing into three classes — the Sarakuna (rulers),
the unhappy Maaikata (the salaried officials) and the
helpless Talakawa (peasantry).
But the British officials were indifferent to what was happening around
them. Worse still, they segregated themselves and thus lived in a
world of their own. For that reason misunderstanding was increasing
between them and the people they governed.
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How can we understand each other? Normally when a
European comes to see you or you go to see him it is
so that he can give you a command or reprimand you for
your faults. There is no other reason for you to meet
... Prank discussion is the best method of clearing
misunderstanding and solving problems,,
Alhaji Imam added that the demand of the Haaikata class was not an
impossible one because they were only asking for a responsible govern¬
ment as laid out by Shehu Abdullahi, the brother of Shehu Usman Dan
Podio, i.e. a constitutional system, with the Emir ruling by the
advice and consent of his people. But very startling, British officials
who came from a country with a constitutional monarchy were not prepared
to see one in Northern Nigeria. When pressed on that they replied:
"This is how we found you. We do not want to change you." And Imam
said,
That is a statement that we never understand. How can
Europeans say that they do not want to change us while
they give us education? There is no other change in the
world which is greater than education. Once you give
people education you have changed them entirely. So,
we want Europeans to forget the idea of saying that
they do not want to change us. They have already changed
us and they are changing us now. So, what we want is
for them to change us for the better, and not to wait
until we change ourselves for the worse. So, I repeat,
let the Europeans make us their friends soon, before
we are made to become their enemies ...
But enmity between the colonial government and Nigerians had already
begun to surface, as even the rank and file who a few years previously
joined the British army and fought against their native rulers (or at
best stood neutral), began to doubt the sincerity of British admini¬
strators. People were generally confused and bitter after forty years
of the British rule in Northern Nigeria; the British idea of justice
still remained an ideal and, even worse, the colonialists pretended
that they did not know and did not want to know of the injustice
inherent in the N.A. system. Thus, Imam represented the common man's
feelings when he said,
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Europeans always repeat that they occupied this country
because they wanted to see justice administered. They
rule for justice. They are showing us ways of justice.
They are fighting for justice. But when the people
look around at their own rulers, and see what a lot
of injustice there is, they blame the Europeans.
Because every act of oppression or extortion on the
part of district head or village head is known by the
people in the area, and so they think that the Emir must
know it too. As they see no action taken, and there is
no way of telling them why no action has been taken, they
say either that the Europeans do not know what is going
on, or that they do not mean what they say when they
talk about justice.
The main points in Alhaji Imam's long letter to Lord Lugard can be
summarised as follows:
1) That the British officials should give Nigerians more moral
training by mixing with them socially.
2) That N.A. Councils should be made to be more representative of
and responsible to the people.
3) That appointment into the N.A. Councils should be based on merit
and that it should include the younger generation of Western
educated Nigerians.
4) That N.A. Councils should have specialised committees to deal
with the many and varied problems in their respective areas of
jurisdiction.
5) That N.A. workers should be made aware that they were neither
working for their respective Emirs nor for the British but for
their country, i.e. for themselves.
Some of the above recommendations were implemented as it later
became the colonial government policy to encourage the N.AoS to co-opt
Western educated young men into the N.A. Councils. However, in another
letter to Lord Lugard (dated 9/l2/l944), many of Imam's observations
on Nigerian society still remained true:
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Our primary need in the Northern Provinces is to see
that the standard of living of the masses is raisedo
At present it is almost as low as it was before your
occupation. The masses, especially in the rural areas,
are heavily diseased, ill-fed and under-fed, ignorant
and poverty stricken.
Alhaji Abubakar Imam did not involve himself openly in politics, but
he remained a member of the N.P.C. inner circle until 1966 when all
political parties were banned by the then Military Administration.
The Impact of the 1946 Richards Constitution in Northern Nigeria
The years 1944-50 were really the years of modern radical
awakening in Northern Nigeria. It was in those years that Northern
radicalism started gathering momentum and Northern radicals featured
in Pan-Nigeria politics. M0 Sa'adu Zungur emerged as the most outspoken
critic of the Northern political system and he was appointed the
National Secretary of the N.C.N.C. Alhaji Habid Raji Abdallah, one
of the founders of the N.E.P.A. (see below), became the President of
the Zikist National Vanguard. Alhaji Zannah Bukar Dipcharima joined
the N.C.N.C. and he became the Personal Secretary to its President,
Dr. Nnamdi Azikwe0 Not only in the urban areas, but throughout the
North, the ferment was beginning to rise. Contentment with ancient
ways was beginning to break down under the impact of new ideas and
experiences. For the first time the North took part in the Legislative
Council of Nigeria (under the Richards Constitution of 1946) and both
chiefs and educated classes welcomed the proposals.
The Richards Constitution had far reaching effects in Northern
Nigeria. It provoked political thinking and led to the formation of
debating societies in all the Northern Provinces to discuss constitutional
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issues,,"*" It brought leaders from various parts of Nigeria together
in the Legislative Councils and thus ignited North versus South
confrontations which seemed to be a necessary prerequisite for under-
2
standing and for national unity in Nigeria,, This confrontation
further created the fear of Southern domination in the minds of some
sections of Northern leadership. Paradoxically, the fear was genuine
but unfounded. Genuine, because as a result of the educational
backwardness of the North as compared to the South, Southerners
dominated all the public services and the commercial activitives of
3
the Northern Region. They were also very conspicuous in the N0A.
technical services,. The attitudes of those Southern employees towards
their Northern brothers had left much to be desired. This situation
gave the impression that in the future independent Nigeria, the Northern
Region would be the "back-yard" of Nigeria,, This factor along with
the unguarded utterances of some Southern politicians led to the fear
of Southern domination in some quarters in Northern Nigeria.
However, this fear was unfounded because at that time the
political tempo was not for independence. To all intents and purposes
the objectives of the Richards Constitution was not to grant Nigeria
political independence but to give the Western educated elite a degree
of political participation and to prepare the whole country for
1. Interview with Alhaji Waziri Ibrahim, London, 1973.
2. A publication by the Current Issues Society, P.O. Box 502, Kaduna,
Nigeria, The Nigerian Situation. Facts and Background (Zaria, 1966),
pp. 11-15 contains a zestful discussion on this topic.
3. Ibid.. pp. 16-25, contains statistical evidence of this assertion.
For a detailed study of the educational gap between Northern and
Southern Nigeria (Western and Eastern Regions combined), see
Nduka, 0., Western Education and the Cultural Background (ibadan,
1975).
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eventual self-rule,, The objective was simply to create a forum in
which the "educated natives" would air their views on the affairs of
the country, in a purely advisory capacity, to the Governor. So,
in the 1940's, talk of Nigerian independence was more a discussion
topic than part of practical politics.
But almost all Northerners who came in contact with Southerners
warned their Northern kinsmen to watch the over-ambitious Southerners.
Even Sa'adu Zungur in his poem (AJM) had this to say:
If they become careless, Southerners
Will get control of the Nigerian government.
Then, indeed, who will ask questions,
Everyone knows he will suffer. 1
These verses of warning from Sa'adu urged for a change of attitudes in
the whole North. He was particularly flabbergasted by the intransigence
of the Emirs who ran their Emirates like medieval autocrats. So, in
the typically covert fashion of Hausa political poetry, Sa'adu's poem
was a call to the Emirs to take account of the new political trends
and to reform their ways; otherwise the whole of the Northern Region
would regret it.
Furthermore, the Richards Constitution prompted the formation
2
of regional political parties and thereby began to change people's
attitudes towards the authorities. Radicals had a different conception
of Northern problems and their preoccupation was to organize political
1. The Hausa verses run as follows:
In sunka sake jama'ar kudu,
Suka hau mulkin Nigeria.
Dada ba sauran mai tambaya,
Kowa ya san zai sha wuya.
2. Among many other references see Ezera, X., Constitutional
Development in Nigeria (Cambridge, I960), especially pp. 64-104;
Ballard, J.A., "Administrative Origins of Nigerian Federalism,"
in African Affairs. LXX (No. 281, October 1971), pp. 333-348.
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parties as platforms for the expression of their radical views and
vehicles for the transformation of Northern Nigerian society,, With
these views in mind, Alhaji Habid Raji Abdallah formed the Northern
Elements Progressive Association (N.E.P.A.) at Kano (in 1946).^" The
N.E.P.A. was the first attempt to organize a political party in Northern
Nigeria. As J.S. Coleman said, "It comprised a small group of highly
articulate Northern radicals who felt that the real enemy of the North
was not the illusory threat of Southern domination but the existing
2
autocratic political order in Northern Nigeria." Whereas the first
group of Northern Representatives in the Legislative Council were
essentially defensive against Southern Pan-Nigerian nationalism (in
which they saw the attempt of the Southerners to dominate Nigeria) and
took refuge in regional separation, N.E.PoA. demanded a radical reform
in the North and it favoured the full participation of the Northern
region in a united Nigerian movement as the "best way" to achieve such
3
reforms. This is to say that all Nigeria organxzed pressure brought
to bear on the administration would precipitate a change of attitudes
for the better on the part of the Northern Nigerian Establishment (i.e.
colonial supported N.A.s). However, N.E.PoA. suffered from its
identification with Azikiwe and the N.C.N.C. and, especially, from the
4
support it received from Southerners resident in the North.
1. There is some disagreement over the date of N.E.P.A.'s foundation:
Coleman gives 1945 (p. 358), Sklar gives 1946 (p. 93) and Whitaker
gives 1947 (p. 357); Post (p. 73)who gives December 1946, is the
only author to cite an authority, in this case, the N.E.P.A.'s
founder, Alhaji Abdallah.
2. Cited in J.S. Coleman, op. cit., p. 559.
3. Ibid.,; Sklar, R.L., op. cit.. pp. 89-90, contains the list of the
founder members of the N.E.P.A.
4. See Dudley, B.J., Parties and Politics in Northern Nigeria (London,
1968), pp. 175-6. N.E.P.A. did not seem to enjoy substantial, if
any, rank and file support. Some of its officials regrouped in
N.E.P.U., discussed in the next chapter.
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In 1948, Dr. A.R.B. Dikko, M. Yaya Gusau and Aminu Kano began to
plan a pan-Northern Nigeria cultural organization. This idea was
hatched following a suggestion made by Abubakar Imam that something
should be done to unite all Northern Nigerians.As a result of the
subsequent discussions, which included more leaders of the Northern
Nigerian Teachers' Welfare Association (N.N.T.W.A.) , the Jim'iwaan
3
Mutanen Arewa was formed in Kano in 1949. The leaders of the Congress
1. According to Alhaji Aminu Kano (interviewed in London on 12/ll/l979),
after a meeting of the Northern Nigerian Teachers' Welfare Association
held at Zaria in March 1948, Alhaji Abubakar Imam approached them
and suggested efforts should be made to organize not only teachers
but all educated Northerners with the view to unite the whole
region. Then a meeting was arranged between some leaders of the
N.N.T.W.A. and other educated Northerners at Zaria which included
Dr. Dikko, M.A. Imam and a few employees of the Gaskiya Corporation,
Zaria: see footnote below.
2. In 1947, when he was a student at the London University, Institute
of Education, Aminu Kano made the following entry in his diary:
"On 3/5/1947 discussed the formation of Teachers' Union with
Shettima; after having discussed the general problems of Education
in the Northern Region." While still in the U.K. he made the
following entry in his diary on 27/9/1947: "Northern Nigeria
Teachers' Welfare Association suggested. To see Yaya and write
other interested persons. 5/- (five shillings) to be the initial
entrance fee". Alhaji Aminu Kano confirmed that the N.N.T.W.A.
was formed in London and that he was assigned to transplant it into
Northern Nigeria. The founder members were: Shettima Ajiram,
Salahu Ilorin, Yaya Ilorin, Yahya Gusau, Aminu Kano (interviewed
in London on 12/ll/l979)o
3. A group of Western educated Northern Nigerians formed independent
associations in various parts of the Northern Region in the 1940's.
Perhaps that was a follow up to the idea hatched by Mr. E.L. Mort,
the Principal of Kaduna College, that the College graduates should
form "Kaduna College Old Boys Union". The Union was formed and it
met annually for three years, then it collapsed due to the hostility
of Emirs who suspected the organization and thus prevented their
respective N.A. employees from attending its meeting. Consequently,
each group formed their own little association wherever they were
enough in number to warrant one. Thus, in Zaria, employees of the
Gaskiya Corporation, who included M. Abdulkadir Makama and M.
Abdulmalik Mani, formed the "Zaria Union of Friends". That group
was later joined by a medical doctor, Dr. A.R.B. Dikko, who then
became its leader. The "Union of Friends" was later on named the
"Northern Nigerian Congress" by M.A. Makama.
In Kaduna, among others, M. Yaya Gusau, M. Aliyu Mai Borno and M.
M.D.A. Rafi formed Jam'iyyar Mutamen Arewa A Yau, "Northern Peoples
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declared that "the North must and could be saved by Northeners"; that
the organization was not subversive0 The
Jam'iyya does not intend to usurp the authority of our
natural rulers0 On the contrary, it is our ardent desire
to enhance such authority whenever and wherever possible.
We want to help our natural rulers in the proper discharge
of their duties. We want to help them to enlighten the
Talakawa. 1
Nevertheless, the Emirs and chiefs were suspicious of the Jam'iyya.
while the colonial officials adopted a cautious attitude towards it.
Perhaps that was due to the fact that initially the Jam'iyya had among
its officials some radicals like M. Sa'adu Zungur, M. Aminu Kano, as
well as some progressive civil servants like Dr. A.R.B. Dikko and M.
Isa Wali, whose preoccupation was the reform of the autocratic Emirate
political system. Although the Jam'iyya was then a cultural organization,
the radicals had attempted to use it as a platform to advocate political
reforms in the North and they were also pressing that the Jam'iyya
should convert itself into a political party. In 1950, it became
obvious to all shades of opinion that a Northern political party was
necessary to operate the constitutional machinery then emerging from
the process of the constitutional reviews,. But the N.P.C. could not be
immediately declared a political party because the Emirs and some colonial
officials regarded it as a dangerous radical group. One year later
(1951) the NoP.C. was declared a political party with the following
objectives2:
Congress of Today. Among many others, those were the groups which
along with the Northern Teachers' Welfare Association, came together
and formed the N.P.C. NAK, File Nos. 45, ZAR.PROF. and 467 Yola
PROF, contain information on such associations. Also see Alhaji
Isa Kaita, "In the '40's, '50's, '60's and '70's", and Uthman
Mairiga, "Born to Wage War against Three Evils", and Haroun Adamu,
"Northern Solidarity", all in New Nigerian. Tuesday, 16 January
1979, pp. Ill, viii, and vi.
1. Daily Comet. December 29, 1949, cited in Coleman, on. cit., p. 358.
2. Antiye papers, Potiskum. Photocopies of N.P.C. manifesto are in
the possession of the writer. M. Antiye Na Riga was one of the
first full-time officials of the N.P.C. in Jos. He was later trans¬
ferred to Potiskum by the party. He still lives and works with
Maina Waziri at Potiskum. The following objectives of the N.P.C.
are paraphrased and edited by the writer.
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1) One North, one people, irrespective of religion, tribe or rank.
2) Regional autonomy within a united Nigeria0
3) Drive throughout the whole North for Education while retaining
and increasing cultural influence.
4) Eliminate bribery and corruption in every sphere of Northern life.
5) The voice of the people to be heard in all councils of the North,
o) Local government reform within progressive Emirate system.
7) Retain the traditional system of appointing Emirs with a wider
representation on the Electoral Committee.
8) Eventual self-government for Nigeria with Dominion status within
the British Commonwealth.
Both the Sardauna of Sokoto and Alhaji Abubakar Tafawa Balewa joined
the N.P.C. on Monday, 1 October 1951.^" In December 1953, the N.P.C.
held its first annual conference at Jos, and there the radical elements
were forced out of the party: M. Sa'adu Zungur, M. Aminu Kano and M.
Abubakar Zukoki were removed from the Executive Committee. Subsequently,
a decision was taken by the N.E.P.U. members that they ceased to be in
2
the N.P.C. Also the entire Kano delegation, led by Alhaji Inuwa Wada,
3
withdrew from the conference.
In addition to the N.P.C. and the NoEoP.U., there were several
associations with more limited bases, none of which survived the
repressive reactions of the N.A.s and the colonial authorities; their
leaders and supporters were mainly absorbed into the N.E.P.U. or the
N.P.C. For example, at about the time when M. Sa'adu Zungur and M«
1. Ibid. Also, interview with Antiye Nariga, Potiskum, 1974.
2. Interview with Alhaji Maitama Sulei, Kano, 30/3/77.
3. See Dudley, B.J., op. cit.: Sklar, R.L., Nigerian Political
Parties (Princeton, 1963), pp. 95-6.
205
Aminu Kano were active at Bauchi, M. Sani Darma was organizing
Jara'iyyar Ci Gaban Arewa (Northern Progressive Party) at Kano.^" But
the party was immediately suppressed because its Secretary, M. Yusufu
Maitama Sulei, called for a review of the Nigerian Constitution and
in particular for all Emirships to be elective. That was a bold bid
to democratise the N.A» and more especially to make the Emirs accountable.
The party was crushed and Maitama Sulei was sacked by the Kano N.A.
In 1948 he was once again politically active, helping Alhaji Abba
Maikwaru found, first a kingship organization, Taron Masuzumunta. and
later a political version of this body, Jam*iwar Neman Sawaba (the
Freedom Party). But this party died a natural death due to lack of
organization. Again Maitama Sulei tried to organize the Kano Citizens
Association, Jam'iyyar Samarin Kano. with Alhaji Abdulkadir Dan Jaji
(who later became treasurer of the N.E.P.U.) as its President. Once
3
again, that attempt failed due to lack of public support. Finally,
the remnants of all these elements regrouped themselves in the N.E.P.U.
in 1951.
In 1949-50, Alhaji Waziri Ibrahim launched a one man crusade
against the abuses of Borno N.A., but he was immediately transferred
from Maiduguri to Jos by his employer, the United Africa Company
(U.A.C.). Before he left for his new station, he also helped organize
4
N.E.P.U. at Maiduguri. In 1950, Alhaji Maina Waziri formed the North
East Convention Peoples Party (N.E.C.P.P.) with the sole aim of
1. Interview with both Maitama Sulei and Sani Darma, in Kano on
50/3/77.
2. Dudley, B.J., on. cit., pp. 78-9, mentions Taron Masuzumunta (but
spells it incorrectly). My information is from Sani Darma. M. Sani
Darma was one of the founder members of N.E.P.Uo See Chapter V.
3. Interview with Alhaji Maitama Sulei, Kano, 30/3/77.
4. Interview with Alhaji Waziri Ibrahim, London, 1974.
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securing the creation of a North-East state from the former Northern
Region of Nigeria. Maina Waziri thought that the former Northern
Region of Nigeria was too large and unwieldy and as such difficult to
develop. He wanted to see four provinces (Adamawa, Bauchi, Borno and
Plateau) of the North Eastern part of Nigeria formed into one autono¬
mous state. He believed that the creation of the new state would bring
government nearer to the people and that that would accelerate
economic development. The N.E.C.P.P. had a red flag with three black
stars on it. Thus, the colonial officials suspected the party of
communist connections and it was hammered out of existence: the party
leader was expelled from the Fika N.A. service.
Alha.ii Aminu Kano
We noted above how M. Sa'adu Zungur and M. Aminu Kano worked
together at Bauchi. That brought Aminu Kano to the attention of the
colonial officials. But the attitude of the colonial officials towards
Aminu Kano was ambivalent: as an intelligent young man they liked him
but they disliked his political activities and because he wanted their
elimination from the Nigerian scene they opposed him. A colonial
2
Intelligence Report, once described Aminu Kano as an "able demagogue".
So, the first thing the Colonial Administration did was to separate
Aminu Kano from Sa'adu Zungur. He was sent to the Institute of Education
1. Months later Maina Waziri was made a co-opted member of the Ii.A.
Council on the condition that he abandoned independent, radical
activity,, He compromised by resuscitating the N.E.C.P.P. as an
independent party, but in alliance with the N.P.C. It is this
N.E.C.P.Po that is mentioned by Sklar, on. cit.. p. 387; and
Dudley, on. cit. . p. 89; interview with Maina Waziri, Potiskum,
1974.
2. Rhodes House, Oxford, File No. MSS. Afr. S. 1210, p. 11.
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of the London University. His stay in England further surprised the
colonial officials in Nigeria: he made friends with influential persons
in the Colonial Office, in the Fabian Society, left wing Labour M.P.'s,
Trade Unionists, etc. His diaries also reveal that he attended the
meetings of the British Communist Party in London but he was obviously
not impressed by the Communists because on Friday, 29 August 1947, he
made the following entry in his diary:
I feel myself like a newborn man — more determined
and more courageous to face facts and swallow the
bitter pills. There must be sacrifice if we want to
do something for Northern Nigeria.
6:14 p.m. on the same day: "I confess the Qur'an to be my only guidance."^"
His one year's stay in Britain was both a period of study and of medita¬
tion. By the time he returned to Nigeria he was already thinking that
"the North needs a new faith", as he noted in his diary on Monday,
10 May 1948. Nor did he relent his opposition to bad chiefs and to
the N.A. system. On Thursday, 9 September 1948, he enetered in his diary:
"Emir (of Bauchi) requested to stop forced labour. No hope for North
until N.A. disappears." But when he returned to Nigeria from the U.K.,
he was at Bauchi only for a short time then he was transferred from
Bauchi to the Teachers' Training College (T.T.C.) at Maru, in Sokoto
Province. It was at Maru that Aminu began to act fully independent,
of Sa'adu Zungur. He expelled the Sultan's Yan Labari (informers) from
the premises of the Teachers' Training College (T.T.C.) , he supported
the Sardauna of Sokoto (Sir Ahmadu Bello) in his appeal against a
1. Aminu Kano's Diaries from 1947 to 1977 are in the possession of
the writer.
2. See Feinstein, Alan, African Revolutionary: The Life and Times
of Nigeria's Aminu Kano (New York, 1973). P. 119o
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previous conviction by the Sultan's Court"*"; his (Aminu's) refusal to
attend Maru Mosque on Fridays because the Imam was not good enough
tf
was followed by Muslim students in the T.T.C., and all these infuriated
the Sultan. But more was to come between Aminu Kano and the authorities
in Northern Nigeria, and he foresaw the events, as the front page of
notes of his 1950 diary shows:
The closing side of 1949 was stormy in my life,
officialdom has now applied its hammer on me. There
is no doubt that next year at this time may see my
exit from this filthy affair.
A very turbulent year 1949o Nigeria at crossroads ...
Almost all chiefs against me. Enugu shooting]J
But there might have been some officials sympathetic with Aminu's
predicament. He noted his meeting with what he described as "a very
political D.C.", who suggested that the Shehu (i.e. Shehu Usman Ban
Fodio) would have been angry with Northern leaders if he were to come
back. Aminu further noted, "How true." But subsequent notes in Aminu
Kano's diary showed that his discussions with the "political DcCo"
was more wide ranging because of what he noted in his diary on the same
day, which runs as follows: "Partition of Africa into states]] Looking
for a day when all Africa should be a Socialist Republic of Soviets."
Then two days later (Saturday 28 January 1950) he made these revealing
1. Sardauna is a traditional military title, the equivalent of Commander
in Chief, conferred on Princes in Sokoto (see Nigerian Administration
Research Pro.iect. First Interim Report [institute of Administration,
A.B.U., Zaria, 1972], p. 7). The then holder of the post was
Alhaji Sir Ahmadu Bello, the N.P.C. leader, 1953-1966; and Premier
of Northern Region of Nigeria, 1954-1966, He competed for the
throne of Sokoto with the present Sultan (Alhaji Sir Abubakar).
When the Sardauna was sent to jail by the Sultan's Court for
alleged embezzlement of public funds, Aminu Kano saw that as an
act of victimization. He helped raise funds for the Sardauna's
appeal. His action set him against the Sultan. See Feinstein,
op. cit.. p. 124; for the Sardauna's own views on his trial and
subsequent imprisonment see Bello , Sir Ahmadu, the Sardauna of
Sokoto, My Life (Cambridge, 1962), pp. 49-59.
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notes: "Written to General Secretary I0LoP0 (independent Labour Party)
asking for help to organize a Socialist Party of Northern Nigeria,,"
As the administrations became increasingly concerned with Aminu Kano's
defiant attitude, the Resident of Sokoto Province decided to see him
in person and "tell him off"0 The Resident visited Maru T.T„C. on
Tuesday, 4 April 1950 and Aminu noted in his diary on the same day the
following: "Resident saw me at 5:15 p.m. and uttered his wrath, 'You
are proud to everyone, I am disappointed in you.' We parted in cold
mood." That parting in a cold mood also showed that things were coming
to a head because on Friday, 28 April 1950, Aminu Kano received a
letter from the Deputy Director of Education (D.D.E.) of the Northern
Region, Kaduna, warning him that any further contravention of the
General Orders (regulations on the conditions of service of all civil
servants, which also prohibited the government employees from taking
part in politics) would result in the termination of Aminu's secondment
of service from the Bauchi N0A0 to the government and that the N.A„
would not re-employ hime But Aminu Kano's reaction was that the
government should do as it liked while he remained determined to resign
from the service by the following year. But, in order to test the
D.DoEo's letter, Aminu Kano wrote to Bauchi NoA0 protesting that he was
the NoAo's employee and not the government's employee,. But the N0A.
PrC>y
replied and disowned him. The Provinioal Education Officer (P.E.O.)
for Bauchi Province also wrote quoting the N.A„'s letter and said that
he knew nothing about Aminu Kano<,
Aminu Kano then discovered that what caused all that fuss was
that the Sultan of Sokoto had heard that he (Aminu) would leave govern¬
ment service„ So the Sultan had written to the Emir of Bauchi, advising
him that when Aminu left government service, the Bauchi N.A„ should
210
not re-employ him. That made Aminu Kano even more determined to resign
from the services and become more involved in politics as an independent
person. On 28th April 1950 he made the following entry in his diary:
I am not sure whether 4th January 1951 will ever find
me in this department. But if even it does the next
year term will not. This is my irrevocable determination
and may God give me the strength to bear this will.
Perhaps Aminu Kano's colleagues in the Department of Education were
sorry to see him go, for many suddenly became nice to him whereas the
most senior ones continued to warn him that there would be no job for
him elsewhere. When the D.D.E. visited Maru T.T.C. on Tuesday, 18
July 1950, he made it very clear to Aminu Kano that if he lost his job
at Maru no one would employ him. But the fact was that, at the same
time, offers for employment were made to Aminu Kano in many institutions,
which included one for teaching Hausa language at Oxford and another
to be the Librarian at University College, Ibadan.^" But Aminu Kano
had already made up his mind to be in the turmoil of public life. In
fact, he was already dreaming about the struggle to follow. On Friday,
15 September 1950, he noted in his diary: "Dreamt of taking poison to
die due to too difficult problems of North. Is this a sign that what
I intend to do should be carried out? Ohi God help me." M. Aminu Kano
had been thinking of devoting his life to nationalist politics, in
order to free Nigeria from the colonial yoke, for a long time back.
But in 1948, he actually considered resigning from the government service
because he noted that "government people (civil servants) were stupidi"
Aminu Kano's fondness for standing against authority derived from his
hatred of any government which "sat" on the people. Then Aminu found
1. See Feinstein, op. cit.. p. 119, and Aminu Kano's diary of 1950.
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himself in Sokoto, a place which was (is) wholly stifled with clouds
of religious and traditional conservatism. Thus, Aminu's radical
ideas were incompatible with that of traditional Sokoto. On Tuesday,
3 October 1950, he prepared his letter of resignation but did not hand
it in immediately. On Monday, 16 October 1950 he submitted his
resignation letter from government service, to the Education Officer
in charge, Maru T.T.C. and, on Saturday 4 November 1950, he left Maru
for KanOo This event prompted the Gaskiya Tafi Kwabo. in a leader
article, to warn the whole region to watch "this dangerous man carefully".
On 11 November 1950 the Daily Comet, a Kano based daily newspaper,
published M. Aminu Kano's article entitled "Why I resigned".
I resigned because I refused to believe that this
country is by necessity a prisoner of Anglo/Pulani
aristocracy. I resigned because I fanatically share
the views that the native authorities are woefully
hopeless in solving our urgent educational, social,
economic, political or even religious problems. My
stay in England has hardened my soul in elevating truth,
freedom and above all human rights for which the world
fought off fascism.
I had twice been threatened with the merciless fangs
(of General Order No. 40B) while all around are piled
corruption, misrule, political bluff, slavery under
garb, naked nepotism, tyranny, poverty, unnecessary,
retention of hereditary parasites, naked and shameless
economic exploitation.
I cannot tolerate these things because of their awful
smell. I am prepared to be called any name. Call me
a dreamer or call me a revolutionary, call me a crusader
or anything that Imperialist government wills. I have
seen a light on the far horizon and I intend to march
into its full circle either alone or with anyone who
cares to go with me. To these same oppressors of our
people I say this: Look out.'
Africa is a sleeping giant no more.' She is just about
to shake off the stupor. 2
1. Feinstein, on. cit.. p. 129.
2. Also cited in Ibid.. pp. 129-30.
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M. Aminu Kano's resignation from the government service might have
been dangerous to the establishment but to the Talakawa it provided a
strong voice which was to articulate their grievances. Having freed
himself from the Civil Service Regulations, Aminu Kano concentrated
his energies on political organisations which included the following:
1) "Northern Central Congress" (N.C.C,,), whose aim was to coordinate
all progressive societies formed by Vfestern educated men in urban
towns and its main characteristic was opposition to the N.A. system,,'*'
2) "Northern Muslim Congress" (N.M.C.), which affiliated to "Muslim
Congress of Nigeria" (M0C0N0), a Yoruba organization with
offices at Ijebu-Ode and at Lagos0 It advocated the unity of
Nigerian Muslims; welcomed and encouraged contact with all
Muslims the world over; endeavoured to secure Muslim missionary
2
from the ancient university of Al-Azhar in Cairo.
But Aminu Kano's boldest attempt in political organization was on
the "Northern Askianist Movement" (N.A.M.), alias "United Nationalist
■Z
Movement" (U.N.M.). The aims and objectives of the movement were
initially as follows:
1. Rhodes House, Oxford, File No. MSS., Afr. S„ 1210, p. 12.
2. Ibid.; also see Feinstein, op. cit.« p. 142.
3. NAK, File no. 45, ZAR, Prof, Political bodies in Nigeria, pp,
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1) To try and free every black man wherever he may be in the world,
whether in America South Africa, from the mouth of the English
hyenas and the rest of the oppressors, even if blood will be shed.
2) To try and draw the attention of every black man to his rights to
live in the world, so that extortioners may not harm him.
3) To check oppression, and even dig out from the graves the bones of
the notorious extortioners who have died and burn those bones, or
take legal action against their descendants in a court of law0
4) To try and stop the Colonial Office from sending unsuitable
Europeans, who spoil the country, to Africa0
5) To build a large school where it will teach the black men (Nigerians?)
about politics, trade and social welfare, before the end of 1951.
6) Not before long it will send two delegates to Russia, France,
America and the Headquarters of the Kisrawa (i.e. England), so
that it may make clear what it intends doing.
7) To pray to God that He may bring low that Evildoer, Dr. Malan,
and those who follow his views."'"
2
The "Askianist Movement" was effective in both Kano and Jos , but its
attempts to mobilize support were only partially successful in other
urban centres. It produced a duplicated newsheet, Aminiyya (after Aminu
Kano) at irregular intervals for its members only. When in August 1951,
the N.E.P.U. was launched as a political party, the "Northern Askianist
Movement" automatically became one the of N.E.P.U.'s ancilliary
organisations.
1. See Daily Comet, 22/3/1951, p» 2.
2. The branch officers at Jos were:
President Bagobiri, Garba
Secretary Mahnrud, Baffa
Asst. Secretary Abbas, Sharif
214
CHAPTER V
NORTHERN ELEMENTS PROGRESSIVE UNION1
..o I for one have no faith in the remedial qualities
of a government carried on by neglected democracy who,
for three centuries, have received no education. What
prospect does it offer us of those high principles of
conduct with which we have fed our imagination and
strengthened our will? I perceive none of the elements
of government that should secure the happiness of a
people and the greatness of a realm.
But in my opinion if democracy be combated only by
conservatism, democracy must triumph, and at no
distant date.
From Disraeli's Coningsby.
cited by Thomas Kodgkin 2
Preface
N.E.P.U. was the main opposition party in Northern Nigeria from
1951 to 1966 when all political parties were banned by the new Military
Government in Nigeria. Unlike the Conservative and the "establishment"
nature of the Government Party, the Northern Peoples Congress (N.P.C.),
N.E.P.U. was considered to be radical and the party of the Talakawa.
"commoners" or "the respectable poor". The party initials later became
institutionalised in the Hausa language as NEFU and is virtually
synonymous with Tawaye. rebellion or opposition to authority. This is
because, as we have shown in Chapters II and III, Hausa society today
1. Renamed "Nigerian Elements Progressive Union" in 1964 in order to
give the party a national outlook.
2. This quote from Disraeli appropriately fits the attitude of the
British colonial administration in Northern Nigeria. Cited by
Hodgkin, T.L., "Disraeli on Northern Nigeria", in West Africa
(No. 79229, Saturday, 9 May 1953), pp« 413-414o
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(as with Hausa states in the past) contains within it a process of
constant questioning of authority, but not one of revolution,, It is
not the structures of the society (or the states) that are in question,
but only the nature of holders of power and authority. Rebellion as
the Hausa understand it, can lead to secession, to changes in the
holders of offices, or it can be institutionalized as a factor in the
strengthening of the political organization within the framework of
the traditional structures.^
N.E.P.U.'s other names in Hausa are Jam'iyyan Nemansawaba or
Jam'iyyan Ci Gaban Arewa. The latter literally means "Northern
Progressive Party" and the former is akin to the "Emancipation League".
2
The party's slogan is simply Sawaba , "Freedom". The name "Northern
Elements Progressive Union" was suggested by Alhaji Maitama Sulei (a
founder member of the party) for three reasons: it signified the
unity of Northern Nigerian Progressives; it honoured N.E.P.A. (its
lo Hausa Muslims see their social institutions as "Islamic" or, at
least, as apparently supported by the religious faith, hence
political conflicts are about holders not about systems of
authority. In Hausa society political combat is either a battle
for power or a battle between powers. For example, see the
issues involved in the nineteenth century civil war in Kano in
Eogben, J.S., and Kirk-Greene, A.M.H., The Emirates of Northern
Nigeria (Oxford, 1966), pp. 202-4; for the dynastic conflict in
Zazzau see Smith, M.G., Government in Zazzau (Oxford, I960), pp.
100-109; Skinner, N. (trans, and ed. ). AlhaJi Huhmudu Kola,: Kano
Malam (A.3.U., Zaria, 1977), pp. 11-13, gave his childhood
reminiscences of the Kano Civil War; and for the general African
idea of rebellion, see Balandier, G., Political Anthropology
(trans, by A.M. Sheridan Smith, Penguin, 1970J, p. 148.
2. According to Fuglestad, F., the word Sawaba means quietness or
tranquillity, see Journal of African History. JCIV (4, 1973),
pp. 313-330. It also means peace or, at times, cheapness. It is
originally an Arabic word which emphasized religious righteous¬
ness, i.e. something that is religiously correct. Since
submission to God brings peace to Muslims, anything that is
religiously correct makes a Muslim free.
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predecessor as a radical party in Northern Nigeria); and its initials
could be pronounced as a single word0^
This chapter begins with a very condensed history of N.E.P.Uo by
sketching its origin and enumerating its trials and tribulations
during its formative years. Our subsequent examination of the
structure, organization and sociology of N.E.P.U. attempts to show
how it was run and by whom as well as to reveal the social background
of its leaders and members. Finally, the analysis of N.E.P.Uo ideas
and strategy suggests that it was more concerned to eradicate twentieth
century "feudalism" in Northern Nigeria and to create, in its place,
a new community based on democratic ideals, than with power, patronage
and winning elections. We conclude by examining the assertion that
N.E.P.U. was a continuation of the nineteenth century Muslim reform
2
movement in Northern Nigeria,,
1. Interview with Alhaji Maitama Sulei, Kano, 30/3/77. Alhaji Maitama
Sulei was a founder member of N0E.P0U0 After he defected to N0P0C0
he was elected one of Kano's members in the House of Representatives,
Lagos, from 1956-1966, and was a Federal Minister of Mines and
Power in 1959-1966. He was Civil Commissioner in the Kano State
Government of Nigeria in 1967-1975, and was then appointed the
Federal Chief Complaint Commissioner 1975-1978. He is now a
leading member of the Nigerian National Party (N.P.N.)„ Also see
Sklar, RoLo, Nigerian Political Parties (Princeton, 1963), pp.
94-5; Whitaker, C.S., The Politics of Tradition. Continuity and
Change in Northern Nigeria 1946-1966 (Princeton. 1970). POo
358-9.
2. Feinstein, A., African Revolutionary: The Life and Times of
Nigeria's Aminu~Kano (New York. 1973). p. 35. argues that Aminu
Kano's Genewa clan persistently upheld the principles of the
Jihad discussed in Chapter II; and in pp. 90, 271, he points out
that Aminu's call for social reforms are in line with the
tradition of the Holy Prophet and the teachings of Usman Dan
Fodio0
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The Emergence of a Radical Party
On 8 August 1950, N.EoP.U. was declared a political party in
Kano by a group of Northern Nigerian radical youth."'" The first
President of the N0E.P.U0 was Alhaji Abba Mai Kwaru, the leader of
Taron Masu Zurumta. a "Friendly Society" based in Fagge quarters,
2
Kano. The founder members of the N.E.P.U. included both traders and
3
Maaikata. Alhaji Aminu Kano's name did not appear in the list of the
founder members of the N.E.P.U. because, at the time the N.E.P.U. was
1. Malam Uba Taura's membership card (which is in the possession of
the writer) has on it: 8/8/1950 as the actual date on which
N.E.P.U. was declared a political party. M. Uba comes from
Taura village in Kano Emirate and he was the full-time N.E.P.U.
organizing secretary in Potiskum, Borno Province, in 1958-1961.
Also see Sklar, op. cit.. p. 94; and Whitaker, op. cit.. p. 358.
2. See Sklar, op. cit.: Whitaker, op. cit., p. 359, and Dudley, J.B.,
Parties and Politics in Northern Nigeria (London, 1968), p. 80,
all contain brief discussions of the composition, aims and
objectives of this "friendly society".
3. According to Maitama Sulei, the following are among the founder
members of the N.E.P.U.:
1. Abba Maikwaru (Hausa), trader0
2. Babba Dan Agundi (Fulani), trader Sarakuna.
3. Abdulkadir Dan Jaji (Hausa), trader.
4. Baballiya Manaja (?), ?.
5. Bello Ijumu (Yoruba), ?.
60 Maitama Sulei (Hausa), teacher.
7. Mudi Sipikin (Hausa), trader.
8. Sabo Bakin Zuwo (Hausa), trader.
9. Sani Darma (Hausa), clerk.
Sklar's list in op. cit.. p. 94, contains eight names with the
Maaikata predominating. He lists Abba Kashiya (Hausa), clerk,
Magaji Danbatta (Hausa), journalist and Ahmadu Bida (possibly
N.U.P.E.), ?, who are not in the above list; but he also left out
my Nos. 3, 4, 7 and 8. The difference may be due to lapses of
memory on the part of our respective informants. On Alhaji Aminu
Kano's secret membership of the N.E.P.U., even when he was still
a government employee, see Anon, "The Leader Left Out", in West
Africa (No. 2070, December 15, 1956), pp. 1013-1014.
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launched, he was still a civil servant and General Order 40(b) forbade
government servants to take part in active politics."*" Nevertheless,
it was an open secret that he was not only a member, but also the
brain behind the organization. His resignation from the government
2
service soon after the N.E.PoU. was formed, confirmed thato One of
the main impetuses for the formation of N0E0PoU0 in Kano was the
Bakin Kasuwa Da Fada conflict, i.e. the mutual animosity between "the
market and the palace". This hatred also expressed itself in ethnic
terms, i.e. the mutual contempt between Hayin Fulani and Hayin Habe.
literally, "The Fulani mound versus the Habe mound". This antagonism
stems from the growing awareness of the exploitation of traders who
lived around the market by administrators who lived in and around
the palace» The ethnic connotation is descriptive of the location
of the Fulani rulers as distinct and separate from the location of
Habe subjects,, This unfolding tribal consciousness was later analysed
1. Interview with Alhaji Aminu Kano, London, 12/ll/l979o
2. As noted above (footnote 1, previous page), N.E.P.U. was officially
declared a political party in August 1950 and Aminu Kano resigned
from the civil service in October 1950o See Feinstein, on. cit.,
pp. 123-130 for the full account of his resignation. Alhaji
Aminu Kano said very little about the formation of N.E.P.U. in
his diaries. Perhaps because he was very security conscious.
However, when he was still a student in London, he mentioned
having "interesting talks with Dipcharima [Zannah 3ukar Dipcharima,
who was then the Private Secretary to Dr. Azikwe] on North/South
relations" on 7 July 1947. He also met Zik (Dr. Nnamdi Azikwe)
and an N.C.N.Co delegation at Waterloo Station, London, on
10 July 1947° He recorded in his diary that one M. Isa brought
him papers about N.E.P.A. Then he said, "I strongly support
this organization no matter what they say." This entry was made
in his diary on September 6, 1947o But, according to Maitama
Sulei, N.E.P.A. was disbanded in 1947. He gave neither reasons
nor an exact date. So our uncertainty regarding the date of
formation and disbanding of N.E.P.A. remains to be cleared.
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and. presented as "class" conflict by the N.E.P.U., thus defusing a
potentially explosive tribal tension in Kano, or even in the Northern
Region.^"
Many of the founder members of the N.E„PoU0 were, however,
simultaneously members of the Jam'iyyan Mutanen Arewa (JMA) and at
first, it seemed N.E.P.U. wanted to operate as a political vanguard
within the broader but cultural and more conservative JoM0Ao N.E.P.U.
leaders like Alhaji Aminu Kano, M0 Abubakar Zukoki and Maitama Sulei
2
remained members of the Executive Committee of the J.M.Ao But that
1. In the 1950's and 1960's it was fashionable in Nigeria to interpret
socio-economic problems in tribal terms by attributing bad public
policies or even natural tragedies to the dominance of a particu¬
lar ethnic group over others, especially if the victims happened
to be largely subject people. The case under reference was a good
example because it reflected the grievances of Hausa subjects
against their Fulani rulers. By its "class" analysis N.E.P.U.
began to educate the people on the difference between the Sarakuna
and members of the Fulani tribe. For a brief discussion on tribal
politics in Nigeria, especially Northern Nigeria, see Jalingo,
A.U., "Nigerian Politics: The causes and the effects of the Civil
War" (seminar paper for the Dept. of Sociology, Leeds University,
May 1972). Also see Kirk-Greene, A.H.M., "The Peoples of Nigeria:
The Cultural Background to the Crisis", African Affairs. LXVI
(No. 262, January 1967), pp<> 3-11.
2. J.S. Coleman, Nigeria: Background to Nationalism (Berkeley, I960),
p. 359, holds that N.E.P.U. was formed in Kano by a group of
"dissidents" who broke away from the Jam'iyyan Mutanen Arewa (j.M.A.).
This is not altogether correct as amongst those originally involved
in the J.M.A., only Aminu Kano and Maitama Sulei featured in the
N.E.P.U. More than anything else N.E.P.U. developed from 'Taron
Masu Zumunta. However, there was a desire for unity in both groups,
but the conservative stance of the J.M.A. prevented this. But
according to Maitama Sulei (interview in Kano on 30/3/1977), the
meeting of the Steering Committee of the J0M0A. held in Greene's
Hotel, Kaduna, 1948, he remembered that the following delegates
were in attendance:
1. Maitama Sulei — Secretary, N0NoT0W.A«
2. Shehu Shagari — representing N.N0T.W.Ao Sokoto branch as
well as the Sokoto Discussion Circle (Sokoto Youth Council
and Sokoto Debating Society merged in this new name, see
Chapter IV,p.175 ).
3o Yahya Gusau — N.N.T.W.A. member also representing
Mutanen Arewa A Yau. which was based in Kaduna.
4. Aminu Kano — from Bauchi.
5. Abubakar Imam — from Zaria.
6. Dr. A.R.B. Dikko — from Zaria.
The/
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dual membership of J.M.A. and N.E.P.U. ended when at the Jos convention
in December 1950, the radicals ceased to be members of J.M.A. This
The Steering Committee appointed the following pro tern officers:
1. Umaru Agaie — Secreatry.
2. Abubakar Imam — Treasurer0
3. Abdulkadir Hakama — Publicity Secretary.
Maitama Sulei explained that the Kaduna meeting was very open and
that letters of invitation were sent to persons both of Northern
and of Southern origin0 Sklar, op. cit.. pp. 87-96, contains a
longer list of the officials involved in the saga which led to the
formation of the J.M.A. and subsequently the Northern Peoples
Congress (N.P.C.).
In 1949, the inaugural meeting of the J.M.A. was held in the
El-Duniya cinema house (now a tomb in memory of those who were
killed in it following a fire tragedy), Kanoc The meeting elected
the following officers:
1. Drc A.R.B. Dikko — President General.
2. Alhaji Sanda — Deputy President General.
3o Maitama Sulei — First Vice President General.
4. Rafi Tiyaye — Second Vice President General.
5. Umaru Agaie — First Secretary General.
6„ Isa Wali — Second Secretary General.
7. Abubakar Imam — Treasurer.
8. Yahya Gusau — Auditor.
9o Aminu Kano — Joint Auditor.
10o M. Julde — Joint Auditor.
11. Abdulkadir Makama — Publicity Secretary.
M. Sa'adu Zungur attended this inaugural meeting from Lagos. Both
the Sultan of Sokoto and the Emir of Kano sent their goodwill
messages to the meeting. But before the meeting finally closed,
it was announced that the Sultan of Sokoto withdrew his blessing
from the meeting.'
Maitama Sulei think s that the significance of the Kano meeting
of J.M.A. was that for the first time some Kano N.A. employees
openly criticised Kano N.A. (and other N.A.s as well) and, a
decision was taken to appeal to the Regional Government in Kaduna
against certain actions of the Emir of Kano. However, Kano
delegates to the conference were already split by the Fulani versus
Habe controversy (see footnote 1, previous page). It was also in
that meeting that the J.M.A. began to weed out some radical youth.
Hence, Maitama Sulei and Bello Ijumu began to meet secretly with
the view to forming a new political party. Thus, meetings in the
Kano branch of the J.M.A. became irregular until the convention
of the Jam'iyya in December 1950 at Jos.
1. The general impression is that the radicals were expelled from the
J.M.A. at Jos in 1950: see Sklar, op. cit.. pp. 95-96; Whitaker,
op. cit.. p. 59; ana Dudley, op. cit.. p. 80. But Maitama Sulei
maintained that it was their own decision to leave the J.M.A. He
explained that the preparations for the Jos convention led to a
closing of ranks in the Kano branch of the J.M.A. and that Aminu
Kano suggested to them in Kano certain resolutions to be moved by
their branch at Jos. When all the resolutions tabled by the Kano
branch/
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set in train events which led to both intense and bitter political
rivalry as well as to the partly tribal and partly religious politics
of the separatist movements in Northern Nigeria,,"'" On the one hand,
three years after the withdrawal of the radicals from J.M.A. (and two
years after it was declared a political party) its leadership became
2
almost entirely drawn from members of the Sarakuna , and thus the
party became a convenient instrument in the hands of the establishment;
furthermore, most of the J.MoA. (N.P.O.) provincial leaders were employed
branch were rejected, the delegation withdrew to one Alhaji
Akawu Namata's house, along Sarki Street, Jos. There a decision
was taken that they should cease to be members of J.M0A0 Bello
Ijumu then suggested that they should join the N.C.N.C., but Aminu
Kano and Haitama Sulei opposed the suggestion Finally, a decision
was taken to align with the N.C.N.C. in the absence of Aminu Kano
but when Aminu Kano returned to the meeting he accepted the decision
but laid conditions of alliance with N.C.N.C. as follows:
1. That the N.C.N.C. should give the control of its Comet Press,
which came to Kano in 1948/49, to N.E.P.U.
2. That the N.C.N.C. should finance all N.E.P.U.'s election
expenses.
3o That the N.C.N.C. should bear the running costs of the
N.E.P.U.'s Secretariat and provide transport for the
party's National Officers.
When interviewed in London on 12/ll/79, Alhaji Aminu Kano
explained that he was not in favour of alliance with N.C.N.C. but
a decision to that effect was taken by the majority. However, he
then felt certain that the above conditions would be unacceptable
to the N.C.N.C.; hence he was startled when the conditions were
accepted. So he abided with the majority decision.
1. The "exclusive conservatism" of some leaders of J.M.A. characterised
by their servile deference to Emirs and their disregard to Talakawa:
worse more, they continued to regard the peoples of the Middle Belt
as the traditional fodder of the Muslim North. These are some of
the factors which led to the formation of the United Middle Belt
Congress (U.M.B.C.). See "Demand for a Middle Region", in Political
Bodies in Nigeria, NAK File No. 45, ZAR PROF, pp. 118-122.
2. Just to mention a few of J.M.A. (N.P.C.) leaders: Alhaji Sir
Ahmadu Bello, the Sardauna of Sokoto (President); Alhaji Muhammadu
Ribadu, formerly Ardo Balala, a district chief in Adamawa Emirate
and N.A. Treasurer (Treasurer); Alhaji Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa,
formerly Bauchi N.A. Education Officer (Vice President). The
first two were members of the Fulani ruling dynasties at Sokoto and
Yola respectively, and the last named was the son of a leading
client of the Ajiya of Bauchi. See account of Northern Nigerian
political leaders, 1946-1966, in Whitaker, on. cit., pp. 471-497;
and the occupational background of the members of N.P.C. National
Executive Committee, 1958, in Sklar, on. cit., pp. 513-517.
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by, and therefore dependent upon, the very administration which was
the main political issue in Northern Nigeria at that time; on the other
hand, the unprogressive stance of the J.M.Ao (N.P.C.) generated the
anti-Muslim reaction of the Christian converts which led to the formation
of the Middle Belt Zone League (M.B.Z.L.) which later became the
United Middle Belt Congress (U.M.B.C.) with the objective of demanding
the creation of a Middle Belt State."'"
The religious animosity and tribal jingoism which -underlined the
separatist demand of U.M.B.C. was rejected outright by N.E.P.U., hence
the two parties could not cooperate initially. N.E.P.U. conceived
religious bigotry and tribalism as part of the colonial tactic of
"divide and rule". According to N.E0PoU0, the domination of the
colonized "barbarian" by their "civilizing colonizers" was rationalized
1. According to official reports, the United Middle Belt Congress
(U.M.B.C.) came into existence as a result of the merger of three
associations:
1. Birom Progressive Union (B.P.U.) which was mainly opposed to
tin-mining activities which had taken good farming land from
the Birom tribesmen on the Jos Plateau. It was also against
Muslim domination of the Jos township area. See Rhodes House,
Oxford, File No. MSS. Afr. S. 1210, p. 12,
2. The Tiv Progressive Union (T.P.U.), started in November 1944,
with non-political objectives but later became a sattelite of the
N.C.N.C.
3. The United Tiv Movement (U.T.M.), first started in Zaria in
September 1952, as a non-political body devoted to undermining
the position of the T.P.U.
All the above associations came together and formed the Middle Zone
League (or the Middle Belt Zone League) mainly representing
non-Muslims. Their main aim was to demand the creation of a
Middle Belt Region out of the then Muslim dominated Northern Region
of Nigeria. In the 1950's it came to be known as the United Middle
Belt Congress (U.M.B.C.) under the leadership of Mr. J.S. Tarka.
For more details on 2 and 3 above, see "Political Party Summaries"
in NAK, File, on. cit.. pp. 70-78, and 117-122. And for a general
account of U.M.B.C., see Dent, M., "A minority party — the United
Middle Belt Congress", in Mackintosh, J.P., Nigerian Government
and Politics (London, i960), pp. 461-507.
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by dehumanizing the "natives", by describing and regarding them as
"bigots", for whom there is no justice.^" N.E.P.U. held that colonial
exploitation and political repression are the root causes of all
Nigerian problems. In view of this perception of colonialism and
2
because of its radical leadership , it was clear from the outset that
N.E,P.U. was destined to clash with the J.M.A, (N,P.C,) and to have a
showdown with the Administrations,
No sooner was N.E.P,U, launched than it made its stand on current
issues in Nigeria known. It disliked the abnormally autocratic powers
and the unpopular rule of the "chiefs"; it was opposed to the Richards
Constitution, on the grounds that it would "pakistanize" Nigeria and
break the country up into tribal "chiefdoms", N.EoPoU, saw the new
constitution as a deliberate legal device by the British to keep
Nigeria divided and thus hold the country in bondage: it detested the
electoral college system, introduced in Northern Nigeria by that
constitution, and in its place wanted a system of direct election based
on universal adult suffrage. It stood for separate executive and
legislature in Nigeria as a whole and it wanted to separate the judiciary
1, Interview with Alhaji Abubakar Zukogi, Bida, 1977o Alhaji Abubakar
Zukogi was the General Secretary of N.E.P.U. He was a Civil
Commissioner in the North Western State Government of Nigeria in
1967-1972, Also see part of M. Gambo Hawaja's poem A Yau Ba Maki
Nepu Sai Wawa, "Today, no one rejects NEPU but a fool", reproduced
below. For a more illuminating analysis of colonialism see
Stauder, J., "The 'Relevance' of Anthropology to Colonialism and
Imperialism", in Race and Class. XVI (No. 1, July 1974), pp. 29-51;
May, R., and Cohen, R., "The Interaction between Race and Colonialism:
A case study of the Liverpool Race Riots of 1919", in Race and
Class, XVT (No. 2, October 1974), pp. 111-126; and Hodgkin, T.L,,
"The Vietnamese Revolution and Some Lessons", in Race and Class.
XVI (No. 3, January 1975), pp. 233-249*
2. For an analysis of the difference in styles of leadership between
N,E.P.U. and N.P.C., see Whitaker, C,S,, "Three Perspectives on
Hierarchy", Journal of Commonwealth Political Studies, 3-4 (1965),
pp. 1-19*
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from the executive in Northern Nigeria. N.E.P.Uo was very critical of
the colonial government for not providing education on a wide and
popular basis in Northern Nigeria as was the case in Southern Nigeria. ^
The anti-establishment stand of N.E.P.U. was made even more clear by-
its dedication to the emancipation of the Talakawa through the reforms
of the autocratic N.A. system. N.E.P.U. believed that the root cause
of the social and economic degradation of the Talakawa was "the vicious
system of administration by the family compact rulers which was
2
established by the British Imperialist Government." Thus, N.E.P.U.'s
primary objective was to fight the twin evils of colonialism and native
autocracy. This is one of the points with which the party fought its
first electoral battle in Northern Nigeria.
The First Parliamentary Election
Under the Richards Constitution which came into effect towards
the end of 1946, Northern Nigeria was represented in the Nigerian
Legislative Council for the first time. Northern Nigerian representatives
in the legislative council were the personal nominees of the Emirs
3
chosen by the Native Authority Councils of each province. Most
provinces had one member each except for Sokoto Province, which had two
4
and Kano with three.' Obviously, the method employed in choosing those
1. Interview with Alhaji Aminu Kano in London on 12/ll/79. For N.E.P.U.'s
criticism of the colonial education policy in Northern Nigeria, refer
to official N.E.P.U. documents in Rhodes House, Oxford, Pile No.
MSS. Afr. S. 1210, p. 11.
2. N.E.P.U., "Declaration of Principles", a copy of which is in the
possession of the writer.
3. The details of how members of the legislative council were chosen
is contained in "The Constitution of Nigeria" published in the
Nigeria Gazette of 1946 as Public Notices Nos. 139-147.
4. Bello, Alhaji Sir Ahmadu, My Life (Cambridge. 1962), pp. 60-72,
gave an account of his recollections on some of the members and
on how they were "chosen".
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representatives and the representatives chosen were inadequate in
proportion to the population of their respective provinces,, So a
new system of election (or selection) based on the electoral principle
was introduced in the whole of Nigeria as follows:
A. Eastern Region: universal adult suffrage.
B. Western Region: suffrage limited to tax payers,
C. Northern Region: electoral college system.
Thus, there was a curious situation in which Nigerian representatives
went to the legislative council via different routes. That was both
odd and undemocratic though, in the Northern Region, it was an advance
on the previous system of nomination by the N.A. councils. The
general form of the electoral college system was as follows, each
2
level forming the college for the one above :
1. Primary elections Hamlet level
2. Sub-Intermediate elections "Village" level
3. Intermediate elections District level
4» Pinal Intermediate elections Emirate level
5o Pinal elections Provincial level
Even with these arrangements made for holding the elections in
Northern Nigeria, it was still feared by the authorities that the
system might produce a crop of quite "inexperienced, possibly illiterate
1, The qualification for voting was restricted to males over 25 years.
Up to five layers of electoral colleges were then used to select
the final representatives. See Review of the Constitution,
Recommendations of the Northern Regional Conference. 5th to 12th
September, 1949 (printed by Government Printer, Kaduna, 1949),
pp. 7-8. Por a fuller study of the subsequent pertinent Orders in
Council, Letters Patent and Royal Instructions, etc., for all
Nigeria, see Nigeria Gazette of 1949, Public Notices Nos, 158-160
and Public Notice No. 13, see "The Nigerian Constitution — III,
The System of Voting", in Venture (October 195l), p. 6,
2. See "Report on Elections, Katsina Province", in NAK, Pile No.,
KANO PROP: - PRE/42, p. 1. For a detailed discussion on electoral
trends in the whole of Nigeria, see Mackintosh, J.P., on. cit..
pp. 508-544o
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and, even worse, possibly unsuitable representatives from whom it
might well prove to be almost impossible to build up a ministerial
system of government."'*' It was thought essential by officials that
the North should not fail her first step towards democracy for lack
of the right people at the topc The solution was that at every stage
of the electoral college one-tenth of the number of members were to
be chosen by the N.A.s from the senior members of their staff or
councillors. That came to be known as the "10 A N.A. Injection", and
it meant that the political parties'activities were limited to the
lowest level of all the five stages. It was obviously very difficult,
if not impossible, for a party man through the sheer support of his
party, to fight his way at each of the colleges into the House of
Assembly. The difficulty lay in the fact that it was not possible to
predict who would be elected (and with what number of supporters) from
one lower college to a higher. The rationale behind that awkward
arrangement might be that, since Hausa society (if not the whole of
Northern Nigerian society) was unfamiliar with elections, it was a
temporary expedient, a sort of practice run, to assist those who had
no experience in democratic political organization and who had never
taken part in,an election on the principle of the ballot box or indeed
in any kind. In the 1950's the Western concept of election by secret
ballot and of popularly elected representatives was a novelty in
2
Northern Nigeria.
N.E.P.U.'s opponent (j.M.A./N.P.C.) did not grumble on the electoral
colleges, perhaps because at that time J.M.A./N.P.C. was more an alliance
1. See Bello, Alhaji Sir Ahmadu, op. cit.. p. 70.
2. Ibid.. pp. 70-71; also see Hiskett, M., "The Development of Sa'adu
Zungur's Political Thought", African Language Studies. XVI (1975),
pp. 8-9.
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of men who happened to have arrived in the Northern House of Assembly
than a political party0 As for the N.E.P.U., the electoral college
system was a travesty of democracy;
if democracy means a form of government in which the
ruling power of the state is legally vested, not in
any particular class or classes, but in the members
of the community as a whole, then it is essential to
simplify registration, to make the franchise direct,
equal and universal and to make the ballot secret,, 1
2
Opposition notwithstanding, the constitution had to be upheld and
elections carried on under the existing rules. So one of the first
changes in the N.E.P.U. hierarchy in preparation for the election was
the elevation of M. Aminu Kano to the post of the Vice President of
the party and in that capacity he directed the 1951 election for the
party.
The electoral regulations under the 1951 constitution stipulated
7
Zaben Hawan Hawa (indirect election by electoral college system),, The
elected members of the Regional House of Assembly in turn were to
1. Interview with Alhaji Tanko Yakasai (N.E.P.U. Publicity Secretary)
at Kano, 1977« Alhaji Tanko was obviously reading from one of
his former party's pamphlets at the time of the interview. Alhaji
Tanko Yakasai was a Civil Commissioner in Kano State government
of Nigeria, 1967-1975. He is now a businessman and a member of
N.P.N.
2. The "Macpherson Constitution" (named after the then Governor of
Nigeria, Sir John Macpherson) came into effect in 1951o For a
critical analysis of this constitution see Ezera, K., on. cit..
pp. 105-175; and "Nigerian Constitutional Road to Independence"
in Political Quarterly. XXX (No. 2, 1959), pp. 131-140. Also see
Mackintosh, J.P„, op. cit.. pp. 26-28.
3„ See "Arrangements made for holding the Elections" in NAK, File No.
KANO PROF: - PRE/42, p. 1. Later on the number of electoral
ladders differed from one province to another. In some provinces,
it was reduced to a three tier indirect election, i.e.:
1. Primary election District level (with all hamlets
and villages)
2. Intermediate election Emirate level
3. Final election Provincial level
Also see Whitaker, C.S., on. cit.. pp. 359-60; Dudley, B.J.,
on. cit., pp. 80-81.
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select members of the House of Representatives (the central legislature)
from among themselves. But far more disastrous for N.E.P.U. was the
right given to Emirs and chiefs (or the N.A.s) to inject a further
10to the members elected at every stage of the system's five stages.
That eventually produced representatives favoured by Emirs. The
primary election itself was conducted by the electors standing in the
open space (in most cases in front of the Emirs' palaces) behind the
man whose candidature they supported. The counting agents and the
returning officers were all N.A. employees. At the Emirate and
Provincial levels, a District Officer and a Senior District Officer
respectively acted as the returning officers.^ That the electoral
college arrangement was susceptible to manipulation by the N.A. is too
obvious to need elaboration here. Unfair to N.E.P.U. as that method
of election was, it was a step forward towards democracy in Northern
Nigeria where succession to an official title or nomination to a
public office by the Emirs had been the only known way of acceding to
political office and thus to political participation.
In view of the foregoing obstacles, it is unsurprising that N.E.P.U.
2
contested the 1951 regional elections unsuccessfully. The party's
election programme promised that it was dedicated to improving
the welfare of the people of Northern Nigeria and to
establish sound social, economic and political justice,
to insure domestic tranquillity and to secure liberty
of thought and expression, equality of status and
opportunity for all the peoples of Northern Nigeria
1. For example, see "List of Electoral Officers, Katsina Province",
in NAK, File No. KANO Prof: - PRE/42, p. 10.
2. All the 90 seats in the Regional House of Assembly, Kaduna, were
won by J.M.A./N.P.C. See Sklar, R.L. and Whitaker, C.S., "Nigeria",
in Coleman, J.S., and Rosberg, C.G., Jr. (eds.), Political Parties
and National Integration in Tropical Africa (Berkeley, 1964J,
p. 652.
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and to promote among them all real fraternity, to
safeguard the individual as well as the unity of the
people. 1
2
N.E.P.U.'s 1951 election programme can be summarized as follows :
1) Mechanization of agriculture and improving animal husbandry to
increase food production, in order to raise the standard of
living of the people and thus stabilize our internal economy.
2) Progressive reforms of our system of education so as to provide
appropriate intellectual, technical and moral training.
3) A scheme to dam river Niger to provide water for drinking and
irrigation as well as for improved water transport and the
production of electricity.
4) Introduction of a local government system to be based on popular
democratic elections and thus do away with the autocratic Native
Administrations (N.A.s); and sound town and country planning.
5) Reforms in the laws relating to transport and the provision of
better trunk and feeder roads.
6) Introduction of a uniform judicial system throughout Northern
Region for the purpose of establishing the rule of law.
7) Development of local (primary) and secondary industries in order
to provide employment and thus reduce the present high percentage
of unemployment.
Despite the administrative haughtiness and the legal obstacles
of the electoral college system, N.E.P.U. recorded unexpected success
at the primary and intermediate levels of the elections in Kano city,
1. Quoted from the appendix of N.E.P.U.'s memo submitted to the
Colonial Secretary, London, 1952. A copy of this memo is in my
possession.
2. N.E.P.U.: Party Programme 1951.
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Jos township, Kaduna, Maiduguri, Kabba, etc."*" To the consternation
of the authorities it appeared as if N.E.P.U. night capture the control
of Northern Regional House of Assembly. But at the final level of the
elections all those previously defeated by N.E.P.U. candidates were
declared elected members of the Regional House of Assembly. Notable
among those who were at first defeated by N.S.P.U. candidates but
finally emerged as the "elected" members, due to the 10 J injection
device were Inuwa Wada (Kano), Bello Dandago (Kano) and Isa Kaita
(Katsina). Some of them became government ministers at Kaduna and
2
Lagos. Following N.E.P.U.'s initial success at the primary and
intermediate elections, an editorial comment in the Nigerian Citizen
(a government owned newspaper then published at Zaria) warned that the
election results showed "the red-light" for "the stringent heart searching
particularly at the top" and with the N.E.P.U.'s objectives already
known, the question was whether the N.A.s and the Regional Government
3
would heed the warning before "it is too late".
N.E.P.U. itself was not unaffected by the election result, which
boosted the morale of the party's members and raised the hopes and
the expectations of the leaders. Both the leaders and the led felt
1. Although the final result of the 1951 election is known (see
footnote 2, p. 228), the details of the winners'of the elections
at primary and intermediate levels are not (to our knowledge)
recorded anywhere. However, the elections were discussed by Sklar,
R.Lo, on. cit.. pp. 28-37; Paden, J.N., Religion and Political
Culture in Kano (Berkeley, 1973), p. 308; also see Supplement to
Nigeria Gazette. 38, No. 37, 19 July 1951.
2. Inuwa Wada became a federal minister at Lagos whereas Isa Kaita
became a regional minister at Kaduna. See Whiteaker, C.S.,
op. cit., pp. 360-1.
3. Nigerian Citizen, October 25, 1951, p. 6. Both Whitaker, op. cit..
and Dudley, op. cit. , pp. 80-81, reproduced and analysed the
implications of this editorial comment.
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that in a free and fair election based on secret ballot system, N.E.P.U.
would sweep the polls and thus seize the government of the region.
On the one hand, the party intensified its recruitment drive and it
opened branches all over the Northern Region, especially in all the
provincial towns and the urban centres; on the other hand, the focus
of the party's profuse petitions became centred on the desire for
electoral reforms in Northern Nigeria. Accordingly, a new slogan was
coined to reflect the party's immediate desire: Zabe Daya, Falle Daya,
Rana Daya, Cikin Asiri. Kan Balaga. "One man, one vote, on the same
day, by secret ballot, based on universal adult suffrage."
Pressing further its demands for general, i.e. electoral,
administrative, educational and other reforms in Northern Nigeria,
N.E.P.U. sent a delegation to London in 1952 to present its case
before the Colonial Secretary. In a memorandum^ they explained all
the injustices of the electoral college system and then pointed out
that most of the members of the Northern Regional House of Assembly
were N.A. employees in whom the electorate had no confidence but who,
through the 10--' N.A. injection became the officially "elected"
members.Table 1:5 on the next page, culled out from the memorandum,
elucidates their point in Kano province,,
2
In Kano District alone, seven N.A. employees contested the
elections against their N.E.P.U. opponents and of those four were
actually defeated by N.E.P.U. candidates. But in the end all the four
1. The original copy of this memorandum which includes Table I
reproduced on the next page is in my possession. For the Colonial
Secretary's reply to N.E.P.U., see Venture IV (No. 8, October 1952),
Po 2.
2. In 1951, Kano electoral district included the city, Fagge, Sabon
Gari, Tudun Nada, Gwagwarwa and Tarauni with an estimated
population figure of about 150,000 people.
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TABLE 1:5
KANO MEMBERS IN THE HOUSE OF ASSEMBLY AFTER 1951 ELECTIONS








3o Alhaji Ahmadu District Head
4o Usman N.A. Staff
Supervisor
5c Bello Edo Offr. (N.A.)
60 Galadiman District Head
Hadejia
7o Ma'ajin GH^mel N.A. Treasurer
8. Ibrahim Trader























































































defeated members of the N.A. Staff reached the House of Assembly.
Five out of the remaining sixteen members from Kano province were
rejected by the electors at the initial stages of the election but
nevertheless eventually entered the House of Assembly through the
"back door". As the above table shows altogether ten members
contested the elections at the final level only, i.e. they contested
neither primary nor intermediate election, yet they represented Kano
people in the House of Assembly at Kaduna. Yfhat happened in Kano was
the rule rather than the exception and, if anything, may have even
been fairer because the electors in Kano were more enlightened and
relatively more prosperous and thus less coercible; also in the 1950\s
Kano people were more assertive of their rights than any other province
in Northern Region,, Table 1:5 also clearly shows that N0E.P.U. was beaten
by the existing electoral system which appeared to be specifically
designed to favour the N.A.s.
In the same memorandum N.E.P.U. recommended to the Colonial
Secretary that the Northern Region should be divided into single member
constituencies, in which one member would represent a population of
100,000 people in the House of Assembly. That, the party argued, would
make the members more representative. Based on the 1947 Head-Tax Count,
which estimated the population of Northern Nigeria at about 13 million,
that recommendation, if accepted would have increased the membership
of the Regional House of Assembly from ninety to one hundred.
During their stay in London, the N0E.P0U. delegation must have
lobbied, among others, Members of Parliament to support their case
before the Colonial Secretary, for no sooner had they returned to
Nigeria, than Colonel George V/igg, M.P., launched an attack on the
Colonial Secretary on the ICfp N0A„ injection in Northern Nigerian
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elections. He explained that the N.A.Police assaulted N.E.P.U.
supporters and described in detail the political conditions in Kano
which he likened to that in a "Fascist state"Soon after that
criticism, it was announced that the 10N.A. injection -was abolished,
although the electoral college system remained; but the damage had
been done.
Trapped in Opposition
At home, N.E.PoUc was both reorganizing itself and intensifying
its political campaigns,. In 1953 came changes in the party's leader¬
ship. In those changes Aminu Kano replaced Abba Maikwaru as the party'
President. Between 1951 and 1956 N.E.P.U.'s popularity soared up
among the masses and, conversely, the Administrations reacted with
2
merciless ruthlessness. H.E.P.U. members, in the far North, claimed
that they bore administrative repression and victimizations with
fortitude, believing that in 1956 when the secret ballot system was to
be tried in some parts of Northern Nigeria, the party would win.
In 1954, there were elections into the Federal House of Representa
tives, which N.E.P.U. contested. Once again, N.E.P.U. was badly beaten
3
not winning a single seat. The main problem of N.E.P.U. was that the
1. "One-Party Parliament", in West Africa (No. 1919), 5 December 1953,
p. 1131; and "Instability in Kano", in West Africa (No. 192l),
19 December 1953, p. 1178.
2. For example, see NAK, File No. 45, ZAR PROF, on many administrative
judicial and police reports on the actions taken against N.E.P.U.
in Zaria province, between 1952 and 1955» Also see "Political
File", D.O.'s Office Potiskum, for similar reports in Fika Emirate
between 1953 and 1959o See further, "The Administration of Bida",
in West Africa (No. 1913), 24 October 1953, p. 996; and Olu
Akinfosile, "The Bida Situation", in West Africa (No. 1913), 28
November 1953, p. 1114.
3c The results of 1954 Federal elections are in Sklar, op. cit.,
p0 35; and Whitaker and Sklar, op. cit., p. 652. Paden, on, cit.,
pp0 308-9, discussed the significance of this election in Kano.
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electoral college system was still enforced in the North. In addition,
electoral officers especially in rural areas were N.A. employees
(District Heads, Alaklis, Chief scribes) and, worse still, many more
were active members (or officials) of the N.P.C. Many electoral officers
openly demonstrated their antagonism towards N.E.P.U. members.^ On the
whole, N.E.P.U.'s preparations for the elections were less elaborate
than its preparations for the previous Region elections in 1951. This
suggests that the party was more concerned with the problems of Northern
Nigeria and the use of governmental institutions to make reforms in
the region than in winning Federal elections. After all, Federal
Government was then so remote that it made little direct impact on
the rank and file Nigerian.
With the electoral college system and the use of N.A. staff who
were also N.P.C. supporters (or active members) as electoral officers,
it was a foregone conclusion that N.E.P.U. would lose the elections,
as it did. Far more important was, judging from the experience in
the 1951 elections, the authorities became more apprehensive that
N.E.P.U. migjit -ae-well win and that it must be stopped. Indeed the
authorities became more determined to win because of the risks in
the N.P.C. not controlling the Federal authority. As by the time of
the election the first batch of N.P.C. ministers were already elected,
the combination of patronage and coercion were used to ensure the
success of their party. But the party's agitation for reforms continued
unabated and, at the same time, it made preparations for the forthcoming
1. For the electoral procedure in the North, see Government Circular
TS. 5352l/So7/Vol. 111/24 of 24/8/1954 and "Revised Constitution —
Electoral Regulations for new House of Representatives", both in
NAK, File No. C. 6/1954, ZAR PROF, pp. 15-16 and 17-19. Also see,
Aminu Kano,"Northern Nigeria's Electoral Officers", in West Africa
(No. 1969), 20 November 1954, p» 1091.
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1956 elections to the Regional House of Assembly. In a bid to enlighten
the masses, newspaper articles on political issues were written by
N.E.P.U. leaders. After one of these articles, entitled Biyayayya Ga
Samuta Haramun (literally, "obedience to hereditary titled traditional
official is unlawful")^" by Aminu Kano published in Daily Comet. Kano,
the author was prosecuted for sedition and subsequently fined fifty
pounds. In that article Aminu Kano said that Nigerians disliked
2
Europeans (British) and wanted them to leave Nigeria.
N.E.P.U.'s objective of effective electoral changes in Northern
Nigeria was not achieved before 1956. Although the membership of the
Northern House of Assembly was increased, very much in line with N.E.P.U.
recommendations (see above), the introduction of direct elections on
the secret ballot system were limited to nineteen urban constituencies.
Elections in the rural districts were to be through the electoral
colleges: in most cases there were to be two stages but in some cases
up to three. Electors were to be adult male tax-payers only. In the
urban centres suffrage was limited to men over 21 who had lived and
paid tax in an area for three years immediately before the elections
or were born there and had paid tax for one year. In the rural areas
there were primary, intermediate and final levels of electoral colleges,
3
and voters had to produce tax receipts. Another electoral hurdle for
1. Earam, "forbidden", i.e. anything that is unlawful under Islamic
law. As for the objection of Islam to hereditary leadership and
the condemnation of traditional titles in Northern Nigeria by Usman
Dan Podio, see Chapter II.
2. According to Alhaji Aminu Kano (interviewed in London on 12/ll/l979),
his offence carried the minimum of four years and the maximum of
ten years in prison. But the judge, Capt. Symes, believed that to
imprison Aminu Kano was to deny him his political objectives, hence
he fined him £50. For the interest shown in Aminu Kano's prosecution
in the House of Commons, London, "Matchet's Diary", in '.vest Africa
(No. 1966), 30 October 1954, p. 1015.
3. See Northern Region of Nigeria Gazette Extraordinary (No. 40, V),
30 August 1956, Supplement Part B, pp. B531-B535.
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N.E.P.U. was the transfer of the responsibility for the maintenance
of law and order at election times, from the government to N.A.s,
thus handing back N.E.P«U. members to their enemies at the time when
they most needed protection from the abuses of the N.A.s by the
government,^
N.E.P.U. fought the 1956 election on European style "Class" basis.
In its election manifesto, N.E.P.U. said that the N.P.C. was a party
of "property and privilege" fighting a "rear-guard action against
equality": to vote for the N.P.C. meant "to believe in a ruling class".
Tactfully, the manifesto promised the Emirs a "glorified status" under
N.E.P.U. government, and it warned that intransigence to change would
bring "extreme leftist revolution" that might result from poverty and
hunger.8 The party's message throughout the manifesto was clearly
directed at the underprivileged. N.E.P.U. did not promise detailed
reforms in the field of government, but it emphasized that if elected
to power there would be constitutional changes in the Region as well as
in the whole Federation. In the economic field it promised to establish
a "National indigenous Bank for the Northern Region" and higher prices
2
for farm produce from the Marketing Board.
The economic resources of the Region will be improved.
We shall see to it that all the economic potentialities
of the Region are tapped and the economy of the Region
diversified. Farmers would be guaranteed fair and
stable prices for their produce and thus keeping the
margin between the prices offered to those farmers at
present and the profits made by the Marketing Board
Agencies within a reasonable bound as well as by giving
1. See "Native Authority Law, No. 4, of 1954: The Native Authority
(Delegation of Powers) Notice", in NAK, File No. MSWC 7, especially
annex B. Also see Governor General's Reply to Aminu Kano in
West Africa (No. 2057), 15 September 1956, p. 711.
2. This and the following quotations are cited in Nigerian Citizen,
12 September 1956. Also see NAK File: AGNN/1095, for more
election manifestoes.
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the farmers representation on the various Marketing
Boards which deal with their interests,, We shall
establish more industrial centres and generally under¬
take to develop the Region to become a very strong
agricultural country,, We shall encourage foreign
investments in various development enterprises, but
we shall always see that the Government and private
indigenous shareholding are greater in such enterprises.
With regard to small scale cottage industries, N.E.P.U. would give
the necessary financial aid or loans to farmers, craftsmen, traders
and cooperative societies,
N.E.P.U, promised universal, compulsory and free education to all
children between the ages of 6 and 14 (but no time-table was mentioned)
and would establish Marriage Bureaux to deal with the causes of hi^i
divorce rates.
Women and girls' education will be intensified
throughout the Region and more and more girls' schools
will be built in every province. Greater facilities
will be accorded to our girls for secondary and higher
education irrespective of tribe, creed or status.
Domestic Science centres and women's institutes will
receive full encouragement,
N.E.P.U. believed that the ability to work depended on good health
hence it regarded good health as a matter of great importance in its
drive to have a virile population in a new society. The main items
in their -health services can be summarized as follows:
1) To improve the health of the next generation by looking after
children and expectant mothers.
2) To bring the means of healing within the reach of those who are
ill without regard to status,
3) To provide both practical and theoretical knowledge and preventive
measures in order to diminish the incidence of illness.
If elected to power, N.E.P.U. government would reform the legal system
and local governments; and it would convert the "N.P.C. ministers'
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palaces into maternity clinics, nursery schools and other social and
medical institutions.""*"
N.E.P.U. 's election manifesto in 1956 was one of the most radical
in West Africa, because its real concern was with internal class
relations in Northern Nigeria, not with political relations with
Britain,, NoE.P.U. disliked not the individual Emirs but the N„A„
system which was oppressive; it opposed not the British but colonialism
which created internal divisions and exploitative strata within
Northern Nigerian Society,,
The result of the 1956 elections (see Table 2:5below) confirmed
N.E.PoU.'s complaint that the electoral college system was unfair to
the party and it also confirmed N.E.P.U.'s accusation that N.P.C. was
a "party of property and privilege". For example, M. Abba Habid, the
2
Waziri of Dikwa , won election to the House of Assembly in Dikwa North
constituency where he bypassed the primary and intermediate levels and
contested only the final level of the electoral college. According to
results declared in the first week of the election (November, 1956),
N.P.C. won 53 seats: 30 of these were District Heads; one was an uncle
of the Northern Premier, one his cousin and yet another was his
nephew (i.e. they were all members of the Sokoto ruling dynasty). A
son of the Emir of Eano was elected as were sons of the Emirs of
Gombe and Fika. 35 of the 53 elected N.P.C. members were returned
unopposed, and many N.E.P.U. candidates (and supporters) were arrested
3
to permit this.
1. For a critical comment on the 1956 election manifestoes, see "The
Sardauna's Prospects" in West Africa (No. 2063), 27 October 1956,
p. 843.
2. Dikwa is also commonly called Bama. For a portrait of Abba Habib,
M.H.R., see "The member for Dikwa" in West Africa (No. 192l), 19
December 1953, p. 1181.
3. See "Sardauna's Return to Power", in West Africa (No. 2064), 3
November 1956, p. 866.
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TABLE 2:51
NIGERIA: NORTHERN REGION ELECTIONS 1956
FINAL STATE OF THE PARTIES
Party Seats
Northern Peoples Congress 100
Northern Elements Progressive Union — N.C.N.C, 6
(Opposition)
Ilorin Talaka Parapo — A.G. (Opposition) 3
Egbe Igbomina Parapo A.G. (Opposition) 1
United Middle Belt Congress — Lot's Wing (Allied to
N.P.C.) 5
United Middle Belt Congress — Rwang's Wing (Opposition) 6
Igbirra Tribal Union (Allied to N.P.C.) 2
Bornu Youth Movement — N.E.P.U. (Opposition) 2









1. The figures in Table 2:5 are culled from "Election Results", File
No. AGNN/1095A in NAX. Also see Sklar, on. cit. . p. 36; and Whitaker
and Sklar, on. cit., p. 563. For a critical appraisal of the
election results, see "Northern Nigeria" in Venture, VIII (No. 7,
December 1956), p. 2.
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The aristocratic background, of the N.P.C. members^" showed that the
party and the N.A.s were Siamese twins. In addition to N.A. employees
being the electoral officers, the N.A.s themselves were given the legal
rights, at election times, to decide when and where public order was
liable to be endangered and to take appropriate action to restore law
and order. In that way the electoral system provided sufficient
built-in safeguards for the ruling party. It was not surprising that
the electoral fortunes of N.E.P.U. fell below expectations in 1956. As
Table 2:5 above shows, N.E.P.U. won only 6 seats (4 in the urban
constituencies by direct elections and 2 in the rural constituencies
through the electoral colleges), whereas its ally the Bornu Youth
Movement (B.Y.M.) won 2 seats. Naturally, the result of the election
was shocking to the party, however, their failure was attributed to
3
poll rigging, harrassment of the party's candidates and supporters, etc.
Despite its defeat at the polls, N.E.P.U.*s non-electoral campaigns
and activities heightened political awareness and thus increased public
protests against maladministration and that, in turn, led to many changes,
especially at the local level. For instance, the Emir of Zaria (M.
Ja'afar) complained that the damage done by N.E.P.U. was to let the
1. Whitaker, on. cit. . pp. 476-489, contains "biographical directory"
of N.P.C. members of the House of Assembly, 1956-1961, as well as
that of the members of the opposition in the same House at the
same period. Sklar, on. cit. , p. 325, has the occupational back¬
ground of some N.P.C. and, p. 365-70, discusses the social origins
of some N.P.C. leaders.
2. The opposition parties and one Independent candidate won more than
half of the 19 urban constituencies in which direct election by
secret ballot took place. For an analysis of the first direct
election in Northern Nigeria see "The Sardauna's Century" in West
Africa (No. 2068), 1 December 1956, p. 961.
3. See "NEPU's failure" in Ibid.; and "Electoral systems and the
Franchise", in Venture, VIII (No. 3, July 1956), pp. 2 and 4.
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commoners know that they could say "no" to their rulers."'" Following
N.E.P.U.'s protests, communal labour for non-communal purposes ceased;
so did unpaid forced labour on farms belonging to the Emirs and the
District Heads; forced labour to rebuild or to repair public places
2
and to construct roads, all stopped. The use of Jekadu or Yaran Sarki
(Emirs' Representatives) on oppressive missions in the rural areas
was waived. Underpayments of peasant farmers for their produce at
cotton and groundnuts markets was reduced. All the foregoing changes
came as a result of N.E.P.Uo's criticism of N.A.s and its protests on
3
behalf of the villagers.
In urban centres N.E.P.U. activities centered on the reduction of
taxes and rates, with particular success in Zaria and Kano. These
successes precipitated the enforcement by the Colonial administration
of the salient aspects of the Native Authority Law 1954 which was
designed to prevent the introduction of a fully-fledged participatory
local government and thus restrict the role of the chiefs to a purely
symbolic one. This reduced the N.E.P.U. controlled Town Councils to
an advisory capacity and thus ended their power to enact any rule or
regulation without the approval of the N.A. Council. What had, at
first, brought N.E.P.U. success in some local elections was the fact
that, under British supervision, political competition became tolerated
1. Feinstein, A., on. cit.. p. 132. In a letter Ref. ll/l946/35 of
20/10/52 to the Civil Secretary, Northern Region, Kaduna, the
Resident of Zaria Province explained how disturbed the Emir was
with N.E.P.U. activities and he suggested the things to be discontinued
in order to blunt N.E.P.U.'s appeal; see NAN, File No. 45, ZAR PROF.
2. See Government Circular headed "Intervention in local affairs by
political bodies", in NAX, File ibid.
3. A detailed analysis of this aspect of N.E.P.U. activity in Zaria
Emirate is made by Smith, M.G., "Historical and Cultural Conditions
of Political Corruption among the Hausa", in Comparative Studies
in Society and History, VI (1963-4), pp» 164-194..
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and direct elections, by secret ballot, were held in most urban centres.
In several cases parties opposed to the Government and the Native
Authorities controlled the Town Councils. For instance, N.E.P.U.
controlled Funtua, Kano, Mubi, Potiskum and Zaria Town Councils. In
Jos, N.E.P.U. 's victory was so overwhelming that the party's Provincial
Treasurer, Alhaji Usman Na Garba, was appointed the Magajin Gari
(Lord Mayor) of Jos, which also assumed full control over N.A. bureaucracy.
African Solidarity
Whereas N.E.P.U. local branches were gaining control of some
urban councils in 1956-57, the national leadership of the party was
making clear its commitment to the idea of"Pan-Africanism". To the
N.E.P.U. the ideal of Pan-Africanism was based on two components.
Firstly, N.E.P.U. believed that there was an "African personality"
which revealed itself in the attitudes and the institutions of all
peoples of African descent. Secondly, that African peoples (and their
New World descendants) ought to and would have a common destiny — a
2
notion signifying the political unity of an independent Africa. With
the slogan of "one god, one aim, and one destiny", the idea of Pan-
Africanism was disseminated among N.E.P.U. supporters in Northern
1. That was because, following the recommendation of a commission of
inquiry, Jos N.A. Council was dissolved in 1955. For the details
of town council election in Jos, see NAK, File KANO PROF: - PRE/42,
pp. 27-29. For a report on franchise in Northern Nigeria and
N.E.P.U. victory at the local elections see Venture. VIII (No. 3,
July 1956), p. 9.
2. Interview with Alhaji Aminu Kano, at Kano and with Alhaji Ali
Batan Yerima Balla at Gombi, 1977. Alhaji Ali Batan Yerima Balla
was the Deputy President of N.E.P.U. He was one of the members
from Adamawa to the Federal House of Representatives, Lagos,
1959-1964o He became a civil commissioner in the North-Eastern
State Government of Nigeria, 1967-1975»
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Nigeria. Their conception of the Pan African Movement transcended
the established nation-state's boundaries: it was built upon much
wider cultural and geographical affiliations. In the Muslim North,
Pan-Africanism was often presented in religious terms, i.e. Pan-Islamism
(or Arabism). This method followed the Hausa idea of Jama'a which
conceived a community united by religion and in which language,
ethnicity or territorial differences were insignificant. In fact the
literal meaning of the word Jama'a is much nearer to "Commonwealth"
than to that of a "nation". In physical or geographical terms, N.E.P.Uo
appealed to the continental unity of the "black people" (coloured
inclusive) wherever they happened to be. That was also in keeping with
the idea of Jama*a which, in fact, derived from the Islamic ideal of
community. Thus, the idea of Pan-Africanism differed from that of
a national movement in scale and in degree, though both the national
movement and Pan-Africanism were political innovations which aimed at
satisfying one thing: nationalism, i.e. independence, decolonization
and development.^
It was, therefore, with a firm belief in Pan-Africanism that
Aminu Kano represented N.E.P.U. at the Accra Conference in 1953 to
2
consider the possibility of forming a "West African Federation".
Following this the party's relationship with other African nationalists
began to warm up. N.E.P.U. was particularly close to Djibo Bakary's
Sawaba party, the Partie de Federation Africain (P.F.A.) section in
1. Interview with Alhaji Aminu Kano, ibid. This whole idea was
presented in a simplified form in a song by a leading N.E.P.U.
singer in Kano city, Alhaji Lawan Maiturane, Africa Kasa Maison
'Yanci (Africa: A continent in search of freedom), Kano, 8 August
1961. The original copy of this song is in my possession.
2. See a report on this conference in West Africa (No. 1921), 19
December 1953, pp. 1177-8.
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Niger Republic."*" In 1965, there were many exiled members of the Niger's
Sawaba Party, in Kano, Jos and Kaduna (N.E.P.U.'s stronghold). N.E.P.U.
was also friendly with Dr. Kwame Nkrumah's Convention Peoples Party
2
(C.P.P.) in Ghana. At the African Peoples Conference in Accra in
December 1958, the N.E.P.U. delegation's address ended in these words:
This conference must condemn "apartheid", and all
African Nations in close collaboration with their Asiatic
brethren must take stand about South Africa; the restor¬
ation of the dignity of the "Black Man" is an avowed duty
for us all. 3
The Beginning of the End
The foregoing shows that N.E.P.U. was not only concerned with the
abuses of power in Northern Nigeria but also with the wider problems
of the African continent. But the party's main arena was the Emirates
and its emphasis was to check the malpractices of the N.A. system,
especially in the rural areas. The successes scored in the 1956-57
urban elections raised the hopes of the party. All N.EoP.U. officials
were optimistic that the 1959 general elections, when the secret ballot
system would, for the first time, operate all over Nigeria, might give
them their first taste of victory over the conservative forces in
4
Northern Nigeria. That optimism was based on the theory that given the
1. See Puglestad, P., "Djibo Bakary, the French and the Referendum of
1958 in Niger", in Journal of African History. XIV (No. 2, 1973),
pp. 313-350. Also see Alhaji Lawan Maiturane, on. cit., p. 2.
2. In a recent interview in London (on 12/ll/79), Alhaji Aminu Kano
informed the writer that he thought of naming the N.E.P.U. as the
C.P.P. but the idea was dropped because it would be too obvious that
they were copying Dr. Nkrumah in Ghana and that the relationship
between the two parties in Ghana and Nigeria remained- "cordial"..
3. Quoted in Sklar, on. cit., p. 374.
4. See a song by Alhaji Lawan Maiturare which aimed to raise the hopes
of N.S.P.U. supporters and to urge the electorate to vote for N.E.P.U.
in 1959 Federal elections: Zabe Yazo Rana Guda Dan Sawaba Zaka -Ga
Gaskiya (meaning, roughly, election by secret ballot has arrived .
N.E.P.U. members will obtain justice). A copy of this song which
is undated is in my possession.
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opportunity to vote secretly, the Talakawa would use their votes to
further their own interests by voting the party which represented
that interest (N.E.P.U.) and reject the party of property and privilege
(N.P.C.) which was against their interests. In 1953, N.E.P0U.'s
strength appeared to be so formidable that many N.A. officials and
Atta.iirai (rich merchants) were secretly enrolling in the party.Many
people then held dual membership cards of both N.E.P.U. and N.P.C.
That action was a reflection of the uneasiness of those people about
the approaching Federal Elections in 1959.
The result of the 1959 General Elections was a shattering
disappointment for N.E.P.U. because its political activities did not
lead to parliamentary power. The party obtained more than half a
2
million votes but won only eight seats in Northern Nigeria. All the
election did was to give N.E.P.U. a voice in the Federal House of
Representatives but at the same time it created confusion within the
party. Since none of the parties won sufficient seats to form a
government alone, N.P.C. formed a coalition government with N.CoN.C.
(N.E.P.U.'s ally). Subsequently, Alhaji Aminu Kano (the N.E.P.U.
leader) was appointed a government whip. This appointment was opposed
by all N.E.P.U. branches in Northern Nigeria, 'who were already against
any idea of cooperation with N.P.C. government. But due to strong
discipline (see below) in the party, a semblance of unity was maintained
pending the forthcoming 1961 Northern Regional Elections. It was hoped
1. For example, in Potiskum and Azare towns, the writer acted as an
intermediary who sold N.E.P.U. membership cards and collected
funds for the party from many U.A.C. customers. Similarly, I put
many N.A. staff in touch with party officials in many areas,
including Jos.
2. See Post, K.W.J..Nigerian Federal Election, 1959 (Oxford, 1963),
pp. 367-75.
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that if N.S.P.Uo could win the Region Elections, then it would break
its alliance with the N.C.N.C. (thus ceasing to be a member of the
Federal Coalition Government) and go it alone0
But that hope was also destined not to be realized because many
changes took place in Nigeria and, especially, in Northern Nigeria,
which made it impossible for an opposition party to win an election in
any region. For example, in contrast to N,E,P,U,, which was never in
power and could only speak vaguely of political reforms and socio¬
economic improvements, the N.P,C, had been in power for nearly ten years
and could therefore rely on its record in office. Even more important
to the Northern Nigerian electorate, the N.P,C, promised to "Northernize"
the civil service in the shortest possible time. In March 1959,
Northern Nigeria became self-governing and since the 1959 Federal
elections installed the N,P,C, in the centre, by the same token, the
N.P,C„-controlled government in Northern Nigeria was further consolidated.
Thus, the N.P.C, increased and intensified its "Northernization policy".
This policy preferred a Nigerian of Northern origin for employment and,
in the absence of a suitable Northern Nigerian, an expatriate on a
contract basis, to a Nigerian from the Southern Regions,'3'
As a result of the Northernization policy, the Administrative
Service of Northern Nigeria was filled by the members of the ruling
elites who were the first (or even most preferred) to go to Western
2
schools in Northern Nigeria, In view of their social origins or
1, See NAK, File No, MSWC/402/s.1, pp. 1-10,
2, An analysis of^t^e^B^tish colonial policy on education in Northern
Nigeria is made in^Sonia, <4,F., Government and Mission Education in
Northern Nigeria 1900-1919 (ibadan, 1966), But the primary source
still remains in "Northern Nigeria Reports" in NAK, Kaduna, Reports
for the years 1955-1953 are most relevant for the period we cover.
Also see Crampton, E.P,T,, Christianity in Northern Nigeria (London,
1979); Ubah, C.N,, "Problems of Christian Missionaries in Muslim
Emirates of Nigeria, 1900-1928", Journal of African Studies, III
(No, 3, 1976), pp. 351-371; Gbadamosi, G.O., "The Establishment of
Western Education among Muslims in Nigeria", Journal of the Historical
Society of Nigeria, IV (No. 1, December 1967), pp. 89-115.
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socialization processes or both, most of the new administrative officers
were sympathetic to the N.P.C.^ Those indigenous officers replaced
British officers from the Provincial and Divisional Administrations and
thus made way for the increased and more effective harrassment of
N.E.P.U. members by a series of indiscriminate arrests either for
"illegal meeting" or "misbehaviour" under the newly enacted section 37
2
of the N.A. Law, for the control of "unlawful" assembly,, Similarly,
N.E.P.Uo's attempt to obtain redress for agrieved commoners were
rendered ineffective by the enforcement of a new administrative rule
that complaints of official misconduct were to be entertained only if
3
made personally by the complainant,, Consequently, the N0E.P.U. branch
leadership was sentenced to silence by those events and the party's
organization became tattered,, Many N.E.P.U. supporters were forced
or induced to defect to the N.P.C. As N.A. officials became aware that
government administrators did not permit the N.E.P.U. organization to
1. See "Administrative service in Africa", Nest Africa (No. 3062-6)
8 March - 5 April, 1976. See also A.H.M. Kirk-Greene, "The New
African Administrator", in Journal of Modern African Studies. X
(No. 1, 1972), pp. 93-107; and "Bureaucratic Cadres in a Traditional
Milieu", in Coleman, J.S. (ed.), Education and Political Development
(Princeton, 1968), pp. 372-407; also see his perceptive analysis on
"The merit principle in an African Bureaucracy: Northern Nigeria",
in Rivkin, A., Nations by Design (1968), pp. 257-285°
2. NAK, File No. MIN. FOR LOCAL GOVT: MLG/CON/29, contains copies of
the N.A. Laws and other Government ordinances; and File No. Premier's
Office: ASl/919 contains copies of Government Circulars which
stipulated the role of public officials in dealing with political
parties and, especially, at election times. See M.G. Smith, 013,
cit., p. 191.
3. NAK, File No. 45, ZAR PROF, contains a Government circular, No. 287/
1948 of 25/ll/l948 which explained how government officials should
deal with the problem of "Intervention in local affairs by political
bodies", but in 1952 a more stem instruction, specifically headed,
"Northern Elements Progressive Union", was issued in a Secret Circular
No. Sec. 100 of 13/6/1952. This circular warned that redressing
decisions/actions taken by local officials, on the intervention of
N.E.P.U. agents was "improving the strength and prestige of the
party". The circular urged that "N.E.P.U. should be treated with
customary courtesy" but the imagined complaints of these "discredited
riff-raff" must be made to pass through recognized channels. Also
see Whitaker, on. cit. , p. 381.
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sponsor private complaints, hell was let loose upon innocent people and
thus it amounted to reckless courage to identify oneself as an N.E.P.U.
supporter.^" In fact in 1961 what remained of the N.E.P.U. was only its
vocal national leadership,. Therefore, it was not surprising that despite
the votes it polled (see Table 4:5 below) in the 1961 Regional Election,
2
N.E.P.U. won only one seat in Jos. Indeed, without an effective
opposition in the Northern House of Assembly, the N.P.C. majority
became an elected despotism,,
The following years became a period of declining morale in the
NoE.P.U. Many N.E.P.U. leaders at all levels had either declared for
the N.P.C. or had quietly taken gainful employment. In fact, the only
N.EoP.U. members remaining were the N.E.P.U. Kaceni, "the N.E.P.U.
diehards"o On the other hand, the N.P.C. local agents were engaged in
a witch hunt of N.E.P.Uo members. Except in the urban centres like
Jos, Kaduna, Kano and Zaria, it was very risky to be known as an N.E.P.Uo
member, so much that in several areas most known activitists of the party
were in exile until 1966 when the Armed Forces took over the Governments
of Nigeria. In 1962, N.E.P.U.'s main problem was how to maintain its
name even in the press and on the radio. In the same year the U.M.B.C.
1. Many N.E.P.U. supporters were killed in various parts of the Muslim
North. For example, Dr. D.J.M. Muffett has told us that a N.E.P.U.
official was beaten to death and thrown into a disused well at
Birnin Kudu in Kano Emirate. See Muffet, D.J.M., "Legitimacy and
deference in a tradition oriented society: observations arising
from an examination of some aspects of a case study associated with
the abdication of the Emir of Kano in 1965"> in African Studies
Review, XVIII (No. 2, September 1975), pp. 101-115.
2. For detailed results of the 1961 Regional Election, see Dudley,
on. cit. , pp. 166-168; Sklar, on. cit. , p. 55; 'Jhi taker and Sklar,
on. cit., p. 654. An analysis of the election process and its
prophetic consequence is made by O'Connell, J., "Northern Regional
Election, 1961: An Analysis", in The Nigerian Journal of Economic
and Social Studies, IV (No. 1, 1962), pp. 181-187.
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TABLE 4:5
NORTHERN HOUSE OF ASSEMBLY ELECTION IN 1961






Igala Union/N.PoC. alliance 26,530
Igala Divisional Union/N.PoCo alliance 22,564
Igbirra Tribal Union/N.P.C. alliance 9,773
Kabba Federal Union/Kabba Divisional Union 3,739
Middle Belt State Party/N.PoC. alliance 320
Borgu Talaka Parapo /Action Group alliance 320








Altogether 158 candidates lost their deposits: a total amount of
£11,850, distributed among the parties as follows:




1. The details in this table are culled from the Government Newsheet,
Northern Nigeria Daily Press Service (No, 1240), Kaduna, 1C-/5/61;
also see NAX, File No. Xano PROF: PRE/4, p. 126.
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broke away its alliance with its main financier, the A.G,, because the
latter was in crisis"'" and thus fell in serious financial difficulty.
So, while the N.E,P,U. was on the verge of organizational collapse, the
U.Mo B.C. was faced with its possible extinction as an opposition political
party in the Middle Belt area of the Northern Region. Hence, the two
parties were impelled to pool their resources, as a united opposition
group, if they were to survive as political parties.
2
The Northern Progressives Front
The N.P.P0 came into existence in October 1963 as a united front
of Northern Nigerian opposition parties, held together by their common
opposition to the N0P.C. and for electoral purposes, otherwise each
party retained its separate identity, Alhaji Aminu Kano, the N.E.P.U.
leader, was elected the President, whereas Mr, J.S, Tarka, the U.M.B.C,
leader, became the General Secretary. Together, they unsuccessfully
campaigned for a majority in the 1964 General elections in Northern
Nigeria.
3
At the same time, a crisis of legitimacy arose in Kano following
the deposition of the all powerful Emir, Alhaji Sir Muhammadu Sanusi, by
the Northern Regional Government. Consequently, the supporters of Emir
1. Martin Dent's article in Mackintosh, J.P. , on. cit. , pp. 461-507,
discusses in detail the A.G. crisis and how it affected the U.M.B.C.
2. Dudley, on, cit.. p. 135, analyses the circumstances which brought
about the formation of the N.P.P. and in pp. 324-327 he reproduces
the Instrument Establishing the N.P.F.
3. This point was ably dealt with by D.J.M, Muffet, on. cit. (see
footnote 1, p. 250)o Mr, Muffet was the Senior Administrative
Officer in Northern Nigeria who, as the Government appointed Sole
Commissioner, enquired into the finances of Kano N.A, The Emir of
Kano, Muhammadu Sanusi, was deposed as a result of his report.
Also see, Skinner, N, (trans, and ed.), Alha.ii Mahmudu Koki, Kano
Malam (Zaria, 1977), pp. 141-2.
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Sanusi formed the Kano Peoples Party (K.P.P.in April 1963. The main
objective of the K.P.P. was to secure the return of the ex-Emir Sanusi
to his throne or the succession of his eldest son, Ado Sanusi» The
executive officers of the K.P.P. were jailed for abusing the Sardauna,
almost immediately after the party was formed. Hence, the K.P.P. became
heavily reliant on N.E.P.U. and in January 1964, the two parties were
formally allied. Apparently, N.E.P.U. leaders felt that Emir Sanusi
was deposed, not for his crimes against the people of Kano Emirate, but
because of a rivalry for power and authority between the ex-Emir and
the Premier of the Northern Region, Alhaji Sir Ahmadu Bello, the Sardauna
of Sokoto. Thus, N.E.P.U. believed that Alhaji Sir Muhammadu Sanusi
2
was unfairly treated by the Regional Government , hence its sympathy
with the ex-Emir and its subsequent alliance with the K.P.P. But no
sooner was the alliance agreement reached between the parties than
N.E.P.U. transformed the K.P.P. to Kano State Movement (K.S.M.) and
thus the political demands of KoP.P. supporters was widened and their
energies channeled into the new party which agitated for the creation of
3
a separate Kano State from the existing Northern Region of Nigeria«
1. Paden, op. cit.. pp. 266-272 analysed the circumstances which led
to the emergence of KoPoP0 and subsequently K.S.M.; and K.W.J. Post
and M. Vickers, Structure and Conflict in Nigeria, 1960-1966
(London, 1973), p. 102, described the popularity of K.P.P. in Kano.
2. Interview with Alhaji Ibrahim Biu at Maiduguri in 1972. Alhaji
Ibrahim Biu was Minister of Information in Northern Regional Govern¬
ment in 1961-1966 and, at the same period, he was also a member of
the National Executive Committee of the N.P.C. In 1967-1975 he was
a Civil Commissioner in the North East State Government of Nigeria.
3. This was the result of N.E.P.U.'s influence which was clearly using
the K.S.M. to do the groundwork with its full support. In 1965
N.E.P.U. leaders became convinced that it was very difficult, if not
impossible, for the party to win elections and to introduce reforms
in Northern Nigeria, hence the demand for the creation of Kano State.
This represented a marked change of policy on the part of N.E.P.U.,
which was previously opposed to the creation of states in the North.
But even then N.E.P.U. demanded an "effective" Federal Government.
Interview with Alhaji Tanko Yakasai in Kano, 1972. However, Paden,
op. cit.. p. 271, argued that the K.S.M. was a resurgence of "Kano
nationalism", i.e. he was drawing a parallel with the crisis which
led to the nineteenth century civil war in Kano.
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K.S.M. worked closely with N.E.P.U. (they shared the N.E.P.U. Secretariat
in Kano). Obviously, K.SoM. and N.E.P.Uo were one and the same thing,
but it seemed that separate names were maintained to keep the momentum
for the demand for the creation of a Kano state and thus deploy local
activities to that goal while national leaders of N.S.P.U. tried to
grapple with national problems. Also the alliance saved N.S.P.U. from
having to explain (or even defend itself) publicly, why it changed
position from its previously known preference for the establishment of
Provincial Administration with an effective centre (see below) to its
demand for a Kano state within the Nigerian Federation.
In 1964, the N.P.F. along with the N.C.N.C. and the remnants of
the A.G. formed the United Progressives Grand Alliance (U.P.G.A.).
Under the umbrella of the U.P.G.A. all the parties campaigned for the
1964 Federal elections. But sensing defeat due to the irregularities
of the campaigns as well as the election arrangements, the U.P.G.A.
partially boycotted the General Elections in protest^", and thus they
set in motion the events which led to the military take-over of the
Government in 1966.
2
Party Structure and Organization
N.E.P.U.*3 organization was simply structured and highly centralized,
based on direct individual membership. Significantly, the important
1. The perceptive analysis of this crisis is made in detail by K.W.J.
Post and M. Vicker3, op. cit., pp. 161-189.
2. Dudley, on. cit., p. 171, denied the existence of any N.S.P.U.
organization except in ad hoc form: a conclusion probably derived
from the lack of records in N.S.P.U. Headquarters in Kano on the
party's branches. He asserted that N.S.P.U. has no constitution
(p. 172). The fact is that N.S.P.U. has a constitution published
in Hausa: Jam'iyyar Neman Sawaba: Manufa, Sharudda da Ka'idodi
(printed in Great Britain by Lowe and Brydone Ltd., London, n.d.).
A copy of this constitution is in possession of the writer. Sklar,
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N.E.P.U. units did not necessarily coincide with the Administrative
Divisions. For instance, some of the party's branches in Misau Division
of Bauchi Province came under Potiskum in Fika Division of Borno Province.
However, rural, town or district branches were often coterminous with
administrative units. The lowest level organization was the ward branch,
where the party's agent responsible for the ward kept a record of
members and collected membership fees either weekly or monthly. He also
knew all party supporters in his ward. His duties included keeping
members and supporters informed of party activities and politicies as
well as canvassing for new members. He represented his ward in town or
district branch meetings.^ Each party agent was elected by members in
his ward and he was recognized by the town or the rural branch. All
town and district officers were elected annually. Each town or district
branch had a president, secretary and treasurer, and in turn, one or
two of the branch officers (depending on the membership of the branch
concerned) represented their branch on the relevant higher body. There
was a direct chain of command linking local branches to one another and
on to the Provincial body.
In the early 1950's N.S.P.U. organization was very skeletal. Party
branches existed in the urban centres (especially in Kano, Jos, Kaduna
and Zaria). But by the mid 1950's, the party's structure began to take
op. cit., p. 418, admitted that N.E.P.U. organization existed but
was more effective at two levels, i.e. "the branch, at the urban
and rural district level, and the provincial executive." But Post,
on. cit. , pp. 153 and 147-9 only made a detailed analysis of N.E.P.U.'s
activities at the National and Provincial levels, at election times.
In addition to interviews, I draw very heavily from my personal
experience as a member of N.E.P.U. branch committees in Potiskum,
Yola and Jos. I also worked in the N.E.P.U. Headquarters in Kano
during the 1964 Federal Elections.
1. That was the detailed functions of a party agent at Potiskum, Fika
Division, Borno Province, where the writer acquired personal
experience and so was the case in many other branches in Borno,
Adamawa, Bauchi and Plateau provinces.
256
shape. In 1956 provincial organizers were appointed and the National
Secretariat was properly organized into departments„ The Provincial
Organizers were the party's overseers in the provinces,. They ensured
that the existing branches were functioning properly and they helped to
organize new ones8 They organized and helped to run adult literacy
and political classes to train party cadres and educated members by
explaining to them their rights under the law. They also helped to
organize Islamiyya schools (see below)0 Provincial organizers submitted
reports on their activities to the National Organizing Secretary and were
the effective links between their respective provinces and the National
Headquarters0 Whereas all other provincial officers of the party were
elected by the annual provincial conferences, the organizers were appointed
by the National Secretariat at Kano. They were not necessarily sent to
their provinces of origin. For example, in the early 1960's, Lamin
Sanusi, from Potiskum in Borno province, was the Provincial Organizer
of Bauchi province. Lawan Dambazau, from Kano, was sent to Sokoto; and
M. Garba Kano, from Kano, went to Borno province. They were employees
of the National Secretariat and they were paid £360 p.a.^in the 1960's)
by the N.E.P.Uo Headquarters.
Another important component of N.EoPoU. organization was the Election
Committee,, From 1951 to 1956 each province had an election committee
which accepted recommendations on prospective candidates from branches
and made the final selection for all the constituencies in the province.
1„ This was very attractive salary at the time, considering that a
teacher grade II (i.e. a primary school head teacher) earned between
£18 and £25 a month (depending on his length of service). The salary
scale was equivalent to that of N.A. councillors, assistant executive
officers in the civil service, and senior staff in the private
sector. Unfortunately, this relatively good salary did not stop
some officials (e.g. Lamin Sanusi and Adamu Abubakar Jajire) breaking
away from N.E.P.U. to join N.P.C. or the civil service.
257
But in I960 that was changed so that each constituency had its own
election committee. Whereas in 1956-1959 the party's headquarters paid
all election expenses, in 1961-1964, each constituency paid most election
expenses, except deposits, which were first paid by the constituency
committees but later on refunded by the National Headquarters. Presumably,
this change reflected the partial collapse of N.EoP.U., underlined by
organizational disarray due to lack of finance. After the 1961 Regional
Election it became obvious that N.E.P.U. had little, if any electoral
prospects, hence most of the better educated members defected to the
N.P.C. Denuded of talents, N.E.P.U. organization suffered irreparable
damage.
Each provincial branch held an annual conference of the party to
elect its officers for the following year as './ell as to elect branch
and provincial delegates to the party's General Annual Conference.
After 1961, some provinces like Adamawa, Benue , Kabba, etc., were
unable to hold provincial conferences, due to many and varied reasons
(see above) but others like Kano, Plateau, Zaria, etc., continued to
do so until 1965.
The Annual Conferences of N.E.P.U., which was held regularly from
1951 to 1965, was vested with supreme authority. The conferences were
attended by delegates from all branches who could afford the expenses
and by representatives of the youth and women's wings of the party.
The conferences elected most members of the National Executive Committee
(N.E.C.), whose number fluctuated, on provincial basis. The President
also nominated between four and seven members of the N.E.C. for the
approval of the conference. The Western and Eastern regions of Nigeria
had two representatives each on the N.E.C.; so did Kaduna Capital
territory, youth wing, women's wing, and ex-servicemen union. Kano
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Waje Area and Labour Unions were represented by one member each on the
N.E.C. The N.E.C. was expected to meet three times in a year to
implement conference decisions and to decide on policies between
conferences,, It also disciplined any erring national officers of the
party.
The Central *,forking Committee (C.N.C.) was responsible for the day
to day running of the party, especially of the National Secretariat.
The exact number of its membership was undefined but it comprised
members both elected and nominated as well as all the departmental heads
in the National Secretariat. Half of whatever happened to be the
number of C.V/.C. members every year were to be elected by the Annual
Conference of the party; the President nominated a further four members,
whose names were first to be submitted to and approved by the Annual
Conference of the party.
Prior to I960, the President General of N.E.P.U., like all party
officials, was elected annually at the party's annual conferences.
But, in January I960, at Jos, the annual conference confirmed Alhaji
Aminu Kano as N.E.P.U.'s President General for life. The President
General, in consultation with the elected members of the N.E.C. selected
four ex-officio members of N.E.C., subject to ratification by the annual
conference. A great deal of N.E.P.U. business was conducted by
sub-committees whose members were either elected or selected by the
1. This and the following paragraph are based on my interview with
Malam Adamu Abubakar Jajire at Potiskum, 1976. M. Adamu was a
N.E.P.U. Secretary at Potiskum and he rose up the ladder to become
Assistant General Secretary in 1959-61. After the 1961 Regional
Elections he defected to the N.P.C. but returned to join the N.E.P.U.
again in 1964. Sklar, on. cit. , pp. 418-419 discusses the N.E.C.
very briefly, but in pp. 524-527 he makes a list of N.E.P.U.'s
national officers, principal advisers and parliamentarians.
Dudley, oo, cit. , pp. 172-175 discusses both N.E.P.U.'s N.E.C. and
C.rf.C.
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annual conference of the party. The most important of those committees
were the Finance ana the Election Committees.
Party branches were instructed to adhere to policies made by the
N.E.C. through the full-time Provincial Organizers. In that way the
conference decisions provided the general guidelines within which the
party operated for a period of one year. The conference elected the
members of the committees which made policies and looked after the day
to day business of the party. Ultimately, all national officers were
answerable to the membership through the Annual Conferences."^
Auxiliary Bodies: Communities, Youths and '»vomen in N.E.P.U.
NoE.PoUo's auxiliary organizations included a small number of
communalist bodies, such as the Kilba Tribal Union and the Kare-Kare
and Ngizimawa Tribal Union, which represented small communities particu¬
larly disadvantaged by the N.A. system. In the 1950's many tribal unions,
such as the Southern Zaria Freedom Movement and the Middle Belt Peoples
Party and the Zamfara Peoples Party, etc., were affiliated to the
N.E.P.U., but most of such affiliates of N.E.P.U. from the lower North
disaffiliated from the party and went alone because their leadership
had ambitions for the creation of new regions from the Northern Region,
which were not in keeping with N.E.P.U. policy. Those who accepted
N.E.P.U. policy on tribal 'unions and remained with the party were soon
to be absorbed by N.E.P.U. branch organizations. N.E.P.U. policy on
tribal unions was briefly as follows:
l) They must carry N.S.P.U. cards and not that of their tribal union.
1. For a brief but useful discussion on decision making in the N.E.P.U.,
see Dudley, on. cit., p. 173o
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2) The union as a body was automatically given a seat in the N.E.C.
3) Their problems were regarded as part of the wider problem of
"class" relations arising from economic exploitation, political
oppression and social repression as analysed by N.E.P.U. which
were collectively tackled by the party at the national levelo
4) Following the above, tribal unions affiliated to N.E.P.U. became
means of recruitment for the party at the local levels.^
This policy aimed to negate tribal consciousness and ethnic
competition and thereby eliminate, or at least, to minimise tribal
2
hatred and mistrust which bedevilled Nigerian politics,, The ultimate
3
objective of the policy was to subsume the false "ideology of tribalism"
to the wider struggle of the peasants against their rulers. The policy
worked in the Muslim North where the society is relatively homogeneous
and in which the great power was concentrated in the hands of the
Northern Emirs. Thus in the far North, tribal discrimination was seen
as another aspect of the subjugation of the Talakawa and the N.A. system
1. Interview with both Alhaji Aminu Kano and Alhaji Ali Batan Yerima
Balla, at Gombi, on 7/4/1977. Yerima Balla was the president of
the Kilba Tribal Union.
2. The subject of "tribalism" in Nigerian politics captured the attention
of scholars, especially during the period just before and, indeed,
on the outbreak of the civil war. For example, see Akintunde, J.O.,
"The Demise of Democracy in the First Republic of Nigeria: A casual
analysis", in Odu, IV (No. 2, 1967), pp. 3-28; Oyediran, 0., "The
role of Ethnicity and Partisanship in the Politics of Nigerian
Students", in Odu, IV (No. 2, 1968), pp. 3-29; Nnoli, 0., "The
Dynamics of Ethnic politics in Nigeria", in Odu, New Series, No. 14
(1976), pp. 3-25; Sofola, J.A., "Some Aspects of Pre-crisis Inter-
ethnic Relations in Nigeria: The Yoruba Repatriates' Social Relations
in the Former Eastern Region", in The Nigerian Journal of Economic
and Social Studies, XII (No. 1, 1970), pp. 115-132.Also see Anon.,
"Reflections on the Nigerian Revolution", in South Atlantic Quarterly,
Autumn 1966, and Onwubu, C., "Ethnic identity, Political Integration
and National Development: The Igbo Diaspora in Nigeria", Journal of
Modern African Studies, XIII (No. 3, Septebmer 1975), pp» 399-413o
3. This phrase is coined and ably analysed by Mafeje, A., "The Ideology
of Tribalism", Journal of Modern African Studies, IX (No. 2, August
1971), pp. 253-261. " " ~
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as the enemy of all tribal groups, Muslims and non-Muslims alike. But
in the Middle Belt areas, the whole purpose of political organization
was, first and foremost, to resist Muslim domination of their region.
Historically, these areas were Gwari (pagan) areas and as such the
legitimate targets for slave raiders. Their plight was changed by
colonization and, especially, by the introduction of Christianity and
Mission Schools. Their first political awareness"'" came about in the
1950's and it manifested itself in their attempt to assert their tribal
identity by their control of their local political institutions.
Subsequently, they realized that they were in a hopeless numerical
minority in the Northern Region and that the Muslim majority would
continue to rule the North for a long time to come. Their solution was
to demand a separate Middle Belt Region to be carved out of the then
Northern Region in which Hausa/Fulani Muslims were dominant. Hence,
their politics was primarily anti-Muslim and anti-Hausa/Fulani; indeed
against everything the "North" stood for. Thus N.E.P.U. which was
based in the Muslim North and vrhich seemed to articulate the grievances
of the Hausa/Fulani Talakawa against their Muslim rulers, was ultimately
rejected in the Middle Belt Areas.
The most important wings of the N.E.P.U. were the youth and women's
wings of the party. The first of these originated in the "Askianist
Movement" (see Chapter IT,pp. 212-2 13) which in 1952 temporarily changed
1. M. Dent's article in Mackintosh, on. cit., analysed Tiv political
awareness in detail. In addition, see Doraard,D.C., "The Development
of the British Colonial Administration among the Tiv, 1900-1949",
in African Affairs, LXVIII (No. 273, October 1969), pp. 316-333;
and "Ethnography and Administration: A study of Anglo-Tiv misunder¬
standing" , in Journal of African History, XV (No. 3, 1974), pp.
457-477. These two articles provide useful background on political
development and awakening in Tiv Division.
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its name to "Northern Aminiyya Movement", and. from time to time called
itself "The Northern Askianist (Aminiyya) Movement"„ It was devoted
to disseminating among the youth N.S.P.U.'s class analysis of Northern
Nigeria and especially to inflame the traditional animosity between the
Habe stock and the members of the Fulani ruling classes. In April 1952,
it restated its aims and objectives as follows"*":
1) This society is properly established , therefore, there
is no objection to its interference in the matter of
constitutions whether just or unjust.
2) It agrees with the existence of Emirs but in future it
wants the people to have control of the conduct of affairs.
3) It has the firm aim of ending the oppression of old
persons without family support who die of hunger in the
market for lack of attention.
4) If there is an opportunity it will establish a school
with a wide curriculum of subjects so that people may
understand their condition and demand justice, which is
their due from those in authority over them.
5) The society will cooperate with any society which has the
good of this country at heart although it may differ in
opinion from it.
6) It will help anyone bs he rich or poor who is oppressed,
especially he who has truth on his side, and every effort
will be made to see that he gets his just demands.
7) It will demand economic development so that business may
prosper and traders enjoy prosperity in a spirit of friendship.
8) Every effort will be made to see that Europeans take their
hands out of the affairs of the country, especially affairs
of finance.
9) It will advise educated and intelligent persons on certain
subjects which may cause peaceful and prosperous progress.
Obviously, in colonial Nigeria some of the above objectives were
clearly seditious but legal action could not be taken either due to its
obscure language or a deliberate policy to ignore N.E.P.U. and its
2
auxiliaries or both.
1. Points 1-9 are quoted from N.A.M.' s aims and objectives, a copy of
which is with M. Uba Taura (see footnote 1, p. 217 ). See NAK,
File No. 45, ZAR PROF, pp. 79-84, for an official report on the
activities of the N.A.M.
2. Official concern on the N.A.M. clearly showed in the NAK File,
ibid., especially in pp. 38-39. However, there was a standing
instruction (see footnote 3, p. 249 ) in confidential circular No.
Sec. 100 of 13th June 1952 which explained that the Government
policy towards N.E.P.U. was "As far as is practicable, to ignore it
until or unless its members indulge in activities which are contrary
to law or threaten a breach of the peace." NAK, File ibid., p. 19.
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A second youth organization which came into existence in 1953 but
was very quickly dissolved in 1954 when its actions proved embarrassing
to N.E.P.U. was the Positive Action Wing. The P.A.W. was especially
formed to protect N.E.P.U. members against N.P.C.'s Jam'iyvar Mahaukata"^.
literally "Madmen's Party", which was a group of political "enforcers"
founded in 1953 and known to have existed in Kano only. This group was
purposely organized by the N.P.C. to disrupt a political tour of Northern
Nigeria by A.G. politicians led by the late Chief S.L. Akintola. But
2
after the Kano riot of 1953 they began to attack N.E.P.U. members,
hence N.E.P.U. reacted by organising P.A.W. supposedly in self defence;
but the P.A.W. turned out to be even more violent, hence its dissolution
in 1954c3
In 1954, the AskLanist Movement was succeeded by Rundunan Samarin
Sawaba (R.S.S.)^ literally "The Freedom Youth Wing". This was a youth
1. Dudley, op. cit. , pp. 24-25, implies that Inuwa had a hand in its
formation to retaliate on the A.G. delegation the humiliation
suffered by Northern politicians at Lagos in 1953c Whitaker, on.
cit.. p. 386 says Yan Mahaukata existed in Bida, Lafiya and Chafe,
but he mentioned no source or even date (year). Perhaps similar
positive action groups existed in other areas, (see footnote 3,
below), but according to the writer's knowledge as Dan Sawaba.
there is no evidence of its existence anywhere outside Kano.
2. A copy of the official report on Kano riot, Report on the Kano
Disturbances in May 1953. is available in NAK. Although in Appendix
B, p. 46, of this report, Inuwa Wada was said to be involved in
organizing the J.M., no evidence was produced against him. Bello,
Alhaji Sir Ahmadu, op. cit.. pp. 110-134, discusses the background
to Kano disturbances.
3o As both the J.M. and P.A.W. were underground organizations, infor¬
mation about them is scanty; what information exists is as horrific
as it is legendary. However, it is a well known fact that whenever
and wherever law and order broke down, political bodies did organize
their own security guards and that varied from area to area. For
instance N.E.P.U. had mysterious associations known as Al.janun Dare
(Midnight Fairies) at Jos, and Al.ianun Tsakar Rana (Dare Devils) at
Potiskum. But still no one speaks about these bodies and, as far
as we know, their records are not available.
4. The President of the R.S.S., Alhaji Tijjani Gago, informed the writer
that Ihe lost all his papers in police raids at Jos. While the
Secretary General, Alhaji Jibril Zololo, explained that what remained
of their official files were removed by the police in 1966 when the
new military regime banned all political parties.
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1
brigade which was to N.E.P.U. what the "Zikist Movement"'"' was to N.C.NoC.,
2
and the "Young Pioneers" to Ekrumah's C.P.P. in Ghana. R.S.5. was the
most successful and, indeed, the most influential of N.E.P0U.'s youth
wings. It had a special representative in both N.E.C. and the C.W.C.
But constant wrangling for leadership within the R.S.S. greatly
weakened it in late 1962. Furthermore, it adopted a policy of con¬
frontation toward N.P.C. after the 1961 elections and it advocated
"positive action" against government and N.A. officials, all of whom
they thought were the accomplices of N.P.C. in defeating N.E.P.U. in
the 1961 Regional Elections. This position was seen by the N.E.P.U.
leadership as dangerous and fruitless, and as a result of these incessant
disagreements between the R.S.S. and its parent body the former ceased
to exist in 1963.
In 1955, a religiously inspired body, Zahral Hag, literally "The
Truth is Revealed", was formed: the revelation being N.E.P.U.'s
interpretation that "Islam is the religion of fighters for freedom who
pursue justice and righteousness; the religion of those who crave for
3
freedom and independence; the school of resisters of exploitation."
According to N.E.P.U.'s interpretation of the Qur'an, "Islam is as much
opposed to political authoritarianism as it is to economic exploitation
and injustice hence a religious person is simultaneously a fighter
4
against oppression and cruelty." Two other youth wings of N.E.P.U.
existed at about the same time with R.S.S. Those were Tabi'unal Haa.
1. See Olusanya, G.O., The Second World War and Politics in Nigeria,
1933-1953 (Lagos, 1973), especially pp. 112-117 and 120-123.
2. See Austin, D., Politics in Ghana, 1946-1960 (Oxford, 1964).
3. Interview with Sadi Gabari, the President of Zahral Haa, in Kano,
1976.
4. For this quote and the subsequent information I am indebted to
Alhaji Aminu Kano, interviewed in London on 12/ll/l979.
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literally "Those who follow the path of Truth" , and Nu.iumun Zaman ,
literally, "The start of new era". The latter was a young pioneer
group whose aims were to recruit youth in their teens into the N.E.P.Uo
whereas the former was mainly concerned with the organization of the
political education of Qur'anic Malams.,
As their name showed, the Zaman was an aspect of N.E.P.U. 's strategy
to create a new society in Northern Nigeria. The aim was to replace
in the minds of the young, the Hausa concept of Biyayya. "obedience",
with Mutunci, "human dignity". The difference is that whereas Biyayya
is often manifested by slavish attitudes towards superior.Mutunci is
characterized by psychological humanism, i.e. the ability to respect
the dignity of every man. In this way Mutunci is an inner spirit which
is demonstrated by one's ability to respect the human dignity residing
in the individual. In order to achieve that goal members of the Zaman
were taught some Islamic fundamental tenets which could be the basis
of a democratic society and government, notably:
1) The supremacy of God, which means the rejection of all idolatry
including personality cult and Emir worship. In that way N.E.P.U.
asserted that there was no place for monarchy and, worse still,
hereditary rulership in Islam.
2) Justice and equality under the law which is a negation of class
distinction based on any criterion.
1. Its President General was M. Habu Makwalla. It very quickly spread
in the Northern provinces and was particularly strong in Katsina,
Jos and Zaria. The writer knows and recently had an interview
(August 1978) with its former Secretary, M. Shitu Tela, at Potiskum.
2. Because this body was mainly concerned with youth in their teens
its leadership is not well remembered. Also in 1958 it was out¬
lawed by the Northern Regional Government, hence documents
concerning Zaman were destroyed in panic.
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3) The principle of accountability and responsibility; the participation
of people in running their own affairs.
4) That it is offensive to human dignity to take off one's shoes for
anyone and kneel down in greeting anybody in authority, etc.
Members of the Zarnan greeted each other by raising one finger up and
saying Allah Dava, literally "God is Alone", meaning we ought to obey
God rather than man.
To N.E.P.U. those teachings were "categorical imperatives" if the
hearts of the youth were to be changed with the view to changing the
"decadent" Hausa society in the futureD The government was quick to
see the writing on the wall and so the young pioneer groups were quickly
proscribed under the Northern Region of Nigeria Children and Young Persons
Law of 1958. The law made it illegal for children under the age of 16
to engage in politics or to join any political school.
2
N.E.P.U. women's wing under the leadership of Hajiya Gambo Sawaba
had great significance in Northern Nigeria in the sense that it made
real efforts to involve women in politics. Unfortunately, most of its
3
members were unmarried women as many married women in the Emirates
remained in purdah. Nevertheless, it ma'de its impact felt when it
1. NAK has a copy of Northern Region Law No. 28 of 1958, especially
pp. 33-35o Dudley, on. cit., pp. 174-175 superficially describes
N.E.P.U. youth wings; and Sklar, on. cit.. pp. 419-20, mentions
them briefly but contains useful footnotes.
2. Sklar, on. cit.. p. 419 footnotes 99 and 100, discusses the training
and the leadership of the women's wing. Hajiya Gambo herself
emphasized the influence of Mrs. Ransome Kuti, the N.C.N.C. women's
leader from Abeokuta, Western Nigeria, upon her. See Trust (Nigeria),
July 1978, pp. 5-6.
3. Hajiya Gambo Sawaba, the women's leader, was then married to a
policeman in Zaria whereas the Secretary, Malama Ladi Shehu, was
then a housewife. In addition she was a teacher in a girls' secondary
school at Kakuri-Kahuna South. The fact still remained that not
many married women in the Muslim North had the opportunity to
participate in public affairs.
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campaigned vigorously for women's suffrage in the North. N.E.P.U.'s
liberal teachings and unrelenting activities on the liberation of
women (see below) provoked zestful discussions and heated debates in
the Muslim North. The net result of this was that other parties,
especially N.P.C, imitated N.E.P.U. by attempting to organize women,
although for different purposes. Whereas N.E.P.U.'s primary objective
was to emancipate women and thereby to involve them in all public
affairs, N.P.C. was determined to contain women and thus to maintain
the status quo which kept women as subordinates of their male counter¬
parts. N.E.P.U.'s limited success in organizing women was that it
trained women who on their own kept the agitation for their emancipation
alive and thus put a big question mark on the role of women in the
traditional North where they had been subservient and very much relegated
to the background in almost everything.
N.E.P.U. believed that "there is no justification in Islam for
purdah or for the ^Subordination of women."''' The party explained that
Islamic political theory and practice "are the first to emancipate women
by giving them equal rights with men in their civic responsibilities as
well as guaranteeing them comparable place with men on the platform of
2
fundamental human rights." On the equality of all human beings
references were made to the Qur'an and the Hadith to confirm the equality
of all sexes in Islam. For example, the Qur'an teaches that all people
are created equal and classified into tribes and nations so as to "know"
themselves and that in the eyes of God the best among them are the most
1. This and the subsequent quotation are from n$r interview with
Hajiya Gambo Sawaba at Zaria in 1976.
2. This point was supported and, indeed, elaborated upon by my
colleague Dr. M.T. Liman of the Dept. of Arabic, Bayero University,
Kano.
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pious."'" The implication of this Qur'anic teaching is that the quality
of piety does not discriminate between the sexes. Piety manifests
itself in a man or a woman in his or her behaviour, morality, honesty,
dedication to duty and positive contribution to society.
In order to encourage women to make their own positive contribu¬
tion to society, women participated in all N.E.P.U. schools and many
of them, notably Amina Karamba, became teachers in such schools. The
party believed that the only thing which debarred women from participating
in public affairs was ignorance:
They are ignorant about health and child care. Their
heads are full of superstitions, legends and apathy.
Incapable of devising any new thing, they submit to
fate and to the work of medicine men, witches or to the
power of prayer. 2
In order to overcome that ignorance N.EoP.U. did not stop in attempting
to educate its women members, it also urged all its supporters to send
their daughters — the future mothers— to school. The party explained
that:
The girls of today are the true educators of citizens
in the society of tomorrow. It would be useless to
teach in schools principles that are contradicted in
homes governed by ignorant mothers ... If this assertion
is accepted, the logical conclusion is that education
of girls is more important than that of boys.
1. This is paraphrased from an unpublished paper by Dr. M.T.A. Liman,
"Women's Franchise in Islam", p. 4. I suppose the argument here
is that since Qur'anic teaching does not specify that the male is
superior to the female the imagined superiority of men over women
is man-made and thus ought to be changed to ensure the equality
of both sexes.
2. This and the following quotations were made by Alhaji Aminu Kano,
the N.E.P.U. leader, cited by Adamu, A1 Rashid Haround, The Worth
and Nigerian Unity: Some Reflections on the •political, social and
educational problems of Northern Nigeria (Zaria. 1973). P. 55. The
writer remembers very clearly many touring N.E.P.U. officials
using the same arguments and subsequently urging all N.E.P.U. women
members to attend adult literacy classes and thereby get rid of
their illiteracy and ignorance.
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N.E.P.U.'s firm stand on the emancipation of women was based more
on the balance of rights than on the equality of rights with mena The
party referred to the works of leading Muslims^, including Shehu Usman
Dan Fodio, to support its stand. N.E.P.U. supporters also wrote
2
profusely on the "True position of women in Islam". N.S.P.U.'s policy
on women's education and the numerous hand-outs produced by the party
on the subject were all largely adaptations from Aminu Kano's 1947
dissertation on girls' education for the Institute of Education, London
3
University.
N.E.P.U. and Trade Unions
Although some N.E.P.U. leaders had personal contacts with central
labour unions no trade union was officially affiliated to the party.
1. For example, some of the works of Shehu Usman Dan Fodio are avail¬
able. among others, in Hodgkin, T.L., Nigerian Perspectives (Oxford,
1975;, pp. 254-255; Ogunbiyi, I.A., "The Position of Muslim Women
as Stated by Uthman b. FudI", in Odu, New Series, No. 1-2 (1969),
pp. 45-60. Also see Brown, N. G. and Hiskett, M. (eds.), Conflict
and Harmony in Education in Tropical Africa (London. 1974), especially
Chapter II, pp. 134-168, and 247-270. On the same theme in North
Africa and the Middle East, see Beck, L., and Neddie, N. (eds.),
Women in the Muslim World (Cambridge, Mass., 1978), especially
Part One, pp. 35-226. Afza, N,, and Ahmed, K., The position of
Woman in Islam (Karachi, 1969), is an interesting comparison of
the position of woman in Islam and Christianity. For a useful
contribution towards understanding the position of woman in Muslim
parts of Northern Nigeria, see Adamu, Al-Rashid Haroun, Matsayin
Arewa A Tarayyar Ni.jeriya (Zaria, 1973).
2. The most controversial of these were the articles written by Alhaji
Isa Wali, "The True Position of Women in Islam", in Nigerian Citizen.
Zaria; the copies of this paper and the articles for the month of
July and August 1956 are in NAK. Alhaji Isa Wali was one of the
founder members of J.M.A. (see footnote 2, p. 220 ,No. 6). He was
the Nigerian High Commissioner in Ghana from 1964 until# his
untimely death in 1967. For a general study on the position of
women in Islam, see V.R. and L. Bevan Jones, Woman in Islam
(Lucknow, 1941)»
3. See Aminu Kano, The Problems of Girls' Education in a Muslim Emirate:
Kano, Northern Nigeria (Presented to the Institute of Education,
London University, in partial fulfilment of the requirement for
Diploma certificate in Education, 1947).
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However, N.E.P.U. identified itself with workers' interests and some
individual trade unionists were known to be the party's supporters.
For instance, the late Gogo Chu Nzeribe considered N.E.P.U. to be "The
most conscious radical political organization in the country."^" Mr.
G.C. Nzeribe was a strong supporter of IT.S.P.U. Another left wing trade
2
unionist, Mr. Eskor Toyo taught off and on at N.E.P.U. political
school in 1959-1964. Alhaji Ibrahim Nock^ was also associated with
N.E.P.U. and N.P.F., especially in 1963-1964, i.e. just before he
identified himself with N.P.C. N.E.P.U.'s inability to win direct
support of the trade unions was due to the fact that Nigerian workers'
unions were then essentially "house unions" organized around a single
employer, not "trade unions" based on trade or professional groups, as
4
is the case in the industrialized countries of Western Europe.
Consequently, most individual unions in the North were at the mercy of
their employers and of the Government and, therefore, dared not openly
oppose the Government party; worse still, support a radical political
party: that was in contrast to the role of the trade unions in the
South in the 1940's, especially in their relationship with N.C.N.C.,
Zikist wing. However, Nigerian politics, even after independence,
remained largely determined by ethnic cleavages and that obscured the
1. Quoted in West Africa (No. 2502), 15 May 1965, p. 533. Gogo was the
General Secretary of Post and Telecommunications Workers' Union in
Nigeria. The circumstances of his murder at Lagos in 1967 are yet
to be known.
2. Esko, as he is fondly remembered by his N.E.P.U. comrades, is now
Dr. Esko Toyo, a Senior Lecturer in Sociology at the University of
Calabar.
3. Ibrahim Nock was the General Secretary of Northern Federation of
Labour, the only trade union to be officially affiliated to a
political party (N.P.C.). See Ananaba, W., Trade Union Movement in
Nigeria (London, 1969), p. 127. For his brief honeymoon with N.P.P.,
see Dudley, or. cit., p. 324.
4. For a comprehensive study of trade unions and politics in Nigeria
(heavily biased on Southern Nigeria), see Cohen, R., Labour and
Politics in Nigeria, 1945-1971 (London, 1974).
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true interests of working men0 Hence the politically unenlightened
workers (especially in the North) remained politically divided by
their ethnic differences because they understood little (if any)
about real economic and political issues. Thus, if any union tried to
identify itself with any political party it would certainly lose those
of its members who were tribally opposed to the party.
Another reason why N.E.P.U. did not win direct and open trade
union support was partly because there were neither strong unions nor
conscientious trade unionists in the North, and partly because in
post-colonial Nigeria (1960-1966) trade unionists were competing for
political patronage from the governments of the Federation and so it
was not materially rewarding to identify themselves with an opposition
party."'" A sizable proportion of Northern workers were not organised
in trade unions and those who were organized did not pay their union
2
fees regularly, even after the introduction of "check-off system" in
1. Dudley, on. cit., pp. 239-41, discussed the political role of trade
unions on the tin mines in Jos. But the political involvement of
trade unions in politics even on the mines was more apparent than
real. For example, trade unionists like S.U. Bassey (N.T.U.C.)
was a sponsored member of the N.C.N.C. in the House of Representatives,
Lagos; M.A. Inuwa (U.L.C.) was a special member of N.P.C. in the
House of Assembly, Kaduna; both of them were in their repsective
parties as individuals not because their respective unions were
officially affiliated either to N.P.C. or N.C.N.C. The Northern
Federation of Labour was officially affiliated to N.P.C. because,
as Ananaba, ¥., ot>. cit. , p. 127, explained,the N.F.L. was wholly
sponsored by N.P.C. to "stage war against Southerners" in the North.
N.F.L. had virtually no fee paying trade union affiliated to it and
thus it was a labour off-shoot of N.P.C.
2. A system in which the union dues were directly deducted from a
worker's wages by the employer on behalf of the ■unions. But even
at that the law made it the discretion of the employers to introduce
the system. Some did, but on the condition that whenever the workers
went on strike it was withdrawn and thus its continuity had to be
renegotiated between the unions and the management after every strike
action. Indeed, that condition was a disincentive hence a great
limitation on unions which were already financially weak to attempt
a strike action. A further handicap was that many workers took the
option not to be union members and, as non-union members, they did
not contribute to the union's purse although they always reaped the
benefits of the unions' negotiations with the employers on behalf
of all the workers.
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in 1965. Therefore they were financially so weak that they had no
career structure and thus did not attract intelligent officials,
subsequently trade union officials were largely "careerists", who were
prepared to compromise or even to betray the interests of their members
in return for some material reward,,"'' The only thing that was certain
about many of them was their support for the government of the day no
matter how detrimental its policies were to the working men. The
foregoing notwithstanding, N.E.P.U. always sought redress for the
grievances of the workers as part of the exploited class and both the
trade unions and their members featured prominently in the party's
election manifestoes.
Party Discipline and Central Authority
There was very strong discipline in N.E.P.U. For example, Abba
Maikwari was expelled from the party for conducting unauthorized
2
negotiations for alliance with A.G. in 1954„ The only conflict between
the party and a Parliamentarian resulted in the expulsion of the
Parliamentarian from the party. In 1957, M„ Isiyaku Gwamna, N,E„P«U.
member for Jos central constituency, in the Northern House of Assembly,
was expelled from the party for proposing in the House that members be
3
given loans by the government for the purchase of private cars. In
1. The effect of trade unionists' opportunism on the Nigerian working
man is variously analysed by different authors. For example, see
Cohen, R., op. cit., pp. 70-144 and 145-179; Ananaba, ¥., on. cit.,
pp. 86-97 and 141-154; and Waterman, P., "Communist Theory in the
Nigerian Trade Union Movement", Politics and Society, III (No. 3>
Spring 1973), pp. 283-312. See also Post, K.W.J., "Nationalism and
Politics in Nigeria: A Marxist approach", The Nigerian Journal of
Economic and Social Studies. 71 (No. 2, 1964), pp. 167-175; and
Dudley, B.J., "Marxism and political change in Nigeria", in ibid.,
pp. 155-165, both of which lament the careerist tendency in the
labour movement.
2. Interview with Alhaji Aminu Kano in London on 12/ll/l979.
3. For his speech see Northern Regional House of Assembly Debates,
Official Report, March 6, 1957, p„ 605; and for a brief discussion
on party discipline in N.E.P.U., see Sklar, op. cit., pp. 420-421.
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principle, N.E.P.U. opposed the bestowal of unnecessary monetary rewards
upon parliamentarians which widened the gap between them and the people
they represented and consequently elevated them into the privileged
classes. N.E.P.U. believed that the personal style of life of all the
members of government ought to be exemplary, and it called for moral
restraint, economic frugality and a generally simple way of living by
all leaders national and local. The party hoped that such personal
examples by public figures would give the government the moral
authority to enforce austerity measures in all public life.
Another important member of N.E.P.U. (then he was the first
National Vice President), Alhaji Ibrahim Imam , was expelled from the
party in June 1958, when he entered negotiations with the A.G. for
alliance without the consent or consultation with the party. As Alhaji
Ibrahim Imam was also the leader of Borno Youth Movement (B.Y.M.),
the alliance between N.E.P.U. and B.Y.M. automatically dissolved and
B.Y.M. then entered into a new alliance with A.G. It is relevant to
note that B.Y.M. was a political extension of "Borno Youth Improvement
Association" (B.Y.I.A.) founded by Alhaji Ibrahim in 1949, for the
purposes of reforming social habits and building up a healthy Kanuri
patriotism. The association wanted a changed status for women as well
as the ending of the Kanuri habit of wearing knives and carrying amulets
and other evidence of superstition among the peoples of Borno. It also
favoured the development of a written Kanuri language. The Association
1. For protraits of Alhaji Ibrahim Imam, see "The Member from Bornu",
in Nest Africa (No. 1885), 11 April 1953, p. 315; and "Leader of
Opposition", in Nest Africa (No. 2068) 8 December 1956, p. 989.
Also Dudley, op. cit., pp. 88-89.
2. Because it was a cultural association the B.Y.I.A. made no political
impact in Borno until 1955-56. See "Unrule and Undivide", in Nest
Africa (No. 1958), September 1954, p. 821.
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also encouraged the simplification of dress for their fellow countrymen
because it believed that the current voluminous robes of the Kanuris
slowed down action,, The B.Y.I.A. remained essentially a cultural
association like the J.M.A. until Ibrahim Imam resigned from the
N.P.C. in 1954c1
On his resignation as the General Secretary of the N.P.C. and from
the party as a whole, Ibrahim Imam became like a fish out of water0 In
order to build an independent political base for himself, Imam returned
to Maiduguri where he secretly converted the B.Y„I.A0 from a cultural
2
body to a political one in 1955® No sooner was B.Y.M. declared a
political party than it established a working understanding with
N.E.P.U. Having accused N.P.C. leadership of "being reactionary
3
Imperialist agents who fear radical changes in the North" , Imam saw
himself as a radical and thus found a natural ally in N.EoP.U.
The B.Y.M. was a federalist party which believed in "one Nigeria".
It did not advocate the separation of Borno province from the Northern
Region hence its- alliance with the n.E.p.U. However, the B.Y.M./n.E.P.U.
alliance was more than anything else an electoral strategy. The
reformist ideas of B.Y.M. were very popular in Borno's capital, Maiduguri,
resulting in the party winning the two Maiduguri urban seats in the
1956 Regional Elections. Thus, rather than contest elections separately
and split the votes (and possibly make way for the victory of their
common opponent, N.P.C.), N.E.P.U. and B0YoMo allied against and defeated
1. See Dudley, on. cito, p0 110, footnote 60o
2. Interview with Malam Ben Waffy at Maiduguri in 1978. M. Waffy was
a founder member of B.Y0M.; and later he became a leading member
of N.E.P.U. at Jos. He was a U.A.G. (N) Ltd. manager at Yola, Leu
and Jos before he retired from the company. He now lives in
Maiduguri.
3® Alhaji Ibrahim Imam, cited in West Africa (No. 194l), 8 May 1954j
p. 410.
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the ruling party. That agreement (or understanding) between N.E.P.U.
and B.Y.M. ended in 1958 when Alhaji Ibrahim Imam led B.Y.M. into
alliance with A.G.^"
As we explained earlier, after the 1961 Regional Elections,
N.E.P.U. was greatly weakened mainly because of its continuing alliance
with IToC.N.C. In addition there was increased decline in morale due to
internal dissension and strife. Also due to lack of finance, some
full-time officers became jealous of the party's parliamentarians.
As a result, some N.E.P.U. leaders (mainly based in Zaria) broke away
from the party and formed the "Northern Elements Freedom Organization"




N.E.P.U. parliamentary candidates were first selected by the
party's election committee (1956). But later (1959, 1961 and 1964) all
1. Sklar, on. cit., pp. 338-344, discusses the impact of communalism
and populism in Borno.
2. Interview with Alhaji Aliyu Mahmud in Kano, March 1978. In addition
to being a leading member of N.E.P.U. Aliyu Mahmud was a hotel
proprietor at Zaria and later at Maiduguri. He is now a successful
businessman based in Kano, and a N.P.N, member of the House of
Representatives, Lagos. According to Aliyu Mahmud, his main reason
for leading the N.E.F.O. in 1961 was because N.E.P.U. was not
benefitting by its alliance with N.C.N.C. In fact, he felt that
N.E.P.U. made no electoral head-way in the North because of its
association with the Ibos. It should be remembered that when Abba
Maikwaru was expelled from N.E.P.U. in 1954 he also formed a body
called N.E.F.O. which died a natural death because most of the
leaders who went along with Abba Maikwaru, later took gainful
employment either in the Northern Nigerian civil service (like
Magaji Danbatta) or in the private sector (like Abba Kashiya).
Dudley, op. cit., p. 87 (see also his footnote 47, p. 109), refers
to the U.N.M. as one of the splinter groups in 1954. But the
U.N.M. was the predecessor to R.S.S. (see Chapter IV, p. 212 ). It
was voluntarily dissolved in favour of R.S.S. in 1954 (see pp.
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candidates were selected by their respective constituency election
committees subject to the approval of the provincial Selection Boards
and their ratification of the N.E.C.^" The various election committees
were largely responsible for electoral financing. A manifestation of
the degree of centralization in N.E.P.U. was when in 1959 some of the
2
party's candidates contested election in constituencies where they were
neither natives nor residents: a risk rarely taken by any other Nigerian
3
political party. That was done because the party members were made to
believe that a capable Nigerian should contest election anywhere in the
country: a belief which was in keeping with the party's concept of
" one Nigeria" .
Finance
NoEoP.Uo's known sources of finance were its membership fees of
one shilling (l/-) and then the monthly contribution of sixpence (6d)
per member; the lecture fee of three pence (3d); special levies and
money collected from dances organized by party branches; income derived
from the sales of party literature, emblems, badges, flags, etc. The
party also received generous donations from its financially better-off
4
members and supporters. Under the terms of their agreement for an
1. That practice was a mere formality to ensure that the local election
committee made a "good" choice in the first place. Both the
provincial selection board and the N.E.C. never rejected selections
made by the constituency election committee.
2. For constituency delimitation, and nomination system in N.E.P.U.
in contrast with other parties, see Whitaker, on. cit., pp. 369-370;
Sklar, on. cit., p. 421; and Post, K.W.J., Nigerian Federal Elections
1959 (Oxford, 1963), pp. 244-245.
3. In fact, the only exception was when in 1961, Alhaji Ibrahim Imam,
a Kanuri from Borno, won election in Jamgbar constituency in Tiv
Division, Benue province, on A.G. platform and with the help of U.N.B.C.
4. Interview with Alhaji Aminu Kano in London on 12/ll/l979. Alhaji
Aminu Kano recalled a contribution of £12 made by one Alhaji Aw.ce at
Sharanshi in 1951, i.e. soon after N.E.P.U. was formed. The writer
collected secret donations for the party from prosperous businessmen
at Potiskum in 1959-1961. Also see Uhitaker, op. cit.. p. 335,
footnote 13.
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alliance N.C.N.C. bore the running cost of N.E.P.U. National Secretariat
and paid the salaries of all the national officers of the party (see
footnote 1, pp.220-221 ); also the N.C.N.C. paid most of N.E.P.U.'s
election expenses."'" In 1959, N.E.P.U. received a contribution of
twelve cars and some substantial amount of money from Dr. Kwame Nkrumah
2
in Ghana but there is no evidence this help continued. The party's
annual budget was about £4,000 which was for the personal emoluments
and the general upkeep of the National Secretariat; all branches were
supposed to be financially self-sufficient.
Party Sociology
In general, while N0E0PoU0's active cadres were farmers who also
followed a second occupation such as petty trading, blacksmithing,
3
butchery, etc. , the party leadership was drawn far more from full-time
petty traders, craftsmen, shopkeepers and labourers, especially at
provincial or branch level. Pew of them had aristocratic origins.
Many salaried clerks and technical workers employed by N.A.s and other
educated individuals covertly supported N.E.P.U. but were inhibited from
assuming leadership roles by their career considerations. Among the
N.E.P.U. national leadership, the presence of certain "well bom"
individuals was significant in the early 1950's. Aminu Kano is a member
of an eminent Pulani family of Muslim jurists and the members of his
extended family still dominate the religious and judicial institutions
1. There is more speculative discussion on N.E.P.U. finances in Dudley,
op, cit. , pp. 179-81; Post, ot>. cit. (1963), p<> 153.
2. Interview with Alhaji Adamu Abubakar J ajire, Potiskum, 1976.
3. Interview with Alhaji Yusuf Maitama Sulei, in Kano on 30/3/1977.
In Skinner, N., on. cit., pp. 65-76, Alhaji Mahmudu Koki discussed
various taxes, their organization and collection in Kano Emirate,
the base of N.E.P.U.
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in Kano. One of the patrons of N.E.P.U., Malam Abubakar Tambuwal, is a
descendant of Shehu Usman Dan Fodio, a member of the Atikawa"*" royal
family in Sokoto and, as such, a distant cousin of both the Sardauna
and the Sultan of Sokoto. The late Alhaji Abubakar Zukogi, the
2
General Secretary of N.S.P.U., was a member of the Masaba ruling dynasty
in Bida. Alhaji Ali Batan Yerima Balla, is a title holder in Kilba
District of Adamawa Division. There were many others who either by
conviction or through frustration have abandoned their ascribed status
3
in favour of an achieved one through the N.S.P.U.
But as from 1955 there occurred marked changes in the composition
of N.E.P.U. leadership; changes in their social background, education
and occupation, as Tables V and VI below show. Those changes were due
to an increase in political awareness among the rank and file of the
1. The members of the Sokoto royal house are now drawn from two lineages:
the Bellawa, i.e. the descendants of Muhammadu Bello (Mai-',furno).
the first among the sons of Shehu Usman Dan Fodio to become the
Sultan in 1817-1837; the Atikawa are the descendants of Abubakar
Atiku (Mai-Katuru), the second son of Shehu Usman Dan Fodio and the
full brother of Muhamraadu Bello, who became the Sultan of Sokoto
in 1837-1842. See Hogben, S.J. and Kirk-Greene, A.H.M., The
Emirates of Northern Nigeria (London, 1966), p. 414; and Abdullahi,
B., "Story behind Sokoto Dynasty", in World Peace, II (No. 6, June
1978), p. 9. Bello, Alhaji Sir Ahmadu, op. cit.. p. x.
2. See his obituary by Candido, the man behind the mask, "Late Zukogi —
a fearless patriot",in New Nigerian.Wednesdav. 7 June 1978. Alhaji
Zukogi was also the Ciroma of Bida. The traditional title of
Ciroma is given to the heir apparent in Hausaland and it probably
has the same status in Nupeland (Bida). Masaba was the second son
of Malam Dendo (Manko), the founder of the Fulani Etsuzhi Nupe.
Masaba ruled 1841-1847. His son Abubakar was the Etsu Nupe 1895-
1901 and he fought against the British until his death. Abubakar
Zukogi was the grandson of Etsu Abubakar. See Hogben and Kirk-
Greene, op. cit. . p. 282.
3. Further see Whitaker, op, cit., pp. 329-31 and 441-46. There was
a relatively high proportion of patricians in the N.E.P.U. leadership
both at the provincial and branch levels, especially in 1951-56.
A good number of them were attracted by N.E.P.U.'s call for a return
to Islamic puritanism. A comprehensive analysis of N.E.P.U.'s




EDUCATIONAL QUALIFICATION OF MEMBERS OF THE N.E.C o of Nf.E.P.U.
1954 1958 1962
No. No. No.
University Trained 1 5o5 3(c) 5 3(c ) 4.5
Secondary School 2 11 1 2 1 1.5
Middle IV (a) 7 39 55.5 5 8 15 2 3 9
Primary School 4 22 12 19 9 14
Illiterates (b) 4 22 43 65 51 77
TOTAL 18 99c 5 64 99.0 66 100
NOTES
(a) Roughly equivalent to two years past primary education,,
(b) I.e., not literate in English. Some of these, a small number,
certainly not more than 5 , are literate in Arabic.
(c) This is of course Aminu Kano alone in 1954 and two lawyers in 1958
and 1962 who had university training.
TABLE 6": 52
OCCUPATIONS OF N.E.P cU. MEMBERS OF N«S.C. 1954-1962
1954 1958 1962
No.t No. No.
Civil servants (a) 3 16.6 4 6 1 1.5
N.A. employees (b) 3 16.6 3 5 3 5.5
Employees of Commercial firms 2 11 66 6 9 26 - 13
Lawyers (c) - - 2 3 2 3
Teachers 4 22 2 3 2 3
Businessmen (d) 3 16.6 11 17 2 3
Petty Traders 2 11 23 36 36 54
Artisans (e) - - 6 9 10 15
Farmers 1 5.5 2 3 5 7.5
Others - - 5 8 5 7.5
TOTAL 18 99.3 64 99.,0 66 100.0
NOTES
(a) Junior Civil Servants, i.e. clerks and messengers.
(b) Composed as for (a).
(c) The two N.C.N.C. lawyers coopted into the N.E.P.U.'s N.E.C.
(d) Made up largely of small contractors, produce buyers, etc.
(e) Tailors, washermen, dyers, etc.
1. This table is taken from Dudley, op. cit., p. 178.
2. This table is taken from ibid., p. 177o
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party who were disillusioned by the Haaikata^ leaders of the party
and, consequently, asserted themselves in the party so as to run. it
in their own way and according to their own interests.
N.E.P.U. was started largely by the Maaikata, but between 1955 and
1958 the formerly Ammawa (the politically enlightened, or the most
political conscious, illiterates) became dominant in the party's N.E.C.
This replacement of the Western educated elites by the merely enlightened
illiterates is also reflected in the change of occupations of the
members of N.E.C. Table VI above shows this change very clearly, while
Table VII provides supplementary data from a wider sample, compiled by
R.L. Sklar, for the late 1950's.
TABLE 7:52
OCCUPATIONAL DATA ON THE NATIONAL OFFICERS, PRINCIPAL ADVISERS AND
PARLIAMENTARIANS OF N.E.P.U., 1957-1958
All employees 13 (20 )
Civil servants 4
N.A. employees 3
Employees of Commercial firms 4
Inderiendent Agents 2
Lawyers 2 (; 3
Teachers 2 1( 3
Businessmen 11 Is1?
Petty Traders 23 1 36
Artisans 6 (, 9
Farmers 2 (; 3
Others 5 <: s
1. A good number of N.E.P.U. leaders who belonged to the Haaikata
class (e.g. Maitama Sulei, Lamin Sanusi, etc.) later declared for
N.P.C. Some of them won elections as N.E.P.U. candidates (like
Ibrahim Mahmud, M.H.A., ex-N.A. Supervisor; Misau and M. Abdulmumini,
M.H.A., ex-District Head, Katsina, etc.) but crossed over to
government (N.P.C.) benches in the House of Assembly. Thus, N.E.P.U.
members believed that the Maaikata were using the party as a platform
to secure employment in the government. Hence they increasingly
elevated their own Talakawa fellows to the party leadership and to
parliamentary candidature.
2. This table is taken from Sklar, on. cit.. p. 337. This table is
weakened in that it probably took account only of those advisers whose
names appear in N.E.P.U. files. The fact was that there were more
workers (or employees) who were N.E.P.U. advisers, but whose names
did not appear anywhere (see p<246 )• Similarly, there were many
government (or N.A. subsidized)businessmen who were among the principal
NoE.P.U. advisers. I am still inclined to withhold such names in
writing although I am quite willing to discuss instances with
interested researchers/scholars.
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Both in the 1959 General Elections and in the 1961 Regional
Elections an increased number of disaffected N.A. employees and deposed
Emirs contested elections on N.E.P.U. platform. For instance, Me
Ahmadu, the deposed Lamiao of Adamawa, contested election in 1961 as a
N.E.P.U. candidate at Jada in Sardauna province. There were many other
formerly prominent figures who attempted to return to public life through
N.E.P.U. But even then such person were adopted as party candidates
only when there was no active member available to contest in that
constituency. In 1959 the position of non-Maaikata person in the N.S.P.U.
leadership was so strong that they injected more rank and file members
than any other category as N.E.P.U. candidates in the election of that
year. N.E.P.U. contested 117 out of 161 seats in the Northern Region,
during the 1959 General Election: out of that number 46 candidates
were petty traders; 19 were peasant farmers; 16 were professional
drivers; 9 were mechancis; and only about 20 candidates belonged to
the Maaikata class.
The distrust of the Maaikata by the rank and file members became
still more pronounced when after Northern Nigeria attained internal
self-government in 1959, the Maaikata were attracted to the sharply
increased opportunities for gainful employment in the public and the
private sectors of the economy. Thus Talakawa became dominant in N.E.P.U.
leadership and what remained of the party in 1965 depended heavily upon
them until 1966 when all political parties were banned in Nigeria.
N.E.P.U. was conceived as essentially a mass movement and a
reformist party and the most active of its supporters were those least
1. There is a more detailed analysis of the candidates of all the parties
in that election in Post, on. cit. (1963), PP= 277-283 and especially
Table X, p. 279»
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in thrall to hierarchical relationship, especially those of clientage.'*'
lost N.E.P.U. members were free of the complex relations between those
who use their influence, social position or some other attribute to
assist and protect others and those whom they so help ana protect.
Thus they were mainly petty traders, craftsmen, artisans, skilled
workers and young men about the town. They were less dependent for
their livelihood on the good will of eminent personages than were either
peasant farmers of the Atta.iirai (merchants). Moreover, they had common
grievances in connection with taxation, levies and other forms of
administrative extortions (see Chapter III). Other urban youth like
Gardawa (singular, Gardi. meaning mature students in Islamic Studies),
who were in towns in order to escape from the inevitable toil, severe
discipline and subservience of peasant life, were recruited into N.E.P.U.
Those were the group often called Yan Iska, literally, "sons of the wind".
This really means hooligans or irresponsible persons and in the Hausa
language the term Yan Iska (singular, Dan Iska) is a convenient term
of abuse which could apply to anyone whose behaviour or actions are
2
distasteful.
1. Both Nhitaker, op. cit.« pp. 373-375 and Smith, H.G..Government in
Zazzatt 1800-1950 (Oxford. I960), pp. 259-261, discussed patron and
client relationship from the narrow political or administrative
context. The fact is that the subject is much wider and far more
complex (and often confusing) than is realized. For example, in most
parts of Northern Nigeria there seems to be no clear distinction
between a slave and a servant; and what is today being done by civil
servants was the function of royal slaves in the traditional Emirates.
Clientage exists both overtly and covertly in all asepcts of the
society in Northern Nigeria. Thus its comprehensive examination is a
subject for a doctoral dissertation on its own, or that of post¬
doctoral work. Here, by clientage I mean simply the exchange of
personal labour, loyalty and obedience by a subordinate (client) in
return for the security, i.e. economic, political and social
protection provided by a superior (patron).
2. See Smith, Sir Bryan Sharwood, But Always as Friends (London, 1967),
who throughout his book insists that N.E.P.U. supporters were
"undesirable elements"; and ~;ihi taker, op. cit. , p. 380, who tells
us that another British official referred to all N.E.P.U. supporters
in/
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In the rural areas N.E.P.U. mobilized the peasantry by attempting
to champion their causes by complaining against maladministration on
their behalf, but the party's efforts to obtain redress were not always
especially in the Emirates, raised the expectations of many people
towards the realization of "social justice" and thus the policy won for
the party many sympathizers.
N.E.P.U. cadres, agents and the hard core of the party's supporters
mostly came from those who were economically independent but of low
social status. The party's voters were also drawn from the urban poor
and the peasants, often those belonging to a particular religious sect,
or ethnic group. The dilemma of the urban poor stemmed from the fact
that they moved from their respective villages less by their own will
than at the dictate of external compulsions — which they could neither
comprehend nor question — and the reactionary stance of their rulers.
They were lured from the countryside into the towns by the glitter of
social amenities and the promise of regular incomes, higher wages and,
2
at times, by land shortage. Once in the townships, the poorer among
in the same theme but less crude than that of Sir Bryan Sharwood
Smith. In pp. 410-11, Dr. Whitaker explains that even members of
Ti.i.ianiwa brotherhood are called Yan I ska. N.E.P.U. members were
first of all called Kafirai (singular, Kafiri. the apostates) but
that label did not stick as the party was predominantly Muslim led
as it originated and was based in the Muslim North. Then the term
Yan Iska was applied on some not all N.E.P.U. members.
1. For the official reaction to N.E.P.U. 's unsuccessful effort to assail
the emirate system see NAK File No. 45: ZAR PROF, p. 19.
2. Hill's analysis of the causes of rural poverty, sale of farm lands
and migration in Batagorawa village is typical of Hausaland. See
Polly Hill, Rural Hausa: a village and a setting (Cambridge, 1972),
pp. 84-159. She takes up the theme again in her recent study of
Dorayi village near Kano and examines the economic relationship
between city and countryside; the consequences of persistent popula¬
tion pressure; and the evidence of economic inequality. Once again
with slight and insignificant local variation this analysis can apply
to almost every village in the far North. See Population, Prosperity
and Poverty: Rural Kano 1900-1970 (Cambridge, 1977), pp. 1-20 ana
95-123. Also see Alhaji Umaru, "Wakar Talauci Da tfadata: 'The song
of Poverty and Wealth': A poem on social problems", in Africans




them became separated from their families which led to the break-up of
their households and the disruption of all those ties which linked man's
heart to the better portion of his nature: his instincts and social
affections. In most cases, it was impossible to go back to the rural
areas, even if they wanted, because as more and more able-bodied men
and women left the countryside for the urban centres, the old village
economy tends to crumble at their backs and thus there is nothing to go
back to. Their state of alienation created serious problems for them
and for the authority. N.E.P.U. provided the platform upon which they
could vent their feelings against the authority so they supported
the party en masse.^
As for the peasants, their predicament has always been that they
were, to the ruling classes, mainly the producers of revenue; hence, the
more the peasant grew, the more he had to turn over to the tax collector.
Furthermore, the emirate system of occupation/taxes, in addition to head
tax, contained a built-in temptation to squeeze the peasant heavily.
The peasants responded to an oppressive ruler simply by absconding,
because flight was the traditional answer to famine or to man's oppression
in Northern Nigeria (see Chapter II, pp.128—129). Again N.E.P.U. provided
a means whereby they could stay in their respective villages and complain,
until the administration decided that "attempts by N.E.P.U. to set itself
up as an independent organization, entitled to investigate grievances
and to arrogate unto itself the duties of the local administration should
1. See Police and Administrative Officers' reports on N.E.P.U.'s
increasing popularity and large scale recruitment in 1952-1956 in
"Provincial Reoorts and Complaints", File Nos. ASl/l34, ASl/305 and
ASl/432 in NAK. The administrative reaction to stop that "mass
enrollment" in N.E.P.U. can be seen in the official minutes and
recommendations attached in these files. Also see "Political File,
Fika Division", Potiskum, with John Lavers, Dept. of History, Bayero
University, Kano.
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not to be tolerated." Accordingly, the government officials were
instructed, "On no account should Administrative officers permit N.E.P.U.
organization to sponsor ... complaints.""''
N.E.P.U. articulated the grievances of all the poor in cultural
terms as much as in an economic formation to explain their predicament.
In that way N.E.P.U. made its appeal and sought support by evoking the
special solidarity of the Talakawa versus the aristocracy. In that
respect the party was careful in emphasizing the authentic ideals of
the Jihad with the imputation that those ideals had been betrayed by
those who succeeded the founding fathers of the Fulani Empire. That
method was meant to stir the inner feelings of the people by inculcating
an acute awareness of the inequalities of the authoritarian administration
and by instilling the conviction that people would have independence,
justice and equality under a N.E.P.U. government. N.E.P.U. believed
(as shown below) and made it clear to the Talakawa that social hierarchy
inevitably embodied conflict of divergent interests. Such a class appeal
showed that N.E.P.U. was not a sectarian party, hence it did not win
support in the Middle Belt where the grievances of the people were more
communal in nature (see p. 222). Furthermore, as it had been British
colonialism which checked the Emirate authorities and slave raiders from
overrunning the region, the peoples of the Middle Belt were initially
on the side of the British against a nationalist from the far North.
1. Quoted from a Government Circular in NAK, File No. 45, ZAR PROF,
"Political Bodies in Nigeria", p. 19. Although this circular was
dated 15/6/1952, M.B. Yunusa (N.E.P.U. organizer for Niger province)
observed that it was not until 1955/56 that it became really
enforced. This is about the time when the Northernization policy
was adopted by the Regional government and indigenous officers
were appointed into the Administrative Service of the Northern
Region. Interview with M.B. Yunusa, at Minna, in 1976.
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Their early political awareness was conditioned, by their historic
opposition to Islam and to subjection by Muslims, Therefore, in the
Middle Belt, N.E.P.U. suffered for having emerged from the group to
which the party was opposed. N.E.P.U.'s primary strength was in the
Emirates which were predominantly Muslim and, especially among the
Habe commoners and members of the Ti.i.ianiyya brotherhood,^
The Ti.i.ianiyya arose in Algeria early in the nineteenth century.
After the death of its founder, Ahmad Tijjani of Fez, born at the end
of the eighteenth century, the brotherhood split, with one group in
Algeria and the other in Morocco, The order still flourishes in the
2
former French and British territories in North and West Africa. From
Morocco it entered Nigeria in the first decade of the nineteenth century.
It is a puritan brotherhood which believes in militant Islamic activism;
hence it is opposed to Western materialism and material culture. It
came into confrontation with and was crushed by French in West Africa
1, My information on the Ti.i.ianiyya "confraternity" is derived from my
interview with my friend Alhaji Abdulkadir Mansur, who is a member
of the order in Kano, 1977/78; with Alhaji Salihu Na Kande, the
Ti.i.ianiyya leader at Jos, and also the N.E.P.U. member of the House
of Assembly, Kaduna, 1961-1966 (see Sklar, op. cit.. p. 524, No. 6),
at Jos, in 1976/77; and M, Liman, a devout Ti.i.iani. at Potiskum in
1976/78. For the relationship between the Ti.i.ianiyya Tariqa (Yan
Wazifa, as they are called in Hausa) and N.E.P.U., see Paden, op.
cit.. pp. 197-198 and 312; Whitaker, op. cit.. pp. 254-256, 413-414,
396-397; and Dudley, op. cit. . p, 190, Since his visit to Kaulaha
(Kaolack) in Senegal as the guest of Shehu Ibrahim Na Kaulaha (Shaikh
Ibrahim Niass of Kaolack) in September 1964, Alhaji Aminu Kano has
been the Deputy Khalifa of the Ti.l.ianiyya in Northern Nigeria (the
Khalifa being the deposed Emir of Kano, Alhaji Sir Muhammadu Sanusi),
On Aminu Kano's visit to Senegal, see Daily Comet, 1 September 1964,
P o 1 o
2. For a study of Islamic radicalism in French West Africa, see Lansine
Kaba, The Wahhabi Movement and its Contribution to Political Develop¬
ment in Africa 1945-1958 (Ph.D, Thesis, Northwestern University. 1972);
and Alexandre, P,, "Hamallism in French West Africa", in Rotberg,
R.I, and Mazrui, A,A, (eds,), Protest and Power in Black Africa
(New York, 1970), pp. 497-512,Paden (see footnote 156) discusses
Tij.ianiyya politics in Nigera, especially in Kano in contradistinction
to Sokoto,
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during the 1914-1918 war. Many of its adherents settled in Kano and
spread the rite in Northern Nigeria. The French further expelled more
in 1949 and some of them entered Nigeria and settled in Sokoto province.
In contrast to Kadiriyva (see below) the Ti.i.ianjyya is the "Pro^testant"
Islam and, as such, it upholds the revolution precipitated by the Holy
Prophet Muhammad and thus it is the repository of the revolutionary
tradition of Islam. The Ti.i.janiyya teaches that not to retaliate against
the oppressor is tantamount to collaborating with him. As a result of
its teachings against colonialism and against the authoritarian emirate
system it became the natural ally of N.E.P.Uo^
2
The Kadiriyya brotherhood was founded by Abdulkadir Al-Jilani of
Baghdad about A0D<> 1150. It made its first converts in Borno in the
late twelfth century and remains the predominant brotherhood there,
though not until after the Jihad did it become widespread throughout
the Northc It is a very ascetic Sufi system but like a dead volcano it
causes no trouble. It emphasizes obedience to authority and respect to
elders. Its political tenet is the Umma: the singleness or the unity
of Muslim community. It teaches that Muslims are one people, one
brotherhood and, in theory, it follows that they can only have a single
leader in one country. This is to say that, fundamentally, Islam is
opposed to nationalism and separatism in all its forms. Its adherents
3
were mostly the palace Malams and, therefore, it was opposed to N.E.P.U.
1. See "Political Situation in Northern Provinces of Nigeria", in File
No. MSSo Afr. S. 1210, in Rhodes House, Oxford, pp. 5-7.
2. Muslim religious sect and followers of Shaikh Abdulkadir Al-Jilani.
For Kadiriwa politics and its activities in Nigeria, in particular,
see references in footnotes 1 and 2, previous page.
3» In addition to footnote 1 above (p0 4 of the reference), see
Introductory Notes on Muhammadanism (compiled in the Secretariat,
Northern Provinces, Nigeria, Government Printer, Lagos), p. 4, in
File No. M.PoKo5669/3 Northern Provinces, in NAK„
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Strategy and Ideology
N.E.P.U.'s concept of "class" stemmed from what the party understood
as the common experiences (both, inherited and shared) felt by the Talakawa
as well as their identity of interests against the interests of their
rulers. To N.E.P.U., class experience was determined by the productive
relations into which people were born or entered involuntarily. The
party attempted to awaken class consciousness by explaining the experiences
of the common men in cultural terms: embodied in traditions, value
systems, ideas and institutional forms of an ideal Muslim society. In
that way "class" was defined by the way people lived currently and by
the way they lived in their social history.
Conflict between the Sarakuna and the Talakawa was N.E.P.U.'s main
point everywhere. The party's presentation of that point was however
made in such a way as to argue that the Sarakuna were the revisionists
of the principles of Islam in the sense that the maintenance of their
privileges and power took priority over and above the application of
Islam and the protection of the interests of their people. In that way
N.E.P.U. sought to justify its objectives by simultaneous reference to
the absolute norms of Islam (which are otherworldly) and to material
Western values (which are this worldly). They appealed to tradition,
in the sense of emphasizing the need to restore the reformist ethic of
Shehu Usman Dan Fodio and, at the same time, they criticised the
Sarakuna for neglecting the welfare of the people.
N.S.P.U. ideas were presented in different fashions to the elites,
the Malamai and the masses. For instance, to the Western educated elite,
N.E.P.U. argued in favour of rapid economic development and "democracy"
through the reform of the existing political system in order to give
an opportunity to the deserving educated youth. In this case democracy
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reflected the party's fundamental belief in "justice""'' and its position
that equality of opportunity was essential to a just society,,
But to the Halamai . N.E0P0U0 referred to Eadith to remind them
that they should lead the fight against foreign domination by guiding
their students and the peasantry in the struggle. The Halamai could not
keep themselves out of the people's struggle on the specious basis that
religion and politics should not be mixed. Did Ali (the son-in-law of
the Holy Prophet) keep out of politics? Did Hassan and Hussein (the
twin sons of Ali and the grandsons of the Holy Prophet) fatalistically
accept the tyranny of their era? Were the Halams holier than Ali and
2
his twin sons? It was thus clear to all who could think, NoE.P0U0
argued, that the duty of the Halams was to sacrifice all their possessions
and even their lives, if necessary, in the struggle against oppression
and exploitation,, Since NoE.P.U. believed in the rule of law and that
a N.E.P.U. government would carry out social reforms in line with
Islamic ideals, the Halamai would be given the opportunity to play a
fitting role in it as the custodians of public morals in their respective
3communities and as advisers on Muslim affairs to the administration.
1„ N.E.P.Uo's concept of justice remained vague and often conflicting.
The most religiously minded among them turned to the notion of
justice in Islamic thought which is equated with the equality of all
before God and before Shari'ah and the practice of mutual aid; and
that the rulers should set an example of frugality and simplicity
in their way of life. But the Maaikata equated justice with the
strict observance of the order of meritocracy, equality of all
before the law and the rule of law. In addition, some of them
vagaely mention "socialism" which was closer to material aid than
to scientific socialism,,
2. The writer was at a public lecture which ran on those lines by
Ma lam Uba Taura, at Potiskum, in 1959„ Immediately after the
lecture M. Uba was arrested by N.A. police for inciting public
disorder. This and the subsequent arguments were the general patterns
of N.E.P.Uo's appeal to Qur'anic Halams before Nigerian independence,,
3. It is relevant to note here that N0E.P0U0's N.E.Co and all branch
executive committees always had an adviser on Muslim law/Muslim
affairs.
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N.E.P.U.'s own Muslim scholars bridged the gap between the party and
the Malamai in their ability to articulate the inner Islamic feelings
of the people. Some N.E.P.U. leaders made Tafsir (Qur'anic exegesis)
in which they cited relevant Qur'anic verses to stress the centrality
of injustice in Islam (interpreting justice to mean equality before the
law; equality of status through equitable distribution of wealth; and
equality of opportunity for all citizens) and the importance of education.
But to the illiterate Talakawa, N.E.P.U. concentrated more in
articulating their local grievances and on simple political education,
i.e. the rights and the duties of a citizen, as well as the methods of
making legal appeals and administrative petitions, to higher authority.
N.E.P.U. never relented in pointing out to the people the unlslaraic
excesses and the extravagance of the rulers. In a just society as
advocated by Islam, N.E.P.Uo explained, "there is no trace of great
f 2
palaces and other ostentations of hereditary kingship." The party's
Muslim scholars would quickly refer to the exemplary leadership of
Caliph Umar who, even when his dominions expanded beyond Arabia,
continued to live so unpretentiously that strangers to Mecca would
mistake a servant for the Commander of the Faithful himself; who kept
1. I have personally attended such Tafsir sessions by Alhaji Ibrahim
Imam, at Maiduguri (1958); and by Alhaji Aminu Kano. at Potiskum
(1959). During our interview in London (l2/ll/l979) Alhaji Aminu
Kano confirmed that they began to make Tafsir in reply to N.P.C.
accusations that N.E.P.U. were Kafirai (apostates) but the practice
was lessened in the middle 1960's. Perhaps this is after when N.P.C.
formed a coalition government with N.C.N.C. (in I960) Muslims
realized that the former's accusations of N.E.P.U. as Kafirai was
mere political propaganda. Paden, op. cit., pp. 274-291, 294-297,
reproduces and analyses the Tafsir session given by Alhaji Aminu
Kano which he (Dr. Paden) attended in Kano.
2. When I* first heard this from M. Lawan Dambazau I cross-checked
with Muslims scholars, and with an Imam, M. Abubakar Liman of
Potiskum. He confirmed that M. Lawan Dambazau was right by making
references to Muqaddimah and other works on Islam.
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his treasury empty through help to the poor; and who, when his all
powerful army brought him large quantities of booty, broke down and
wept, lamenting the day when "the riches which the Lord bestoweth on
us will be a spring of worldliness and envy and in the end a calamity
to my people."^ Still more relevant to Northern Nigerian Muslims was
Caliph Uinar's rebuke to Sa'id, one of his most brilliant commanders;
he said:
It has been reported to me that you have built yourself
a palace; and people call it the castle of Sa'id. Moreover,
you have erected a gateway between you and your people.
It is not your castle, rather it is the castle of perdition.
What is needful for the treasury that you may guard and
lock, but the gateway which you shut out the people from
you, that you must break down.
Citing the above, N.E.P.U. leaders reminded their Muslim followers
that the history of Islam can be seen as a struggle against tyranny and
against hereditary monarchy (which is one of the causes of tyranny);
because hereditary monarchy hinders the political, economic and cultural
growth of the people. To establish a just society, the party argued
that people must first eliminate all forms of political tyranny and
restore the freedom, the dignity and the liberty of the individual.
N.E.P.U. stated that Northern Nigerian masses were shackled by
fetters and chains imposed upon them by regimes which appeared to be
Islamic when in fact they were un-Islamic. As an alternative to what
existed, the party would create a society in which talents would be
1. This and the quote following were taken from M. Lawan Dambazau's
text of a public lecture at Sokoto in 1958. See Lawan Dambazau's
political papers, Kano. It is important to note that II. Lawan
Dambazau succeeded M. Sa'adu Zungur as N.E.P.U. Legal Adviser
(Muslim Law) in 1958. In 1957-58 he was N.E.P.U. provincial
organiser for Sokoto Province (see Sklar, on. cit,, pp. 524 and 525).
The political undertone of that sermon was very significant when
we remember that Sokoto, where it was given, is the home town of
Alhaji Sir Ahmadu Bello, the Sardauno of Sokoto and the Fremier of
the Northern Region of Nigeria.
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trained and permitted to develop. The laws of the new society would
not contradict Islam, All affairs of that society should be in the
hands of the people and would be implemented through just laws.
The Role of Songs
One of the most effective ways by which N.E.P,U. conveyed its
ideas and popularised its policies to the pre-literate masses was by
the use of party songs. This is because, traditionally, singers were
one of the few groups of people in the society who enjoyed freedom of
speech. By convention, popular songs never make direct references and
no real names are mentioned. Nevertheless, they are full of insinuations,
oblique gibes and double entendres. They are also characterized by
extreme subtlety and presented in satirical form using innuendo. The
purpose of the singers is to extract presents in return for abandoning
the satire. Praise singers are tolerated because public reaction to
their songs, like a public display of emotion, is regarded as uncouth
by the cultured group. Furthermore, by publicly reacting to the singers
one reveals not only the hidden nuances of the songs, but one also
exposes oneself as the real person referred to by the singers. Popular
songs are rapidly learnt especially by women and children: thus one
fears both the immediate impact of the satire and that if it goes on
too long, one is likely to suffer veiled references to one's miserliness
or one's amorous adventures, chanted by women and children as they go
about their daily chores. But if one is generous to the singers one can
enjoy hearing one's good qualities celebrated in the same way. Thus
singers constitute a powerful factor in Hausa society."''
1. Academics are now becoming increasingly interested in the social
functions and meaning of Hausa popular songs. See Ames, D.'.v.,
Gregersen, E.A., and Neugebauer, T., "Taaken Samaarii: A Drum
Language of Hausa Youth", in Africa, XLI (1971), pp. 12-30; Smith,
M.G., "The Social Function and Meaning of Hausa Praise-Singing", in
Africa, XXVII (1975), PPo 26-43; also see Clayton, A.,Communications
for New Loyalties (Athens, Ohio, 1978); Hiskett, M,, A History of
Hausa Islamic Verse (London, 1975), especially pp, 2-11, thereof.
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Just as Hausa praise singers composed songs to extol the virtues
of their patrons or to insult those who refuse to patronize them, so
N.E.P.U. adopted the same method to sell its ideas as well as to
ridicule its opponents to the masses,, The party's political broadsheets
served both to entertain and to educate the masses on political issues.^"
Although N.E.P.U. political songs were on secular subjects, the under¬
lining sentiments were Islamic both in content and in purpose: Islamic
mores and attitudes colour most of the political songs. For example,
in his song Wakar Yan Sawaba (W.Y.S.), literally "The song of Sawaba
2
members" , M. Gambo Hawaja of Jos ridiculed the N.P.C. leader by making
veiled references to Islam and to other pious rubrics inseparable from
Muslim literature. He said:
Ancestor, Father, will not save the soul of their son,
If the son does not follow the path of Truth.
And here is the example which the Lord revealed to us,
The lesson of how Kana'an was destroyed.
You] who flatter yourself with the glory of your ancestors stop,
Remember that Hassan and Hussein upheld the Truth.
Don't be proud of your ancestor I see no salvation for you,
Your Ancestor did not shake hands with a white woman.
And he did not say that Kolanuts should be taxed,
He neither made friends with Christians nor drank alcohol.
The son of this and the descendant of that is not sufficient
for you,
God said that only good works count.
Your beard and your sidewhiskers induces no respect for you,
Unless your works are righteous.
The man in a loin-cloth i£ he is righteous,
Is superior to the man with a turban who is this worldly.
If nobility of birth were the criterion for leadership,
Awolowo would not have been a Premier.
1. N.P.C. also composed songs in praise of the party's leaders. But
N.P.C. songs are largely political invective and not really designed
to educate the masses. See some of N.P.C. songs in Dudley, on. cit.,
pp. 328-334; Hiskett, M., on. cit. (1975), pp. 105-107.
2. The full Hausa text of this song is in my possession. The Hausa
version of the text translated below is reproduced as Appendix V,
Wakar Yan Sawaba by Gambo Hawaja, Section A. In my interview with
Alha.ji Ibrahim Biu at Maiduguri in 1972, he recalled that Ahmadu
Bello said that Aminu was no problem, fama. Kaga Zabiyan Nasui ,
literally, "But you see that minstrel of theirs.'" That, of course,
referred to Alhaji Gambo Hawaja, because when his song was
published in 1954, it spread in the Muslim North like wildfire.
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The bogey of "beware the bull"1 no longer frightens me,
I will not run until I see the f orehead of a cow.
They despised the ways of the Shehu they renounced him,
They are not interested in heaven save in wealth.
They would rather ride in a Buick and lodge at Hill-Station,
Friday is the day they make feast on alcohol.
Had he the faith to emulate the past heroes,
Who ruled the entire world.
They held no evil intention (in order to harm anyone),
Their plans aimed to help everyone.
All the Prophets, the Apostles, who preceded,
They worshipped God and upheld the Truth.
The descendants of the Holy Prophet for whom this world,
And the next world were created, also upheld the Truth.
You Gaskami (2) who goes to market once, stop.
Remember God, you better be less bumptious,
If you refuse you will make a false start like Bubukuwa (3)
The community will be saved by the Shehu while you suffer.
Whoever knew Alhaji Sir Ahmaau Bello, the N.P.C. leader, would
recognize the subject of the above verses. The "Ancestor"and the "Shehu"
referred to are the same person: Shehu Usman Dan Fodio, the leader of
the Muslim Jihad in Northern Nigeria, from whom Sir Ahmadu Bello was
descended. Hassan and Hussein were the two sons of Ali ibn Abi Talib
and the grandsons of the Holy Prophet Muhammad. Cther descriptions in
the song refer to actual events or to real personalities of the time.
As a whole the verses challenged the apprent legitimacy of hereditary
leadership as they question qualifications of the N.P.C. leader. N.E.P.U.'s
official view was that it would be fatal to any society to give anyone the
right to leadership and to power merely because his parents had it. In
this song M. Gambo Hawaja attempted to popularise his party's official
1. The Hausa expression Gafara Sai is roughly equivalent to "crying
wolf" in English. My translation, "beware the bull", is the literal
meaning of the Hausa version in the original text.
2. Gaskami (Hausa), blocks of locust bean pulp (epithet, Gaskami
Kasuwarka Daya, literally, "Gaskami, you have one market",i.e. it is
taken to the market once because it soon goes bad). Metaphorically,
it is roughly equivalent to the English expression, "flash in the
pan" or "nine days' wonder."
3. Bubukuwa (Hausa), the earliest grass after the dry season (others
which spring up later grow taller). Epithet: Kada Kayi Sammakon
Bubukuwa, literally, "Do not make a good early start and then tail
off".
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view. The song also mocked the Talakawa who supported N.P.C. in these
words:
I am not in N.P.C. nor do I want to join,
Their leaders do not help Nigeria.
I disdain their party they are boastful,
I stand under the banner of N.E.P.U. the flag of Truth.
The flag which does not attract the ignorant nor the tyrant,
(it) Is black with red, with green and a white star.
If not an ignorant fool who does not know,
Who will support a party of con men,}
To God I will tell you my brothers,
The Talaka who supports N.P.C. has no heart.
Only pimps and servants can join (it),
And he who can betray his father because of greed.
And any rich man who supports them, be sure,
He scorns what he has and strives for the unlawful.
You are the sons of Talaka so is your father and your mother,
Nevertheless, you support the party of the PrincesI
Your money has confused you, you did a shameful thing,
Because you reject your lineage for the drunkards.
Either the rich or the learned who lost his head,
May God save him — let us pray for him.
To-day no one opposes N.E.P.U. except the tyrant,
And the ignorant Talaka who is doomed.
Or those who are born fools,
And those destined to lose their souls because of wealth.
Save the merchants who want loans at all costs,
Hence, they are enticed with loans and they became restless.
They forgot the gift that God bestowed upon them,
They intend to obtain loans that will not be repaid.
This money they will only hear of but never will see,
For God's sake let them stop fidgeting.
The Talaka who supports N.P.C. ought to know that
(He is like) the pail-bucket used in digging a well;
When water is obtained, it is not to be used,
In no time you will see it in the gutter.
You are the son of Talaka who lend support to the tyrant,
So that he can cheat your father while you laugh.
We do not care two hoots for those who like the tyrant,
Nor give a tinker's curse for the stupid tyrant himself.
Any Talaka who supports N.P.C. here is your name,
You are a traitor: the betrayer of your class.
Your father is a farmer who lives by sweat of his brows,
Yet you do not want him to prosper. 1
1. The Hausa version of this song is reproduced in Appendix V, ("W.Y.S.)
Section 3.
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M. Gambo Hawaja wants, simultaneously, to inculcate class consciousness
as well as to evoke class solidarity. He also makes consistent attempts
to portray the Sarakuna as ticks who live on the blood of the Talakawa.
When ministerial offices were first introduced in Northern Nigeria and
the first ministers were appointed in 1954, M. Gambo Eawaja decried the
composition of that first crop of ministers as a victory for conservatism.
He lamented the fact that the exploitation of the Talakawa would be
increased and intensified. He said:
The habit of squatting continues though the dog is sold,
A monkey is bought with the proceeds, the former is better,,
Among the ten ministers now gathered,
Who is Talaka among them, I ask you?
They are either nobles or the sons of nobles,
You know, the composition is not right at all.
OhJ what people to select as our rulers,
As if one is to make gruel with the recipe of a soup.
Or to leave one's goat in the trust of a hyena,
Oh. people, how can a monkey watch over peanuts? 1
At times the songs are presented in similes and in metaphors. For example
Gambo Hawaja said:
N.P.C., like the stinking shrew-mouse, is myopic,
For an owl does not like to see a dove.
The shade of a palm-tree can be pretty useless,
To those near the trunk as only those who are far away enjoy it
The Witch can forget (his misdeeds) after some time,
But the victim's mother remembers till she dies.
The repentance of a wild-cat is useless,
Someone is forbidden to dance but he sways, 3
1. The Hausa version of this text is reproduced in Appendix V, Section C.
2. The palm tree which normally has no branches can be taller than
twenty feet and its leaves hang from the tip of the trunk, hence
what little shade (if any) it has, is always far away from the main
trunk. Anyone sitting by the tree is bound to suffer the heat of
the tropical sun. This metaphor explains that under N.P.C. govern¬
ment, the wealth of the country is enjoyed by foreigners, not by
Nigerians. It decries foreign control of the national economy and,
especially, the close association of N,P,C. ministers with Lebanese
and Syrian traders at the expense of indigenous businessmen.
Interview with Alhaji Gambo Hawaja at Jos in 1972,
3. The Kausa version of this text is reproduced in Appendiz V, (W.Y.S,),
Section D„
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N.S.P.U. 's songs carried to the masses the cross-fire of political
debates normally confined within the literate group. They also set
out the party's aims and objectives in simple and popular language for
the understanding of the rank and file. For example, Alhaji Aminu Kano,
in his ,t akar Yancin Neru Sawaba (W.Y.N.S. ), literally, "N.E.P.U.'s song
of freedom"''", said:
Oh! God, the most merciful;
Here we are inspired;
Help is with you the Lord of the Universe;
We beseech freedom and social justice;
The Lord most High: he is Nigeria.
We appeared (and) we are not afraid of trouble;
Give way anyone who is a weakling;
The time is ours (and) we can't be diverted from (it);
We shall sacrifice everything and endure suffering;
The Lord most High: he is Nigeria.
We shall stake wealth and even life;
We are of to-day, sons of to-day, fit for the task;
We set ourselves on a rightful course;
Woe to all oppressors of Talaka;
The Lord most High: he is Nigeria.
Time has changed so have the old ways;
We have already taken the flag of nationhood;
In order to liberate mother Nigeria;
Hence we shall make name in this world;
The Lord most High: here is Nigeria.
In the 1956 Regional Election, N.E.P.U.'s manifesto ended with
this short poem:
Oh you common people look.'
Strengthen your determination and overthrow your curse,
1. The full Hausa text of this poem is in the possession of the writer.
The poem carries no name of the author but it is believed to be
authored by Alhaji Aminu Kano, who confirmed the same to me. But
the poem also carries a brief Hausa explanation of its objectives
in Hausa which is reproduced at the bottom of the original text
in Appendix V, Wakar Yancin Neou Sawaba. Paden, on. cit., p. 295,
has a slightly different translation of this poem from mine.
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The rule of oppression and the government of tribulation,
Vote for the candidates of N.E.PoU. Sawaba,
Assure victory to those on the side of Truth. 1
The strategy of using songs to appeal to the masses worked
especially among the young. Youths all over the Emirates chanted
N.E.PoU. songs and poems, even if they did not know what they meant.
It also inspired many poets and singers in the Northern Region to practice
their skill even more with the result that Northern Nigeria is very
much richer in such literature. We hope that as time goes on native
scholars will translate these poems and songs into languages of wider
communication.
Reaction to the N.A. System
As mentioned earlier in this dissertation, N.E.PoU. 's primary
objective was the democratization of the local governments, and thus
its immediate target of attack was the N.A. system. In its "Declaration
2
of Principles" (1950) , N0E0PoU. outlined Northern Nigeria's socio¬
economic and political problems as follows:
1. The shocking state of social order as at present existing
in Northern Nigeria is due to nothing but the family
compact rule of the so-called Native Administration in
their present autocratic form.
1. This poem was composed by M. Sa'adu Zungur. It was cited in Paden,
or. cito , p. 295. Once again Dr. Paden's translation of some words
differs slightly from mine. The Hausa version of the poem runs
as follows:
Ina Jama'ar Talakawa Ku Dubai
Ku Kar Fafa Himma Ku Toshe Masifa,
Ta Mulkin Zalama Da Daular Azaba,
Kuzabi Wakilai Na Nepu - Sawaba,
Ku Tabbatadda Nasara Ga Mai Gaskiya.
2. The original copy of N.E.P.U. "Declaration of Principles" is in my
possession. It is undated but all the N.E.P.U. officials I inter¬
viewed agreed that the date should be 1950. Sklar, or. cit. , p. 557,
agrees with this date but Dudley, or. cita, p. 191, dated 1952,
quoting no one as his source. One of my sources is Alhaji Aminu
Kano, the N.E.P.U. leader.
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2. That owing to this unscrupulous and vicious system of
Administration by the family compact rulers, there is
today in our society an antagonism of interests, mani¬
festing itself as a class struggle, between the members
of that vicious circle of the Native Administrations on
the one hand and the ordinary 'Talakawa' on the other.
3. That this antagonism can be abolished only by the
emancipation of the 'Talakawa1 from the domination of the
conduits, by the reform of the present autocratic
political institutions into Democratic Institutions and
placing their democratic control in the hands of the
'Talakawa' for whom alone they exist.
4. That this emancipation must be the work of the 'Talakawa'
themselves.
5o That as at present the machinery of Government, including
the armed forces of the nation, exists only to conserve
the privilege of this selfish group, the 'Talakawa' must
organise consciously and politically for the conquest of
the powers of Government — both national and local, in
order that this machinery of Government, including these
forces, may be converted from an instrument of oppression
into the agent of emancipation and the overthrow of
Bureaucratic and autocratic privilege.
6. That all political parties are but the expression of class
interests, and as the interest of the 'Talakawa' is
diametrically opposed to the interest of all sections of
the master class, the party seeking the emancipation of
the 'Talakawa' must naturally be hostile to the party of
oppressors,,
7o The Northern Elements Progressive Party of Northern Nigeria,
therefore, being the only Political Party of the 'Talakawa'
enters the field of political action determined to reduce
to nonentity any party of hypocrites and traitors to our
mother country, and calls upon all the sons and daughters
of Northern Nigeria to muster under its banner to the end
that a speedy termination may be wrought to this vicious
system of administration which deprives them of the fruits
of their labour and that Poverty may give place to Comfort.
Privilege to Ecuality, and political, social and economic
Slavery to Freedom.
N.E.P.U.'s "Declaration of Principles" is one of the few documents
produced by the party in English, hence numerous poems and songs were
composed which supplemented as they analysed the society for the
benefit of the illiterate N.E.P.U. members. One such social criticism
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was by M. Sa'aau Zungur, who in his Wakar Yanci (v,Yo), literally,
"The Song of Freedom"\ said:
Everything in the North is different
From what is found in a hundred [other] communities,.
Their trading is different, their occupations are different,
Their knowledge is different, for it is not well organized,,
Their trading is like their trousers,
Their wide loose trousers that have no value.
Their occupations are like their turbans,
A useless tangled bundle, not carefully planned.
Their knowledge is like their gown,
Voluminous but making no useful contribution.
N.E.P.U.'s aim was to recruit all who agreed with its principles
on the condition that those who wanted to join the party in order to
reform the above conditions should be active cadres in accordance with
the "Sawaba Creed" (1950?)^:
1, I joined the Sawaba Crusade because I have a mind; a mind
I have trained to accept or to reject, to ponder and to
weigh — a mind which knows the flowing stream of thought,
not the stagnant swamp of blind obedience; a mind trained
to think for itself, to be curious, sceptical, to analyse,
to formulate and to express its opinions because if a mind
does not think, it is the brain of a slave.
2, I join the Sawaba Crusade because my knees kneel only to
God,
1. The full Hausa text of this poem and its English translation are in
Hiskett, M., "The Development of Sa'adu Zungur's Political Thought
from Haraba Da Soja, through Arewa Jumhuriya Ko Kulukiya, to Wakar
Yanci", in African Language Studies. XVI (1975). on. 1-23. However,
parts of the poem quoted here are reproduced in Appendix V, Wakar
Yanci, Sections A, B, C and D.
2. A typed written copy of the "Sawaba Creed" is in my possession. It
is undated though it bore the address of N.E.P.U. in Kano. It was
given to me by Mr. T.L, Hodgkin, at Oxford, in 1971. Some of the
documents given to me bore the signature of Malam Ben Vaffy, who
informed me (interviewed at Maiduguri in 1972) that he got his
copy in Kano, 1953, but he thought it was written about two years
earlier (l95l). But Lawan Dambazan thinks (interviewed at Kano,
1977) that it was actually typed in 1950, with very limited circu¬
lation, I relied on M. Lawan's information because he was in the
N.E.P.U. from its inception in 1950; he was a full-time officer of
the party till 1966. Furthermore, that neither Whitaker and Dudley
nor Sklar, on. cit., made any reference to the Sawaba Creed shows
that it had a very limited circulation indeed.
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3. I join the Sawaba Crusade because I believe in progress
not in reaction; because despite our shortcomings I trust
that all African government for Nigeria could offer better
opportunities and security and freedom to read, to write,
listen, think and talk and enjoy life to its fullest,,
4. I join the Sawaba Crusade because I want my children to
be born into a free Nigeria,,
5. I join the Sawaba Crusade because I want to be free: free
to establish a govt.of the people, for the people and by
the people in this great country, Nigeria.
6. I join the Sawaba Crusade because it is better not to live
at all than to live on one's knees.
7. I join the Sawaba Crusade because my feet should go where
they please, because they should need no passport to walk
among any of the 24 provinces of Nigeria; because I do not
believe in the establishment of custom houses between any
of the three Regions of Nigeria; because I want to go about
in my country without having to bribe anyone; because when
my feet walk only the way they are forced to walk they hobble.
8. I join the Sawaba Crusade because my mouth does not fear
to utter my opinions; because, though I am only one, my
voice helps to forge my destiny; because when my mouth
speaks and can say only what everyone is forced to say,
it is gagged.
9. I join the Sawaba Crusade because my ears can listen to
both sides of a question; because they are a channel for
information not a route for repetition; because if I hear
and do not think I become deaf.
10. I join the Sawaba crusade because my eyes are unafraid to
look into another's eyes; because they have been suffering
and because they want to see happiness and want to be free.
11. I will fight, if need be, for Sawaba because it is my
obligation, because oppressed and exploited people must
struggle to be free.
12. I will fight, if need be, for Sawaba because colonial brand
of fascism is menacing us as we have never before been
menaced, because only craven will not struggle against the
establishment of a fascist government in Northern Nigeria.
The Sawaba Creed shows very clearly that N.E.P.U. regarded its
political campaign against the emirates authorities as a twentieth
century Jihad reminiscent of the mediaeval Christian war to recover the
Holy Land: it was at the same time a campaign against the evils of
colonialism and a concerted action against the "un-Islamic feudalism"
of the emirate structure. There was no distinction between the colonial
power and the local authorities because the latter derived both its
power and "legitimacy" from the support of the former, hence Dokan Sarki
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(the order of the Emir) was synonymous with Dokan Bature (the colonialist's
order)."'" In his poem cited above, M. Sa'adu Zungur explained to the
masses how indirect system of colonial rule worked in Northern Nigeria,
in these words:
They say that authority over everything rests with the Emir,
Because we are told the town is in his hands.
But the Resident, the District Officer and others,
Are (mere) Advisers without the full responsibility of
carrying it out.
A useless lie, an empty lie,
They have the thread, they lay out the warp.
They have the knife, they do the flaying —
Rule over the people to their discomfort.
The chiefs are mere imitations,
Of the traditional authorities in the town.
Resident, District Officer, Assistant District Officer,
They have the key to the matter.
What they plan, the District Officer
Must sign it and he must scrutinize it.
Even if it be a religious matter,
If it touches the authority of the chiefs.
Or if it be a matter of custom,
Let alone a matter of the politics of the oppressors. 2
Having explained how indirect rule worked, that the chiefs were mere
window-dressing, whereas real power lay with the colonialists, N.E.P.U0
urged its supporters first to unmask the enemies within, to expose them
and then to fight them along with their imperialist backers. Again
M0 Sa'adu Zungur said:
As from today we have taken up our weapons,
For killing the oppression of the chiefs.
For the tongue is a sword,
And the pen a spear.
1. Dokan Bature, literally means the order of the European. In fact,
the Hausa word Bature refers to all white men though it originally
referred to the brown-skinned North Africans.
2. The Hausa version of this text is reproduced in Appendix V,
(W.Y.), Section B.
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It is the Truth that we will eome forth and declare,
Even if we are tied up in bonds — to the very tip of our
penis.'
Truth has but one colour,
Even in the palace of Pharoah, the oppressor.
We are wise to the web of the Europeans, let alone
Their servants the ministers, the oppressors.
Oh LordJ release the Worth,
From its tight and dangerous bonds,,
Those pilfering butchers' mates — they and their Europeans,
Have made friends with the chiefs,.
They have hatched up a friendship, inseparable,
Until the day when the spider inherits the town. 1
And Mo Gambo Hawaja (in W.Y.S.) added:
We are the people who are set out to achieve,
Freedom, in order to cleanse Nigeria.
This party, the N.E.PoU., is determined,
To see the end of this tyrant, the drunkard.
She took weapons more deadly than any gun or bomb,
You know them or let me tell you they are the Truth.
When it comes to the crux, artillery and bombs are useless,
For no one has the power to blunt the Truth. 2
Both the Sawaba Creed and the subsequent verses above spelt out
not only the political and the religious conservatism which N.E.P.U. had
to deal with, but also what the party called "colonial fascism" and the
native despotism which combined to keep the commoners in bondage and
thereby forced the Talakawa to remain at subsistence level. But to many
common men the Sawaba Creed was an open call to rebellion because Hausa
believe that Addinin Hu Addinin Biyayyane, "Our religion is the religion
of obedience". Indeed in the rural North it is impossible to be
respectful without being slavish. So to call thus upon the Talakawa
was mistakenly believed to be a violation of Islam. In fact, this
mistaken belief follows a Hausa adage: Bin Nagaba Bin Allah, "To obey
a' superior is to obey God." It is mistaken because the Islamic injunction
upon Muslims to obey their leaders (superiors) depends on the conditions:
1. See Appendix V, (w.Y.), Section C, for the Hausa version of this text.
2. Part of Wakar Yanci Sawaba by M. Gambo Hawaja, Jos. The Hausa version
is in Appendix V, Section E.
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1) that the leaders must come from amongst the led, i.e. the elected
representatives of their people.
2) that the leaders have neither rights nor privileges over and above
their people.
3) that the leadership must be collective, i.e. by consultation."'"
nevertheless, to the Sarakuna, the Sawaba Creed was an indirect
challenge to political legitimacy which would make the ground beneath
their feet cease to be solid. Some colonial officials became openly
harsh towards n.E.P.U. because they regarded the Sawaba Creed as a
clandestine call to revolution. Conversely, N.E.P.U. reacted to
administrative repression with increased political militancy which
included protest poems against the administration. One such poem was
entitled A Yau Ba Haki Nepu Sai Wawa (s.W.'tf.). "Today no one opposes
2
N.E.P.U. except a fool" (1955) , by M. Gambo Hawaja. It attacked the
N.P.C. for being the stalking-horse of the colonialists. Again, the
appeal to Islamic values is the central theme of this poem. M. Gambo
Hawaja said:
1. The Lord, Most High, help us to help ourselves,
Raise us over our opponents,
Bring freedom and dignity to our country,
Make the peasants vote for us,
Free us like everybody else.
2. Think of the greatness of our country,
Our ancestors had [islamic] learning,
Their judiciary was uneaualed,
Today our chiefs have no self-respect,
The N.P.C. fellows gave it to the Europeans.
1. Interview with Dr. M.T.A. Liman, a Senior Lecturer in the Department
of Arabic and Islamic Studies, Bayero University, Kano, 1978.
2. The full Hausa text of this poem runs to 65 parts of five lines
each and covers 7 pages. I have a copy in my possession. Hiskett,
on. cit. (1975), pp. 111-112, contains the English translation of
some parts of the poem. The Hausa version of the parts translated
here are reproduced in Appendix V, A Yau Ba Haki Menu Sai Uawa,
Sections A and B.
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3« With their aid our chiefs have been demoted,
Whereas they [themselves] became our representatives,
Today they-do not apply our [islamic] knowledge,
Our judicial system is flung aside,
Europeans [are now] both chiefs and judges,,
4. As for the Christians, what they desire is gain,
They cast aside our learned men,
They caused them to stop applying the Shari* ah,
Which God sent to our Prophet,
You know there is nothing more hateful than the European.'
5. Both our chiefs and our merchants,
And judges and the leaders of our country,
The Christians treat us [all] as if we "have eyes and see
When they [Christians] push our leaders they [our leaders]
push us around,
N.P.C. fellows are their stupid guides.
6„ The Christians picked our enemies,
And placed them in charge of our affairs,
That they would open our eyes[lead to progress],
It is a confidence trick against us,
So that we shall be led into wilderness.
7. They cheat us because we are unwise to their tricks,
They rub shit in our calabash,
Then flies will cover all over our food,
Yet they prevent us from improving our situation,
It is greed that deceives you, you idiots.
8. We must regain our self-respect,
By teaching the [islamic] knowledge of our forefathers,
That traditional one "because it will save us",
Let us also purify our religion,
And worship the Lord of all creatures.
9. Our predicament is most worrying,
Let us pray to our Lord and Master,
To save us from the conspiracy of our enemies,
N.E.P.U. [members] ought to be our representatives,
[if we are] to regain our honour even to Europeans.
10. Look at a blessed country like ours,
Yet we have no control over our affairs,
Men and children and our women,
There are chains of slavery on our waists,
Today we are the slaves of these fools. 1
1. Eor the Hausa version of this text see appendix V, Section A,
whereas parts of the poem below are reproduced in Section B.
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He also capitalizes on a number of government regulations, e.g. game
laws, which were the sources of grievances of the peasants, especially
in the rural areas of Northern Nigeria. He said:
1. And the river and the forest and our farms,
Houses and children and our women,
Horses and cattle and our sheep,
Our hunters can testify that
Today we have no power to kill an elephant.
2. As for the hippopotamus in our lake,
As the giraffe in our forest,
It is lawful for every son of our soil [to hunt them],
[Yet] Today no hunter among us,
Can kill them save Europeans.
3. Our people and/or our chiefs,
Who will dare shoot at our elephants,
And distribute the meat among our relations,
And take the tusks to our markets,
It is unlawful for us [to do so], but lawful for Europeans.
4. Brothers a great misfortune befell upon us,
It enslaved our children and our country,
When we cut down a tree we shall be arrested,
They will imprison us along with our families,
How can anyone feel at ease in his mind?
5. If not for the stupidity of N.P.C.
At Jos there is grass in our forest,
We can't cut it with our sickles,
Unless we have permits in our hands,
And the grass tax goes to Europeans.
6. They fence off part of our forest,
They say it is the property of the Governor,
When a leaf is found in our hands,
We are arrested and we are surely fined,
Our trees are also given to Europeans.
The above poems are means of political propaganda which played on
the short term grievances of the peasants to arouse their consciousness
and rally them behind N.E.P.U. On the other hand, the administration
persisted in its view that N.E.P.U.'s real intention was to destroy the
emirate system; whereas the party's main goal was to mobilize enough
support among the masses in order to press for the reform of the N.A.
system. Democracy, i.e. political participation of the Talakawa so
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that they could have a say on how they were governed and economic
development geared to raise the standard of living of the masses, were
the objectives which N.E.P.U. meant to achieve. Furthermore, N.E.P.U.
believed that development (economic, social and political) would enable
"Northerners" to compete, on an equal basis, with other Nigerians in a
united independent Nigeria. While that policy did not seem to be
destructive to the emirate system, it was •undoubtedly too radical for
Northern Nigeria at that time: because the idea of the North competing
on an equal basis with the South was then a day-dream which bordered on
irresponsibility. A further evidence of N.E.P.U.'s reformist, rather
than destructive intention was the fact that one of its leaders and,
indeed, the leading critic of the Northern Nigerian political arrange¬
ment went as far as advocating "regionalism" in order to preserve the
emirates' governments (see Chapter IV, p. 137).
Mo Sa'adu Zungur's plea for the preservation of an ideal emirate
system was in accorance with N.E.P.Uo's call for the reformation and
the democratization of the actual N.A. system, to bring it in line with
the modern idea of an elective local government. N.E.P.U. leaders thought
that when given the vote, the Talakawa would use it to emancipate
themselves. Thus N.E.P.U. was pro-Talakawa and, indeed, the party for
all the subordinate strata. Hence N.E.P.U. intellectuals composed poems
and songs to educate the masses on how they were being exploited, to
instil self-confidence in them and to explain the extent to which the
Sarakuna were dependent on the surplus they expropriated from the
Talakawa as well as to call upon those who were contemptuous of the
peasantry to refrain from their "most objectionable" attitudes and
behaviour. M. Sa'adu Zungur (W0Y0) said:
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Those who chant the proud refrain,
That the common man is the plaything of the rulers.
Money payments are imposed upon him perforce,
He must find it to avoid the fetters.
Chains, shackles and fetters,
All are weapons of oppression.
We pay taxes and we pa;/ for transport,
We pay for tickets [to enter] motor parks in towns.
We pay for licences and pay court fees,
Before the judges of the rulers.
And the market-stall fees to sell [even] spindles,
And all merchandise including braiding.
If you appeal against these, you will lose all,
Your money in the pool of the oppressors. 1
And M. Gambo Hawaja (W.Y.S.) added:
You immodest honey-sucker stop,
You extremely greedy ant.
You do not at all farm or trade,
And you have no occupation, yet [you are] outrageously
boastful.
I am sure no N.E.P.U. member would like you,
No more than [he would like] the bluebottle that dropped
into the soup.
We N.E.P.U. are the water-lettuce in ponds,
The idiot who steps on us will be drowned.
Here is N.E.P.U., the stone which cannot be suddenly assailed,
If assailed the attacker will catch hell.
We are in dish of fine sand to the oppressor,
Before they eat us, I swear, they must suffer.
You, who are puffed-up with self-importance,
Your huge tummy demonstrates your corruption. 2
Thus, by the use of poetry and very many songs, N.E.P.U. sought mass
support by trying to evoke the special solidarity of the Talakawa against
the Sarakuna. In this respect the party was very careful in emphasizing
the authentic ideals of the Jihad with the insinuation that those ideals
had been betrayed by those who succeeded the founding fathers of the
Fulani Empire. These methods of appeal explained the party's substantial
peasant following. N.E.P.U. believed that social hierarchy inevitably
embodied a conflict of divergent class interests. To N.E.P.U., democracy
1. The Hausa version of this text is reproduced in Appendix V, (w.Y.),
Section D.
2. The Hausa version of this text is reproduced in Appendix V, (W.Y.S.),
Section P.
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was the antithesis of that hierarchy, a levelling process which provided
the channel for the ultimate resolution of conflicts. Hence its persis¬
tent call for the democratization of the N.A. system. The party had
great distaste for the lordly comportment of the chiefs. It hated both
servility and arrogance in all their forms. It fought against
deference and called upon its members and supporters to abandon the
traditional habits of removing their shoes and prostrating themselves
before the Sarakuna. In general the party's attitudes towards authority
was something akin to rebellion by the standards of Northern Nigerian
political culture. Non-violent civil disobedience was an important but
unpublished tenet of N.E.P.U.'s political creed. Constant references
to Islamic religious injunctions and precedents to justify its teachings
notwithstanding, N.E.P.U. members were referred to as Tan Tawaye. "the
rebels", by the traditionalists. Conversely, N.E.P.U. made it clear to
the authorities that the traditionally deferential habits were offensive
to human dignity. The authorities took repressive measures against the
party's supporters whose behaviour was found to be contrary to the
traditionally accepted social norms,^ N,E,P.U, reacted by advocating
legal limitations on the customary powers of government and constitu¬
tional guarantees of civil liberties and the due process of law. In
keeping with that principle the party was identified with the successful
pressure to write the provisions of "Fundamental Human Rights ", based
on the United Nations Declaration, into the Nigerian Constitution.
1. This point is discussed at length, with examples from various
parts of the Muslim North, by Sklar, op. cit., pp. 355-365.
310
Sducation and the Emancipation of Women
As the problems of the lower strata of the society were the focus
of its attention, one of N.E.P.U.'s primary objectives was the
emancipation of women,, The effective way to achieve this objective 'was
through education, hence both married and unmarried women were enrolled
in the party's adult literacy classes throughout Northern Nigeria,,
The number of mature students in those classes varied from 20 to 30.
Where the number of interested students was more than 30 a double
stream was introduced. The teachers were mostly party cadres at the
local level though many Maaikata members of N.E.P.U. volunteered as
teachers. For instance, the writer along with other employees"*" taught
at the N.E.P.U. school in Potiskum. For political lessons and those on
elementary hygiene, the classes were often mixed (both men and women)
but when the lessons were on child care and home economics the students
were mostly women except for interested men or observers. The curriculum
was varied and, dependent on the availability of volunteer teachers.
As far as I know, political lessons were taken by full-time party
officers. In addition to reading and writing, religious (islamic) and
general knowledge were taught. The English langauge was also taught to
1. In fact I found that already M. Danbala Illiasu was running an
evening school for N.E.P.U. at Potiskum (1958). M« Danbala was
then an employee of the U.A.C. (Nigeria) Ltd. Others were M.
Baba (Jadau and M. Mahmuda Gwarso, both employees of Barclays Bank
(Nigeria) Ltd. Except for M. Danbala who was transferred from
Potiskum to Zaria (1959), the rest of us taught in the school
till 1962, when the writer was also transferred to Yola. I
helped to open a N.E.P.U. school at Yola (Jimeta) in 1962 and I
taught at Jos in 1963-64. Similar schools existed in Maiduguri,
Kano, Zaria, etc.
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some advanced, students."'" All the lessons were carefully designed to
assail superstitious beliefs and slavish deference, and to inculcate
political awareness.
N.E.P.U.'s eventual achievements in the field of women's education
were minimal, because in the traditional North women's education was
seen as a waste of both money and time, for girls marry in their teens.
The whole idea of a working woman or a working wife was abhorrent since
many people thought (and still think) that it is un-Islamic for women
to mingle with men other than their husbands. In many cases unmarried
women and, especially the working women, are regarded as Karuwai.
"harlots". Underlining this opposition to women's education is the
fear that female material independence will lead to their emancipation
and hence to the end of the traditional family set up in which women
are the subordinates.
In view of the foregoing and many other reasons, many people in
Northern Nigeria were, at best, skeptical and at worst abhorrent of
N.E.P.U.'s call for the emancipation of women. Furthermore, their
opposition was reinforced by the fact that in Islam, it is one of
woman's religious duties to marry. Therefore, it is not surprising
that the strongest opposition to N.E.P.U. policy came from the Malamai.
especially those upon whom the pull of tradition is particularly strong.
The religion of Islam prescribes certain functions and obligations for
1. Uhen I returned to Nigeria in 1976, I found that most of our former
students were making real progress. For instance, M. Babayo Hamman
took employment with the Northern States Marketing Board in late
1969; Alhaji Babayo Audu, now a successful contractor and property
owner, supervises all his business ventures personally; and M.
"uba Taura completed his legal studies, from the School for Arabic
Studies, Kano (l977). All of them were in my English class in
1959-1962. It is relevant to explain that it was Alhaji Babayo
Audu (then Babayo Dan Soja, as we called him) who first took me
to a N.E.P.U. meeting at Potiskum in November 1958.
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women as much as it does for men in accordance with the "natural"
characteristics of each sex; because Islam recognizes that the male
and the female play different but complementary roles in society.
Although the Holy Our'an is differently interpreted on the role of
women in Islam, it is impossible for anyone to justify the subordination
of women on the basis of Islamic law, nor is it possible for anyone to
dare reduce, cancel or distort the clear cut legal rights of women in
Islamic law. The history of Islam is rich with women of great achieve¬
ments in all walks of life from as early as the seventh century. In
any case what Muslims do to their women in Northern Nigeria is no
different from the way their pagan neighbours treat their women folk.
The latter do not attempt to justify their traditional practices from
the teachings of Islam nor do they pretend that they are imitating
their Muslim cousins. Thus one cannot but conclude that the established
practices in regard to polygamy, concubinage, divorce and the non-
participation of women in public affairs are matters of custom merely,
and they have nothing to do with the basic principles of Islam.
Education and Schooling
N.E.P.U. appealed to the Malamai as well as to the Muslim Congress
of Nigeria to help modernize Islam in the North and, more especially,
1. The stand of most Muslims on women is more customary than it is
Islamic. For the debate on the position of women in Northern Nigeria,
see Isa Wali, "The True Position of Women in Islam", in Nigerian
Citizen. 4 August, 1956, p. 5; Dr. M.T.A. Liman, "Women Franchise
in Islam", unpublished paper in my possession. Also see Greenberg,
JoHo, "Islam and Clan Organization among the Hausa" , in South 'Jest
Journal of Anthronolo.rv, III (1947), pp. 193-211; Barkow, J.H.,
"Hausa Women and Islam", in Canadian Journal of African Studies.
VI (No. 2, 1972), pp. 317-328; The African Studies Review, XVIII
(No. 3, 1975), pp. 1-120, A Special Issue: Women in Africa;
Ogunbiyi, I.A., "The position of Women as stated by Uthman b. Fudi",
in Odu. New Series, No. 1-2 (1969), pp. 43-60; Ahmad, K., on. cit..




to develop Qur'anic schools to qualify/government grants which Christian
mission schools already enjoy. This meant that Qur'anic education was
to be developed along more modern Western lines and the curriculum
expanded to include secular subjects. N.E.P.U.'s position was at
least listened to by some of the Halamai who saw Aminu Kano, the N.E.P.U.
leader, as one of them, both because of his family background and
because of his very wide knowledge of Islam and the Islamic law.
Indeed, Aminu Kano is a convinced Muslim and his intellectual commitment
to Islam is serious. This is why he is seen by his supporters as a
religious as well as a political reformer. Nevertheless, his desire
to reform Islam met with many setbacks.
N.E.P.N. made bold attempts to reform Islam by the introduction
of Islamiyya^ schools in Jos, Zaria and Kano, 1951-1952. These schools
are very much like the Western schools and, thus, contrary to the tradition
of 'Qur'anic schools in Northern Nigeria; pupils sit on chairs and use
tables and/or benches to write on. There are blackboards, chalk and
exercise books, etc., and the students are divided into classes according
to the year of entry. The school organization as well as the syllabi
are more appropriate to the Muslim North because they aim to integrate
traditional and modern methods of education. The Islairdyya schools
are by far in advance of the traditional Qur'anic schools in the sense
1. These are essentially Muslim schools in which both religious and
secular subjects are taught. The;/ are organized exactly as Western
schools except for their Islamic religious bias. The introduction
of Island.yva schools in the North was M« Sa'adu Zungur's idea. It
was first unsuccessfully tried at Bauchi in 1944: see Kano, A.,
Rayuwar Ahmad Hahmud Sa'adu Zungur (Zaria, 1973), P<> 13® It failed
because Sa'adu's request to open an Islamiyya school was referred
to Alkalin Bauchi Umaru by the Emir of Bauchi Yakubu and when the
idea was explained to the Alkali, he said in Arabic: "Kutilal
Karrasuna", roughly,"God accursed those who want to create what
does not already exist." That ended the matter. Interview with
Alhaji Aminu Kano in London on 12/ll/1979®
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that the Our'an is being interpreted in Hausa for the benefit of the
pupils. They are also taught how to perform ablutions and how to
practice praying and many other relevant religious subjects. This is
in contrast to the method of teaching in the traditional Our'anic
schools in the Northern Region where the pupils, like parrots, recited
verses of the Our'an in Arabic without knowing — or ever coming to
know — the meaning of what they learnt by rote. N.S.P.U. made efforts
to open more Island.yya schools in the North in 1953-1954* but in the
face of strong opposition from the authorities some of the schools
were abandoned.^
But on the whole the few Islamiyya schools which survived are now
a great success: the old style N.A. controlled elementary schools
adopted the Islamiyya techniques of teaching; their style of uniforms
are adopted by all government schools in the Northern States. Those
who started their schooling in the Islamiyya schools in the 1950's can
be found among high-ranking civil servants, university lecturers,
local government councillors and businessmen. My colleague, Shehu
Abdullahi Umar, a senior lecturer in Islamic Studies, Bayero University,
1. During our interview, ibid., Alhaji Aminu Kano recalled that he was
slapped by one Baban Adamawa as he and N.A. representatives were
inspecting a plot of land to be given to N.3.P.U. for the purpose
of building an Islariyya school. Subsequently, N.E.P.U. was refused
the promised plot of land on the grounds that its members were
already fighting and that if the party was given the plot it would
cause more trouble in the building. Following that, Aminu reported
Baba in an Alkali court but all the N.A. employees who were there
denied having seen Baba slap Aminu, hence the case was dismissed.
Nevertheless, N.E.P.U. was not given the plot of land. M. Sani
Bunu donated his guest house in which the first Islamiyya school
was opened in Kano. The teachers were Hassan Dan Waziri and
Musa Dan Wazirij both are sons of M. Gidado, the Waziri of Kano.
At Azare the first teacher was M. Adamu Badamagare with M. Hassan
Na Abba as the school's secretary. The Azare school , which was
opened in 1953, is now a secondary school.
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Kano, is one good example of those who started schooling in the Islamiyya
schools. Finally, the Islamiyya school at Azare in Bauchi State,
celebrated the silver jubilee of its foundation in 1978 which many of
its now famous former pupils attended from all parts of Nigeria,,
Education and Democracy
N.E.P.Uo's two principal political strategies were, firstly, the
political awakening of the masses through education and by using both
the modern means of formal education as well as the traditional informal
education such as Tafsir (Qur'anic exegesis) and Na'azu (sermon) in
which the exemplary life of prominent Muslim religious leaders and,
particularly, that of Northern Nigerian Jihadists, were cited and their
achievements extolled,, Their greatness was always attributed to their
education, thereby emphasizing the importance of education in the
teachings of Islam. The modern means of motivating the masses included
appealing to their self-interest in material advancement through education
and citing the achievement of Western societies in the field of technology,
commercial products and, subsequently, high standards of living, as the
examples. But more important, N.E.P.U. tried to eliminate the official
interpretations of the Qur'an which reinforced the selfish interests
of the traditional elite.
N.E.P.U.'s second strategy was to agitate for public participation
in governments through democratization of the N.A. and, subsequently,
the Regional and the Federal Governments. The party hoped that a greater
degree of local democracy would lead to direct confrontation between the
rulers and the ruled. N.E.P.U.'s concept of democracy was summed up
by Aminu Kano when he said:
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We interpret democracy in its more traditional
radical sense, and that is the true rule of the
common people, the poor, the illiterate ... 1
But the Northern Nigerian peasant in particular has yet to acquire
the material and the intellectual prerequisites for such a democratic
society. N.E.P.U. itself knew that its ideal of democracy as the rule
by the Talakawa had its attendant problems in that illiteracy, handicapped
the party in winning the support of the populace which was the first
step in establishing any type of democracy in the Northern Region.
The party was fully aware that, rightly or wrongly, many people especially
in the rural areas felt that the party's ideal of democracy was
inconsistent with what was thought to be the religious justification of
the status of the chiefs. On the other hand, N.E.P.U. saw its own
concept of democracy as the only effective cure for the political
plague of Nigeria because the party's ideal of democracy aimed
l) to check arbitrary rulers, 2) to replace arbitrary rulers with just
and rational ones and 3) to obtain a share for the underlying population
2
in the making of rules.
National Unity
From its formation as a political party in 1950, N.E.P.U. became
the leading proponent of "One Nigeria" in the Northern Region. N.E.P.U.'s
early idea of unity was first Northern, then Nigerian unity. The type
of government the party envisaged for the Northern Region was one that
would unite the Emirs and chiefs with their subjects; that would make
1. Quoted in Sklar, on. cit.t p. 372.
2. Alhaji Aminu Kano still thinks that this idea of democracy is the
only way out of political bondage for Nigeria; and many former N.S.P.U.
leaders still share his views. Field interviews in 1976, 1977 and
1978.
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everyone realize that the progress of the country did not lie in those
who were holding official positions only, but in everybody be he an
official or not. Unless the people could feel that the elected
representatives were their own representatives, having the interests
of the masses at heart and not merely the "yes-men" of their respective
Emirs and chiefs, the common people would not feel that they had means
of making their contribution to the common effort.
At first, this conception of Nigeria unity made N.E.P.U. hesitant
to enter into an alliance with any Southern based political party
despite the overtures of both N.C.N.C. and A„G. Furthermore, N.E.P.U.
was hesitant because of the regionalist stand of the Southern parties;
and because they lacked shared democratic ideals. These hesitations led
to the initial opposition, by certain N.E.P.U. leaders, especially H0
Sa'adu Zungur, to any dealings with Southern politicians and, more
especially, with Sa'adu Zungur's former colleagues in the N0CoN0Co~
But in 1954, Sa'adu Zungur changed his views, not because he thought
that Southern politicians were any better but because he was flabber¬
gasted by the intransigence of the Northern Emirs; he lost any hope
that they would ever agree peacefully to reform their despotic ways.
For example, just before the elections in 1956, Sa'adu Zungur wrote in
one of his memos to the N.E.P.U. Headquarters in Kano:
The next three decades will surely see the Northern
Region cut off completely from the rest of Nigeria,
under the aegis of a theocratic, one part;/ fascist
government built on the remains of the present
feudal autocracies. 2
1. On the causes of M. Sa'adu Zungur's disagreements with N.C.N.C.,
see Chapter 17, pp. 184-185.
2. Quoted in Paden, on.cit., p. 284.
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This realization not only shifted Sa'adu Zungur's emphasis from the
reform of the emirate system to a more forcible destruction of the
whole set-up, but it also made him see alliance with a Southern party
as a lesser evil than the increasing isolation and subsequent possible
"Pakistanization" of the Northern Region from the rest of Nigeria. He
insisted that Nigeria must be preserved as a united entity by any means
possible. Its central concern with the preservation of Nigerian unity
made N.E.P.U. suspicious of the separatist dreams of U.M.B.C. and the
protective regionalism of N.P0C. Despite articulate pleas for caution
in dealing with Southern politicians, the N.E.P.U. annual conference
at Lafiya decided in favour of alliance with N.C.N.C. in 1954."*"
In spite of this alliance, N.E.P.U. scrupulously preserved its
separate identity which was a necessary condition for its effective
operation in Northern Nigeria. Another reason why N.E.P.U. maintained
its separate identity lay in the disparity between the nature of the
leadership of the two parties. Whereas N.E.P.U. had minimal and, indeed,
indirect connections with the Atta.lirai. the N.C.N.C. was both led and
heavily dependent financially on middle class businessmen, with the
2
result that it was preoccupied with entrepreneurial interests.
Generally speaking, N.E.P.U. had very little in common socially with
the leadership of the N.C.N.C. and it was reluctant for egalitarian
ideological reasons (see below) to abandon its separate political identity.
1. The conference decided with 64 votes in favour of alliance with
N.C.N.C. and 13 for the A.G. and the rest abstained. Altogether
about 100 delegates attended the conference. But M. Sa'adu Zungur
remained cold towards southern politicians till early 1956. This
information is based on nry interview with Alhaji Aminu Kano in
London on 12/ll/l979.
2. The business connections of some N.C.N.C. leaders is discussed in
detail by Post, on, cit. (1963), pp. 57-60; Sklar, on. cit., pp. 62-
185, discusses the report of the Foster-Sutton Tribunal of Inquiry
which reveals the business connection of N.C.N.C. leaders in Eastern
Region.
319
Perhaps the most plausible reason for the N.E.P,U./N.C.N.C. alliance
was the fact that N.S.P.U. regarded the attainment of independence for
Nigeria as one of the first objectives of progressive politics. In
view of that it was consistent for N.E,P.U. to seek a de-emphasis of
interparty conflict in order to enhance the stability of independent
Nigeria, This was one of the reasons for the party's participation in
the 1959-1964 Federal Coalition government in which Aminu Kano served
as a government whip. Although N.E,P.U. was a fierce opponent of the
N.P.C, in the North, it cooperated with the N.P.C. controlled central
government and it was prepared to cooperate with other nationalist
parties in order to achieve independence and to ensure the stability
of the nation. On the other hand, N.S.P.U. never regarded its
participation in the Federal government (1959-1964) ana its cooperation
with any other party as an obligation to abate its militant opposition
in the North. Hence its separate identity was convenient both to the
party and to its ally, the N.C.N.C,
N.EoP.Ue's stand on Nigerian unity was consistent but its approach
to constitutional reforms was gradualist. Before Nigerian independence
N.E.P.U. wanted a federal system/an effective centre, but after indepen¬
dence it advocated gradual transfer of residual powers from the regions
to the centre and an ultimate unitary system. N.E.P.U.'s vision of a
unitary government was one comprising provincial rather than regional
sub-units. Although the party supported the creation of states as a
step in the right direction, in principle it was opposed to regional
legislatures and to the Houses of Chiefs in particular. N.E.P.U.'s
unitary philosophy was based on its confidence in the long term unity
of the peoples of Nigeria and the party's perception of social change
that would render current tribal divisions obsolete. At the party's
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annual conference in 1957, the Presidential Address summed up the
party's policy on Nigerian unity as follows:
Nigeria has the good fortune of having large Muslim
communities in the North and in the Nest as there
are pagans in the North and in the South and Christians
in almost every corner of the country,, It is our belief
that the overriding factors for unity within a given
territory are community of interests, economic problems
and the existence of external factors which withhold or
threaten full independence of the people of an area,, The
desire of the people of Nigeria for progress, comfort
and freedom is the same all over [ the country]. The
complementary nature of the resources of the different
parts of the country emphasize the need for a single
direction of economic development to benefit all the
people alike.
It is in the light of this belief that we stand for
the unity and the ultimate independence of Nigeria, We
in Nigeria, today, as you all know, have come to believe
that whatever political system may have to be in the
future, the one thing certain is that it will be considerably
unlike the system under which most of us have been living.
For better or for worse, we are for comprehensive changes
in the fundamental structure of our society and it will
depend on us and on other men much like ourselves what is
made of the objective conditions upon which the future
state of Nigeria would have to be built, 1
In view of this conviction and confidence in a united Nigeria, N.E,P,U0
believed that only inter-regional party alliances would save Nigeria
from complete disintegration and help the emergence of a Pan-Nigeria
political party in the future. It may as well be argued that N,E,P.U,'s
idea of a united Nigeria led to the party's support for a West African
Federal Union and to its involvement in Pan-Africanism (discussed above).
The main reason why NoE,P,U, tolerated autonomous regions within
federal Nigeria was for the purpose of separate development, especially
in the field of education. This is because N.E.P.U. wanted Northern
Nigeria to be treated as a "special" case, so that more federal money
could be pumped into the North to enable it to catch up with other
1, Quoted in Sklar, on, cit,, p„ 373.
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regions in education, the acquisition of technical skills, etc. But
even with this policy of separate development N.EoP.U. preferred
provincial administrative units to regional governments so as to bring
government nearer to the people. Because, rightly or wrongly, N.E.P.U.
believed that smaller provincial sub-units would both accelerate
economic development and thus facilitate mass participation in government,,
The gradual devolution of the existing regional administration to
a provincial administrative unit, and the transfer of residual powers
from the regional to the federal government would, N.E.P.U. believed,
cater for minority interests. Thus, the party was reluctant, at least
initially, to be involved in separatist politics. However, N.E.P.U. did
appeal to some tribal unions mainly by sympathizing with their demands
for greater local autonomy. What little support the party had in the
Kiddle Belt was due to its ideal of a united Nigeria and the fact that
it regarded the creation of states (or rather provincial assemblies) as
a step in the right direction. This also explains why most of N.E.P.U.
supporters came from the Muslim North , a few from the Maaikata class
and a section of the Northern ex-Servicemen Associations: the problem
of the ex-Servicemen's Union (Northern Nigeria) was that their leaders
were political mavericks aligning themselves with either N.S.P.U. or
NoP.Co as and when it suited them to do so. But the oscillation of the
union notwithstanding, most of its individual members remained loyal
to the N.EoP.U. There were also N.E.P.U. branches among the Northern
traders resident in the urban centres of the South, and since the
dominant theme of N.E.P.U.'s programme has been the ideal of One Nigeria,
in contrast to N.P.C.'s policy of regional autonomy, many Southerners
resident in the North supported the party.
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Economic Policy
N.E.P.U. 's economic policy reflected the prevailing enthusiasm
among contemporary African leaders for economic development and its
objectives were an optimum point between the pnuouit of material growth
and a more equal distribution of goods. N.E.P.U. was prepared to
accept a sacrifice of a measure of the former goal for the attainment
of the latter. But in order to understand N.E.P.U. 's economic policies
we need to grasp the party's analysis of the Nigerian socio-economic
predicament under colonial domination. This analysis is based, and to
some extent is an elaboration on, Aminu Kano's Yan Tande (the colonialist
exploiters)."*" It was first written in 1943, but could not be published
then because the publishers (Gaskiya Corporation, Zaria) thought that
it was seditious. Alhaji Aminu Kano's analysis can be very briefly
summarised as follows:
\ 0 i '
1) That colonial demtfnation had arrested and self-contained the internal
dynamics of Nigerian development and thus diverted the country's
progress onto a path of underdevelopment.
2) That development of the metropolitan country (U.K.) and the under¬
development of its colonies were the two opposites of the same
process each being largely the cause and the effect of the other.
3) That colonial domination reduced Nigeria, in particular, to
structural dependency which formal political independence alone
was not likely to correct.
1. Literally, Yan Tande means "the lickers", as in licking something
sweet with the tongue. But metaphorically its nearest equivalent
in English is a parasite, or a social drone. This unpublished
Hausa manuscript is still with Alhaji Aminu Kano.
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4) Thus, after independence the socio-economic structure of Nigeria
would need a complete reorganization which would include the over¬
throw of the existing exploitative colonial structure which in
itself characterized underdevelopment,,
The paper argued that since the majority of the population were peasant
producers living in the countryside, the first step towards economic
self-sufficiency was the mechanization of agriculture and the improving
of animal husbandry to increase food production in order to raise the
standard of living of the people and thus stabilize Nigerian internal
economy.
N.E.P.U.'s economic policy was based on the strategy of self-reliance
and the use of intermediate technology. The party was opposed to prestige
projects and capital intensive development projects which excluded
Nigerians in their construction and thereby deprived them of the
opportunities for learning new skills.Therefore, N.E.P.U. believed
in labour intensive development programmes. The party favoured heavy
industries like steel, whose social benefits included a means of training
Nigerians — in metallurgy and heavy engineering. In view of the dearth
of skilled manpower and capital in the country, N,E.P.U. favoured
government participation in the private sector of the economy. To the
embarrassment of its ally, the N.C,N.C., N.E.P.U. spearheaded the
1. This economic policy dervied from the foregoing analysis kept on
recurring in different forms in N.E.P.U. manifestoes and the public
speeches of the party leaders. For example see, "N.E.P.U. Manifesto",
in The Nimerian Citizen, 12 September 1956: NAK Pile AGNN/1095j
S. Darma, Nenu Sawaba: Zaben 1959 Kira Na Farko (Kano, 1959); and
Kano, A., African Economic Development (Kano, 1961).
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opposition to foreign domination of the Nigerian economy0 It
successfully called for the establishment of a "Retail Trade Commission"
which gradually stopped foreign firms (U.A.C., G.B.O., John Holts, etc.)
from retail trading and from buying agricultural produce in Northern
Nigeria. N.S.P.U. also favoured nationalization "with full compensation"
and it believed that the only effective strategy for economic develop¬
ment was by "mobilizing and involving the teeming millions of Nigerians
and campaigning against all the existing evils that weaken the super-
2
structure of our society."
The Nature of Decolonization and a Socialist Nigeria
Despite what appeared to be the African leaders' belief in the
"divine right" of the Western educated elite to lead their people,
N.E.P.U. pointed out that the attractions of new leadership opportunities
frequently led the new educated elite to compromise their political
principles and thus the forefeiture of their claim to democratic
leadership. A N.E.P.U. poem by Alhaji Abba Haikwaru, on the Western
educated elite, entitled "We have recognized those who have wronged us",
reads as follows:
You through hankering for a salaried job,
Your attitude had made a volte-face,
So that you continually take a way of corruption,
On the day of Resurrection the day of Judgement,
You will be cast into the hell-fire. 3
1. N.C.N.C. was worried that the result of N.E.P.U.'s campaign against
foreign firms would seriously affect its financiers who were agents
and customers of big companies like the U.A.C. Hence N.C.N.Co made
unsuccessful efforts to restrain N.E.P.U. on that campaign. Interview
with Bala Keffi, M.H.A., N.E.P.U. member for Kaduna in the Northern
House of Assembly (1956-1961) at Kano in 1978. K. Bala also served
on the "Retail Trade Commission", 1958/59.
2. Quoted from Alhaji Aminu Kano, Parliamentary Speeches (Kano, 1964),p.10.
3. Part of N.E.P.U. political song recited by the writer. There is a
slightly different translation of this part of the same song by
Whitaker, C.S., Jr.,"Three Perspectives on Plierarchy" , in Journal
of Commonwealth Political Studies, III (1965), pp. 1-19, especially
p. 19, footnote 39.
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N.3.P.U. leaders were disheartened both by the corruption and by the
contempt with which the Haaikata held the rural population. N.E.P0U0
feared as Sa'adu Zungur did, after his experience with N.C«N.C0, that
on the attainment of independence, the Western educated elite would (as
they did) degenerate into the mere inheritors of the power and the
privileges previously enjoyed by a few whites; and that as the post-
colonial rulers took a grip on power it would be impossible to effect
a peaceful change in the society which would benefit the rank and file.
Thus, N.E.P.U. preached to the masses that life was an unending contest
and that the overthrow of the colonialists was only the first of the
many battles to be fought. The party urged its supporters to be ready
to fight Azzalumai Farare Da Bakake (the oppressors white and black).
NoEoP.U. lumped together both the Haaikata and the Sarakuna as "parasites":
lacking any skills and dependent on their exploitation of the peasants,
The Maaikata in particular were referred to as Yancin Amana (traitors):
"who betrayed the trust and confidence" of the masses; because they were
educated by the tax-payers' money, yet they failed to use the knowledge
they acquired to emancipate those who paid for their education. So,
except for those whose loyalty to the party had been tried and tested,
NoE.PoU. members were cool towards all Kaaikata. Hence, official N.E.P.Uo
policy condemned the Haaikata for accepting the presuppositions of
Western Imperialism and for identifying themselves with the imperial
power against the Talakawa0
Whereas N„E.PoU0 denounced the colonial apparatus of government,
the party was much less clear on the nature of the regime it would
1. I attended a N.E.P.U. lecture in the New Era cinema house, at Jos
in 1963, when successive speakers enumerated the crimes of chiefs
and the educated elite against the people and the country. Each
speaker reminded the audience that the road to freedom was long
and thorny and that people must be prepared to fight as the
struggle continued.
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establish if voted to power: only saying that it would be MulkLn
Gurguzu, "an egalitarian/socialist government". The party's officials
were vague on what that meant. M. Tanko Yakasai, N.3.P.U. publicity
secretary, said: "Ours is that we firmly believe in Socialism, but as
to what it should look like, it is left to the people of this country
to determine when the time cornes."^" So, in order to identify N.E.P.Uo's
brand of socialism, it is important to understand the party's analysis
2
of post colonial Nigeria:
1) The party believed that Nigeria is a client state in that the
successors to the colonial power did not rid the country of any of
the social evils of colonialism and, particularly, the exploitative
characteristics which the British colonial administration represented.
They perpetuated all those evils and, even worse, Nigerians in
power used government machinery for their own self-advancement to
the detriment of the majority of the population.
2) Thus, the power base of the new Nigerian state and what stability
it achieved depended on the congruency of the interests of foreign
corporations, which dominated (and still dominate) the national
economy, and those of the indigenous ruling group, who were (and
still are) the executive arm of the foreign corporations in Nigeria.
Hence there existed a bureaucratic form of authoritarian state
which served the interests of the international bourgeoisie and
their internal allies.
1. Yakasai, S.A. Tanko, 'ihy Even/- Northern must not vote for the N.P.C,
(Kano, 1964), p. 5.
20 The following points are based on a series of interviews with Alhaji
Lawan Dambazau and Alhaji Tanko Yakasai in Kano between 1976
and 1978.
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3) In view of the above, Nigeria was being run by the adoption of
"foreign ideologies" which could not be reconciled with the
Nigerian traditional way of life. In fact the Nigerian tradition
was jettisoned and substituted by a foreign one which was unacceptable
to the generality of the population. N.E.P.U. argued that colonialism
had already subordinated the indigenous culture but after independence
the colonial legacy caused our indigenous culture to begin rotting.
4) N.E.P.U.'s answer to what the party called the "increasing decadence
of Nigerian society" was a return to the common cultre of
Communalism: in which people were bound together not only econom¬
ically and politically but also religiously and socially by a
system of collective activity and mutual help which extended from
the family to the ethnic group. That traditional reciprocal policy
created both sense of belonging and of brotherhood which served as
the cornerstone of the extended family system. The system taught
social obligations and, in it, the whole purpose of education was
to prepare a child for participation in the life of the community,
the ideal of which was to inculcate correct relations with, and
behaviour towards, others."'"
Alhaji Aminu Kano has explained that N.E.P.U. believed in socialism;
in that the party's objectives and its implementation were socialist;
but the pronouncements were welfarist because the Hausa phrase meaning
socialism scared away supporters in the sense that it also implies
2
denial of private ownership of basic needs. So the apparent obscurity
1. This concept of "communalism" was first mentioned to me by Alhaji
Aminu Kano, in London, 1973® I have since discussed it with many
other former N.E.P.U. officials, in addition to those named in
footnote
2. Interview- with Alhaji Aminu Kano at Little Gombi on 7 April 1977.
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of N.E.P.U. literature on its ideology was the result of practical
politics not lack of clear cut ideology as it appeared to be. To
N.E.P.U., socialism means the setting up of a society on the basis of
self-sufficiency and justice, work and equal opportunity for all, and
production and service to people. Seen in that light both democracy
and socialism appeared as one and the same extension of the act of the
emancipation of the Talakawa. Democracy was the political freedom and
socialism was the economic freedom. They were, so to speak, its twin
wings without which it could not soar to the horizons of the desired
justice in society. The freedom of the masses was to be consolidated
with all their abilities.
If voted to power, N.E.P.U. had no intention of adopting the
colonial structure of government as it was committed to restructure the
whole Nigerian economy and society. N.E.P.U. maintained that the
colonial bureaucratic set-up was as alien as it was oppressive, hence,
it was undesirable for a "truly free society. It was designed to
preserve the privileges of the "master classes" and, therefore, socially
divisive. The party held that civil servants, or any other group of
employees, had no right to be more secure than the peasant tax-payers
with whose money they were educated and who they were supposed to
serve. Accordingly, salaries and wages would be revised to bring them
into line with the general standard of living in the country.
Conclusion/Summary
From the foregoing, it can be seen that N.E.P.U. entered the
Nigerian political scene determined to reduce and subsequently to
eliminate the privileges of the Sarakuna. It was dedicated to the
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struggle to emancipate the Talakawa and to win real independence for
Nigeria,, In order to achieve those aims, it called upon the peoples of
Northern Nigeria to end the ancient system of rule which deprived them
of the fruits of their labour, so that poverty might give way to comfort,
privilege to equality, and political, social and economic slavery to
freedom,, Whether or not N.E.P.U.'s underlying concepts of society and
its proposed solutions to social problems were Marxist was and still
is debatable, but the party's language clearly owed much to Marxian,
although no member of the party travelled beyond the "Iron Curtain"
or was familiar (except Aminu Kano) with communist literature before
Nigerian independence,, Similarly, Marxism cannot claim to be the sole
quarry from which N.S0P.U. ideas and terms were extracted because, if
anything, our evidence shows that the party was more "utilitarian" than
"Marxist". Even more important, our research shows that N.SoPoU.'s
modes of thought and language derived from Islamic sources and thus,
at that time, it was the only substantial representative of the Islamic




ISLAMIC RADICALISM IN NORTHERN NIGERIA: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
N.E.P.U. KUKAN JARIRINE, SHI DAI BA SAI YIKOME BA SAI DAZIU
N.E.PoUo is [like] the cry of a baby, it does nothing but disturbs,,"
Alhaji Alhassan Dantata, Kano^"
Introduction
Islamic "radicalism" (or radical ideas) refers to those aspects
of the teachings of Islam which oblige believers in the Islamic faith
to resist tyranny by "exertion", "struggle", or "effort" (Jihad),
especially if the tyrant (or tyranny) is anti-Islamic or un-Islamic.
In practice all tyranny is interpreted as irreligion in Islam. Those
teachings also uphold definite political rights which are bestowed
upon Muslimso Among other things, the teachings emphasize the rights
of the ruled over and against those of the rulers,, The teachings are
underlined by demands for the widest possible diffusion of knowledge
and education and stresses on the idea of Umma (the international
Muslim community). On the other hand, Islamic thought justifies the
use of revolutionary means to achieve Islamic objectives. Depending
on the nature of government and its laws, it upholds that violence is
permissible.
1. My informant is Alhaji Ahmadu Tireda, Kano. Alhaji Ahmadu was for
many years the national treasurer of N.E.P.U. Alhaji Alhassan
Dantata was, in his time, the richest man in Kano, and his family
became the principal financiers of the Northern Peoples Congress
(N.P.C.) in the city0
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In this concluding chapter I intend to show that as N.E.P.U.'s
political philosophy stemmed from its belief in personal liberty,
national independence and opposition to foreign domination, the party
was part of the above radical tradition. I shall argue that as N.E.P.U.
was a national movement in a predominantly Muslim area (the Emirates),
the party's language and modes of thought derived from both Islamic
and from Western sources; and that N.E.P.U.'s Islamic mode of thought
was in fact a continuation of the religious "activism" set in motion
by the nineteenth century Jihad in Northern Nigeria. Thus, Alhaji
Aminu Kano, the N.E.P.U. leader is the twentieth century counterpart
of Shehu Usman Dan Fodio, the leader of the Jihad movement0
The flare point in the Muslim North is no different from the
legacy of the rest of the Muslim world where religion is the natural
vehicle for the expression of dissent and the mosque is its focus.
But what Northern Nigeria has in common with other Muslims is not just
religion but exposure to the tensions of abrupt and often unprepared
change. In either case a part of the political stage, and often a
dominant part, is occupied by supporters of reform and modernization.
The rest is held by forces, traditional, conservative and often deeply
religious, who reject the philosophy of reform and progress almost in
its entirety. Consequently, the clash is ultimately about values and
each community has to resolve its crisis in its own way. That religion
plays such a vital role in Muslim affairs is apparently due to the
fact that in Islamic thinking the Western separation between private
religion and public affairs does not exist (see below). Islam was the
ideology of the Jihad movement as it was equally used to justify N.E.P.U.'s
rebellion against the N0A. system in the North and against colonial
domination of Nigeria.
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Thus, the historical thread which ties together radical ideas and
indeed radical movements in Northern Nigeria is Islam. But since
Islamic ideas were neither clear to nor accepted by the generality of
Muslims until the nineteenth century Jihad, our examination of the
radical tradition in Northern Nigeria begins with the Jihadists'
ideas and their movement. The ideals of the Jihadists were rooted
in Islam and their purpose was to create an Islamic state, taking the
form discussed in Chapter II and now summarized below.
A Summary of Some of the Political Teachings of Island
1. The political philosophy of the Qur'an is essentially based on
its fundamental concept of the Universe which can be summarised as
follows:
i) That God is the creator of the whole universe, including
man and all that man exploits and harnesses into his service,
ii) That God Himself remains the sole master, ruler, director and
administrator of His creation,
iii) That the sovereignty of this universe does not and cannot vest
in anyone except God and no one else shares this sovereignty
with Him.
iv) That all attributes and powers of sovereignty are solely His
prerogatives.
2. God is the only rightful authority in human affairs just as in all
other affairs of His creation. Thus no human or non-human has any right
to give orders or decide matters independently.
1. The following account on the political teachings of Islam is drawn
from Sharif, M.M. (ed.), A History of Muslim Philosorhy, vol. I
(Wiesbaden, 1963); and Gibb, H.A.R., Studies on the Civilization
of Islam (London, 1962).
3. The Qur'an says that unadulterated obedience is due to God alone,
in that His law should rule supreme, i.e. to obey others or follow
one's own wishes against the law of God is not the right way.
4. The Qur'an says that Prophets are the only source of knowing
the law of God.
5o According to the Qur'an the commandments of God and the Prophet of
Islam constitute the supreme law of God and that Muslims cannot adopt
any other attitude other than that of complete submission to it0
6. According to the Qur'an, the right form of government for mankind
(i.e. an Islamic state) is one in which the state relinquishes its
claim to sovereignty in favour of God and, after recognizing the legal
supremacy of God and His Apostles, accepts the position of viceregency
(caliphate)0
7o The Qur'anic conception of the caliphate can be summarised as
follows:
i) All the powers that man possesses in this world are not his
own but have been endowed to him by God and may be exercised
only within the limits prescribed by Him. Thus man is neither
the real sovereign nor an independent master but a viceregent.
ii) This viceregency cannot be right and lawful unless it is sub¬
servient to the commandments of God. Thus any state that
claims to be independent of Him is in revolt against the Lord
and, therefore, forfeits the obedience of the Faithful.
8. The powers of a true caliphate do not vest in any individual nor
in any clan, community or class, but in those who believe in God and
do good.
9. The government in a caliphate system cannot claim an absolute or
unlimited obedience from the people because the people are bound to
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obey it only so far as it exercises its powers in accordance with the
divine law»
10. In all affairs of the state the Muslims should make it the rule
to take counsel among themselves.
11. The qualifications of those who run the affairs of the state should
include the following:
i) They must have faith in the principles according to which they
have to manage the affairs of the Caliphate,
ii) They must be honest, trustworthy, God-fearing and virtuous,
iii) They must be intelligent, educated, wise and both physically
and intellectually fit to manage the state,
iv) They must be men of integrity who can be safely entrusted with
public responsibilities.
12. The constitution of the caliphate should be based on the following
principles:
A: i) That obedience to God and to His Apostle takes priority over
obedience to everyone else,
ii) That obedience to those in authority is conditional on their
obedience to God and His Apostle,
iii) That the Caliph must be elected from amongst the believers,
iv) That it is permissible for the people to differ (or even to
oppose) the government and all their rulers,
v) That in the case of dispute the final authority to decide between
them is the law of God and His Apostle.
B: The Qur'an gives no fast and hard rules on the method of election
and consultation; it only lays down broad principles within which
practical implementation of public problems can be decided in
accordance with the exigencies of time and the requirements of
society.
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C: On matters about which no clear injunctions are given and no
limits proscribed by the Apostle of Islam, the legislature (i.jma)
has the right to enact by-laws, rules of procedure, in keeping
with the spirit and the general principles of Islam, to bring
them into practice.
D: The judiciary must be free, independent and impartial in its
authority. Its main duty is to adjudicate cases in strict accord¬
ance with God's law and the requirements of justice without being
swayed by the passions or prejudices of its own members or of any
other group.
13. The Islamic state comes into being for two purposes: firstly,
that justice and equality be established in human affairs and,
secondly, that the powers and the resources of the state be harnessed
in order to promote the welfare of the people.
14. All citizens of the Islamic state, whether Muslims or non-Muslims,
must be guaranteed, among other things, the under-mentioned fundamental
human rights and it is the duty of the Islamic state to safeguard them
against all types of encroachments:^"
i) Personal security
ii) Security of property
iii) Protection of honour
iv) Right of privacy
v) The right to protest against injustice
vi) The right to enjoin what is good and to forbid what is evil.
This is the right to criticism.
1. This list is by no means exhaustive. In fact, it is greatly abridged
to serve the purpose of this thesis.
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vii) Freedom of association
viii) Freedom of faith and of religious practice
ix) Protection against bringing one's own religion into disrepute
x) Limiting the responsibility of every person to his or her own
deeds
xi) Protection against action being taken against anyone on false
reports
xii) The right of the destitute and the needy to be provided with
the necessities of life by the Islamic state
xiii) Equal treatment of all citizens by the Islamic state without
discrimination.
15. The Islamic state has the following rights over its citizens:
i) That they must submit to the authority of the Islamic state,
ii) They must be law-abiding and should not disturb public order
and tranquility.
iii) They must give support to the Islamic state in its rightful
activities.
iv) They must be prepared to sacrifice their lives and properties
for the defence of the Islamic state.
From the foregoing one can see that Islam incorporates a tradition
of political submission as much as it teaches the legitimacy of rebellion.
On rebellion, there are numerous Qur'anic injunctions which exercise a
powerful hold on the mind of Muslims and which are constantly quoted by
radicals to justify revolt. For example, the Qur'an says:
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God has given permission to those who have been
cheated (or oppressed) to rise up against injustice,
and indeed, God will help them to be victorious,,
(22:40) 1
In fact, another injunction can be seen as making rebellion obligatory
when it says: "If they deal with you righteously then do the same
thing to them ..." (9:7). The full interpretation of this fairly long
injunction very briefly means that loyalty is due only if the leaders
are not corrupt, but if the]/- are (corrupt), disobedience to them is
obligatory. Also Muslims are taught to persist in their struggle
against tyranny because ultimately victory will be theirs:
Do not weaken and do not be aggrieved for you will
be victorious as long as you have strong belief
and commitmento (3:139)
Again Muslims are encouraged by a promise of reward thereafter:
Do not weaken your effort in fighting the enemy because
if you are suffering difficulties they too are suffering
the same difficulties but whereas you will be rewarded
by Allah they have nothing to hope for. (4:105)
These and similar teachings inspired a man like Shehu Usman Dan Fodio
and his fellow Jihadists and thus changed the course of history in
Northern Nigeria.
2
The Political Ideals of the Jihad
In analysing the ideals of the Jihadists it is important to look
at the circumstances which favoured the upsurge of the Jihad movement.
1. I owe this and the subsequent Qur'anic injunction to Alhaji Aminu
Kano who drew my attention to them. I am grateful to Dr. M.T.A.
Liman who checked my English translation of the injunctions.
Students of Islamic history will recall that this first injunction
was written on the Abbasid flag when they rebelled against the
Ummayyad caliphate in 749 A.Da
2. This section has benefitted greatly from the study of Thomas Hodgkin's
work, especially his Nigerian Perspectives (Oxford, 1975), pp. 244-
267. It also draws on Mahmud Tukur's "Political Ideals of the
Sokoto Caliphate", unpublished paper submitted to International
Islamic Seminar on Social Justice (3rd to 8th January, 1978),
A.B.U., Zaria.
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Bearing in mind the fact that the religion of Islam and thus Muslims
existed in Northern Nigeria centuries before Usman Dan Fodio, the
period between the middle of the eighteenth century to the early
nineteenth century witnessed the growth of the scholarly class,
particularly among the Fulani and the Tuareg, with their own distinct
family and educational base, sharing a common Islamic culture and
community values, operating outside and independent of the existing
political structures. This gave the Muslim scholars the freedom to
teach their religion and to inculcate alternative political values to
their students and fellow Muslims alike. In so doing a firm base was
created for the opposition to and the subsequent overthrow of the existing
ruling dynasties. There were also a variety of social, economic and
political grievances, of the kind listed by Usman Dan Podio in his
Kitab A1 Farq, which affected all sections of the population, Muslim
and non-Muslim alike. The reforming scholars became increasingly aware
of these grievances through their teaching profession and because some
of them worked as functionaries of the rulers. Conversely, the masses
were awakened to, and indeed, became resentful of, their predicament
through the teachings of the scholars. The increasing number of
conversions to Islam posed a serious threat to the non-Muslim rulers
who reacted by attacking the Muslims, especially the new converts. The
Muslims answered aggression with aggression and in the confrontation
which ensued the Muslims emerged victorious.
The Jihadists' solution to the problems of government was the
installation of a humane and just government which would govern
according to the Shari* ah;
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The foundation of good government is justice,, The
Imam should command his people with justice,, There
can be no development without justice and justice
is the basis of all progress. 1
It should be supported by a simple non-exploitative bureaucracy. The
appointment of the Caliph would be by consultation not by hereditary
right. As a safeguard against oppression on the part of the rulers,
the importance of accessibility was stressed: one of the practices
most destructive to any reign is "the seclusion of the King from his
subjects". Their aversion to injustice and oppression is illustrated
by this statement:
The most abhored and remoted from Allah is the
tyrannical ruler. Whoever commits oppression is
cursed by God. The oppressive ruler will not get
Kuhammed's intercession. Authority given to those
unfit for it is oppression.
As Thomas Hodgkin perceptively observed that the Jihadists' idea of
the state is "essentially elitist, but their conception of an elite is
an open scholarly class, admission into which should depend on piety
2
and learning only." Thus, like Plato in The Republic, the Jihadists
insist that the entitlement to power and the credentials for exercising
rule over others should be based on individual merit only. The Republic
of Plato is clear on its insistence that intellectual merit is the
ultimate criterion of the right to rule. On the top of the structure
are the "guardians", those who are entrusted with the welfare and the
destiny of the society. The guardians should be trained and groomed
on the basis of their intellectual capacities and they should be
1. This and the quotations below were originally from Shehu Usman Dan
Fodio, Kitab A1 Farq (M. Hiskett, trans.) in Bulletin of the School
of Oriental and African Studies. XXII (No. 3, I960), p. 570; and
Muhammadu Sello, Usui, Fifth Principle, p. 83; all are cited in
M. Tukur, on. cit., pp. 6-7.
2. See Hodgkin, T., "The radical tradition in Muslim West Africa"
(see below, footnote 3, p. 340) p. 115.
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entrusted with the power to rule on the basis of a strict leadership
code. Then comes the class of the "auxiliaries", those bearing the
burden of defence and security. Lastly, there is the "economic sector
of the society", those bearing the heavy burden of production and the
economic well-being of the society."*" In the same fashion the Jihadists
divided men into three categories: firstly, Malamai of high standing;
secondly, those that seek knowledge and the way of salvation; and
2
thirdly, the rest of the crowd who follow anyone who calls them. The
elite for the Jihadists, like the guardians for Plato, have the right
to rule because of their knowledge and piety. This is the theoretical
basis of their republican ideas. They dismissed ethnic origin as worse
than irrelevant in becoming a member of the ruling group, with the same
theoretical justification:
One of the swiftest ways of destroying a kingdom
is to give preference to one particular tribe rather
than another or to show favour to one group of
people rather than another. 3
This is a reflection of their own belief that when the state power
consistently favours one ethnic group against others, the state will
not only forfeit the support of the excluded groups but it also under¬
mines the legitimacy of its claim to authority over those ethnic groups.
In fact, the reforming scholars were known to have frequently attacked
those who mistakenly thought that being a Fulani was a sufficient
qualification for being a member of the elite or holding office within
1. See Plato, The Republic (Lee. H.D.P., trans.) (Penguin Classics,
1572), pp. 156-173.
2. See Arnett, E.J., The Rise of Sokoto Fulani (Kano, 1922), p. 27;
M. Mahdi, AlFarabi, made a similar division of citizens in Strauss,
L., and Cropsey, J. (eds.). History of Political Philosophy
(Hew York, 1963), pp. 160-1.
3. Usman Dan Fodio, in his Bayan Wuiub, cited by Thomas Hodgkin,
"The Radical Tradition in Muslim West Africa", in Little, D.P.
(ed.), Essays on Islamic Civilization (Leiden, 1976), p. 115.
341
the new Islamic stated Furthermore, after their victory in the
confrontation between the Muslim and the Habe rulers, the reforming
scholars demonstrated a remarkable tolerance and accommodation of the
not so learned Muslims as well as their pagan neighbours:
The caliph has to honour the notables of every tribe
and the head of each clan and enjoin them to be kind
towards the learned, those who know the law by heart,
and the pious and ascetics ... He should not deprive a
chief of his chieftaincy — rather he should make sure
that every mighty man retains his position and cause
everyone to occupy the place he is entitled to. Only
then can he be the chief of chiefs. 2
Indeed, it was on this tolerance and accommodation (which was in
contrast with the persecution of Muslims by the Habe rulers), the ease
of Muslim conquest and the subsequent stability of their regime in
part depended. On the other hand, it partly depended on the accountability
of the rulers to the ruled.
Among other things, the Jihadists also stressed the importance
•z
of the accountability of all public servantss l) that a leader
should be answerable for all his public actions; 2) that holders of
public offices whould conduct themselves in accordance with the values
and the standards of their society; 3) the willingness and the ability
of rulers to give information and to submit themselves to examination
by the ruled; 4) that caliphs are responsible not only to their own
people but ultimately to God. Emphasizing the personal responsibility
of a leader to the whole community (umma), Shehu Usman Dan Fodio told
his Muslim followers that everyone of them was a shepherd and thus
1. See Last, M., The Sokoto Caliphate (London, 1967), p. 59.
20 Usman Dan Fodio, op. cit., cited in Hodgkin, T., in Little, D.P.,
op. cit., p. 115.
3. For more detailed discussions on the importance of accountability,
see ibid., pp. 103-117.
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every one °4 them was responsible for the flock.^ And Huhammadu Bello
reminded his provincial governors that the happiest ruler was he with
'
2
whom his people were happy. The governors were also urged by Abdullah!
Ibn Fodio to enforce the law of Tuhdasu, covering those who appear to
3
be "living beyond their incomes". Abdullahi Ibn Fodio explained that
whoever was found to have wealth above what he earned from his work,
the ruler should confiscate and restore it to the treasury. Indeed,
the emphasis on the accessibility of the caliph and his deputies to
the rank and file members of the community is also a form of accountability
because when the oppressor is certain that the oppressed will not have
access to him, he becomes even more oppressive. Thus, the accessibility
of the ruler and the upholding of justice are means of ensuring the
unity of the community, because when people suffer without getting
redress from their ruler the people's loyalty will shift to another
ruler and thereby cause dissension and division within the community.
In order to avoid this, Sokoto still maintains the tradition whereby
the Sultan periodically explains his policies and actions to the Ulema,
who are the visible embodiment of the Islamic value system. This
4
tradition came into being when Aliyu Babba , the Sultan of Sokoto,
encountered a group of Sokoto Ulema who publicly announced that they
had withdrawn their allegiance from Aliyu and that it was Halal,
1. This originates from a well-known Hadith of the Holy Prophet. It
was paraphrased by Usman Dan Fodio in Kitab Al-Farq, p. 567.
2. Muhammadu Bello, in Usui A1 Siyasa (B.G. Martin, trans.) in D.G.
McCall and N.R. Bennett (eds.). Boston University Paners on Africa,
V,(Boston, 197l), p. 83.
3. Abdullahi Ibn Fodio in A1 Hukkum, p. 94, cited by M. Tukur, on.
.ext., p. 22.
4. Aliyu Babba (Mai Cinaka), the eldest son of Muhammadu Bello and
thus the grandson of Shehu Usman Dan Fodio. He was the third
Sultan of Sokoto, 1842-1859.
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"permissible" , in Islamic law, for other Muslims to do likewise,,"*"
Accountability to God is fundamental to Islamic political thought,
hence the importance of public accountability of Islamic leaders
cannot be gainsaid,,
In view of the above, widening access to education (and thus entry
to the elite) was not only a safeguard against unaccountability but
also a means to maximise popular participation in politics, A high
standard of education became a necessary precondition of membership
of the community as it is necessary to understand the Shari* ah in order
to act in accordance with the divine law and to ensure that others do
the same. In view of this the reforming scholars put tremendous
emphasis on education for the purpose of training more teachers,
administrators and jurists. In addition widening the spread of
education enabled the reforming scholars to popularise the basic ideas
of the reform movement among the masses through poems and songs in
Hausa and Fulfulde languages. The right of women to receive education
was not neglected and, in fact, it became the responsibility of their
2
menfolk to instruct them.
To what extent are the ideas of the Jihad movement radical and
what are the radical dimensions of the changes introduced by the
Jihadists? The central idea of the Jihadists concerned the legitimacy
of political authority: the rejection of all the existing dynasties as
Haram, "unlawful" according to Islam law and religion; the hostility
1. Interview with Sarkin Rafi, Abdullahi Kaikano, at Sokoto, in 1976,
2. See Ogunbiyi, I.A., "The position of Muslim V.romen as Stated by
Uthman b„ Fudi", in Odu, N.S. (Nos. 1-2, 1969), pp. 43-60; and
Abdullahi Ibn Fodio, Tazvin al-Waraaat (M. Hiskett, trans.)
(ibadan, 1963), pp. 86-87.
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towards monarchy because it is an un-Islamic institution; and the
condemnation of hereditary kingship as an un-Islamic practice. These
were all radical positions for their time and more so in nineteenth
century Hausaland. But, far more important were their efforts to give
their followers a political education: l) on the importance of knowledge
and its relationship with allegiance to a particular leaders; 2) on
the necessity to migrate from the land of oppression and injustice;
3) on the need for the Ulema to disassociate themselves with powerful
and wealthy persons; 4) on boycotting the ruling elites and governments
who perpetuate injustice and oppression. In fact, the belief that
when improperly-educated people were given leadership disaster would
ensue, set new rules for the political game in Hausaland. All these
ideas and beliefs are rooted in Islam which teaches Muslims not to
follow leaders whose policies and practices are not based on the Shari'ah:
Knowledge and authority are the fundamentals of
religion and a person who simply follows his whims
is not acting according to the Shari'ah. This type
of man should not be given leadership. 1
The Muslims' refusal to humble themselves in front of the Habe rulers
at a time when the tradition impelled all commoners to prostrate them¬
selves before the members of the ruling classes, reflected the radical
element of the Jihad movement. Similarly, the refusal of the Jihadists
to compromise or to negotiate with the Habe rulers posed a serious
threat to the existing regimes.
They also addressed themselves to the difficult issues of the
economic relations between their new community and the power-elite of
Hausaland. They spelt out the correct attitudes which should be adopted
1. Usman Dan Kodio, Masa'il al-Muhimma (0. Isma'il trans.) cited in
M» Tukur, on. cit. . p. 30.
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towards the property of the al-Zalama, "the unjust", and the imper¬
missibility of association with themc The concept of al-Zalama includes
all those persons who misused their power, influence or offices to
trespass on other people's rights. The economic history of Hausaland
in the late eighteenth century and the early nineteenth century suggests
an uneven economic boom"'' which enabled many people, traders, rulers
and even scholars, to amass wealth; much of which was, of course,
obtained by exactions, expropriation or other exploitative means. The
relative affluence prevalent drew this stipulation from Shehu Usman Dan
Fodio:
Where the Haram part of a person's property is clearly-
identifiable and the property is still in possession of
the person who expropriated it, it is not permissible
to sell, buy, eat or wear from it. Nor should any Muslim
accept part of it as a present or in settlement of a debt.
When most of a person's property is illegally acquired
(i.e. through oppressive policies) it is not permissible
to trade with him. Any dealing with him is Haram. 2
The Shehu further advised all Muslim scholars not to visit such corrupt
persons:
A learned man should have people come to his door and
ought not be seen at others' door For a scholar
should cater for his needs and those of the Muslims by
cutting himself off from the men of the world — Abna
al-Duniva. 3
That devastating campaign against the existing socio-economic order was
unparallelled in the history of Hausaland. The Jihadists put forward
a view which is frequently associated with radical movements, that "
1. See "Economic History Papers" (forthcoming by A.B.U., Zaria),
submitted at the seminar on Economic History of the Central Savanna
of West Africa, 5th to 10th January, 1976, Abdullah! Bayero
College, A.B.U., Kano,
2. Quoted in Usman Dan Fodio, oo. cit,. cited in M. Tukur, op. cit,.
p. 37.
3. Ibid, This is in fact paraphrased from the Qur'an, 2:156.
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the identity of their community should he based on the common culture
of the Muslims which is rooted in the Islamic belief system rather
than on common ethnic or economic interests. Thus, like Marxism"*",
the Jihad movement put its claim to the loyalty of its members on the
basis of a common belief system. In this way the Islamic values of
justice and truth, personal integrity, selflessness, humility and the
pre-eminence of the public interest, provided the basis of a viable
political community in Hausaland until the advent of the British.
But, as experience has shown all over the world, radical theories
are quite different from their practices and,Islamic radicalism is no
exception to this general experience. Islam is in its origins
revolutionary in that Prophet Muhammad precipitated one of the most
remarkable transformations in the history of mankind. But not long
after the Holy Prophet, the Muslim world was ruled by despots who used
his teachings to sanctify their own authority. The revolutionary tradition
of Islam was pitted against the religion of the state which drew its
legitimacy from the apparent belief that it stood for justice, equality
and freedom on the side of the poor and the oppressed; but in reality
the institutions of the state were on one side and the people on the
other side. That situation came about when military leaders seized
control of the institutions of the state and turned them into the
2
instruments for their own preservation and enrichment. The religion
of Islam degenerated into a dogma which reflected, in a semi-secular
1. For a comparative study between Islam and Marxism see Hodgkin, T.,
"The Revolutionarj*- tradition in Islam" , in Race and Class. XXI
(No. 3, 1980), pp. 221-237.
2. The same situation developed in the early Muslim state in Arabia.
See, among others, Wolf, E.R., "The Social Organization of Mecca
and the Origins of Islam", in South Western Journal of Anthropology.
VII (No. 4, 1951), pp. 1-19.
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form, the socio-political habits conditioned by the authoritarian
caliphal system. This crisis arose from the conflict between Islamic
values and the values of Arab Bedouin society. All along Islam was
unable to free itself completely from ancient Arab beliefs and the
search for a balance between the two elements remained a feature of
Muslim intellectual life for many years.
Similarly, Islamic values became entangled with local traditions
in Northern Nigeria and thus not long after the passing away of the
leading Jihadists, Hausaland witnessed the use of Muslim religious
dogma to perpetuate un-Islamic traditions. Contrary to the teachings
of Islam, the institution of kingship was reestablished and the Emirs,
more than anything else, became military commanders who led their
people in wars, hence they made laws and controlled the administration
of justice. Title to the throne became essentially hereditary while
Emirs were regarded as sacred persons if not themselves God, they were,
at least, the Lord's annointed. The descendants of the Jihadists and
some Ulema who cooperated with them enjoyed all the trappings of high
office and much affluence. Subsequently, all members of the ruling
dynasties were placed at the top of the social hierarchy. In fact, to
many people, the Jihad ceased with the overthrow of the Habe rulers when
most non-Muslims came under the protection of the Muslim states and as
such they were treated as property (slaves).*"
1. Interview with Jauro Adarnu Mapindi who also drew my attention to
the large number of pagan communities in the former Adamawa Province
(now Gongola State) who were (and still are) referred to as Habe
Amana, "Those under Muslim protection". Such pagan areas were
preserved as the communities from which slaves were captured as
and when they were needed.
348
That sorry situation led to the rise of Hausa "radicalism", i.e.
those who identified themselves with the kind of criticism which
Abdullahi Ibn Fodio made on the new political order, especially the
predominantly Fulani ruling class:
Whose purpose is the ruling of countries and their
people, in order to obtain delights and acquire
rank, according to the custom of the unbelievers
and the title of their sovereign,, 1
That interlude of crisis was immediately linked with the appearance
of the Mahdi and thus to increased criticism of the Emirate governments
by puritan Malamai. It also led to the migration of other Muslims to
Sudan en route to Mecca. Increased social tension and the anxiety of
the people did not seem to minimise oppression as rulers warmed up to
power and as the descendants of formerly austere Malamai who were
accustomed to all the hardships of a meagre existence on the borders
of the Sahara desert found themselves masters of some of the richest
parts of Hausaland, able to enjoy every luxury and to acquire some of
the refinements of ancient Arab civilization,, As commerce developed
(e.g. in Kano), so did the Emirs' courts become brilliant centres of
luxury. "Absolute monarchy" combined with polygamy led, as it did
in the Middle East, to dynastic civil wars. There were immense numbers
of slaves, largely as a result of the successful military campaigns
against non-Muslims. Not only did possession of enormous wealth create
demand for costly merchandise, such as silk, etc., from the Mediterranean
region by the ruling Emirs, but it also increased ostentatious consumption
by all the nobility. In addition, there developed the practice of Murgu.
1. Abdullahi Ibn Fodio, on, cit., pp. 121-122.
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"payment by a vassal to his overlord"^", i.e. the annual tribute of
slaves, horses, food stuffs and clothes, to the Sultan of Sokoto by
all his vassal states,, That practice began when slaves became difficult
to obtain in the far North and some Emirs resorted to the practice of
2
Kifa Kwando , i.e, the conscription of Muslim Talakawa as slaves and
sent them to Sokoto as tributes. This was widely practiced in Kano,
3
Katsina and Daura before the British conquest of Northern Nigeria.
The Colonial Impact
4
It was de Maistre who observed that in every major social and
political transformation the old order had suffered a moral defeat and
the erosion of its legitimacy well before the political changes took
place. In each case the new morality claimed to express the feelings
and the aspirations of a wider segment of the society. This was clearly
true of the triumph of Muslims over Habe rulers in the early nineteenth
1. Murugu: also the payment by a slave in lieu of service to his
master. It can also mean payment by a master for the returning of
his run-away slave. The practice of paying tributes to Sokoto was
established after the death of Muhammadu Bello (1837)® In his
lifetime, Sultan Bello refused any sort of tribute, commenting that
each must be content with what he earned by his own labour. This
principle applied to lesser chiefs as well. See Smith, M.G.,
Government in Zazzan, 1800-1950 (Oxford, I960), p. 146.
2. Kwando is the Hausa name for a straw bucket; and Kifa means to turn
something upside down. The practice of Kifa Kwando was one by
which a straw bucket with some ashes inside was put in front of
one's house to signify that the whole family were declared slaves
by the Emir and, accordingly, they were taken to Sokoto as part of
the tribute to the Sultan. Many such slaves and other poor people
who were potential slaves ran away to Lokoja where they joined the
British forces which later conquered Hausaland.
3. Interview with Alhaji Aminu Kano, at Kano, on 9/l/l978. I have
verified this with two more informants: one in Katsina and another
at Daura who want to remain anonymous.
4. See The Works of Joseph de Maistre (London, 1965, selected, trans¬
lated and introduced by Lively, J.).
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century. Ironically, it is equally true of the subsequent fall of
the "Fulani Empire" For some decades before the British conquest of
Northern Nigeria, the legitimacy of the Emirates' governments was being
questioned and, indeed, challenged (as evidenced by the civil wars)
both in terms of Islam and on a functional basis. The British took
advantage of the existing internal divisions and imposed their
suzerainty over Northern Nigeria. The imposition of the British
colonial rule opened a new chapter in the political development of
Northern Nigeria in that colonial conquest meant that Muslim rulers
had been shorn of political autonomy and were, instead, subjected to
the humiliating control of their Christian overlords. This represented
the defeat not merely of a particular ruling class, but also of a
religion and a culture. British conquest proved not only the techno¬
logical superiority of the colonial power, it also exposed the weakness
of the Muslims and thus put their culture at risk.
Nevertheless, the British conquerors and their Muslim vassals had
some common characteristics which made their cooperation possible, and
while the vanquished Muslim rulers acquiesced in a subordinate position
to the British in order to maintain their privileges their Christian
victors, impelled by administrative necessities, coopted their enemies
on the battlefield and ruled through them at the local level. Hence,
the policy of indirect rule which made the Emirs efficient agents of
2
colonial administration.
The administration established by the British might have been
different in content but it was similar in form to the old Muslim model,
1. Anon, "The Fall of the Fulani Empire", in The South Atlantic
Quarterly. LXYII (No. 4, 1968), pp. 591-602.
2. See Hodgkin, T., Nigerian Perspectives (Oxford, 1975), pp. 70-71.
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Under the British, the administrative structure of the Emirates'
governments was retained hut with slight modification which ensured
more effective control of the outlying districts. New fiscal arrange¬
ments were made which guaranteed regular incomes to the administrators
and the law-enforcing agents, A head-tax was enforced which coopted
the natives into a cash economy. In contrast to the personal despotic
rule of the chiefs, the colonial civil service was in principle a
rational bureaucracy which operated impartially according to rules in
implementing government policies. But the British promise not to
interfere with Islam proved to be a contradiction in terms since Islam
is as much a political system as it is a religion. Furthermore, the
British idea of the secular state was fundamentally opposed to the
Muslim conception of the Islamic state.
What actually led to a radical challenge to British rule in Northern
Nigeria was the British policy of teaching "these semi-civilized natives
good behaviour and obedience to government authority."^" In pursuit of
this, Western schools were established to train local functionaries of
the Imperial power. These schools produced the graduates who later
demanded reforms in Northern Nigeria. Once again there were similarities
between the products of the British schools and the products of the
Islamic schools in the early nineteenth century. By virtue of their
education both had been made distinct in their respective cultural
milieu. The British educated Northerners belonged to the modern world
of scince and technology, as superior to the old ways as Islam was to
the pagan ways. They too criticized the British compromise of their
1. Quoted in Anon, "Muslim Areas of Northern Nigeria under British
Rule", in Duckworth, E.H. (ed.), Nig-eria (No. 22, 1944), p. 38.
Also see a long discourse on British policy in Nigeria by Lugard,
F.D,, "British Policy in Nigeria", in Africa. X (No. 4, 1937),
pp. 377-400.
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principle of administration with the old traditional methods, as the
Islamic reformers criticized religious syncretism 150 years ago. Like
the Muslim scholars before them, the young graduates of the Western
schools became teachers and administrators in their communities.
Again like Shehu Usman Dan Fodio and his contemporaries, the Western-
educated elite were not absorbed into the landed magnates of the
community but rather remained radicals and idealists. But the modern
radicals were critical not only of the old ways but also of the very
colonial institutions which produced them. This is one of their
distinctive differences with the Islamic reformers of the nineteenth
century and, indeed, their main predicament.
Sandwiched between the otherworldly Muslim values and the secular
materialism of the West, many of them were concerned that their indigenous
culture would be subordinated to the Western European culture. For
example, in contrast to Western education, Islam teaches that knowledge
is not a goal in itself but, among other instinctive values, it is a
path to wisdom; and that it bestows neither privilege nor power but duty
and responsibility to one's community. Knowledge provokes the desire
to learn as much as to teach: it is the religious duty of the learned
to teach those who are not. And that knowledge is used to promote social
cohesion and to achieve a higher quality of life for the whole community.
It stresses cooperative endeavour rather than individual advancement.
It urges respect for the traditional knowledge and wisdom of one's
elders. Muslims are taught that the business of the educated is to
use their skills to serve the people. Under colonial domination these
^ i ty
values were eroding ggaudally. The radicals feared that the growth
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of material culture would compound social divisions and heighten
social conflicts,,"'"
Western education "brought along new moral principles0 It taught
its graduates new scientific methods of analysis,. Hence the radicals
were simultaneously disillusioned with colonial rule and disenchanted
with the NoAo system,, The N.A. system preserved pre-colonial social
and political institutions with little modification and thus pre-colonial
dynasties of the authoritarian type survived under British colonial
rule,, This gave the chiefs the power to resist any rational attitudes
and practices as well as the power to crush national movements because
they were seen as "those seeking to disturb the existing political
structure". Subsequent to their collaboration with the colonial
authorities , the Emirs enjoyed increased power which was used to arrest
progressive ideas both from Muslim reformists and from secular radicals,,
ar^r ; . ai c A~On the religious front the Emirs belonged to the Kadiriyya , at>
component—of the Wahhabi tendency. This is a fundamentalist Muslim
sect which in its political aspect emphasizes total submission to
Muslims rulers. The members of this sect were absorbed into the admini¬
strative and legal framework of the N.A.s, against the members of the
Ti.i.jani yya sect which were essentially anti-colonialist and anti-traditionalist.
1. See Last, M„, "Continuity in Bureaucracy and Dissent: Northern
Nigeria 1800-1967" (unpublished seminar paper, A.B.U., Zaria, 1969),
in which an interesting comparison was made between the modern and
the traditional bureaucrats in Northern Nigeria. Also see Brown,
G0N. and Hiskett, M„ (eds.), Conflict and Harmony in Education in
Trorical Africa (London, 1974), especially pp. 134-151 and 247-270.
2. Except for the Emirs of Kano, expecially Abdullah! Bayero (1926-
1953; and his sons. In fact, Muhammadu Sanusi (1953-1963) is,
till today, the leading member of the Ti.i.ianiyya in Northern Nigeria.
3. A Sunni Muslim fundamentalist tendency established in Arabia in
1747-1812 and named after its founder, Abdul V/ahhab.
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This deepened division and intensified rivalry between the adherents of
the two Muslim sects,,
While British colonial rule meant the loss of sovereignty on the
part of the traditional rulers, nevertheless the policy of indirect
rule preserved a considerable measure of local autonomy for the chiefs,,
Through indirect rule the British lent support to the ruthlessness and
the avarice of the ruling classes. However, the British ideal of a
bureaucrat as uncorruptible, just and efficient was greatly admired by
the radicals, for these values were identical to the preceding Islamic
ideals and, as such, were accepted by the radicals as criteria of good
administration. But the British turned a blind eye to the conniptions,
injustices and inefficiencies of the N.A. system and, for this reason,
the radicals' demands for internal reforms graduated into a generalized
nationalist struggle for independence.
The desire to modernize Northern Nigeria was what the Western
educated intellectuals had in common, but on the means to achieve that
end they were as divided as the European radicals"'" of the nineteenth
century. They fell into two categories: the gradual reformers and the
"extreme" radicals. The former recognized the need to enlighten the
peasantry and to attract them to the cause of reform but the latter
believed in peaceful coexistence with the nobility, more especially,
they accepted the British strategy of decolonization. Some of them
(like the late Alhaji Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa) advocated mild and
gradual reform with sincere attempts to moderate the two extremes of
reactionary conservatism of the Emirs and the progressive radicalism
1. See Hobsbawn, E.J., The Age of Revolution, Europe in 1739-1848
(London, 1962), pp. 123-126.
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of the intelligentsia. But the latter conceived a radical or even
a "revolutionary" struggle against both foreign rulers and domestic
exploiters. They doubted the capacity of the nobility and the weak
middle class to lead the nation into independence and modernization.
Some of them (like the late M. Sa'adu Zungur) directly and sharply
challenged the entire society, calling for "power to the people" and
for stripping the Emirs of their aristocratic heritage, while, at a
meeting of the Jam«iwa at Kaduna in 1949, the late Alhaji Isa Wali
proposed that the Northern Nigeria House of Chiefs should be abolished
as a legislative chamber and be substituted in its stead by an advisory
council of elders, which might include some Emirs."'' Malam Aminu Kano
had a little earlier written in his diary (in August 1948) that "Nigeria
is doomed if this pernicious system of bloodthirsty, barbarous,
obselescent Fulani rule is pursued." The gradual reformers dismissed
their radical fellows as "irresponsible" elements but the extreme
radicals regarded the reformists as "selling-out", for comfortable
positions within the old order and, especially, within the colonial
administration. The division between the two was so serious that it
led to a split and subsequently to the formation of two political
parties (N.P.C. and N.E.P.U.) in Northern Nigeria.
The reformers remained in the N.P.C. which first incorporated
and was finally taken over by the traditionalists, hence the cooperation
between the N.P.C. and the nobility. The N.P.C. leaders took over
power from the British when Northern Nigeria attained internal self-
government in 1959, and except for minor ameliorations for administrative
1. See Feinstein, A., African Revolutionary. The Life and Times of
Nigeria's Aminu Kano (New York. 1975). PP. 111-112.
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convenience, ran Northern Nigeria very much on traditional lines. The
traditional hierarchies were strengthened and the plight of the
Talakawa remained as it was when the British came. The N.P.C. tried
to mobilize the traditional Muslim scholars and through them the Muslim
community and the party turned particularly to the defence of the
traditional North in Muslim terms. They opposed Northern radicals and
their Christian allies from Southern Nigeria®
N.E.P.U, Radicalism
The radicals grouped themselves in the N.E.P.U., the opposition
party in Northern Nigeria. The peculiarities of the Northern Nigerian
political system which prevented N.E.P.U. from securing effective
representation in the Northern House of Assembly also obliged the party
to concentrate its energies on the demands for electoral and local
government reforms and the struggle over civil liberties. Furthermore,
the party's concern to preserve Nigerian unity and its development
orientation combine to give it a "western orientation", which led
Thomas Eodgkin to observe that:
When the delegation from the Islamic congress — a
cultural organization sponsored by Egypt, Pakistan and
Saudi Arabia, a kind of Muslim version of the British
Council — visited Northern Nigeria at the end of April
(1956) it made fairly clear that it was interested in
the "Easterners" of N.P.C. rather than in the "Westerners"
of N.E.P.U. 1
Indeed, N.E.P.U. was a modern Islamic, radical political party, which
could not afford to reject a faith which is deeply rooted among the
Northern peoples, hence the party's ideas were derived as much from
1. Quoted in Hodgkin, T., "Radicalism and Revivalism in Northern
Nigeria", in West Africa. No. 2062, 20 October 1956, pp. 823-4.
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Islam as from Western democratic sources. N.E.P.U. tried to mobilize
the Muslim community through the Ti.i.ianiyya or that branch of the
order in Northern Nigeria which accepted the leadership of the late
Sheikh Ibrahim Nyas of Kaolack.
The Ti.i.ianiyya order disapproves of saint worship and the
personality cult; the emphasis is upon blind obedience to a leaders;
the economic exploitation of the faith by encouraging or compelling
gifts and offerings; the appeal to the credulity of the masses by the
use of amulets, miracle-working, etc."*" Thus, the order's religious
grounds of opposition to the establishment reinforces N.E.P.U.'s
political objectives. To both N.E.P.U. and Ti.i.ianiyya leaders, the
abuses of the traditional authority — nepotism, corruption, extortion,
jobbery, arbitrary power, etc. — represented the main cause of social
chaos in the Northern Region; both held that it was wrong for the
Emirs to regard the inhabitants of their respective emirates as
subjects rather than as members of the community of the faithful
(citizens) because all the peoples were either Muslims or they all
2
recognized the Sarkin Musulmi as their leader.
In contrast to the N.P.C.'s defence of the traditional system,
N.E.P.U. believed that in addition to dispensing justice, to make
better his people is one of the foremost tasks of the Emir. This
utilitarian moral view argued that morality is not merely man's duty
1. Tahir, I., Scholars, Sufis and Capitalists in Kano 1904-1974. the
Pattern of Bourgeois Revolution in an Islamic Society (dissertation
submitted to the University of Cambridge in fulfilment of the
Requirement for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy, November, 1975)
contains an analysis of Ti.i.ianiyya network in Kano in 1930-1949,
in Figure 4, ppo 419-421; and its geographical spread among traders
and merchants in pp. 423-4.
2. In addition to Tahir, I., ibid., p. 435, the reader is also
referred to Paden, J.N., Religion and Political Culture in Kano
(Berkeley, 1973), pp. 106-130, where its structure and authority
is discussed.
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but it is also good for the maintenance of law and order and, for the
political, social and economic well-being of the state and hence helps
to keep the ruler in power,, M. Lawan Dambazan likened the relation
between the Emir and his people to that between "the physician and his
patient".^ This implies a criticism of absolute rule because a Muslim
ruler must be guided by the fear of God in administering his people,,
The secular slant of the N.E.P.U. became manifest when it asserted that
although the Emir, like every Muslim, had to perform religious duties,
he should neither defend the faith, punish heretics nor wage the Jihad
in contemporary Northern Nigeria« N.E.P.U. considered Islamic moral
values were valuable not merely because the Shari'ah demands it, but
also for political purposes, i.e„ for the happiness of citizens and
for the perfection of the institutions of the state,, N.E.P.U. was the
first, in modern politics, to think of the state as an entity in its
own right and the first to insist that the Emir should be judged by
the performances of his administration in relation to the best interests
of his people.
Whereas it was for functional reasons based on the principles of
accountability that N.E.P.U. sought to bring the N.A. systems into the
full glare of public scrutiny, the party's challenge to the principle
of hereditary kingship,as practiced in Northern Nigeria, was based on
2
Islamic grounds. To N.E.P.U. leaders, the extravagance of the ruling
classes represented an arrogant display of insensitive greed. The party
argued that the privileges of the Emirs were immoral because they
1. Interview with M. Lawan Dambazan, Kano, 1978.
2. This discourse was recently developed by Hodgkin, T., in "The
revolutionary tradition in Islam", in Race and Class, op, cit..
p. 226.
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negated the Islamic belief in the equal dignity and worth of all human
beings, whatever their birth or wealth. N.E.P.U. supporters were
urged to desist from "the cult of the individual": explaining that hero
worshipping was for school children. The hierarchical society of
Northern Nigeria, "which forms a solid foundation for the emergence of
a class society, to be based on inherited wealth, privilege and the
power that goes with it", was indefensible.^"
The N.E.P.U. leader made very scathing criticisms of the Emirate
2
governments. In his Yan Tande."The exploiter-colonialists" , Alhaji
Aminu Kano challenged the validity of the principle of hereditary
rulership in a modern democratic society. He explained that among its
many flaws, the monarchy has three outstanding disadvantages: l) In
a monarchical system it is unlikely that the rulers will continue to
have sufficient ability, and if there is any uncertainty about succession
there will be dynastic civil war; 2) the monarchy is indifferent to
the interests of the ruled except when they are identical with the
interests of the ruler; 3) kings have the habit of relying upon the
nobility to maintain their power and this divides the society into
nobles and commoners and thus perpetuates economic exploitation and
political repression. Indeed in the 1950's the Northern Nigerian nobility
became the bastion of reaction and privilege and, with British support,
the N.A.s became the unyielding barrier against which the radical
spirit broke itself in vain.
1. See, "N.E.P.U. Election Manifesto 1956", p. 2; a copy of which is
in the possession of the writer.
2. Yan Tande. a manuscript written in Hausa language by Alhaji Aminu
Kano, Bauchi, 1943.
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In a way the failure of radical politicians to win elections in
Northern Nigeria was, in fact, a failure of reason. In the name of
reason they called upon the people to change their traditional ways,
but reason alone does not determine the ends of life, hence their
failure. Also they attacked deep rooted prejudices while their argu¬
ments were either open to question or too difficult to be followed by
the non-literate masses. For example, they wanted democratic reforms
because they believed that democratic power was the only means by which
they could sweep away the aristocratic privileges and interests that
impeded progress in their society whereas their rivals (N.P.C.) skill¬
fully countered the radical demand by, on the one hand, accepting the
need for democracy but, on the other hand, insisting that democratic
institutions would be introduced when the people were ready to use
them. This was tantamount to saying that children must not paddle till
they know how to swim. The case for political democracy rests on the
fact that the use of democratic institutions is learnt by practice.
The counter-argument was absurd but it was backed by the authority of
government so it had to stand.
This debate on democracy is one of the distinguishing features in
the political values of the N.P.C. and the N.E.P.U. There were two
particular qualities which N.E.P.U. regarded as virtues and wanted all
citizens to possess, while on the contrary the N.P.C. found it necessary
to suppress those qualities. The first was I.itihad. the insistence on
the right to think for oneself and to form one's own opinions; the
second was tolerance, i.e. respect for the rights of other people to
have and express their own opinions. The radical view was that one of
the aims of democracy was to habituate the people to thinking in terms
of the good of the whole country rather than of their respective
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sectional interests. These objectives were to be achieved in three
ways: l)stimulating general interest in public affairs by 2) setting
and striving to achieve a minimum standard of education amounting, at
least, to literacy, throughout the population; 3) the free expression
of opinions and free discussion. The authorities did not publicly
oppose the above objectives but they employed sill the institutions of
command and control to ensure that the radical politicians were defeated
at the polls.
The defeat of radical politicians at elections signified more than
a rejection of radical ideas in northern Nigeria: it involved a
rejection of intellectual values and achievement. The Northern Nigerian
establishment have always tended to exalt "character" above intelligence,
practical experience and, above all, theory. We were instructed in
schools all over the region that "Education is of no value without good
manners". The North has produced some of the finest intellects in
colonial Nigeria, but the intellectual as such has never been greatly
prized. Moreover, during the Zamanin Siyasa and even earlier intelligence
was discredited in the eyes of the "man of affairs" by its association
with the plight of the masses — or the traditional role of the radical
intelligentsia. The suspicion of men of intellect is more deeply
rooted than most people realized. It arose as far back as the early
nineteenth century when Shehu Abdullahi Ibn Fodio led the Muslim
populist left against the post-Jihad administration. Abdullahi was
punished for his intellectual vigour and physical dynamism by the
promotion of Muhammadu Bello who succeeded Shehu Usman Dan Fodio as
the leader of the faithful in 1817. Since then the Emirates of Northern
Nigeria were led by largely undistinguished men who were thought to be
"fair minded, judicious and responsible" by the various N.A. councils
of electors. In 1943, Alhaji Aminu Kano observed:
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Let us go back to the Emirs. From what we have seen
of the Emirs, only a few deserve to be on their thrones
at present, if we maintain that our present constitution
is fashioned both theoretically and in practice on what
was laid down in former days [at the time of the Jihadl.
Apart from our government today, where else has there
ever been a blind man leading the sighted, a one-eyed
man laughing at the two-eyed, and an ignorant man
occupying a position reserved for the knowledgeable? 1
In addition, they transplanted mediocre men into high office. These
"sovereigns" got rid of all difficult "characters" in their councils
while they were establishing their supremacy. Consequently, the
emirates were left with no local leadership capable of evaluating
the state of affairs and reacting accordingly because the royal dictators
had schooled their top officials into taking no iniatives of their own
(even if they were able) so that even at the most critical moments they
would wait for directives which were slow to arrive. Even more serious
was the Emirs' conception of themselves as a group quite apart from
the common herd of humanity. This mystical, religious belief in their
own separateness was also reinforced by the practical considerations
of the whole palace community.
It was his deep-rooted disaffection and frustration with the N.A.
system that caused Alhaji Aminu Kano (and others like him) to rebel
against both the emirate governments and the colonial might which
supported them. In his opposition to the emirate system and to colonial
domination, Alhaji Aminu Kano, like Shehu Usman Dan Fodio before him,
found intellectual stimulation in the teachings of the Qur'an. The
main, if not the only, impetus to Alhaji Aminu Kano's life struggle to
emancipate his people lies in his conviction that:
1. Alhaji Aminu Kano, cited in Paden, op. cit., pp. 278-82.
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Islam is a religion of rebellion,, Bvery time the
Muslim raises his arms in prayer and recites the
Kabbara he issues a challenge and a repudiation of all
earthly power. He invites emperors, kings, despots
and all of the powerful and everything in the universe
to bear witness and to deny if they dare that nothing
but Allah has power and is to be worshipped and obeyed.
The Islamic faith and Islamic prayer are a call to
revolution. 1
1. Alhaji Aminu Kano, in Tafsir at Kano, Ramadan 1973, cited by
Tahir, I., op. cit.. p. xl.
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BIBLIOGRAPHY
Bibliographical Notes on Primary Sources
My most important source material is myself, as I was a N.E.P.U.
supporter and official from 1959-1966. Furthermore, during my career
as a trade unionist (1964-1969) I travelled widely throughout Nigeria —
especially in the Northern Region — during which I met and interviewed
people, too many to be listed here. Being a Muslim has helped me
greatly in asking appropriate questions as well as in comprehending
answers on theological matters. Dr. M.T.A. Liman (formerly a senior
lecturer in Arabic and Islamic Studies at the Bayero University, Kano,
but now the Principal Private Secretary to Alhaji Aminu Kano, the
national chairman of the Peoples Redemption Party [P0R0P.], which is
the successor party to N0E0P«U.) assisted me greatly in explaining
Qur'anic injunctions and in my translations from Arabic to English
(and Hausa). Alhaji Aminu Kano was always ready to answer all religious
and political questions, while Alhaji Naziri Ibrahim explained subtle
political issues, especially in Borno, and on his role in both N.E.P.U.
and N.P.C. Alhaji Maina Waziri (a Fika prince) and the late Alhaji
Abubakar Zukogi, Ciroman Bida (also a Bida prince) dispelled most of
the myths of the "ruling class" in Northern Nigeria. My close friend,
Alhaji Abdulkadir Mansur (a Tijjaniyya adherent) was my principal
informant on the Tijjaniyya religious order.
The primary source materials on N.E.P.U. are abundant, but have
been by no means fully or sympathetically exploited. This is because
except for such publications as The Declaration of Principles and
The Sawaba Crusade, N.E.P.U. literature was almost entirely in Hausa,
for which reason it attracted little interest by earlier researchers,
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who were non-Hausa speakers,. For example, the party's ideas were better
expressed in Hausa songs and poems renowned for their innuendo and
allusions# Indeed, the works of poets like M. Gambo Hawaja, Jos, and
M. Lawan Maiturare , Yelwa, Kano, etc., confirmed that N.E.P.U.'s most
effective vehicle of expression was by song (or poem). Behind almost
every N.E.P.U. politician was a competent and elegant versifier skilled
in the effective use of imagery and piquancy, in conveying the party's
ideas to the masses. Yet only a few of these songs and poems are
translated into English# Even N.E.P.U. 's constitution, Jamiyyar Neman
Sawaba, Manufa, Sharudda da Ka'idodi, was in Hausa, which led J.B.
Dudley to conclude wrongly that N.E.P#U. had no written constitution.
Similarly, important documents like Aminu Kano's blueprint for radical
politics in Northern Nigeria.Yan Tande.is yet to be translated into
English; and his critique of the N#A# system, Kano under the Hammer of
Native Rule, is yet to be published.
Furthermore, N#E0P#U. documentary sources are widely scattered
all over Northern Nigeria (this is not to mention those which were
destroyed or confiscated by police) and their utilization presents
several problems. In addition to the problem of translation, there are
no organized central archives open to scholars. However, some individuals
still retain their private collections of useful materials. Alhaji
Aminu Kano has a library in his house at Kano which contains a great
wealth of source materials on Northern Nigeria. In addition, he keeps
all his personal diaries from 1947 to date (except for the one for 1949,
which was removed by the police in I960). Alhaji Ali Batan Yerima Balla
has the largest private library in his home at Little Gombi, in Gongola
State. He successfully evaded police harassment and escaped with many
useful N.E.P.U. files and other documents concerning his area# Both
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Alhaji S.A. Tanko Yakasai in Kano and Alhaji M.B. Yunusa at Minna have
substantial collections of N.E.PoU. materials. There are also useful
N.E.P.U. documentary sources with Alhaji Salihu Nakande at Jos and
Alhaji Adamu Abubakar Jajire at Potiskum. Every N.E.P.U. official I
know of has something to show or a story to tell about his experience
in the party at his or her locality. For example, former field officers
of the party like M. Uba Taura (who is now an area court judge at
Birnin Kudu) and M. Lawan Dambazau keep important party circulars for
Borno and Sokoto provinces respectively. Almost all Hajiya Gambo
Sawaba's papers were lost through police raids but she herself remains
a mine of information on N.E.P.U. activities.
Arabic and Hausa materials on Islam in Northern Nigeria are
substantial, but spread all over the Muslim areas and, unfortunately,
only a small proportion have been translated into English. Documents
from Sokoto are fairly treated, as shown in the list of books and
articles below. But research on other parts of the Muslim North is
yet to be made and if they are researched, the results are yet to be
published. Some of the enlightened rulers are willing to be inter¬
viewed by research students but are reluctant to make available what
documents exist in their respective palaces. Even those who agree to
be interviewed do not want their names to be mentioned. Perhaps this
is because in the traditional North where secrecy is regarded as a
virtue, it is considered uncouth to discuss predecessors and departed
friends with other people. And since the value of academic research
is yet to be fully appreciated, research scholars are seen as intruders
who may be talked to but nothing important should be said to them.
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The National Archives in Kaduna (HAS) contains many official
records and newspapers (especially Nigerian Citizen and Gaskiya Tafi
Gwabo) which adequately covered most parts of Northern Nigeria. Police
and provincial reports show the variety of opinion and, indeed, of
government activities from different parts of the former Northern
Region. The Arewa House (formerly the official residence of Alhaji
Sir Ahmadu Bello, the Sardauna of Sokoto and the Premier of Northern
Nigeria) at Nassarwa, Kaduna, is essentially a research centre which
houses the Sardauna's papers, including his correspondence with Alhaji
Aminu Kano from 1958 to 1966. It also contains some useful Arabic and
Hausa documents from Sokoto possibly collected by Sir Ahmadu Bello
himself.
The Colonial Office Library in London contains mainly colonial
government reports and publications. Reports for 1945 to 1959 on the
political development of Nigeria are particularly revealing, but they
are mostly very general and thus said very little on specific issues.
The Public Record Office, London, contains informative despatches on
colonial government policies but these documents do not adequately
analyse the rationale of policies although some of them reveal official
attitudes on particular issues. The Library of Rhodes House, Oxford,
is by far the most important source materials centre on Nigerian
politics, 1945-1960. Its catalogue on Nigeria contains reports by
many retired administrative officers who lodged their private papers
there. The problem is that access to a good deal of these is restricted
and it will take time before the restrictions are lifted. There are
the papers of the Fabian Colonial Bureau which show the links of the
British Fabian Society and some radical organizations in the former
colonies. Some documents of the Fabian Society are to be found in
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the library of the Trade Union Congress in London, which also, as to
be expected, contains documents on trade unions and politics in
Nigeria and other former British colonies.
There are also in the U.K. retired colonial officials who are
prepared to assist researchers, although some of them do not want their
names to be mentioned. But there are exceptions, for instance, Mr.
A.J. Spicer, from whom Aminu Kano took over at the Teachers' College,
Maru, in 1949 and who was at Bauchi with Aminu Kano, Sa4adu Zungur,
Yaya Gusau and Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, spoke very openly about his
experience at Bauchi and Maru between 1944-1950. Mr. W.P« Gaskell was
a Scout Commissioner in Northern Nigeria in which capacity he knew
most of the Northern political leaders from their days in Kaduna
College (1943-1953). Mr. Gaskell is also free in expressing his opinion
on those he knows. In addition Lord George Wigg was the N.E.P.U.
contact man in the House of Commons, while Marjorie Nicolson of the
T.U.C. helped N.E.P.U.delegations to constitutional conferences in
London. Mr. Thomas L. HodgkLn knows both Aminu Kano and the late Alhaji
Isa Wali fairly well and he has a fair collection of N.E.P.U. papers
from which I benefited immensely.
In addition to the sources outlined above, I give below a select
bibliography of the primary and the secondary sources I consulted on
this work. I also interviewed the following for the purpose of this
dissertation:
Alhaji Ali Batan Yerima Balla, Maiduguri, 1974 and Little Gombi, 1977
Alhaji Abdulkadir Mansur, Kano, 1976-1980.
Alhaji Abubakar Zukogi, Sokoto, 1974 and Bida, 1976
Alhaji Adamu Abubakar Jajire, Potiskum, 1976
Alhaji Aminu Kano, Kano and London, 1973-1980
Alhaji Bala Keffi, Kaduna, 1974
Alhaji Danbala Illiasu, Kano, 1972 and 1974
Alhaji Lawan Dambazau, Kano, 1977-1979
Alhaji Lawan Maiturar.e, Kano, 1972 and 1978
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Alhaji Maina Waziri, Potiskum, 1974 and 1977
Alhaji Muhammadu Danjani, Kano, 1972 and 1977
Alhaji Musale, Potiskum, 1974
Alhaji Sani Daraa, Kano, 1977
Alhaji Tanko Yakasai, Kano, 1974 and 1977-1978
Alhaji Tijjani Gago, Jos, 1978
Alhaji V/aziri Ibrahim, London, 1973
Alhaji Yahya Kwarijo, Kano, 1974 and 1977-1978
Alhaji Yunusa, M.B., Minna, 1976-1977
Alhaji Yusufu Maitama Sulei, Kano, 1977-1978
Hajiya Gambo Sawaba, Zaria, 1976-1977
Malam Abdullahi Mai Kano, Sarkin Rafi, Sokoto, 1976
Maiam Abubakar Tambuwal, Sokoto, 1976
Malam Akilu Madinki, Kano, 1972 and 1977
Malam Antiye Ma Riga, Potiskum, 1972 and 1977
Malam Gambo Hawaja, Jos, 1978
Malam Gambo Sawaba, Zaria, 1976
Malam Inuwa Shehu Kafanahan, Jos, 1972
Malam Tanko Yaro Muhammad, Kano, 1979
Malam Uba Taura, Potiskum, 1972 and 1979
Principal Primary Sources
Alhaji Aminu Kano: Diaries 1947-1977
Political Files, various correspondences with
Govt.: Files 1958-1966
Alhaji Ali Batan Yerima Balla: Private Library
Alhaji Tanko Yakasai, S.A.: Private papers
National Archives, Kaduna
Arewa House, Kaduna
Colonial Office Library, London
Public Record Office, London




Jam'iyyan Naman Sawaba: Manufa. Sharuada da Ka' idodi. London, n. d,
Menu Sa-faba: Zaben 1959. Kirana Farko, 1959.
Why Svery Northerner must not vote for the N.P.C.. Kano, 1964.
Northern Progressive Front 1964 Federal Election Manifesto. Henry-
Printing Press, Lagos, 1964.
The N.B.P.U. Party of Northern Nigeria: Declaration of Principles. n.d.
Sawaba Creed: Why I Join the Sawaba Crusade, Sawaba Central Secretariat,
2 Yoruba Road, Kano, n.d.
Matsayin Rantsuwar Tilas ga Adainin Musulunci. Ladapo Press, Jos, n.d.
(possibly 1964?)
N.P.C. Kamar Yadda ta Fassara Kanta, Hankalinta sai ansha - Dauki ba
Dadi, Comet Press, Kano, n.d.
Kungiyar Yanadawan Gwamnatin Arewa, Zaben Maialisar Tarayyar Ni.jeriya
ta 1964, Lagos, 1964.
Kuryar Kano Gameda Hu Kumar bayan Gida, Comet Press, Kano, n.d.
Sanarwa ga wakilan Zabe. N.E.P.U. Secretariat, Kano, n.d.
Kira Ga Al'umma, Kano, March 1961.
Jahadin Nemam Sawaba 1959. Kano, 1959.
Jam'iyyar Neman Sawa. Kano, n.d.
Jam'iwar Talakawa da Masoyansu. Kano, n.d.
N.E.P.U. Poems and Songs
Anon. Ta'ala zaiyi Sakayya a kanku munafukan banza. n.d.
, Azalumai Kun Shiga uku rundunar N.E.P.U. ta Iso, Community
Press, Jos, n.d.
M. Akilu Aliyu, Wakar Shata ta N.E.P.U., n.d.
, Bankadadde Panskashali Eashi Kunyar Karya Karya. Community
Press, Jos, 15-11-1956.
, Tambaya da Neman Amsa, Maiduguri, 9/3/1960.
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(Aliyu) Bar-ka da Zuwan M. Aminu dagca Ma.jalisar Dinkiri Duniya Game
da Murnar sa.mun Mullein Kan Ni.jeriya, Maiduguri, 11/10/1960.
Aminu Kano, Wakar Yancin NEPU Sawaba, n.d.
LI. Chusu Silame Sokoto, Rabba m. Addu1 a Llukai, Sokoto, 15/lO/l955
M. Gambo Hawaja, Allahu Taimaki N.E.P.U. Kan Azzalumai , Jose, 25/l/l954.
, Aya.u ba maki NEPU Sawawa. City Press, Kano, l/l/l955.
M. Ibrahim Minister, Mainepu, Onitsha, Yau da gobe muntane PISI sai
ta lalace. n.d.
M. Lawan Maiturare, Zalumai Kun Wahala Kunyi Asarar Banza. Kano,
16/8/1958.
-, Wakar Tafiya Ibadan "Conference" ta 1957. composed on the
train en route to Ibadan, 1957.
■, Wakar Murnar dawowar H. Aminu Kano daga London. Gwarzo,
23/11/1958. ~~
•, Africa Kasa Mai son Yanci Yancin bazai zama banza ba. Kano,
8/8/1961.
Yabon aikin leburori, Comet Press, Kano, n.d.
■, Wakar Komawa ga Allah, n.d.
■, Zabe yazo rana guda dan Sawaba zaka ga gaokiya. n.d.
•, Wakar Samarin Sawaba. n.d.
•
, Ko anki anso dolene Yancin mutan Ni.jeriya. n.d.
■, Sada-n kar da ran muga Ni.jeriya shine ya taimaki Ni.jeriya,
Comet Press, Kano, n.d.
, 'Ya'yan N.B.P.U. muna yawa Zalumai Kwa Can.ia Bakin Zama.
Confidence Printing Works, Kano, n.d.
■, Zabi Tauraron Sawaba bar Fatanyar P.C. Banza. n.d.
, Watar Tausayin Masana'anta ta farko, n.d.
M. Lawan Makafo Taura, Muna hanyar Gaskiya ba Zamu bi Karba, Ku bar
Kula Kalam Yadu.du Mai sa.ien banza. Jos, n.d.
M. Salisu Tata, Wakar Aware Kano, Kano City, 1965.
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APPENDIX I A
MEMORANDUM 0? THE NORTHERN ELEMENTS PROGRESSIVE UNION SUBMITTED
TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE COLONIES (in Parliament),
THE RIGHT HONOURABLE MR. OLIVER LYTTSLTON IN
LONDON, JULY 1952
The Northern Elements Progressive Union, in keeping with its
democratic aims and ideals, believes quite strongly that the time
is overdue when something must be done quickly to reform the
Northern institutions - Administrative, Educational, Moral, Economic,
Social and otherwise. The union believes that this change must be
brought about by the combined effort of both the Northern people
and the British officials. But this co-operation must be on the
basis of equality - not on the basis of masters and servants. The
union sincerely shares the view that the British people, however
much they may be criticised, abused and even charged with maladmin¬
istration by the colonials and their (the British) co-nations for
absurdities and contradictory colonial and foreign policy, has done
and suffered more for the cause of human freedom, humanity and just
dealing than any other nation today.
It is in the light of this belief that the NSPU sends this
delegation to the Secretary of State for the Colonies in the hope
that its demands may be looked into with sympathy and broad under¬
standing - thus avoiding a serious political upheaval.
The Union believes that the British public, peaceful and well
meaning as it is, is not aware of what exists in the colonies, and
much more especially in the Northern part of Nigeria where feudalism
is still practiced under the guise of what the Colonial Office
wishes to call "Indirect Rule". The Union is quite aware that many
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individual persons in Britain have the welfare of the colonials at
heart and are ready to support colonial aspiration.
The success of the delegation (the first of its kind from
this oppressed country under Her Majesty) may depend entirely upon
what attitude such persons will show and upon the Colonial Office's
outlook on the trend of affairs in the colonies.
It is therefore hoped that the Secretary of State for the Colonies
will be sympathetic enough to give this union his very best considera¬
tions.






We condemn, seriously, the Electoral system as it stands
today in the Northern Region of Nigeria® For it is deliberately
designed (by means of electoral colleges creating a bottle-neck)
to keep out the genuine representatives of the people and to
favour only those connected with the Native Administrations in
whom the members of the public have no confidence. This is
proved by the fact that all the present members of the House of
Assembly (with the exception of two) are N.A. officials, all of
whom were either rejected by the people or did not even stand for
election at all. Yet, to everybody's dismay, these people were
mysteriously declared elected.
Moreover, the system of ten per cent nominations by the
various Native Administrations is a further proof of a precon¬
ceived lack of confidence among the N.A. officials in the people
and thus creating a back-door entrance to the elected House of
Assembly which is said to be representative of the people. This
we consider incompatible with any democratic ideal; for the house
should either be elective or not.
We therefore impeach the Nominated Committee of Nine,
especially the Chairman (who was then the Secretary, Northern
Province) responsible for these anomalies in the Electoral System
of the Northern Region, for not upholding the enviable British
democratic ideals.
2. ELECTION BY CUSTOM
By this is meant sheer acquiescence to sole Native Authority.
It is therefore the most glaring anomaly of the electoral procedure
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since, obviously, custom is only resorted to in the interest of
the sole Native Authorities. Above all, this particular concep¬
tion of custom is today an anachronism.
3. THE ELECTORAL COLLEGES
At present the Northern Region is divided, for the purpose
of election, into twenty thousand primary colleges of no uniform
membership but which elect a uniform number of one person each.
4. TH5 SYSTEM OF NOMINATIONS
Owing to this undemocratic system, not one of the elected
representatives was able to reach the House of Assembly. Con¬
sequently today the persons who are in the House of Assembly, now
being exalted to the sky as representatives of the people in
Northern provinces, are all nominated by chiefs under the ten per
cent provision, in the first place, or by nominated members, under
an additional provision.
Since the number of outsiders, to be nominated to the pro¬
vincial electoral college by those nominated under the ten per cent
provision, is not specifically limited in the electoral system,
it follows that any number of persons can rightly come into the
provincial electoral college through this additional provision for
nomination. One fails therefore to see the use (whatever originally
meant to be) of these provincial electoral colleges.
As a result of this impracticable system, the people of Northern
Nigeria has no representatives, in the real sense of the word, in
the House of Assembly.
To illustrate this point, let us take the example of the Hano
District comprising Kano City itself, Sabon Gari, Page and the
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villages of Tudun Wada, Gwagwarwa, Nassarawa and Tarauni with a
total population of 150,000 people elected four representatives
(N.E.P.U. candidates) to the provincial electoral college where
they met 115 people supposed to have been elected from Kano
Province and they were all, including the 115 candidates, eclipsed
by the nominated members.
5. FURTHER SUBSTANTIAL POINTS
INVALIDATING- LAST ELECTIONS
UNDUE INFLUENCE: Voters were unduly influenced by the
Native Authorities all over the Northern Region through their
District Heads, Senior N.A. officials, Chiefs, as well as some
of the European Administrative officers. This was done by
calling secret meeting of District Heads, for example in Kano,
at which the D.O. Kano was present (l6th November 1951). The
District Heads were told to use their influence to stop the voters
in their districts from voting for any N.E.P.U. candidate.
Fortunately, however, a sympathiser among them informed
N3FU of what transpired at this meeting. The NEPU, at once wrote
to the Senior District Head, Kano asking him to confirm or deny
the statement, of which he did neither. Instead he rather called
what he perhaps considered a more secret meeting of himself and
three others and reported to them of the incident.
The following day, the NEPU received another similar
information and at once wrote again to the same Senior District
Head, Kano, for confirmation or denial, and for which no reply has
been received to date.
The NSPU, therefore, interviewed the Resident, Kano on this
matter (50th November 1952) who failed to do anything about it«
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This is sufficient evidence of the European Administration's
support of the N.A. autocracy.
Yet another startling support has "been revealed in the
following English translation of an extract from a Hausa circular
letter, sent out before the elections from the Northern People's
Congress (n.P.C.) Headquarters to the Native Administrations
and Government
"Every Emir, every District Head, every
Resident, every District Officer is
aware of this, even by reading in the
'Gaskiya ta fi Kwabo' (The Government
Hausa Newspaper), for this reason,
therefore, seek their support and advice,
and direct co-operation without any fear.
They are waiting for you. Their doors
are wide open with the intention of co¬
operating with you. Tell them all your
movements".
Obviously, therefore, these Emirs, District Heads, Residents
and District officers are members and patrons respectively of
this Political Party (N.P.C.) and they might as well, as did the
District Heads, have wished to have stood for election.
We see no justification for denying the NEPU Party, with its
obvious overwhelming support, equal opportunity and fair play for
reaching the House of Assembly.
Further evidence revealing the White Administration's support
for the N.P.C. is to be found in a publication in the Nigerian
Citizen (a Government Newspaper), referring to the success of NEPU
candidates as the red light which calls for its extermination.
In the circumstances, WE the people of Northern Nigeria, do
hereby make it known that we have no representatives in the present
House of Assembly, and therefore no confidence.
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6. QUE CONCRETE PROPOSALS
FOR IMMEDIATE NEW ELECTIONS.
For purposes of election, the Northern Region shall be
divided into single member constituencies in the proportion of
100,000 people per member, with each returning its member
directly to the House of Assembly. Based upon the 1947 tax
count, this amounts to 132 members for a population of 13M.
96,200 as in the following table
Table 1
Members of the Northern House of Assembly
Present & Proposed








1. Kano 2,871,000 20 29
2. Katsina 1,187,000 8 12
3. Sokoto 2,030,400 14 20
4. Bornu 1,176,000 8 11
5. Ilorin 479,000 3 5
6. Adainawa 796,000 5 8
7. Benue 1,162,200 8 12
8. Niger 579,000 4 6
9. Z'ari a 554,300 4 6
10. Bauchi 1,048,000 7 10
11. Plateau 662,300 5 7
12. Kabba 551,000 4 6
13,096,200 90 132
Note:
This Table is based, in round figures, on the 1947 Tax Count.
(Lord Hailey's Native Administration in the British African
Territories).
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We believe most sincerely that the proposals, provided
herein, are more satisfactory and democratic, and will enable the
members of the public to have confidence in the members of the
new House of Assembly - being their own genuine representatives.
This system is, we believe, also easier to implement, since
the present Residents could be- charged with the responsibility
of dividing up their respective provinces into the required number
of constituencies.
7. VOTING
Voting shall be by ballot and a sufficient number of polling
booths, according to local requirements, shall be provided in
each constituency for this purpose. There shall be provided a
Register of Voters in each constituency and a further separate
Register for each polling station.
The polling day shall be uniform throughout the Region,
from 8 a.m. to 12 midnight.
In view of the fact that there are over 60 per cent of the
people can read Arabic (Ajami), the names of the candidates
standing for election shall be printed on the ballot paper in
both English and Arabic, as it was the case in the final election
in Kano.
In addition to this, however, colour patches or pictures shall
be used to meet the requirements of those few who are not literate




A responsible African civil servant, with a staff of three,
shall be appointed Returning Officer for each polling station.
9. PARTY SYSTEM
It goes without saying that any democratically responsible
Representative Government is practically impossible without a
party system. Now that the Northern Elements Progressive Union
and the Northern People's Congress are for the first time being
the only two recognised political, parties all over the Northern
Region, sufficient notice shall be given them to put up their
respective candidates, by notifying the Chief Electoral Officer.
It shall be the responsibilities of the two parties and any
independent candidates to esplain to the electorate the procedure
of voting by ballot and the colours or pictures representing them.
No party or individual shall use, for purposes of propaganda
or otherwise, any Government or N.A. newspaper or property of
any description or services of their employees.
Candidates may not necessarily be resident in the particular
constituency in which they stand for election.
10. THE NORTHERN REGIONAL GOVERNMENT:
FORMATION OF
The Lt. Governor, Northern Region shall call upon the recognised
leader of the party returned by the electorate with a simple majority
to form a Government for the Northern Region.
11. CONCLUSION
The above summarises our case, and we trust you will use your
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good offices to effect, in 1952, an immediate review of the
Electoral system in the Northern Region of Nigeria, to he
followed by a General election in 1953.
Halam Aminu Kano
The N.E.P.U. Delegate
on behalf of the people of Northern Nigeria
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APPENDIX I B
JOINT MEMORANDUM BY THE NORTHERN ELEMENTS
PROGRESSIVE UNION AND THE MIDDLE BELTS PEOPLES PARTY
ON
ELECTORAL SYSTEM AND HUMAN RIGHTS.
HISTORICAL.
When sometime last year, the Northern Regional Government
took some steps to draw up 'a little bit better system of election'
(undoubtedly as the result of much agitation by the NEPU through
the press, mass meetings and delegation to the Colonial Office in
London), WE of the NEPU and the Middle Belts Peoples Party, as a
matter of courtesy and encouragement, praised the Regional Govern¬
ment not because we accepted the new system but because we saw that
the Regional Government, at last, had begun to be sensible of the
criticisms levied against it by the opposition parties. We deli¬
berately reserved our comments and criticisms because we were of
the opinion that the Committee's recommendations would have been
made available to the public for consideration and review.
But when the Regional Government, instead of taking such a
step, hurried the passage through the two Legislative Houses WE
of the same parties find that we must come out to make out and
make our stand quite clear►
We are concerned at the present moment with the forthcoming
elections into the House of Representatives.
ELECTORAL LAW.
Paragraph 45 Chapter 3 of the Scheme for Ammendments to the
Constitution of Nigeria says, amongst other things...,
418
that the Governor General may make regulations for the
elections of Representative Members of the House of Representa¬
tives and that for this purpose the provisions of section 63 of
the Order will apply with the necessary adaptions.
It is with the last four underlined words that we want to
express our fears and therefore make our stand as regards the
forthcoming elections.
The phrase 'with the necessary adaptions' can mean anything.
It may be, in some areas, election by custom; in some, it may mean
election through labrythine channels of electoral colleges. In
some areas it may mean election by whispering or show of hands and
so on and so forth. For the vast experience we have gathered
during the last general elections is a pointer to us.
We therefore wish to state that what is embodied in the ITEPU
Memorandum to the Secretary of State for the Colonies is still our
stand.
1. Direct elections after getting the country divided into
single member constituencies.
2. Elections on party basis. Use of symbols, letters and
ballot boxes. For we contend that the Northener is not too back¬
ward to participate in such democratic elections. In fact he is in
a better position because he can use both Roman and Arabic characters
as well as symbols. The elections in India, Kashmir, the Anglo—
Egyptian Sudan and even our sister country, the Gold Coast are a
proof and bear testimony to our case.
3. Election Commission. There must election commission to draw
up the electoral law and simultaneously supervise the elections
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throughout the Country. The practice of employing members of
the Native Administrations (who are also an interested party) to
help conduct elections must go, European officials must also
hands off the elections.
FUNDAMENTAL HUMAN RIGHTS..
Recent events in some parts of this country have shown beyond
doubt that the civil liberty of the individual are at stake and can
be trampled on without due regard to his inherent dignity and
inalienable rights.
We do not wish to give personal and individual examples but
it is true to say that in a greater part of this so called protected
country the inhabitants are nothing but casualties of modern civili¬
zation. The country may answer the name protectorate but when we
consider the state of the peasantry internally (especially those
who hold opinions other than the opinions of those in authority) we
hesitate to believe that the men and women are free and enjoy the
five freedoms.
Without freedom of association, assembly, expression, conscience,
and access to justice, it is impossible to make any constitutional
progress.
We know why many of us find it difficult to consider impartially
the meaning and implications of the Universal Declarations of Human
Rights.
The British have a deep-seated dislike of high sounding declara¬
tions and all written constitutions. They are proud of the fact
that they never make Declarations and have practically no written
constitutions. But the world as a whole and the British in particular
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are alive to Magna Carta, the work of Parliaments, the Petition
of Rights, the Habeas Corpus Act, the Reform Act, the Local
Government Act, the Factory Acts and scores of other acts which
were passed not only after tremendous fight - but also after great
sacrifices which involved loss of life and property. The British
struggle for the Fundamental Human Rights started from Rennemede
right up to the scaffold and later to Dunkirk, Hiroshima, and so on.
We of these two parties therefore very strongly request that
the Declaration of Human Rights be incorporated in our Constitution
as is the case with the Sudan.
Aminu Kano
WEPU delegate to Conference.
Federal Secretary,
Middle Belts Peoples Party.
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APPENDIX I G
Northern Element Progressive Union Delegation to the U.K.
c/o Forty-Nine Hotel,
49, Norfolk Square, London, ¥.2.
The Right Honourable A.T. Lennox-Boyd,
Secretary of State for the Colonies,
London.
Sir,
Electoral Reform in the Northern Region of Nigeria
In July 1952, following the first election under the Macpherson
Constitution, the N.E.P.U. sent a delegation to the United Kingdom
to protest against the 5-stage electoral College system used in
Northern Nigeria when WO stages were used in the Eastern and Western
Regions.
That Delegation met the Minister of State to the Colonial Office,
the Honourable T. Hopkinson, M.P., on 25th of July, 1952, who
counselled that the arrangements then existing should be given a trial.
At the 1953 London Conference following the breakdown of the
Macpherson Constitution, the N.S.P.U. again raised the question of
electoral reforms in view of the changes which had then been made.
The Conference decided that the methods of election should be left to
each region to decide. For this reason, the N.S.PLU.. has not the
advantage of appealing to the Governor-General of Nigeria on its
demand for electoral reform on the Northern Region.
Despite the persistent protest of the N.E.P.U. the position now
is that the stages in the Region were merely reduced to WO in some
provinces and THREE in others in the 1954 elections to the Federal
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Legislature. But both the indirect and nomination systems are
retained. They were abolished in both East and West in 1953.
The present Delegation is here to make a third appeal by the
N.E.P.U. to the Colonial Office to call on the Northern Regional
Government to introduce direct elections and to abolish nomination
in all forms in the Region because the N.E.P.U. believes that the
introduction of direct elections in the Northern Region is vital not
only to the advancement of democratic government in the Region, but
also to the unity of Nigeria. The N.E.P.U. believes that the
demand ought to come from Northern Nigerians and it brings on this
delegation evidence of that demand by the people of that Region.
The Working of the Electoral College System
The stages of election of a member differ in each province.
There were at the 1954 elections, for instance, TWO stages in Kano
and THREE in ZaXia.. A constituency ranges from 130,000 to 200,000
adult males who pay tax. Of these, only 500 persons take part in
any form of direct elections (e.g. show of hands) and this at the
primary stage only.
It is the experience of the N.E.P.U. that their candidates who
won at the primary and intermediate stages have to contest at the
final stage against their defeated opponents.. This happens because
the Electoral Law of the Region provides that any person whether or
not he had gone through the first two stages may be nominated to
stand at the final stage by anyone who has passed through the primary
supported by NINE other members of the same Pinal Electoral College.
(See 'Elections Under the Revised Constitution, page 12, first para.)
This also makes it possible for any person who may never have fought
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the elections at all to he nominated, at the Pinal Stage as a
candidate even in his absence.
Invariably it is the candidates nominated to stand at the
Pinal Stage who have won the seats. This was so at the last
election in the case of 16 of the 17 members for Xano for the
Federal House of Representatives*
A) The Case for Indirect Elections as put by the Northern Region
Government - based on the following:-
(i) Illiteracy That the majority of the people of the
Region are illiterate and are therefore incapable of taking part
in direct election.
(ii) Expense The Government claims that the Region would
be involved in great expense in producing Ballot Boxes.
(iii) Distance That direct elections would necessitate
people in rural areas travelling long distances to cast their votes.
B) The Case for Direct Election
(i) There can be no harmony or a true democratic system
of government in Nigeria when the country's Legislature is composed
of members half of whom are not true representatives of the people.
(ii) The argument in respect of illiteracy as advanced by
the Government in (Ai) above is baseless. Elections in India, the
Sudan, the Gold Coast and in the other two Regions of Nigeria where
the overwhelming majority of the people are illiterates have proved
that illiteracy is no longer an obstacle to direct elections. This
view is supported by the Report of the Hansard Society on "Problems
of Parliamentary Government in the Colonies".
(iii) Distance Same argument as (ii) above
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(iv) Expense The Ballot Box is essential to free elections
and must be provided no matter the cost.
(v) Direct election reduces to the minimum all chances of
corruption which exist under the system of indirect elections. It
saves time, when indirect election must be spread over several
weeks or even months before results can be obtained.
Criticism of the Present Electoral Laws - Relevant Matters
This party realises that there must be disqualification from
elections of persons serving terms of imprisonment of over six
months or under the death sentence. But the use which has been
made of this principle in the Northern Region exceeds the limits
of it in any democratic country and the powers given to the Governor
of the Region in this respect are arbitrary and open to abuse.
(See Third Schedule - Northern Elections 1954)
At the 1954 elections to the House of Representatives an
instance of excessive use of the principle by the Governor of the
Northern Region through the Native Court judges (who are almost
wholly members or supporters of Government party) could be given
as an example.
Uba na Alkasim, a candidate of the F.E.P.U. was arrested and
sent to jail for three months after he had won the Primary
election for the offence of giving false information to the police
in connection with disturbances by the Government party before the
elections. This offence is not an indictable offence and it shows
the extent to which opposition candidates are at the mere;?- of the
Government and its supporters. This case of Uba is not an isolated
case.
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The IT.E.P.U. therefore demands that only persons sentenced
to death or serving a term of more than sis months for all INDICTABLE
OFFENCES (not of a political nature) should be disqualified from
being voted for as is the practice in other Regions and other
countries.
Freedom of Assembly
Regulations in the Northern Region restrict freedom of assembly.
Their worst feature is that the authorities administering them not
only differ from one province to another but cannot be ascertained
with precision from the Regulations. Their requirements are also
left to the discretion of the enforcing authority. In some
districts it is the Emir or ruler who gives permits for political
meetings. In others the function is that of the District Head,
and in others still it is any other official not specified in the
Regulations. Periods of notice are equally as uncertain. These
regulations affect mainly the opposition parties as those admin¬
istering them are invariably supporters of the Government party.
Restrictions on freedom of Assembly in an area where the tree
of democracy is tender, is certain to retard its progress. The
N.E.P.U. believes that the normal 12-24 hours notice required
before Regionalisation is all that is needed today. The party
therefore asks the Secretary of State for the Colonies to take
these restrictions into consideration when considering the whole
of the Electoral question in the Region.
TWO other practices in connection with the Elections in the
Northern Region constitute great injustice to the N.E.P.U. and
make a mockery of Northern Region Elections. One is the appoint-
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merit of Returning Officers at one or other stage of the elections
of men who are either candidates at the same Election themselves
or members of the Government party.
The other is the appointment of Native Administration officials
who may be candidates at the elections as information officers for
the constituencies. At the 1954 Election to the Federal House and
By-election to the Northern House of Assembly, the Sarkin Shanu
not only acted as information officer for Kano Constituency but was
a Northern Peoples Congress candidate.. The result was that the
N.P.C. supporters were made aware of the rules and regulations of
the elections several months before. The N.B.P.U. was only informed
only seven days beforb the By-election. The Sarkin Shanu was
elected.
Conclusion
Para 6 of the Notes of the Interview given to the N.E.P.U.
Delegation in 1952 by the Minister of State for Colonial Affairs
begins
"The Minister continued that, while he was not without
sympathy for the feelings of the N.E.P.U., he suspected that that
party represented only a minority opinion of Northern opinion.
He was convinced that the present Electoral System accorded with
the wishes of the majority "
The N.E.P.U. claims that given the normal freedom accorded
an opposition party at any free and direct election in the Northern
Region today it would be the governing party in that Region. To
substantiate this the N.E.P.U. refers to Appendix B showing the
strength of the party at three elections without the 5 stages of
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the Electoral College. Reference has been made early in this
memorandum to the party's evidence of the mandate of the people
of Northern Nigeria.
The N.S.P.N, is the main opposition party in the Northern
Region. For the Colonial Office to take the partjr as representing
only a minority opinion suggests that the Colonial Office does not
wish to encourage an opposition to the Northern Regional Govern¬
ment. This can only be an encouragement of a one party dictator¬
ship and the British Government, if their Minister's view represents
its attitude on this question, will have to accept full responsi¬
bility for the consequences of despotism in the Northern Region.
This tendency on the part of the British Government to
discourage opposition to Governments in countries Britain claims
to be bringing to independence along democratic lines, may cost
the British people the goodwill of the peoples of the countries
affected when these weaker parties become some day the Government
of these territories.
The N.S.P.U. believes that the friendship of Britain and
Nigeria is essential to both. Whatever its experiences in these
past four years under the British rule in Nigeria, the party will
continue to value and work for understanding between the two
countries. The party and its supporters still have faith in
British fairness and professed intention of bringing Nigerians
to independence as a democratic people.
The N.S.P.U. therefore asks that before further constitutional
changes are made in 1956, the British Government should appoint a
neutral Commission to examine the Slectoral College System in the
428
Northern Region of Nigeria and the extent to which it weakens the
strength and unity of Nigeria.
Mall am Aminu Kano,
Leader of Delegation,
Barrister C.A.J. Nwajei,

















J.So Olawoyin (AG) 2588 votes
Defeated: Ezekiel Afolayin (NPC) 1758 votes
Alahji Ahmadu Dantata (NPC) 2119 votes
Defeated Aminu Kano (NEPU) 1776 votes,
Wazirin Sokoto Junaido (NPC) 2400 votes
Defeated Bello Dan Galadima (iTEPU) 381 votes
Aliyu Gumbi Magajin Gari (NPC) 1285 votes
Defeated Abubakar Tambawal (NEPU) 732 votes and
Maiwurno Tela (independent) 451 votes.
Ibrahim Musa Gashash (HPC) 3252 votes
Defeated Sard Darma (NEPU) 1229 votes
Ado Bayero (NPC) 2928 votes
Defeated Baba Dan Agundi (NEPU) 499 votes
and Ali Abullahi (independent) 74 votes,
Isyaku Gwamna (NEPU) 4070 votes
Defeated Alhaji Alin Iliya (NPC) 2406 votes,
Usman Opal (AG) 616 votes and Patrick Fom
(independent) 51 votes.
KADUNA CAPITAL TERRITORY Bala Keffi (NEPU) 1845 votes
Defeated Haruna Dan Birni (NPC) 1432 votes,
KAITO WAJE Alhaji Haruna Kasim (NPC) 2062 votes
Defeated Tanko Yakasi (NEPU) 1773 votes
ZARIA TOWN Shehu Mahiru (NEFU) 4754 votes
Defeated former Minister of Trade
Alhaji Aliyu Turaki Z&ria (NPC) 3611 votes

















Alhaji Othnan Ladan (NPC) 3467 votes
Defeated Alhaji Abubakar Duwan (NPC) 1981 votes
and Isa Wole (NEFU) 919 votes.
Ibrahim Imam (BYM) 2558 votes
Defeated Alhaji Dori (NPC) 1691 votes»
Basharu (BYM) 2416 votes
Defeated Shettima Kashim (NPC) 2060 votes
Yunusa Hai Hajja (NPC) 2054 votes
Defeated NEFU candidate 1234 votes
Indagi Faruk (NPC) 1545 votes
Defeated Alhaji Abubakar Bale Madakin Bida
(independent) 1088 votes, Halilu Bida 750
votes and Ibrahim Tako Galadiman Bida
(independent) 451 votes.
Haruna Tela (NEPU) 2901 votes
Defeated Sarkin Kiyawa 1378 votes and
Dan Galadima (independent) 1266 votes.
Baba Dankantoma (NPC) 1281 votes
Defeated Mamman Na Lado (NEPU) 1053 votes
Garba Gusau (independent) 704 votes,
Rufai Gusau (independent) 335 votes and
Mallam Ali Gusau (Action Group) 208 votes.
Ibrahim Laaro Ilorin Talaka Parapo
(AG Alliance) 3716 votes.
Defeated Alhaji Saadu Alanamu (NPC) 3226
votes.
G.U. Ohikere (igbirra Tribal Union) 1376
votes
Defeated Abdallah Raji (NPC) 893 votes,
ko Abadaki (independent) 331 votes and
JoA. Amoko (Action Group) 98 votes.
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APPENDIX III
NORTHERN ELEMENTS PROGRESSIVE UNION.
Tiews on
THE NIGERIAN CONSTITUTION CONFERENCE.
1956
The Northern Elements Progressive Union regards the 1956
Conference on the Nigerian Constitution as the last of its.
kind before Nigerian independence is accomplished. The Party
therefore believes that the Conference should lay the founda¬
tion upon which a permanent Nigerian Constitution will be
established by the Constituent Assembly which will follow the
British withdrawal from the country.
It is the belief of the NEPU that any formal conference
with the Colonial Office by the political leaders must be
preceded by conferences at the divisional, provincial and
regional levels as was done in the 1949/50.
The London and Lagos Conferences of 1953/54 did not reflect
the views of the people of Nigeria as the Conferences were
organised by the Colonial Office to effect changes in the 1950
Constitution without consulting the people of Nigeria. The NEPU
does not believe that the changes which altered the whole basis
of the 1950 Constitution, without previously consulting the
people, can be valid and permanent. The Party wants an opportu¬
nity to be given to the people to have their say before those
alterations are further entrenched in the political life of
Nigeria.
The debate on Federal, Quasi-Federal or Unitary Constitu¬
tion for Nigeria must be carried into every village and the pros
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and con3 explained to the people. The NBFTJ will not support
the attempts of the Regional Governments and the Colonial
Office to make the division of Nigeria a fait accomoli by
granting self-government to the Regions before the people of
Nigeria know what is actually happening. The NEPTJ wants self-
government and independence for Nigeria but not merely self
government for the Regions designed to hand them over to three
major parties with pledges of non-interference with each other's
policies and failures.
BASIS FOR NIGERIA'S CONSTITUTION.
It has been said that Nigeria is a British creation;
that the Nigerians of today speak many different languages and
have different customs and religions and that for these reasons
only a constitution which brings them into the minimum contact
will suit the country. It is claimed that it is for these
reasons also that the Colonial Office began the Regional system
which parochial-minded men have seized upon to create three
separate states with Prime Ministers while Nigeria, as a nation,
is without a Government and Prime Minister. The NEPU regards
Nigeria as a good creation although the British motive for bring¬
ing it about was to make their domination of the area easy.
The NEFU also believes that differences of Religion, customs
and language are not impediments to the unification of the peoples
of a single territory as has been shown by the United Kingdom
ana Belgium examples. Nigeria has the good fortune of having
large Muslim Communities in the North and West as there are
pagans in the North and South and Christians in almost every
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corner of the country. It believes further that the factors
of tolerances and community of interests which have welded
many distinct ancient Kingdoms into one vigorous and great
British nation also exist to weld into a single Nigerian
nation our own old and varied communities in this territory the
creation of which we owe to the vision of the early British
Administrators.
This Party holds, as modern political scholars hold, that
the overriding factors for unity within given territory are
(a) Community of interests (b) Economic problems and (c) The
Existence of external factors which withold or threaten the
full independence of the people in. an area. The desire of the
people of Nigeria for progress, comfort and freedom is the same
all over. The complementary nature of the resources of the
different parts of the country emphasises the need for a single
direction of economic development to benefit all the people alike.
The NEPU recognises the existence of a strict Federal
Structure . in the country today. But the Party believes that
while the size of the country necessitates the need for a measure
of decentralisation in Covernment, it considers this strict Federal
System as entirely unsuitable to the circumstances of Nigeria
and opposed to the forms of government in countries such as
Canada and India where there are diversities in the population
as there are in Nigeria.
The Party's opposition is not to a Federal Constitution as
such, but to the nature or type of the Federal Constitution
considering the examples of countries mentioned above and the
need for the tendency in the world today towards strong central
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governments.
The NEPU therefore holds that the basis of a satisfactory
constitution for Nigeria is the Quasi-Federal System as practised
in Canada until a Constituent Assembly considers a Constitution
for the country on attaining independence.
For this purpose, the Party still stands by what it pro¬
posed during both the London and Lagos Conferences of 1953/4
respectively and that is...
1. The London Conference must be preceded by a
catagorical declaration by the leaders of all
Nigerian political parties (both invited and
otherwise to the London Conference) that fear,
suspicion and hatred are not only inimical to
Nigeria's interests but that they are agreed upon
exploiting ways and means of removing them from
the midst of the Peoples of the whole territory.
2. That the great desire of the simple people of
Nigeria and their ultimate outlook transcends the
North, the West, the East and the Cameroons and
that they visualise something greater and that is
Great Nigeria.
3. Until Independence, the Police, Judiciary and
Higher Education should be Central matters.
4. Reserved Powers be in the Centre not only for
political reasons but for psychological ones.
Political, because it is easier for the Central
Authority to surrender power to the Regions than
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the other way. Psychological because feelings of
greatness exist in the minds of Nigerians today
for such powers vested in the Centre.
5. A Central Ministry for Internal Security and
Order throughout the country be created. This
is in the light of NSPU experiences since these
subjects were Regionalised.
6. Fundamental Rights be incorporated in the Nigerian
Constitution. These rights should include the
right of appeal to the highest court of the land,
the right of bail, the right for free election
and that is direct election with single member
constituencies, secret ballot and campaign with¬
out being molested, discriminated against on the
ground of party affiliatioh or religion.
FEDERAL AND REGIONAL LEGISLATURES.
There is need for increasing the number and structure of
membership of the House of Representatives. The NEPU therefore
proposes that there should be in addition to the House of Repre¬
sentatives a Senate.
The membership of the House of Representatives should be
increased to 240 and the Upper House should be represented by
three members per province throughout Nigeria.
The allowances of the members of the House of Representa¬
tives should be cut to be commeasurate with the economic condition
of Nigeria and in order to drive away as many as possible those
who participate for personal gains.
The membership of the Regional Houses should be left as
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at present so that Regional Constituencies should be larger
than the Federal Constituencies.
The post of Regional Prime Ministers should be abolished
and the heads of Regional Governments to be known as Leaders
of Government Business. The NEFU believes that with the
reduction in the functions of Regional Governments with re¬
gards to Justice, Security, Higher Education, the country will
be relieved of the burdens of paying double ministries both in
the Centre and the Regions.
SELF-GOVERNMENT AMD INDEPENDENCE.
The NEFU holds that all Nigerian Governments should be
self-governing in all matters within their jurisdiction from
1956, The Party believes that the date should be decided this
year at which Nigerians will assume full responsibility for
their external affairs and other functions of an independent
sovereign state. In all matters within the competence of the
Regional Legislatures, the Federal House should have power of
disallowance and the Powers of both Federal and Regional Legis¬
latures shall be subject to the interpretation by the Courts.
The NEPU believes that the uniformity of Electoral System
and Laws throughout Nigeria is essential for the unity and
democratic government of the country. The Party holds the view
that apart from the larger number of educated Nigerians in the
South, the majority of the people in that part are no better in
any way in deciding public education than Nigerians in the North.
The NEFU therefore believes that with the experience of India,
the Sudan, the Gold Coast and the South of Nigeria in recent
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years, ail the people of Nigeria can take part in a direct
uniform election. The Report of the British Parliamentary
Hansard Society on "Problems of Parliamentary Government in the
Colonies" supports the view that illiteracy is no longer an
impediment to the direct election. The vital problem is that
of freedom of assembly, freedom to campaign and freedom of
opposition. The NEFU strongly proposes that a Neautral Election
Commission be set up.
HOW MANY STATES ?
The TTEFU has always supported the view that states should
be smaller in size than the present Regions. It has supported
the idea because it feels that the present Regions are artifi¬
cial units and therefore it is desirable to create a feeling of
harmony, avoid the domination of one region by another and the
threat of secession. The position is more difficult with the
North than with the South. The IIEPU believes that it will be
foolish to split one region just for the sake of creating
states and it is more foolish to split the Southern Region into
Benin Delta State and the Ogoja-Calabar State and leave one
Region as an octopus. The vital questions are (l) Is it
desirable to have states in the interest of Nigerian Federation?
(2) Is it practicable? (3) By what standard should we judge?
(4) Are we in the position to asses the cause? At the present
time the demand comes from the Benin-Delta Party, the Ogoja—
Calabar people, the United Middle Belt Congress, the Bornu Youth
Movement, the North East Convention Peoples Party and the Katagum
Peoples Union as well as the Kilba State Union. To answer these
questions, the NEPU feels, the subject must be on the agenda to
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be discussed by the conference with the representatives of the
separatist movements to give evidence. But the sole determining
factor will be the Constituent Assembly after independence.
CONCLUSIONS.
The NEPU observes the effect of party politics on the
transition from dependent to sovereign states. In India, the
fact that there was only the Congress Party for many years has
given the country a stability which has enabled her to play a
leading role in world affairs and to obtain much economic support
so soon after independence. In Indonesia on the other hand, the
rivalry of many parties has resulted in instability and chaos
during nearly a decade of independence. In the Sudan, the
closing of ranks by the parties has led to the achievement of
independence sooner than would have been the case, had there been
political party strife.
In the Cold Coast, on the other hand, what has been hailed
as a great West African experiment in self government, is
threatened at its very final stage by factions in the nature of
opposing political parties and the hope of orderly transition
and early stability which will win world confidence, is being dis¬
pelled.
The lesson for Nigeria here is twofold. First, that a
period of tranquility should be found in the last stage from
1956 before complete independence to build up truly national
parties with efficient organisation. Second, that in the period,
a Federal Government of all parties, should prepare the country
for independence; and that the energies and varying talents of
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Nigerians should be collectively devoted to removing any in¬
equalities and causes of suspicion such as the effect of
migrant communities on local independence before the heavier
burdens of external affairs and defence are added to the task
of self government.
This Party believes that given the tolerance and mutual
respect and the over-riding desire of her people to build a
great nation, Nigeria can attain the status and the degree of
independence which even great India enjoys in the world today.
(Signed) Aminu Kano






Case No.l/59 of 14/l/59
Mr. Yusufu Tailor (m) Hausa Moslem of Lokoja
Vs.
Umasasan (m) Kakand Moslem of Lokoja Cantonment.
On account of insulting Sir Alhaji Ahmadu Sardauna
of Sokoto
Proceedings.
Alkali M. Yusufu, What is your complaint?
M. Yusufu I am suing him for insulting Alhaji Ahmadu Sardauna,
Premier of the Northern Region. The insulting words
used, if not because of a court case, even if in a
dream I use such words to my elder. I must pay
alms but I am bound to explain the insulting words
used to the court, and Umasasan will be responsible
for the Sin. Umasasan who is the Organizing
Secretary of the Action Group was on a table to¬
gether with his supporters when he said the
Sardauna who you call the Grandson of Shehu that you
support - his master Awolowo told him that they
were together for seven days at London with the
Sardauna without his saying his prayers and he said
to his people that the Sardauna was a pagan and
his people shouted that Sardauna is a pagan. This
was repeated twice. At the third time one N.P.C.
supporter took a stick but was prevented by Maman
Hadejia from taking it and then the lecture was
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dispensed. This happened on Friday about 6:30
p.m. On the following day which was Saturday I
took the complaint to the Mixed Court and paid the
summons fee and I was given a receipt. Then Mr.
Garba sent Alhaji Messenger to inform Umasasan that
he has been summonsed and should appear in court
on Monday. When Monday came Umasasan did not
appear. I asked Mr. Garba - Did you allow him to
go on his journey without answering the call of
the Court? He answered that he did not permit him
to go. Later on I withdrew my case to Kwara 'B'
Court. That is the reason of my complaint.
Alkali Umasasan, Do you hear his statement? Was it how
the matter went? or How?
Umasasan I heard the statement but that was not what happened.
I did not mention anybody's name, because in our
order it does not say we should mention anybody's
name, and I did not mention anybody's name.
Alkali Umasasan tell the truth. Did you not mention
_paganism during your lecture?
Umasasan I did not mention anything like that during my
lecture.
Alkali M. Yusufu. You hear? Have you anything to say to
him?
M. Yusufu I have a reply to give him, because he made the




Alkali Umasasan. Do you hear? You are denying and
H0 Yusufu said that he has witness.
Umasasan I am asking M. Yusufu where did I give my lecture
that you know?
M. Yusufu The place where you gave the lecture, it was
there Lugard Hall and that was the place you made
the insult.
Umasasan, you hear, he has told you where you gave
the lecture, is it not so?
Before we gave our lecture I obtained a permit and
apart from today I do not know anything that has
brought us together but I gave a lecture..
Alkali M. Yusufu you hear he is still denying. Have you
anything more to say?
M. Yusufu Umasasan as you are denyingi^o you agree that you
gave a lecture.
Umasasan M. Yusufu I gave a lecture but I do not know the
reason of the insult I made.
M. Yusufu Umasasan, you know about the insult you made and
for which I have summonsed you.
Alkali Umasasan, when M. Yusufu summonsed ybu before that
Mixed Court Lokoja did you answer the summons on
Monday? Did you appear?
Umasasan On Monday I did not go to the Court I did wrong.
Alkali Umasasan, how did you give your lecture that it
became so?
Umasasan I gave a lecture in the first instance by telling
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the people Action Group policy and in the second
place by criticizing N.P.C. I told the gathering
that on Thursday the N.P.C. said that A.G. are
pagans because they are following a pagan leader.
So I told the people that this is not a surprising
thing because N.P.C. made an alliance with N.C.N.C.
therefore they too are become pagans. Then I said
to the people that who calls N.P.C. pagan because
there is no connection between politics and religion,
because Shehu Usuman who distributed flags did not
know anything about political parties. Therefore
my people don't you say that Action Group is pagan
and that you should resign from it, because it is
such a time that has come, moreover the N.P.C. who
say that they have money and they are the Govern¬
ment, they say we are slaves. Will, look, I have
got up on a table, they will come to arrest me. I
am giving a lecture, I also said there are N.P.C.
everywhere but the N.P.C. in Lokoja is not good.
Also I said that in other places where there is
N.P.C. they are bringing benefit with what they do,
not so the N.P.C. in Lokoja. The reason for my
saying this is that here in Lokoja there are no
indigenous people only strangers. Because the
leader of the N.P.C. is a stranger, if he gains
in Lokoja he will take to his home town. Hence I
said N.P.C. have not a good and honest leader
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therefore they cannot get any benefit. Again
Lokoja N.P.C. and the Government are not in agree¬
ment. They are like N2FU and N.P.C. Therefore
I said to my people when you hear the N.P.C. are
calling the A.G. thieves don't you mind their
sayings, even the Awolowo Cards are being insulted
by N.P.C. and that Awolowo's are useless cards,
thief, do not follow himw I also said to my people
that N.P.C. are in the habit of calling me thief,
thief as I go along the road. Don't take any
notice because they will not do anything because
we have already overcome them. Also he will say .
that we are leaving them alone because our party
will not find trouble with them. Prom then I told
the people "Salati Goma goma da Annabi"'. Then we
prayed that God would give us plenty of money.
That is the end of my statement.
Alkali Umasasan you agree that you have explained the
lecture that you gave. The N.P.C. witness M.
Yusufu said that you insulted Alhaji Ahmadu Bello,
Sardauna of Sokoto, tell us the truth - I insulted
him or I did not insult him. You also said that
the N.P.C. are insulting A.G. and you reported the
matter to Mr. Jibrin, the Inspector who settled the
matter between you. Is it not so?















M. Yusufu. You hear; have you any question
to ask him?
I have a question to ask him. When he said he
did not mention his name, I have witnesses who
heard him mention his name.
Umasasan. You hear he has witnesses who heard
you mention his name.
I heard, let him bring his witnesses because I
did not mention his name.
Mo- Yusufu. You hear, have you any more questions?
Umasasan. My question is this — V/hat is 'Ribado'
in Arabic?
H. Yusufu, I do not know.
Umasasan I want you to distinguish between a
stranger and a native of Lokoja because you said-
we are strangers in Lokoja.
M. Yusufu, I do not know. Do you want me to go
into the market and collect them? I am a native
and you are strangers.
M. Yusufu, where are your witnesses who heard this
insult.
These; are my witnesses:
(l) M. Uman (2) Garba Gagare and (3) Sheriff Manman,
they are my witnesses who heard with their ears.
M. Uman, what do you know about the time when
Umasasan was giving a lecture? Tell us the truth
for God's sake.
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Uman I will tell the truth for God's sake. I was at
the place, Umasasan climbed on to the table and was
giving the lecture, then he said that the leader
of the N.P.C., Sardauna he heard from his leader
Obafemi Awolowo that when they were at London for
the Conference with Sardauna he never saw the
Sardauna say his prayers and they were together
for seven days. That was what he said and he
further said that in doing so he showed paganism.
That is what I heard. He also said that his people
should say Sardauna is a pagan. I heard this with
my ears.
Alkali Garba Gagare what did you hear that Umasasan said
when he was giving the lecture? Tell me the truth
for God's sake.
Garba Gagare I heard from Umasasans mouth that his leader Awolowo
said that they were together in London for seven
days and Alhaji Bello Sardauna of Sokoto N.P.C.
leader did not say his prayers. I heard so from
his mouth. He also said that his people should call
him a pagan. I heard so from Umasasan's mouth.
Alkali Umasasan do you hear what the witness said? Have
you any questions to ask him or not?
Umasasan Garba Gagare, to what party do you belong?
Garba Gagare Umasasan, I am an II.P.C. member
Alkali Sheriff Manman, what did you hear when Umasasan

















I heard Umasasan when he was giving the lecture
and said that their leader Awolowo told him. that
when they went to London they stayed for seven
days but did not see Ahmadu Bello Sardauna say his
prayers. He said to his people that they should
say the Sardauna is a pagan. His people also said
'a pagan, a pagan'.
Umasasan, have you any question to ask him?
I have a question, to which party does he belong?
Umasasan, I am in the N.P.C. party.
Umasasan, have you any question?
I have no more questions.
Have you got witnesses in this matter?
I have a witness - He is Ndace, he is my witness.
Ndace, what did you hear when Umasasan was giving
a lecture? Tell the truth for God's sake. Re¬
member that when you die you will be buried alone
and not with anybody and therefore tell the truth.
I saw Messenger gave a lecture and came down their
he Umasasan climbed up and said how should Sardauna
make alliance with the N.C.N.C. and not with Yorubas
when Yorubas have been going on the Pilgrimage.
Those Ibos who are pagans he Sardauna made an
alliance with them, he has become the same as the
pagans, I heard so from his mouth.


















Ndace, from who did you hear that Sardauna was
making an alliance with the Ibos, explain to me.
Ndace, do you hear? Have you anything to say?
M. Yusufu, I confirm I heard it from Umasasan.
Umasasan, you hear? Have you anything to say?
M„ Yusufu, you have a radio in your house, did
you not hear?
Umasasan, I did not hear so on the radio.
If he said he did not hear it, that is all.
lldace, you did not explain all the words of the
insult used by Umasasan because you are the
President of the Action Group.
That was all I heard.
(l) M. Umah (2) M. Gagare (3) Sheriff Manman
all of you can swear on the Koran that the evi¬
dence you gave was true?
(l) M. Umah (2) Garba Gagare (3) Sheriff Manman,
Yes we can swear on the Koran that, that was what
we heard from his mouth.
Ndace, can you swear on the Koran that that was
all you heard? You can swear that or what?
I will not swear because I spoke the truth.
Umasasan, did you hear the answer of your witness
Ndace. I don't see the truth in his answer.. Have
you more witnesses?
No, I have no more witnesses.
I do not prevent you calling any member of your
party to give evidence in your favour.
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Umasasan No more witness.
Judgement.
Alkali Umasasan, since you have confirmed to the Court
that you mentioned Alhaji Ahmadu Sardauna's name
and four witnesses have confirmed that you did
mention his name during the lecture M. Yusufu
is right. You yourself are educated in Arabic
(almajiri), you also know it is a major offence
for a man to get up at a lecture and mention
somebody's name and insult him, how much more
Sardauna Sokoto the leader such as Alhaji Sir
Ahmadu Bello who is leading about three quarters
of the people of this country. Had it not been
that the IT.P.O. supporters were patient and
careful to lay their complaint in the Court it
should have resulted in a fight which may lead
to loss of life as happened in Bornu and it would
not have been pleasant at all.
I will make it clear to the people that courts
do not support any political party on such act.
Anyone who allows himself to be brought before the
Court on such offence he will be severely punished.
Since this is your first offence that you have
committed on political activities the court
sentence you to six months imprisonment, in
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accordance with Moslem Law as contained in the
book 'Mudawanati* eighty lashes for Kazaf and
for insult sixty. But the Court will not beat







NEFU POEMS AND SONGS
WAKAR YAN SANA3A JOS; 25/l/54
TSARI DAGA HANNDNf MALAM GAMBO HAtfAJA
"Allahu taimaki nepu kan az-zalumai"
A:
Kaka uba bai fidda dansa ga hallaka,
In dan yace bai kama hanyar gaskiya.
Kumaga misali jaila ya saukar mana,
Aya akan kana' ana inda ya dulmaya.
Kai mai kiranin martabar kaka tsaya,
Katuna Hassan da Husseini sun riki gaskiya.
Bar takamar kakanka banga fitarkaba,
Kakanka baya yin hannu da baturiya.
Kuma bashi cewa goro ai masa jangali,
Kuma bad kawa da nasara baya shan giya.
Danwane jikan wane bata isar maka,
Allahu yace sad kana bin gaskiya.
Geinunka har sajenka bashi da martaba,
Indai yazam aikinka babu na gaskiya.
Mai daura bante in ya bayyana gaskiya,
Ya zarce mad rawanin da keson dulaaya.
Da martabar kaka ka mulkin duniya,
Awolowo waye ya bashi pirimiya.
Kad gafara sa ya isheni ku dakata,
Bana gudu sai naga goshin saniya.
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Sun raina hanyar Shehu sun bijire masa,
Basa bukatar lahira sai dukiya.
Su dal su hau buick ko su sauka a hiltasha,
Ran J anma' a ran nan suke shagalin giya.
Da yayi imani ya dubi maznn gaba,
Da sukai saxautan duniya baki daya.
Basu shuka sharran don cuci waninsu ba,
Su dai shirindasukai ataimaki zuriya.
Duk. Annabawa mursalai da sukai gaba
Sunbauta Allah suntsaya bisa gaskiya.
Jikan ma'aiki wanda ankai duniya,
Har lahira dominsu sun riki gaskiya.
Kai gaskami mai kasuwa daya dakata,
Ka tuna da Allah gara ka rage fariya.
In kaki zakai sammakon bubukuwa,
Jama'a mu tsira da shehu kaiko kasha wuya.
B:
Bana cikin N.P.C. banason Shiga,
Manyansu basa taimakon Nijeria.
Na raina jam'iyyarsu masu abin fada,
Nina tsaya ksn. NEPU tutar gaskiya.
Tutar da bata jahili bazalimi,.
Da baki da ja kore farar tatsaniya.
In banda wawa jahili da rashin shina,
Wazaibi jam'iyyar da batada gaskiya.
Wallahi ALlah zangaya naku yan'uwa,
Talakan dake N.P.C. bashi da zuciya.
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Daga dai kawali sai barori ke shxga,
Sad wanda z.aiki ubansadonkwadayin miya,
Kuia mad kuddnda kaganshx yashdga tabba,
Ya radna nasa yana bidan na baramdya.
Kune talaka uba talaka uwa haka,
Wad harda dan. Sarki kukegama jam'xyya.
Kurddnku ya rudeku kunyd abxn fada,
Don kunki bin asalinku kunbi masba gxya„
Komad kudd ko malamxnda ya karkata,
Allahu shawo kansa muyx masa fatxya.
Yau ba makd dan HEHF sad azzallmi,
Sad jahdlxn talakan dake son dulmaya.
Sad wanda -Allah yadshx bashx da hankalx,
Sad masu neman hallaka dondukxya.
Sad tajxran nan masu son bashxn tsdya,
Wad za'a basu kudi suna ta dawadnxya0
Sun manta kyauta wanda allah yad musu,
Su dad nufdnsu a basu bashx ba bdya.
Wannan kudd kwa jxsu baku gane suba,
Don Allah alhajl wane daxna dawadnxya,
Talakan dake N.P.C. kunyi abxn fada,
Gugan dake yasa dashd ayx rxjxya.
In anka samx ruwa agun shan bandashx,
Kafln jimawa saiku ganshx arirx.
Yad dan talaka ka daure gxndxn z-aliml,
Donixn a cucd ubanka har kayx darxya.
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Mu ba ruwan mu da masu son azzalimi,
Balle fa shi azzalimi wawan tsiya.
Talakanda ke N.P.C. ga sunanka nan,
Kaine gurufa kai dage ki zuriya.
Tsohonku na noma guminsa yana diga,
Wai kunfi so kuma kar aganshi da dukiya.
C:
Tsuguna katashi akwai shi anfansar kare,
Ansayi biri da kudinsagara gidanjiya.
A cikin minista goma wanda ka tarkato,
Waye talaka cikinsu nayl muku tambaya?
Daga wane sal dan wane su aka tarkata,
Kunsan abin nan nasu babu na gaskiya.
Ja ma'a hadin nanko kadan bai zsunu ba,
Tanpar adama kunu idan ansa miya.
Ko kuwa abaiwa kura amanar tinkiya,
Jama'a biri yaya zaiyi gadin gujiya.
D:
N.P.C. jaba baku son hangen gaba,
Don mujiya dai bashiso yagakurciya.
Inuwar giginya banga amfaninta ba,
Saidai na nesa ka shanta nata yasha wuya.
Maye yakan manta idan yaga an jima,
Amma uwar ya harta kaura a duniya.
Tubar muzuru banga amfaninsaba,
Wani an hanashi rawa yanayi
Mans raasaya.
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Mune nutanen nan da munka fito bidar
Yanci ya samu a tsarkake nijeriya.
Ita jam'iyyan nan NEFU ta dau anniya,.
Sai taga bayan saluiainga masha giya.
Ta dan makamai sunfi bom har bindiga,
Kun sansu ko in fadesu sune gaskiya.
Igwa da bom bai magani inta zaka,
Wake da ikon dankofewa gaskiya.
F:
Kai fankashali sha Zumami dakata,
Kwaron da bashi danasa sai kwalamar tsiya.
Kai baka noma ba fatauci ko kadan,
Kuma basana'a sai yawan faharin tsiya.
Na tabbata dan, NSPU ba zai soka,
Tanfar kudan shadda ya sauka akan miya.
Mu dIEPU mune kainuwa bisa kan ruwa,
Wawan da zai takamu shi zai dulmaya.
Ga 2-TSPU dutsi ba'a farmaka nan da nan,
In munka farma zalimi zaishawuya.
Mune tsakin tsakuwa agun azzalumai,
Kafin acimu aradu sai an sha wuya.
Kad turdimi jaki dakikin duniya,
Katon cikin wofi na cinye haramiya.
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WAKAR YATTCIN NEPTJ SAWABA
Ya Ta 'ala Jalia SarkLn Rahama;
Ga mu mun taso da halin azama;
Taimako na gunka Sarki Mai-sama;
Don mu ' san yanci da adalcin zama;
YA TA'ALA JALLA GA NIJERIYA.
Mian naafato bamu tsoron wahala;
Gafara sa duk mutum mai gafala;
Lokacin yau nainu ne ba shagala;
2a mu sau komai mu jure wahala;
YA TA*ALA JALLA GA NIJERIYA;
2a mu ture dukiya har rayuka;
Mu na yau'yan yau mazajen aiyuka;
Kan tafarki* mustakimi mun zaka;
HAGGYALAN duk masu danne talaka;
YA TA"ALA JALLA GA NIJERIYA.
2amani ya juye komai na jiya;
Mun riga moon dauki tutar zuriya;
Don mu ceto Ummun a Nijeriya;
Har mu bar suna a wannan dioniya;




Kcwace kabila a duniya ta na da abinda a ke kira "WAKAR
WADAI'TIYYA" wato wakar da a ke yinta don a nuna abinda ke
karkashin zuciyar jama'a.
A nan kasar Nijeriya muna da jam'iyyoyi da dana amma ba
mu san watta har yanzu da ta wake duddugin imaninta ba sai
NEPU.
Don haka tilas ne kowane dan JTEPU ya haddace wannan waka
ya kuma san yadda a ke rerata.
Political Secretariat
17 Sudawa Kano City.
16/11/1955.
WAKAR YANCI (Possibly Dated: 1956)
By Mo Sa' adu Zungur
A:
Komai na Arewa da bambanci,
Da al'ummomi sunfi dari.
Cinikinsu dabam aikinsu dabam,
Ilminsu dabam don ba nazari.
Cinikinsu kamar wandonsu yake,
Bujensu da bashi da alkadari.
Aikinsu kamar rawaninsu yake,
Daure-dauren banza ba nazari.
Ilminsu kamar rigarsu yake,
Ga yawa ba amfani na-gari.
458
B:
An ce ikon koraai nagun,
Sarki wai don shike da gari.
Amma Razdan, D.O. da wasunsu,
Hashawarta ne ba garari.
Kar yar banza kar yar wofi,
Suke da gari suke wadari.
Suke da wuka suke fita,
Mulkin jama'a kan garari.
Ai Sarakai kan hotan ni ne,
Na Sarautun al'ada a gari.
Razdan, D.O. dasu E'D.O.,
Suke da mabudin al'amari.
Komai suka kulla sai D.O.,
Yasa hannu kuma yai nazari.
Koda sha'anin addini ne,
In ya taba daular masu gari.
Koda sha' anin al'adane,
Balle fa siyasar yan garari.
C:
Daga yau mun dauki makamanmu,
Na kisan zalunci masu gari.
Domin nalshe ne kansakali,
Mashi kuwa all;alami na gari.
Gaski yace zaniu fito mu fada,
Ko ana dauri bar kan zakari.
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Gaslciya launinta guda dayane,
Ko a fadan. Fir'aunan garari.
Mun gane gizo na nasara bare,
ITa baransu minista yan garari.
Ya Rabbi ka fidda Arewa cikin,
Dauri tan-tan-tan mai hadari.
Yan fince dasu da nasaransu,
Sun kulla abutan masu gari„
Sun kulla abuta ba rabuwa,
Sai randa gizami yagaji gari.
D:
Masu rera jawabin alfahari:
Waitalaka talolon masu gari.
Asaka masa kurdi don garari,
Tilas yabida ya kiyayi mari.
Sarka, gigar,ankwa da mari,
Duk makamai ne nakisan garari.
Mu biya gandu mu biya sufuri,
Mu biya tikitin mota agari.
Da. kudin lasin da kudin ushuri,
Agaban Alkalin masu gari.
Da kudin tallan rumfar mazari,
Da dukkan hajja bar mundawari.
In kayiapil aikayi barin,
Kurdinka a tabkin yan garari.
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A YATJ BA I-IAKI ITBTO 5AI WAV/A 1/1/55
By Hal an Oambo Hawaja.
A:




Ka maishemu ya'ya' kamar kowa.
2. Ku dubo mutuncin kas ashenmu,
Da ilmi akwai zuriyartamu,
SHARI'AH da ke ba kamar tamu,
A yau babu girman Sarakanmu,
Su N.P.C. sun kaiwa Turawa.
5. Dasu anka tauye Sarakanmu,
Ka maishesu, sune wakilanmu,
A yau sunk! aiki da ilminmu,
SHARI1AEMU saiko aba t amu,
Da Sarki da Alkali Turawa.
4. Nasara bukatarsa dai samu,
Yadai yadaku malaman namu,
Yasa duk subar yin SHARI'AH mu,
Da Allah ya aikowa Manzonmu,
Ku san ba abinki ya Turawa.
5. Da Sarki kaza tajiran namu,
Da Alkali manyan kasashenmu,
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Nasara garara ya maishemu,
Ya turo su suma su turomu,
Su N.P.C. jagora ne wawa.
6. IJasara ya jawo magautannu,
Yace su ka jagora dominmu,
Muje za'a bude idanunmu,
Ashe lamfa ce don.su cue emu,
Mu fada a dajinda ba kowa.
7. Su cuce mu don ba idanunmu,
Suna shafa tutu a kwariyarmu,
Kuda na rufewa a binnemu,
Muce zamu gyara su karemu,
Kwadai ne ya rudeku kun wawa
8. Mu nemo mutenCin mutanenmu,
Mu koyarda ilmin iyayenmu,
Nagargajiya don ya ficcemu,
Mu zam tsarkakewa ibadanmu,
Mu bautawa Allahu maikowa.
9. Abin nan fa ya dami kowanmu,
Mu roka ga Allahu Sarkinmu,
Ya ficcemu sharrin magautanmu,
Gama NHPU saita wakilcenu,
Mu sarn martaba koga Turawa.
10. Ku dubo kasace kaman namu,
A ce bamu iko da kayanmu,
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Mazaje da ya'ya' da matanmu,
Da igiyoyi nabauta gindinmu,
A yau inuka bauta gasu wawa.
B:
Dakogi da dajida gonanmu,
Gidaje da ya'ya' da matanmu
Dawaki da shanu tumakinmu,
Kubar lasafaga maharbanmu,
Ayau bamu ikon mukar giwa.
Kaman dorina ma a tapkinmu,
Kaza rakuman nan nabajinmu,
Halas ne ga duk dan kasashenmu,
Ayau ba maharbi guda nanu,
Dazai kansu in banda Turawa.
Mutanenmu ko har Sarakannu,
Ina wanda zai harbi giwanmu,
A wanwashe nama a haulanmu,
Da haure a kai kasuwowinmu,
Haram babu sai dai ga Turawa.
Jama'a masifa ta samemu,
Na bautadda ya'y'an kasashenmu,
Da mun sari icce a kamo mu,
Aje duk a dauro iyalanmu,
Ina kwanci yar hankalin kowa.
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Idan banda K.P.C. wawanuru,
Jos, ga ci yawa a dajinmu,
Ace bamu yanka da laujermu,
Tutor sad da famet a hannumnu,
Harajin ciyawa ga Turawa.
Suna kebe daji a gonanmu,
Suce gonakin Gfwanyia kayanmu,
Da an tadda ganye a hannunmu,
Akamo inu sai anci taranmu,
Itacenmu anbaiwa TUrawa.
